西方哲学史（上卷）的笔记(147)
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第十章 斯宾诺莎
SPINOZA (1634-77) is the noblest and most lovable of the great philosophers, Intellectually, some others have surpassed him, but ethically he is supreme. As a natural consequence, he was considered, during his lifetime and for a century after his death, a man of appalling wickedness. He was born a Jew, but the Jews excommunicated him. Christians abhorred him equally; although his w... (更多)
(收起)SPINOZA (1634-77) is the noblest and most lovable of the great philosophers, Intellectually, some others have surpassed him, but ethically he is supreme. As a natural consequence, he was considered, during his lifetime and for a century after his death, a man of appalling wickedness. He was born a Jew, but the Jews excommunicated him. Christians abhorred him equally; although his whole philosophy is dominated by the idea of God, the orthodox accused him of atheism. Leibniz, who owed much to him, concealed his debt, and carefully abstained from saying a word in his praise; he even went so far as to lie about the extent of his personal acquaintance with the heretic Jew. 斯宾诺莎（Spinoza，1632—77）是伟大哲学家当中人格最高尚、性情最温厚可亲的。 按才智讲，有些人超越了他，但是在道德方面，他是至高无上的。 因此，他在生前和死后一个世纪以内，被看成是坏得可怕的人，这是当然的后果。 他生来是个犹太人，但是犹太人把他驱逐出教。 基督教徒对他同样恨之入骨； 尽管他的全部哲学贯彻着“神”这个观念，正统信徒仍旧斥责他讲无神论。 莱布尼兹受到他很多益处，却对这一点讳莫如深，小心避免说一句称颂斯宾诺莎的话； 关于他跟这位异端犹太人私交的深浅，他甚而竟至于扯谎。 The life of Spinoza was very simple. His family had come to Holland from Spain, or perhaps Portugal, to escape the Inquisition. He himself was educated in Jewish learning, but found it impossible to remain orthodox. He was offered 1000 florins a year to conceal his doubts; when he refused, an attempt was made to assassinate him; when this failed, he was cursed with all the curses in Deuteronomy and with the curse that Elisha pronounced on the children who, in consequence, were torn to pieces by the she-bears. But no she-bears attacked Spinoza. He lived quietly, first at Amsterdam and then at the Hague, making his living by polishing lenses. His wants were few and simple, and he showed throughout his life a rare indifference to money. The few who knew him loved him, even if they disapproved of his principles. The Dutch Government, with its usual liberalism, tolerated his opinions on theological matters, though at one time he was in bad odour politically because he sided with the De Witts against the House of Orange. At the early age of forty-three he died of phthisis. 斯宾诺莎的生气很单纯。 他一家是原先为逃避异端审判所，从西班牙（也许从葡萄牙）到荷兰去的。 他本身受了犹太教学问的教育，但是觉得正统信仰再无法守下去。 有人愿每年给他一千弗罗林，求他隐匿住自己的怀疑； 等他一回绝，又图谋杀害他； 谋杀失败了，这时候斯宾诺莎便受人用《申命记》中的样样诅咒咒骂个遍， 更用以利沙对小孩们发的诅咒咒骂； 那些小孩子结果被母熊撕裂了，可是并没有母熊侵袭斯宾诺莎。 他先在阿姆斯特丹、后来在海牙度着平静的日子，靠磨镜片维持生活。 他的物质欲望简单而不多，一生当中对金钱表现出一种希有的淡漠。 少数认得他的人，纵或不赞成他的信念，也都爱戴他。 荷兰政府素常有自由主义精神，对他关于神学问题的意见抱宽容态度； 只不过有一度他因为站在德威特家方面反对奥伦治公族，在政治上声誉不佳。 他在四十四岁的壮年因为肺痨病死去。 His chief work, the Ethics, was published posthumously. Before considering it, a few words must be said about two of his other books, the Tractatus Theolbgico-Politicu* and the Tractatus Politicu*. The former is a curious combination of biblical criticism and political theory; the latter deals with political theory only. In biblical criticism Spinoza partially anticipates modern view*, particularly in assigning much later dates to various books of the Old Testament than those assigned by tradition. He endeavours throughout to show that the Scriptures can be interpreted so as to be compatible with a liberal theology. 他的主要著作《伦理学》（Ethics）是死后出版的。 未讨论这书以前，必须先就他的其它两部作品—— 《神学政治论》（TractatusTheologico－Politicus）和 《政治论》（TractaA tusPoliticus）略说几句。 前书是圣经批评与政治理论的一个奇妙融会；后一本书只讲政治理论。 在圣经批评方面，特别在给《旧约》各卷所定的写定时期 比传统说法定的时期远为靠后这一点上，斯宾诺莎开了一部分现代意见的先河。 他始终努力想证明圣经能够解释得和有宽宏开明精神的神学相容。 Spinoza's political theory is, in the main, derived from Hobbes, in spite of the enormous temperamental difference between the two men. He holds that in a state of nature there is no right or wrong, for wrong consists in disobeying the law. He holds that the sovereign can do no wrong, and agrees with Hobbes that the Church should be entirely subordinate to the State. He is opposed to all rebellion, even against a bad government, and instances the troubles in England as a proof of the harm that comes of forcible resistance to authority. But he disagrees with Hobbes in thinking democracy the "most natural" form of government. He disagrees also in holding that subjects should not sacrifice all their rights to the sovereign. In particular, he holds freedom of opinion important. I do not quite know how he reconciles this with the opinion that religious questions should be decided by the State. I think when he says this he means that they should be decided by the State rather than the Church; in Holland the State was much more tolerant than the Church. 尽管斯宾诺莎与霍布士两人在气质方面有天地般的悬殊， 斯宾诺莎的政治学说大致讲和霍布士一脉相承。 他认为在自然状态下无“是”也无“非”，因为所谓“非”便是说违反法律。 他认为主权者无过；教会应当完全从属于国家，在这点上他跟霍布士意见一致。 斯宾诺莎反对一切叛乱，哪怕是反抗坏政府的叛乱也罢； 他举出英国的种种苦难为例，当作暴力抗击威权而产生的弊害的证据。 但是他把民主制看成是“最自然的”政体，这与霍布士的意见相左。 斯宾诺莎还有一个地方与霍布士有分歧：他认为臣民不应当为主权者牺牲·所·有权利。 特别是，他认为意见上的自由很要紧。 我不十分懂得，他把这点与宗教问题应由国家裁决这个意见怎样调和起来。 依我想，他讲应由国家裁决， 意思是说宗教问题不应当由教会决断，该由国家决断； 在荷兰，国家比教会宽容得多。 Spinoza's Ethics deals with three distinct matters. It begins with metaphysics; it then goes on to the psychology of the passions and the will ; and finally it sets forth an ethic based on the preceding metaphysics and psychology. The metaphysic is a modification of Descartes, the psychology is reminiscent of Hobbes, hut the ethic is original, and is what is of most value in the book. The relation of Spinoza to Descartes is in some ways not unlike the relation of Plotinus to Plato. Descartes was a many-sided man, full of intellectual curiosity, but not much burdened with moral earnestness. Although he invented "proofs intended to support orthodox beliefs, he could have been used by sceptics as Carneades used Plato. Spinoza, although he was not without scientific interests, and even wrote a treatise on the rainbow, was in the main concerned with religion and virtue. He accepted from Descartes and his contemporaries a materialistic and deterministic physics, and sought, within this fraifiework, to find room for reverence and a life devoted to the Good. His attempt was magnificent, and rouses admiration even in those who do not think it successful. 斯宾诺莎的《伦理学》讨论三个不同主题。 它先从形而上学讲起， 再转论各种炽情和意志的心理学， 最后阐述一种以前面的形而上学和心理学作基础的伦理观。 形而上学是笛卡尔哲学的变体，心理学也带霍布士遗风， 但是伦理观独创一格，是书中最有价值的地方。 斯宾诺莎对笛卡尔的关系，和普罗提诺对柏拉图的关系在某些点上颇相似。 笛卡尔是一个多方面的人，满怀求知的好奇心，但是没有很大的道德热忱。 他虽然创造了一些企图支持正统信仰的“证明”， 但是正好像卡尔内亚德利用柏拉图，他也未尝不可被怀疑论者利用。 斯宾诺莎固然不乏对科学的兴趣，甚至还写过一个关于虹的论著， 但是他主要关心宗教和道德问题。 他从笛卡尔及其同时代一些人接受了一套唯物主义的和决定论的物理学， 在这个框架以内，努力给虔诚心念和献身于“善”的生活找一席之地。 这真是件宏伟的壮举，甚至在认为它没有成功的人们中间也引起钦佩。 The metaphysical system of Spinoza is of the type inaugurated by Parmenides. There is only one substance, "God or Nature"; nothing finite is self-subsistent. Descartes admitted three substances, God and mind and matter; it is true that, even for him, God was, in a sense, more substantial than mind and matter, since He had created them, and could, if He chose, annihilate them. But except in relation to God's omnipotence, mind and matter were two independent substances, defined, respectively, by the attributes of thought and extension. Spinoza would have none of this. For him, thought and extension were both attributes of God. God has also an infinite number of other attributes, since He must be in every respect infinite; but these others are unknown to us. Individual souls and separate pieces of matter are, for Spinoza, adjectival ; they are not things, but merely aspects of the divine Being. There can be no such personal immortality as Christians believe in, but only that impersonal sort that consists in becoming more and more one with God. Finite things are defined by their boundaries, physical or logical, that is to say, by what they are not: "all determination is negation " There can be only one Being who is wholly positive, and He must be absolutely infinite. Hence Spinoza is led to a complete and undiluted pantheism. 斯宾诺莎的形而上学体系是巴门尼德所创始的那样类型的体系。 实体只有一个，就是“神即自然”；任何有限事物不独立自存。 笛卡尔承认有神、精神、和物质三个实体； 固然，甚至依他讲，神在某个意义上也比精神和物质更称得起实体； 因为神是创造精神和物质的，要想毁灭它们就能把它们毁灭。 但是除开对神的全能的关系之外，精神和物质是两个独立实体， 分别由思维和广延性这两种属性限定。 斯宾诺莎绝不同意这种看法。 在他看来，思维和广延性全是神的属性。 神还具有无限个其它属性，因为神必定处处都是无限的； 然而这些旁的属性我们不明了。 个别灵魂和单块物质在斯宾诺莎看来是形容词性的东西； 这些并非·实·在，不过是“神在”的一些相。 基督教徒信仰的那种个人永生决无其事， 只能够有越来越与神合一这种意义的非个人永生。 有限事物由其物理上、或逻辑上的境界限定， 换句话说，由它·非某某东西限定：“一切确定皆否定。” 完全肯定性的“存在者”（神）只能有一个，它必定绝对无限。 于是斯宾诺莎便进入了十足不冲淡的泛神论。 Everything, according to Spinoza, is ruled by an absolute logical necessity. There is no such thing as free will in the mental sphere or chance in the physical world. Everything that happens is a manifestation of God's inscrutable nature, and it is logically impossible that events should be other than they are. This leads to difficulties in regard to sin, which critics were not slow to point out. One of them, observing that, according to Spinoza, everything is decreed by God and is therefore good, asks indignantly: Was it good that Nero should kill his mother? Was it good that Adam ate the apple? Spinoza answers that what was positive in these acts was good, and only what was negative was bad; but negation exists only from the point of view of finite creatures. In God, who alone is completely real, there is no negation, and therefore the evil in what to us seem sins does not exist when they are viewed as parts of the whole. This doctrine, thought in one form or another, it has been held by most mystics, cannot, obviously, be reconciled with the orthodox doctrine of sin and damnation. It is bound up with Spinoza's complete rejection of free will. Although not at all polemical, Spinoza was too honest to conceal his opinions, however shocking to contemporaries; the abhorrence of his teaching is therefore not surprising. 按斯宾诺莎的意见，一切事物都受着一种绝对的逻辑必然性支配。 在精神领域中既没有所谓自由意志，在物质界也没有什么偶然。 凡发生的事俱是神的不可思议的本性的显现， 所以各种事件照逻辑讲就不可能异于现实状况。 这说法在罪恶问题上惹起一些困难，让批评者们毫不迟疑地指点出来。 有一位批评者说，按照斯宾诺莎讲，万事皆由神定，因而全是善的， 那么，他愤愤地问，尼罗竟然杀死母亲，这难道也善吗？ 莫非说亚当吃了苹果也叫善？ 斯宾诺莎回答，这两件行为里肯定性的地方是善的，只有否定性的地方恶； 可是只有从有限创造物的眼光来看，才存在所谓否定。 唯独神完全实在，在神讲，没有否定； 因此我们觉得是罪的事，当作整体的部分去看它，其中的恶并不存在。 这个学说固然大多数神秘论者曾经以各种不同形式主张过， 很明显和正统教义的罪业降罚说无法取得调和。 它和斯宾诺莎完全否认自由意志有密切关联。 斯宾诺莎尽管丝毫不爱争论，但是他秉性诚实， 自己的意见无论当时代的人觉得多么荒谬骇人，他也不隐讳， 所以他的学说受人憎恨原是不足怪的。 The Ethic* is set forth in the style of Euclid, with definitions, axioms, and theorems; everything after the axioms is supposed to be rigorously demonstrated by deductive argument. This makes him difficult reading. A modern student, who cannot suppose that there are rigorous "proofs** of such things as he professes to establish, is bound to grow impatient with the detail of the demonstrations, which is, in fact, not worth masterin . It is enough to read the enunciations of the propositions, and to study the scholia, which contain much of what is best in the Ethics. But it would show a lack of understanding to blame Spinoza for his geometrical method. It was of the essence of his system, ethically as well as metaphysically, to maintain that everything could be demonstrated, and it was therefore essential to produce demonstrations. We cannot accept his method, but that is because we cannot accept his metaphysic. We cannot believe that the interconnections of the parts of the universe are logical, because we hold that scientific laws are to be discovered by observation, not by reasoning alone. But for Spinoza the geometrical method was necessary, and was bound up with the most essential parts of his doctrine. 《伦理学》这本书里的讲法仿照几何学的体例，有定义、有公理、有定理； 公理后面的一切都认为由演绎论证作了严格的证明。 因此他的这本书也就难读了。 现代一个作学问的人，不能设想他声称要确立的那些东西会有严格“证明”， 对证明的细节势必感觉不耐烦，事实上这种细节也不值得掌握。 读一读各命题的叙述，再研究一下评注就够了，评注中含有《伦理学》的不少精萃。 但是假若怪斯宾诺莎用几何方法，那也表明缺乏认识。 主张一切事情全可能证明，这是斯宾诺莎哲学体系的精髓命脉， 不仅在形而上学上如此，在伦理学上也一样；所以证明万不可不提。 ·我·们不能接受他的方法，那是因为我们无法接受他的形而上学。 我们不能相信宇宙各部分的相互联系是·逻·辑·的联系， 因为我们认为科学法则要靠观察来发现，仅仗推理是不成的。 但在斯宾诺莎讲，几何方法非用不可，而且和他的学说中最根本的部分是血肉相连的。 I come now to Spinoza's theory of the emotions. This comes after a metaphysical discussion of the nature and origin of the mind, which leads up to the astonishing proposition that "the human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God." But the passions, which are discussed in the Third Book of the Ethics, distract us and obscure our intellectual vision of the whole. "Everything," we are told, "in so far as it is in itself, endeavours to persevere in its own being. " Hence arise love and hate and strife. The psychology of Book III is entirely egoistic. "He who conceives that the object of his hate is destroyed will feel pleasure." "If we conceive that anyone takes delight in something, which only one person can possess, we shall endeavour to bring it about, that the man in question shall not gain possession thereof." But even in this Book there are moments when Spinoza abandons the appearance of mathematically demonstrated cynicism, as when he says: "Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love." Self-preservation is the fundamental motive of the passions, according to Spinoza; but self-preservation alters its character when we realize that what is real and positive in us is what unites us to the whole, and not what preserves the appearance of separateness. 现在来讲斯宾诺莎的情感理论。 这一部分放在关于精神的本性与起源的形而上学讨论后面， 这个讨论到后来推出“人的精神对神的永恒无限的本质有适当认识”这个可惊的命题。 但是《伦理学》第三卷中讲的那种种炽情惑乱了我们的心， 蒙蔽住我们对整体的理智识见。 据他讲，“各物只要它是自在的，都努力保持自己的存在。” 因此起了爱、憎和纷争。 第三卷里讲述的心理学完全是利己主义的心理学。 “凡设想自己的憎恶对象遭毁坏者，会感觉愉快。” “我们若设想有谁享受某物，而此物仅只一人能够占有， 我们会努力使这人不能获有此物。” 但是就在这一卷中，也有些时候斯宾诺莎抛掉数学论证化的犬儒态度外貌，道出这样的话： “憎受到憎回报则增强，但反之能够被爱打消。” 按斯宾诺莎的意见，“自我保全”是各种炽情的根本动机； 但是我们自身当中的实在、肯定性的东西，乃是把我们与整体统合起来的东西， 并不是保全外表分离状态的东西， 我们一体会到这一点，自我保全就改变性质。 The last two books of the Ethics, entitled respectively "Of human bondage, or the strength of the emotions" and "Of the power of the understanding, or of human freedom," are the most interesting. We are in bondage in proportion as what happens to us is determined by outside causes, and we are free in proportion as we are self-determined. Spinoza, like Socrates and Plato, believes that all wrong action is due to intellectual error: the man who adequately understands his own circumstances will act wisely, and will even be happy in the face of what to another would be misfortune. He makes no appeal to unselfishness; he holds that self-seeking, in some sense, and more particularly selfpreservation, govern all human behaviour. "No virtue can be conceived as prior to this endeavour to preserve one's own being." But his conception of what a wise man will choose as the goal of his self-seeking is different from that of the ordinary egoist: "The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God." Emotions are called "passions" when they spring from inadequate ideas; passions in different men may conflict, but men who live in obedience to reason will agree together. Pleasure in itself is good, but hope and fear are bad, and so are humility and repentance: "he who repents of an action is doubly wretched or infirm." Spinoza regards time as unreal, and therefore all emotions which have to do essentially with an event as future or as past are contrary to reason. "In so far as the mind conceives a thing under the dictate of reason, it is affected equally, whether the idea be of a thing present, past, or future. " 《伦理学》最末两卷分别题为 《论人的奴役或情感的力量》和 《论理智的力量或人的自由》，最有趣味。 我们所遭的事在多大程度上由外界原因决定，我们相应地受到多大程度的奴役； 我们有几分自决，便有几分自由。 斯宾诺莎和苏格拉底、柏拉图一样， 相信一切不正当行为起因于知识上的错误： 适当认识个人环境的人，他的行动作风就英明得当， 遇到对旁人来说算是不幸的事，他甚至仍会快乐。 斯宾诺莎不讲忘我无私； 他认为在某个意义上“自利”，特别说“自我保全”，主宰着人的一切行为。 “任何一种德性，我们不能设想它先于这种保持自己存在的努力。” 但是贤达的人会选择什么当作自利的目标，他的想法与一般利己主义者的想法是不同的： “精神的最高的善是关于神的知识，精神的最高德性是认识神。” 情感若是由不适当的观念产生的，叫“炽情”； 不同人的炽情可能冲突，但是遵从理性过生活的人们会协和共处。 快乐本身是善的， 但是希望和恐惧是恶的，谦卑和懊悔也是恶的： “凡追悔某个行为者，双重地悲惨或软弱。” 斯宾诺莎把时间看成非实在的东西， 所以他认为 与已成过去或尚未到来的事件有着本质关联的一切情感 都违反理性。 “只要精神在理性的指示下理解事物 无论那观念是现在事物、过去事物、或未来事物的观念， 精神有同等感动。” This is a hard saying, but it is of the essence of Spinoza's system, and we shall do well to dwell upon it for a moment. In popular estimation, "all's well that ends well"; if the universe is gradually improving, we think better of it than if it is gradually deteriorating, even if the sum of good and evil be the same in the two cases. We are more concerned about a disaster in our own time than in the time of Genghis Khan. According to Spinoza, this is irrational. Whatever happens is part of the eternal timeless world as God sees it; to Him, the date is irrelevant. The wise man, so far as human finitude allows, endeavours to see the world as God sees it, sub specie æternitatis, under the aspect of eternity. But, you may retort, we are surely right in being more concerned about future misfortunes, which may possibly be averted, than about past calamities about which we can do nothing. To this argument Spinoza's determinism supplies the answer. Only ignorance makes us think that we can alter the future; what will be will be, and the future is as unalterably fixed as the past. That is why hope and fear are condemned: both depend upon viewing the future as uncertain, and therefore spring from lack of wisdom. 这是一句严酷的话，却正是斯宾诺莎哲学体系的本质所在， 宜暂且细讲一讲。 按照一般人的意见，“结局好的全叫好”； 宇宙假如渐渐转佳，我们认为强似逐步恶化， 即便这两种情况中的善恶总和相等。 我们对现时的灾祸比对成吉斯汗时代的灾祸更加关心。 依斯宾诺莎说这不合理。 凡发生的事情任何一件，正如同神所看到的， 是永恒的超时间世界的一部分； 对神来讲，年月日期毫无关系。 贤达者在人类的有限性容许的限度以内， 努力照神的看法， SubspecieBternitatis （在永恒的相下）看世界。 你也许要反驳说，我们对未来的不幸比对过去的灾祸多关心， 这样做肯定是不错的， 因为未来的不幸或许还有可能避免， 而过去的灾祸，我们已无能为力。 对这套道理，斯宾诺莎的决定论给出回答。 我们皆因无知，才以为我们能够改变未来； 要发生的事总要发生，未来像过去一样定不可移。 “希望”和“恐惧”所以受谴责，正为这个理由： 二者都依靠把未来看得不确实，所以都是因为缺乏智慧而产生的。 When we acquire, in so far as we can, a vision of the world which is analogous to God's, we see everything as part of the whole, and as necessary to the goodness of the whole. Therefore "the knowledge of evil is an inadequate knowledge." God has no knowledge of evil, because there is no evil to be known; the appearance of evil only arises through regarding parts of the universe as if they were self-subsistent. 我们如果尽个人的能力所及，得到与神的世界象类似的世界象， 这时我们便把一切事物当成整体的部分、当成对整体的善来讲不可缺少，这样来看。 所以说“关于恶的知识是不适当的知识。” 神没有关于恶的知识，原因是无恶可知； 只由于把宇宙各部分看得好像真独立自存， 结果才生出恶的假象。 Spinoza's outlook is intended to liberate men from the tyranny of fear. "A free man thinks of nothing less than of death; and his wisdom is a meditation not of death, but of life." Spinoza lived up to this precept very completely. On the last day of his life he was entirely calm, not exalted, like Socrates in the Phaedo, but conversing, as he would on any other day, about matters of interest to his interlocutor. Unlike some other philosophers, he not only believed his own doctrines, but practised them; I do not know of any occasion, in spite of great provocation, in which he was betrayed into the kind of heat or anger that his ethic condemned: In controversy he was courteous and reasonable, never denouncing, but doing his utmost to persuade. 斯宾诺莎的世界观意在把人从恐惧的压制下解放出来。 “自由人最少想到死； 所以他的智慧不是关于死的默念而是关于生的沉思。” 斯宾诺莎的为人极彻底实践这句箴言。 他在生活的最末一天，完全保持镇静， 不像《斐多篇》里写的苏格拉底那样情绪激亢， 却如同在任何旁的日子，照常叙谈他的对谈者感兴趣的问题。 斯宾诺莎和其他一些哲学家不同， 他不仅相信自己的学说，也实践他的学说； 我没听说他有哪一次，尽管遇上非常惹人生气的事， 曾陷入自己的伦理观所谴责的那种激愤和恼怒里。 在与人争论当中，他谦和明理，决不进行非难， 但是竭尽全力来说服对方。 In so far as what happens to us springs from ourselves, it is good ; only what comes from without is bad for us. "As all things whereof a man is the efficient cause are necessarily good, no evil can befall a man except through external causes." Obviously, therefore, nothing bad can happen to the universe as a whole, since it is not subject to external causes. "We are a part of universal nature, and we follow her order. If we have a clear and distinct understanding of this, that part of our nature which is defined by intelligence, in other words the better part of ourselves, will assuredly acquiesce in what befalls us, and in such acquiescence will endeavour to persist." In so far as a man is an unwilling part of a larger whole, he is in bondage; but in so far as, through the understanding, he has grasped the sole reality of the whole, he is free. The implications of this doctrine are developed in the last Book of the Ethics*. 我们所遭遇的事只要是由我们自身产生的，就是善的； 只有从外界来的事，对我们讲才恶。 “因为一切事情凡其致效因是人的，必然是善的， 所以除非通过外界原因，否则恶不能降临于人。” 所以很明显，宇宙整体遭不到任何恶事，因为它不受外界原因的作用。 “我们是万有自然的一部分，所以我们遵从自然的理法。 如果我们对这点有清晰、判然的理解， 我们的本性中由理智限定的那一部分， 换句话说即我们自身当中较良好的部分，必定会默受临头的事， 并且努力坚守此种默受。” 人只要不由本愿地是大整体的一部分，就受着奴役； 但是只要人借理解力把握了整体的唯一实在，人即自由。 《伦理学》的最末一卷发挥这个学说的种种内在含义。 Spinoza does not, like the Stoics, object to all* emotions; he objects only to those that are "passions," i.e. those in which we appear to ourselves to be passive in the power of outside forces. "An emotion which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it." Understanding that all things are necessary helps the mind to acquire power over the emotions. "He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions, loves God, and so much the more as he more understands himself and his emotions. " This proposition introduces us to the "intellectual love of God." in which wisdom consists. The intellectual love of God is a union of thought and emotion : it consists, I think one may say, in true thought combined with joy in the apprehension of truth. All joy in true thought is part of the intellectual love of God, for it contains nothing negative, and is therefore truly part of the whole, not only apparently, as are fragmentary things so separated in thought as to appear bad. 斯宾诺莎并不像斯多葛派，反对·所·有·的情感； 他只反对“炽情”这种情感， 也就是让我们自己显得在外界力量之下处于被动状态的那些情感。 “某个情感是炽情，我们对它一形成清晰、判然的观念，就不再是炽情。” 理解一切事物都是必然的，这可以帮助精神得到控制情感的力量。 “凡清晰、判然地理解自己和自己的情感者，爱神； 愈理解自己和自己的情感，愈爱神。” 由这个命题，我们初次接触到“对神的理智爱”，所谓智慧便是这种爱。 对神的理智爱是思维与情感的合一：我认为不妨说，就是真思维结合把握真理时的欢悦。 真思维中的一切欢悦都是对神的理智爱的一部分，因为它丝毫不含否定的东西， 所以真正是整体的一部分，不像那种在思维中彼此分离以致显得恶的片断事物， 仅在外表上是整体的一部分。 I said a moment ago that the intellectual love of God involves joy, but perhaps this was a mistake, for Spinoza says that God is not affected by any emotion of pleasure or pain, and also says that "the intellectual love of the mind towards God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself." I think, nevertheless, that there is something in "intellectual love* " which is not mere intellect; perhaps the joy involved is considered as something superior to pleasure. 我方才说对神的理智爱包含欢悦，但这也许是个误解， 因为斯宾诺莎说神不为快乐或痛苦任何情感所动， 而且又说“精神对神的理智爱即神对自己的无限爱的一部分。” 可是我仍旧觉得“理智·爱”中总有某种东西不纯然是理智； 也许哲学中的欢悦被看成是什么比快乐高超的事情。 "Love towards God," we are told, "must hold the chief place in the mind." I have omitted Spinoza's demonstrations, but in so doing I have given an incomplete picture of his thought. As the proof of the above proposition is short, I will quote it in full; the reader can then in imagination supply proofs to other propositions. The proof of the above proposition is as follows : 据他说，“对神的爱必定占精神的首要地位。” 到此为止，我把斯宾诺莎的证明都略去了， 但这一来对他的思想我描述得就不够完整。 因为上述命题的证明很短，我现在全部照引下来； 读者然后可以想像着对其它命题补出证明。 上述命题的证明如下： "For this love is associated with all the modifications of the body (V, 14) and is fostered by them all (V, 1 5) ; therefore ( V 1 1 ) it must hold the chief place in the mind. Q.E.D ' “因为这种爱（据卷五，命题十四）与身体的一切感触相联系， 并且（据卷五，命题十五）受所有这些感触培养； 所以（据卷五，命题十一）它必定占精神的首要地位。 Q．E．D。 ” Of the propositions referred to in the above proof, V, 14 states: "The mind can bring it about, that all bodily modifications or images of things may be referred to the idea of God"; V, 15, quoted above, states: "He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and so much the more in proportion as he understands himself and his emotions"; V, 11 states: "In proportion as a mental image is referred to more objects, so is it more frequent, or more often vivid, and occupies the mind more. " 在以上的证明中提到的几个命题：卷五，命题十四说： “精神能使得身体的一切感触或事物的意象和神的观念相关联”； 卷五，命题十五前面引征过了， 即“凡清晰、判然地理解自己和自己的情感者，爱神； 愈理解自己和自己的情感，愈爱神”； 卷五，命题十一说 “意象所关联的对象愈多，它就愈频繁出现，或愈经常活现， 并且愈多占据精神。” The "proof" quoted above might be expressed as follows: Every increase in the understanding of what happens to us consists in referring events to the idea of God, since, in truth, everything is part of God. This understanding of everything as part of God is love of God, When all objects are referred to God, the idea of God will fully occupy the mind. 上面引的“证明”或不妨这样来讲： 对我们所遭遇的事每增加一分理解，都在乎把事件和神的观念关联起来， 因为实际上一切事物都是神的一部分。 把一切事物当作神的一部分这样理解，·就·是对神的爱。 等到·所·有·的对象和神关联起来，神的观念便充分占据精神。 Thus the statement that "love of God must hold the chief place in the mind" is not a primarily moral exhortation, but an account of what must inevitably happen as we acquire understanding. 可见“对神的爱必定占精神的首要地位”这句话， 从根本讲并不是一句道德上的劝善话； 这话说明随着我们获得理解，不可避免地定要发生的事。 We are told that no one can hate God, but, on the other hand, "he who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return. " Goethe, who admired Spinoza without even beginning to understand him, thought this proposition an instance of selfabnegation. It is nothing of the sort, but a logical consequence of Spinoza's metaphysic. He does not say that a man ought* not to want God to love him; he says that a man who loves God cannot* want God to love him. This is made plain by the proof, which says: "For, if a man should so endeavour, he would desire (V, 17, Corol.) that God, whom he loves, should not be God, and consequently he would desire to feel pain (III, 19), which is absurd (III, 28)." V, 17 is the proposition already referred to, which says that God has no passions or pleasures or pains; the corollary referred to above deduces that God loves and hates no one. Here again what is involved is not an ethical precept, but a logical necessity: a man who loved God and wished God to love him would be wishing to feel pain, "which is absurd." 据他讲，谁也不会憎恶神，但在另一方面，“爱神者不会努力让神回爱他。” 歌德对斯宾诺莎甚至还谈不上开始了解就崇仰斯宾诺莎， 他把这个命题当成是克己自制的一例。 这命题决非什么克己自制，乃是斯宾诺莎的形而上学的逻辑结论。 他没说人不·应·当希求神爱他；他说爱神的人·不·会希求神爱他。 这从证明来看很明白；证明说： “因为假令有人这样努力，那么（据卷五，命题十七，系理） 就是说此人欲他所爱的神不是神， 因此（据卷三，命题十九）即是说他欲感受痛苦， （据卷三，命题二十八）这不合道理。” 卷五命题十七是已经提过的那个命题，它说神没有炽情、快乐或痛苦； 上面引的系理推断神对谁也不爱、也不憎。 在这里，其中的含义又不是道德教训，而是逻辑必然性： 谁爱神又希图神爱他，他就是希图感受痛苦，“这不合道理。” The statement that God can love no one should not be considered to contradict the statement that God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love. He may love Himself, since that is possible without false belief; and in any case intellectual love is a very special kind of love. 神不会爱任何人这句话，不可当成与神用无限理智爱爱自己这话有矛盾。 神可以爱自己，因为这件事办得到，不涉及错误信念； 再说，无论如何，理智爱究竟是极特殊的一种爱。 At this point Spinoza tells us that he has now given us "all the remedies against the emotions." The great remedy is clear and distinct ideas as to the nature of the emotions and their relation to external causes. There is a further advantage in love of God as compared to love of human beings: "Spiritual unhealthiness and misfortunes can generally be traced to excessive love of something which is subject to many variations." But clear and distinct knowledge "begets a love towards a thing immutable and eternal," and such love has not the turbulent and disquieting character of love for an object which is transient and changeable. 讲到这里，斯宾诺莎告诉我们，他现在给我们指出了“矫治各种情感的全部方剂。” 主方剂是关于情感的本性及情感和外界原因的关系的清晰、判然的观念。 对神的爱和对人的爱相比，更有一利： “精神上的不健康与不幸，一般能够追溯到过分地爱某种难免多起变化的东西。” 但是清晰、判然的知识“产生对永恒不变的事物的爱”， 这种爱不带有对变化无常的对象的爱所具有的这种激荡烦扰的性质。 Although personal survival after death is an illusion, there is nevertheless something in the human mind that is eternal. The mind can only imagine or remember while the body endures, but there is in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under the form of eternity, and this idea is the eternal part of the mind. The intellectual love of God, when experienced by an individual, is contained in this eternal part of the mind. 固然死后人格残存这事情是妄念，但人的精神中仍旧有某种东西永恒不灭。 精神只有当肉体存在时才能够想像什么、记忆什么， 但是在神内有一个观念将这个或那个人体的本质在永恒的形式下表现出来， 这观念便是精神的永恒部分。 对神的理智爱被个人体验到时，它就含在精神的这个永恒部分中。 Blessedness, which consists of love towards God, is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself; we do not rejoice in it because we control our lusts, but we control our lusts because we rejoice in it. 福祉由对神的理智爱而成，它并不是对德性的报偿，而是德性本身； 不因为我们克制情欲，所以我们享有福祉， 倒因为我们享有福祉，我们才克制住情欲。 The Ethics ends with these words: "The wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but being conscious of himself, and of God, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible, if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labour be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected ? But all excellent things are as difficult as they are rare." 《伦理学》用这些话结尾： “贤达者，只要他被认为是贤达者，其灵魂绝少扰动， 他却按照某种永恒的必然性知自身、知神、知物，决不停止存在， 而永远保持灵魂的真正恬然自足。 我所指出的达成这种结果的道路，即使看起来万分艰难，然而总是可以发现的道路。 既然这条道路很少为人找到，它确实艰难无疑。 假若拯救之事近在手边，不费许多劳力可以求得，如何会几乎被所有人等闲忽略？ 不过一切高贵的事都是既希有同样也是艰难的。” In forming a critical estimate of Spinoza's importance as a philosopher, it is necessary to distinguish his ethics from his metaphysics, and to consider how much of the former can survive the rejection of the latter. 给斯宾诺莎这位哲学家的地位作批评的估价， 必须把他的伦理学和他的形而上学区分开， 研究一下摈弃了后者，前者还有多少东西可以保存下来。 Spinoza's metaphysic is the best example of what may be called "logical monism" -- the doctrine, namely, that the world as a whole is a single substance, none of whose parts are logically capable of existing alone. The ultimate basis for this view is the belief that every proposition has a single subject and a single predicate, which leads us to the conclusion that relations and plurality must be illusory. Spinoza thought that the nature of the world and of human life could be logically deduced from selfevident axioms; we ought to be as resigned to events as to the fact that 2 and 2 are 4, since they are equally the outcome of logical necessity. The whole of this metaphysic is impossible to accept; it is incompatible with modern logic and with scientific method. Facts have to be discovered by observation, not by reasoning; when we successfully infer the future, we do so by means of principles which are not logically necessary, but are suggested by empirical data. And the concept of substance, upon which Spinoza relies, is one which neither science nor philosophy can nowadays accept. 斯宾诺莎的形而上学是所谓“逻辑一元论”的最好实例； “逻辑一元论”即主张宇宙整体是单一实体， 它的任何部分按逻辑讲不能独自存在， 这样一种理论。 此种见解最后依据的信念是， 一切命题有一个单独的主语和一个单独的谓语， 由这我们得出结论：“关系”和“复多”必定是架空不实在的。 斯宾诺莎以为宇宙和人生的本质能够从一些不证自明的公理照逻辑演绎出来； 我们对待事情也该像对待二加二等于四这个事实一样，抱承受默认的态度， 因为它们同样都是逻辑必然性的结果。 这套形而上学全部信不得；它和现代逻辑与科学方法根本抵触。 ·事·实必须靠观察来发现，凭推理是不行的。 如果我们推断未来推断得成功，作这推断时借助的原理并不是逻辑必然的原理， 而是经验资料显示出来的原理。 而且斯宾诺莎所依据的实体概念是今天无论科学和哲学都不能接受的概念。 But when we come to Spinoza's ethics, we feel -- or at least I feel -- that something, though not everything, can be accepted even when the metaphysical foundation has been rejected. Broadly speaking, Spinoza is concerned to show how it is possible to live nobly even when we recognize the limits of human power. He himself, by his doctrine of necessity, makes these limits narrower than they are; but when they indubitably exist, Spinoza's maxims are probably the best possible. Take, for instance, death: nothing that a man can do will make him immortal, and it is therefore futile to spend time in fears and lamentations over the fact that we must die. To be obsessed by the fear of death is a kind of slavery; Spinoza is right in saying that "the free man thinks of nothing less than of death." But even in this case, it is only death in general that should be so treated; death of any particular disease should, if possible, be averted by submitting to medical care. What should, even in this case, be avoided, is a certain kind of anxiety or terror; the necessary measures should be taken calmly, and our thoughts should, as far as possible, be then directed to other matters. The same considerations apply to all other purely personal misfortunes. 但是谈到斯宾诺莎的伦理学，我们觉得，或至少在我觉得， 即便摈弃了形而上学基础，有些东西还是可以接受的， 固然并非全部可以接受。 大致讲，斯宾诺莎企图说明， 即使承认了人类能力的限度，怎样还可能过崇高的生活。 他本人因为主张必然论，把这种限度说得比实际上更狭窄； 但是在毫无疑问存在人力限度的情况下， 斯宾诺莎的处世箴言大概是最好不过的了。 譬如拿“死”来说，凡是人办得到的事情没有一件会使人长生不死， 所以为我们必不免一死而恐惧、而悲叹， 在这上面耗费时间徒劳无益。 让死的恐怖缠住心，是一种奴役； 斯宾诺莎说得对，“自由人最少想到死”。 但是甚至在这事情上，该如此对待的不过是就一般讲的死； 由于个别病症而致的死亡，在可能范围内应当进行医疗防止才是。 就是在这个情况下，应避免的仍是某种焦虑或恐惧； 必须冷静地采取各种必要手段， 而我们的心思这时候应当尽可能转到旁的事情上去。 其它一切纯粹个人的不幸都适用同样道理。 But how about misfortunes to people whom you love? Let us think of some of the things that are likely to happen in our time to inhabitants of Europe or China. Suppose you are a Jew, and your family has been massacred. Suppose you are an underground worker against the Nazis, and your wife has been shot because you could not be caught. Suppose your husband, for some purely imaginary crime, has been sent to forced labour in the Arctic, and has died of cruelty and starvation. Suppose your daughter has been raped and then killed by enemy soldiers. Ought you, in these circumstances, to preserve a philosophic calm ? 但是你所爱的人们遭的不幸又当如何对待呢？ 试想一想欧洲或中国的居民在现时期往往会遇到的一些事。 假定你是犹太人，你的家族被屠杀了。 假定你是个反纳粹的地下工作者，因为抓不着你，你的妻子被枪毙了。 假定你的丈夫为了某种纯属虚构的罪， 被解送到北极地方强迫劳动，在残酷虐待和饥饿下死掉了。 假定你的女儿被敌兵强奸过后又弄死了。 在这种情况下，你也应该保持哲学的平静吗？ If you follow Christ's teaching, you will say "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." I have known Quakers who could have said this sincerely and profoundly, and whom I admired because they could. But before giving admiration one must be very sure that the misfortune is felt as deeply as it should be. One cannot accept the attitude of some among the Stoics, who said, "What does it matter to me if my family suffer? I can still be virtuous." The Christian principle, "Love your enemies," is good, but the Stoic principle, "Be indifferent to your friends," is bad. And the Christian principle does not inculcate calm, but an ardent love even towards the worst of men. There is nothing to be said against it except that it is too difficult for most of us to practise sincerely. 如果你信奉基督的教训，你会说： “父啊，赦免他们，因为他们所作的他们不晓得。” 我曾经认识一些教友派信徒， 他们真可能深切、由衷地讲出这样的话， 因为他们讲得出来，我对他们很钦佩。 但是，人在表示钦佩之前必须确实知道， 这不幸是如理所当然地深深被感受到了。 斯多葛派哲学家当中有些人说： “哪怕我一家人受罪，对我有什么关系？我照旧能够道德高尚”， 这种人的态度大家无法接受。 基督教的道德信条“要爱你们的仇敌”是好的， 但是斯多葛派的道德信条“莫关心你的朋友”却是坏的。 而且基督教道德信条谆谆教诲的并不是平静， 而是甚至对最恶的人有热烈的爱。 这信条无可反对，只不过对我们大多数人来讲太难，真心实践不了。 The primitive reaction to such disasters is revenge. When Macduff learns that his wife and children have been killed by Macbeth, he resolves to kill the tyrant himself. This reaction is still admired by most people, when the injury is great, and such as to arouse moral horror in disinterested people. Nor can it be wholly condemned, for it is one of the forces generating punishment, and punishment is sometimes necessary. Moreover, from the point of view of mental health, the impulse to revenge is likely to be so strong that, if it is allowed no outlet, a man's whole outlook on life may become distorted and more or less insane. This is not true universally, but it is true in a large percentage of cases. But on the other side it must be said that revenge is a very dangerous motive. In so far as society admits it, it allows a man to be the judge in his own case, which is exactly what the law tries to prevent. Moreover it is usually an excessive motive; it seeks to inflict more punishment than is desirable. Torture, for example, should not be punished by torture, but the man maddened by lust for vengeance will think a painless death too good for the object of his hate. Moreover and it is here that Spinoza is in the right -- a life dominated by a single passion is a narrow life, incompatible with every kind of wisdom. Revenge as such is therefore not the best reaction to injury. 对这种灾殃的原始的反应是复仇。 麦可达夫听说他的妻子儿女被马克白杀了， 当时他决心要杀死这个暴君。 伤害如果很严重， 而且是在利害不相干者当中引起道德憎愤的一种伤害， 在这个情况下复仇反应仍然受大多数人的赞美。 这种反应我们也无法完全非难， 因为它是产生惩罚的一个动力，而惩罚有时候是必要的。 况且，从精神健康的角度来看，复仇冲动往往十分强烈， 假若不给它发泄出路， 一个人的整个人生观可能会变得畸形而多少有些偏狂。 这话虽不是放之四海而皆准的，但是在多数情况下是确实的。 然而在另一方面，我们也必须说复仇心是很危险的动机。 社会只要认可复仇心，就等于允许人在自己的讼案中自当法官， 这正是法律打算防止的事情。 而且复仇心通常又是一种过火的动机；它追求越出适当分寸施加惩罚。 例如，虐伤罪本不该用虐伤来惩罚， 但是因复仇欲而发疯的人， 会认为让自己所恨的对象无痛苦地死去，未免太便宜了他。 不仅如此，在这点上斯宾诺莎正说得对： 受一个单独的炽情主宰的生活 是与一切种类的智慧皆难相容的狭隘生活。 所以说这种复仇并不是对伤害的最好反应。 Spinoza would say what the Christian says, and also* something more. For him, all sin is due to ignorance; he would "forgive them, for they know not what they do." But he would have you avoid the limited purview from which, in his opinion, sin springs, and would urge you, even under the greatest misfortunes, to avoid being shut up in the world of your sorrow; he would have you understand it by seeing it in relation to its causes and as a part of the whole order of nature. As we saw, he believes that hatred can be overcome by love: "Hatred is increased by being reciprocated, and can on the other hand be destroyed by love. Hatred which is completely vanquished by love, passes into love; and love is thereupon greater, than if hatred had not preceded it." I wish I could believe this, but I cannot, except in exceptional cases where the person hating is completely in the power of the person who refuses to hate in return. In such cases, surprise at being not punished may have a reforming effect. But so long as the wicked have power, it is not much use assuring them that you do not hate them, since they will attribute your words to the wrong motive. And you cannot deprive them of power by non-resistance. 斯宾诺莎会说出基督徒所说的话，还会说出超乎这以外的一些话。 在他看来，一切罪恶起因于无知； 他会“赦免他们，因为他们所作的他们不晓得。” 但是他会要你避开他所认为的罪恶本源——眼界狭隘， 他会劝你即使遇到顶大的不幸， 也要避免把自己关闭在个人悲伤的天地里； 他会要你把罪恶和它的原因关联起来、 当作整个自然大法的一部分来看， 借以理解这罪恶。 前面说过，他相信“憎”能够被“爱”克服，他说： “憎受到憎回报则增强，但反之能够被爱打消。 为爱所彻底战胜的憎，转化成爱； 这种爱于是比先前假使没有憎还大。” 我但愿真能够相信这说法，可是我作不到； 不过，心怀憎恨的人若完全在不肯以憎恨相还的那人掌握之下， 这种例外情况不算。 在这种情况下，因未受惩报而感到的惊讶可能还有劝善规过的效力。 但是只要恶人有势力，你对他尽情表白不恨他也无大用， 因为他会把你的话归到不良动机上。 再说起不抵抗主义，你又不能剥夺他的势力。 The problem for Spinoza is easier than it is for one who has no belief in the ultimate goodness of the universe. Spinoza thinks that, if you see your misfortunes as they are in reality, as part of the concatenation of causes stretching from the beginning of time to the end, you will see that they are only misfortunes to you, not to the universe, to which they are merely passing discords heightening an ultimate harmony. I cannot accept this; I think that particular events are what they are, and do not become different by absorption into a whole. Each act of cruelty is eternally a part of the universe; nothing that happens later can make that act good rather than bad, or can confer perfection on the whole of which it is a part. 问题在斯宾诺莎，就比在对宇宙的终极善性不抱信仰的人容易处理。 斯宾诺莎认为，你如果把你的灾难照它的实质来看， 作为那上起自时间的开端、下止于时间尽头的因缘环链一部分来看， 就知道这灾难不过是对你的灾难，并非对宇宙的灾难， 对宇宙讲，仅是加强最后和声的暂时不谐音而已。 这说法我不能接受； 我以为个别事件是什么就是什么，不因为纳入整体而变得不同。 各个残酷行为永久是宇宙的一部分； 后来发生的任何事决不能使这行为变恶为善， 也不能把“完善性”赋予包含着它的那个整体。 Nevertheless, when it is your lot to have to endure something that is (or seems to you) worse than the ordinary lot of mankind, Spinoza's principle of thinking about the whole, or at any rate about larger matters than your own grief, is a useful one. There are even times when it is comforting to reflect that human life, with all that it contains of evil and suffering, is an infinitesimal pan of the life of the universe. Such reflections may not suffice to constitute a religion, but in a painful world they are a help towards sanity and an antidote to the paralysis of utter despair. 话虽如此，假若你合该不得不忍受 比人的通常命运坏（或在你看来坏）的什么事， 斯宾诺莎讲的想整体、或总之去想比你个人的悲痛更远大的事情， 这样一条作人原则仍旧是有用的原则。 甚至也有些时候， 我们细想人类的生活连同其中含有的全部祸害和苦难， 不过是宇宙生活里的沧海一粟，让人感到安慰。 这种思想可能还不足构成宗教信仰， 但是在这痛苦的世界上，倒是促使人神志清醒的一个助力， 是救治完全绝望下的麻木不仁的解毒剂。
2012-02-18 20:46:55 3人收藏 1回应
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第46页
唐尸三摆手 (我不说话，我就吠吠)
文明人之所以与野蛮人不同，主要的是在于审慎，或者。。 用一个稍微更广义的名词，即深谋远虑。 他为了将来的快乐，哪怕这种将来的快乐是相当遥远的，而愿意忍受目前的痛苦。 文明之抑制冲动不仅是通过深谋远虑（那是一种加于自我的抑制），而且还通过法律、习惯与宗教。这种抑制力是它从野蛮时代继承来的，但是它使这种抑制力具有更少的本能性与更多的组织性。 审慎也很容易造成丧失生命中某些最美好的事物。 审慎对... (更多)文明人之所以与野蛮人不同，主要的是在于审慎，或者。。 用一个稍微更广义的名词，即深谋远虑。 他为了将来的快乐，哪怕这种将来的快乐是相当遥远的，而愿意忍受目前的痛苦。
文明之抑制冲动不仅是通过深谋远虑（那是一种加于自我的抑制），而且还通过法律、习惯与宗教。这种抑制力是它从野蛮时代继承来的，但是它使这种抑制力具有更少的本能性与更多的组织性。
审慎也很容易造成丧失生命中某些最美好的事物。
(收起)审慎对热情的冲突是一场贯穿着全部历史的冲突。 在这场冲突中，我们不应完全偏袒任何一方。
2011-03-24 00:25:36 2回应
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第23页
克莱德思构坡 (Human Highway)
一般说来，重要的文明都是从一种严格和迷信的体系出发，逐渐地松弛下来，在一定的阶段就达到了一个天才辉煌的时期；这时，旧传统中的好东西继续保存着，而在其解体之中所包含的那些坏东西则还没有来得及发展。但是随着坏东西的发展，它就走向无政府主义，从而不可避免地走向一种新的暴政，同时产生出来一种受到新的教条体系所保证的新的综合。 (更多)
(收起)一般说来，重要的文明都是从一种严格和迷信的体系出发，逐渐地松弛下来，在一定的阶段就达到了一个天才辉煌的时期；这时，旧传统中的好东西继续保存着，而在其解体之中所包含的那些坏东西则还没有来得及发展。但是随着坏东西的发展，它就走向无政府主义，从而不可避免地走向一种新的暴政，同时产生出来一种受到新的教条体系所保证的新的综合。
2012-05-05 22:32:12 回应
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第197页
noc (欧洲杯期间旗帜鲜明支持莺歌蓝！)
柏拉图 乌托邦：统治者必须是哲学家。公民应分为三个阶级，普通人、兵士和卫国者。 理念论：柏拉图的哲学奠基在实在与现象的区别上。意见是属于感官所接触到的世界的，知识则是属于超感觉的永恒的世界的。 凡是一个个体有着一个共同的名字的，他们就有着一个共同的“理念”或“形式”。对理式我们可以有知识，对实在我们就只能有意见了。 哲学乃是一种洞见，乃是“对真理的洞见”。它不纯粹是理智的；它不仅仅是智慧而且是... (更多)
(收起)柏拉图 乌托邦：统治者必须是哲学家。公民应分为三个阶级，普通人、兵士和卫国者。 理念论：柏拉图的哲学奠基在实在与现象的区别上。意见是属于感官所接触到的世界的，知识则是属于超感觉的永恒的世界的。 凡是一个个体有着一个共同的名字的，他们就有着一个共同的“理念”或“形式”。对理式我们可以有知识，对实在我们就只能有意见了。 哲学乃是一种洞见，乃是“对真理的洞见”。它不纯粹是理智的；它不仅仅是智慧而且是爱智慧。 理性是更高级的，它只涉及纯粹的理念，而它的方法是辩证的；悟性便是数学中运用的那种理智，它之所以低于理性就在于它使用的假设是它自己不能运用的。 关于洞穴的比喻 柏拉图所犯的错误就类似于说“有人性的是有人性的”，他说美是美的；他认为“人”的共相是神所创造的人的类型的名字，而实际的人则是这个人的不完全而且多少是不真实的摹本。他全然没有认识到共相和个体间有着多么大的鸿沟；他的“理念”其实恰好不外是在伦理和审美上较凡品为高的另外一些个体罢了。 我们应该说，如果我们以为天要下雪了，这就是意见；如果我们后来看见天是在下雪了，这就是知识。然而两种情形下题材都是一个，可是柏拉图以为任何时候只要能成为意见的东西，就永远不能成为知识的材料。知识是确实可靠的而且不会错误的，意见则不仅仅是错误而且必然是错误的，因为它假定了仅仅是现象的东西的实在性。
2011-10-17 20:08:50 2回应
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第200页
棒打Leo小青年 (某种定义下的自由和艺术)
评语：追求真理的路上怎能少得了哲学，它是“万学之学”，是解决人类最深刻问题的，只有思考哲学，人才能真正成为“人”。别张口就来什么学校里教的“唯物”、“实践”了，这只是“洗脑”造成的机械重复，而不是你自己的选择。事实上，哲学无所谓好与坏、真与假、对与错，这纯粹是个人的喜好问题。但是，一个人世界观的形成，全赖于哲学的指导，这进而决定了个体走上不同的人生道路。然而哲学好比一团乱麻，大哲学家罗素的这本书是... (更多)评语：追求真理的路上怎能少得了哲学，它是“万学之学”，是解决人类最深刻问题的，只有思考哲学，人才能真正成为“人”。别张口就来什么学校里教的“唯物”、“实践”了，这只是“洗脑”造成的机械重复，而不是你自己的选择。事实上，哲学无所谓好与坏、真与假、对与错，这纯粹是个人的喜好问题。但是，一个人世界观的形成，全赖于哲学的指导，这进而决定了个体走上不同的人生道路。然而哲学好比一团乱麻，大哲学家罗素的这本书是理出头绪的不错选择，至少，它全面。你会看到，关于世界本质竟可以有如此多迥然相异的观点，至少在这点上，就不得不佩服自古希腊以来的各位先哲。鉴于作者本身的立场，你可能因此讨厌柏拉图和尼采，也可能会觉得“一头雾水”，但“眼界大开”肯定是免不了的。而这只是个开始，认知的大门一旦被开启，世界观不经历几次推倒重来是不会最终建成的。 (收起)2012-05-27 12:24:47 回应
