One of the perennial themes in philosophy is the problem of our access to the world around us; do our perceptual systems bring us into contact with the world as it is or does perception depend upon our individual conceptual frameworks? This volume of new essays examines reference as it relates to perception, action and realism, and the questions which arise if there is no neutral perspective or independent way to know the world. The essays discuss the nature of referring, concentrating on the way perceptual reference links us with the observable world, and go on to examine the implications of theories of perceptual reference for realism and the way in which scientific theories refer and thus connect us with the world. They will be of interest to a wide range of readers in philosophy of psychology, cognitive science and action theory.
0 有用 Agilulfo 2020-02-23 15:29:10
为实在论的指称论辩护有两种途径：（1）借助各种科学资源，找到一个不会出现指称缺失或推理谬误的因果相关项；（2）咬住敌人的子弹，放弃无缪的指称实在论，但是想方设法证明那些谬误不会对某个特别领域（e.g. 视觉指示词）的指称实在论构成威胁。Ps：能打的还是那几个。
0 有用 Agilulfo 2020-02-23 15:29:10
为实在论的指称论辩护有两种途径：（1）借助各种科学资源，找到一个不会出现指称缺失或推理谬误的因果相关项；（2）咬住敌人的子弹，放弃无缪的指称实在论，但是想方设法证明那些谬误不会对某个特别领域（e.g. 视觉指示词）的指称实在论构成威胁。Ps：能打的还是那几个。