What is knowledge? Why do we want it? Is knowledge possible? How do we get it? What about other epistemic values like understanding and certainty? Why are so many epistemologists worried about luck? In ON EPISTEMOLOGY Linda Zagzebski situates epistemological questions within the broader framework of what we care about and why we care about it. Questions of value shape all of th...
What is knowledge? Why do we want it? Is knowledge possible? How do we get it? What about other epistemic values like understanding and certainty? Why are so many epistemologists worried about luck? In ON EPISTEMOLOGY Linda Zagzebski situates epistemological questions within the broader framework of what we care about and why we care about it. Questions of value shape all of the above questions and explain some significant philosophical trends: the obsession with answering the skeptic, the flight from realism, and the debate between naturalism and anti-naturalism. THE WADSWORTH PHILOSOPHICAL TOPICS SERIES (under the general editorship of Robert Talisse, Vanderbilt University) presents readers with concise, timely, and insightful introductions to a variety of traditional and contemporary philosophical subjects. With this series, students of philosophy will be able to discover the richness of philosophical inquiry across a wide array of concepts, including hallmark philosophical themes and themes typically underrepresented in mainstream philosophy publishing. Written by a distinguished list of scholars who have garnered particular recognition for their excellence in teaching, this series presents the vast sweep of today's philosophical exploration in highly accessible and affordable volumes. These books will prove valuable to philosophy teachers and their students as well as to other readers who share a general interest in philosophy.
我不确定皮浪主义者是否真的从未判定人们不应该做出判断。根据尤西比斯（ Eusebius）在《福音的准备》
（ Praeparatio evangelica）（14.18.2-5）中，皮浪的学生泰门（ Timon）说：“皮浪公然宣布，[1]事物都是中性的、不可测度的和不可仲裁的。并因此[2]既不是我们的感觉也不是我们的观念（ opinion）告诉我们真理或者谬误。因而出于这个理由，我们不应该信任他们一丁点儿，但是我们应该坚持己见，不受他人影响，坚定自己看法，对于每一个体事物而言，它与它所不是的东西一样，或者它既是也不是，或者它或者是或者不是（ saying concerning each individual thing that it no more is than is not, or it both is and is not, or it neither is nor is not）。”这里尤西比乌斯引用的是亚里斯托克利斯（ Aristocles）的话，后者则是引用泰门对皮浪的评价。很明显，这是摆脱皮浪的几个步骤。无论如何，有鉴于他们所持有的达到不动心的过程的观点，即使一些皮浪主义者陷入“判断一个人不应该做出判断”的陷阱，但很显然他们并不必然如此。在我看来，这种皮浪主义的怀疑论似乎可以被解释为一个融贯的立场。 (查看原文)
我不确定皮浪主义者是否真的从未判定人们不应该做出判断。根据尤西比斯（ Eusebius）在《福音的准备》
（ Praeparatio evangelica）（14.18.2-5）中，皮浪的学生泰门（ Timon）说：“皮浪公然宣布，[1]事物都是中性的、不可测度的和不可仲裁的。并因此[2]既不是我们的感觉也不是我们的观念（ opinion）告诉我们真理或者谬误。因而出于这个理由，我们不应该信任他们一丁点儿，但是我们应该坚持己见，不受他人影响，坚定自己看法，对于每一个体事物而言，它与它所不是的东西一样，或者它既是也不是，或者它或者是或者不是（ saying concerning each individual thing that it no more is than is not, or it both is and is not, or it neither is nor is not）。”这里尤西比乌斯引用的是亚里斯托克利斯（ Aristocles）的话，后者则是引用泰门对皮浪的评价。很明显，这是摆脱皮浪的几个步骤。无论如何，有鉴于他们所持有的达到不动心的过程的观点，即使一些皮浪主义者陷入“判断一个人不应该做出判断”的陷阱，但很显然他们并不必然如此。在我看来，这种皮浪主义的怀疑论似乎可以被解释为一个融贯的立场。 (查看原文)
书是本好书，然而译者的英语水平和哲学水平都惨不忍睹（有趣的是之前的短评居然有人夸翻译得好），严重地影响了可读性。 英语水平举例： P6：“确证恰恰指的是有必要将正确的东西辩护为确定的（justification is what is needed to defend the right to be sure）”。完全一派...
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真紅様
中国人民大学出版社2019版
0 有用 真紅様 2021-09-20 14:56:35
清晰，明快，富有力量
0 有用 真紅様 2021-09-20 14:56:35
清晰，明快，富有力量