Governing China

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  第177页

  风之子

  Document types include the following: an order (mingling) must be carried out precisely by the recipient, with no deviation; an instruction (zhishi) should be modified to suit local conditions, with approval of the modification by the next higher territorial level; a circular (tongzhi) provides information for reference, with the implication that it would be a good idea to utilize whatever might b... (更多)

  Document types include the following: an order (mingling) must be carried out precisely by the recipient, with no deviation; an instruction (zhishi) should be modified to suit local conditions, with approval of the modification by the next higher territorial level; a circular (tongzhi) provides information for reference, with the implication that it would be a good idea to utilize whatever might be appropriate; and an opinion (yijian) simply expresses the current views of an official.

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  2011-12-24 18:02:04   回应

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  第208页

  panpan (another no one)

  In Governing China, Lieberthal traces the legacies of the Chinese imperial system and its demise, studies the effects of the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party developed, examines the organizational structure of the Chinese political system in the post-1949 years, and discusses the challenges it faces. Lieberthal believes that China's history of thousands of years has left various legac... (更多)

  In Governing China, Lieberthal traces the legacies of the Chinese imperial system and its demise, studies the effects of the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party developed, examines the organizational structure of the Chinese political system in the post-1949 years, and discusses the challenges it faces.

  Lieberthal believes that China's history of thousands of years has left various legacies which contributed to the Chinese political system today. Confucianism in the imperial years, for example, valued hierarchy highly and placed social power in the hands of the older, more conservative segments of the population (5 - 8). In addition, during the Maoist era, China adopted a governing system that borrowed heavily from that of the Soviet Union, and most arrays of party and state organs still remain crucial today (77 - 121). To Lieberthal, the imperial Chinese and the Soviet Union systems have a lot in common: both stressed centralized control and bureaucratic administration, and used ideology to support its legitimacy. Moreover, both systems consciously encouraged competition among lower-level bureaucracies in order to tighten the control by top leaders (157 - 158).

  As for the Chinese political system today, Lieberthal argues that its structure duplicates itself at each of the territorial levels. On both the Party and the government sides, each territorial level system has a large congress that meets infrequently; a smaller committee that consists of important people and meets somewhat more frequently; and a even smaller committee that brings together the top few people. While in theory the larger the body, the more powerful it is, in reality it is the opposite case – the smallest committee is the most powerful structure (159). It is also worth noticing that while in theory the Party Congress is the highest organ for authority, its large size and infrequent meetings actually make it a vehicle for announcing, rather than for initiating and deciding, important policies (160).

  According to Lieberthal, the Chinese political system faces several severe problems. In addition to corruption and petty dictatorship, there is also gridlock from the fragmentation of power into different bureaucracies and territorial fiefdoms; and as lower-level officials avoid responsibility by pushing decisions “up” the hierarchy, the top of the system becomes overloaded. Moreover, the system lacks accurate information because of the distortions throughout multiple layers of bureaucracy and because the CCP does not allow truly independent sources of information to develop (170 - 171).

  The Chinese policy-making is characterized by an enormous amount of negotiation and bargaining among officials. This is partially related to the Cultural Revolution and Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, which both have contributed to the loss of ideology as a resource for the central government to coordinate and enforce its priorities. As a result, “value-based” incentives for lower-level officials to obey Beijing have diminished considerably. Because of this fragmentation of authority in the political system, resolving matters below the central level would require constructing a consensus among certain officials who, in turn, need to negotiate with other related officials beforehand (172 - 174).

  In an attempt to present a view of the political power distribution from the inside, Lieberthal suggests that we focus not on the official organizational charts, but instead on the major concepts concerning the true organizaion of power: the kous, the xitongs, and the tensions of tiao/kuai relationships. The kous (“gateways”) are the functional areas inside the Party and are each headed by one or two top leaders. Xitongs are groupings of functionally-related bureaucracies below kous and are controlled by leadership small groups. There are six major xitongs: the Party Affairs xitong, the organization Affairs xitong, the Propaganda and Education xitong, the Political and Legal Affairs xitong, the Finance and Economics xitong, and the Military xitong. These xitongs are virtually invisible on China’s organization charts, but officials very much think in therms of these broad functional systems (192 - 208). (收起)

  2011-03-02 02:10:56   回应

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• 

  第177页

  风之子

  Document types include the following: an order (mingling) must be carried out precisely by the recipient, with no deviation; an instruction (zhishi) should be modified to suit local conditions, with approval of the modification by the next higher territorial level; a circular (tongzhi) provides information for reference, with the implication that it would be a good idea to utilize whatever might b... (更多)

  Document types include the following: an order (mingling) must be carried out precisely by the recipient, with no deviation; an instruction (zhishi) should be modified to suit local conditions, with approval of the modification by the next higher territorial level; a circular (tongzhi) provides information for reference, with the implication that it would be a good idea to utilize whatever might be appropriate; and an opinion (yijian) simply expresses the current views of an official.

  (收起)

  2011-12-24 18:02:04   回应

  收藏

  推荐
• 

  第208页

  panpan (another no one)

  In Governing China, Lieberthal traces the legacies of the Chinese imperial system and its demise, studies the effects of the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party developed, examines the organizational structure of the Chinese political system in the post-1949 years, and discusses the challenges it faces. Lieberthal believes that China's history of thousands of years has left various legac... (更多)

  In Governing China, Lieberthal traces the legacies of the Chinese imperial system and its demise, studies the effects of the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party developed, examines the organizational structure of the Chinese political system in the post-1949 years, and discusses the challenges it faces.

  Lieberthal believes that China's history of thousands of years has left various legacies which contributed to the Chinese political system today. Confucianism in the imperial years, for example, valued hierarchy highly and placed social power in the hands of the older, more conservative segments of the population (5 - 8). In addition, during the Maoist era, China adopted a governing system that borrowed heavily from that of the Soviet Union, and most arrays of party and state organs still remain crucial today (77 - 121). To Lieberthal, the imperial Chinese and the Soviet Union systems have a lot in common: both stressed centralized control and bureaucratic administration, and used ideology to support its legitimacy. Moreover, both systems consciously encouraged competition among lower-level bureaucracies in order to tighten the control by top leaders (157 - 158).

  As for the Chinese political system today, Lieberthal argues that its structure duplicates itself at each of the territorial levels. On both the Party and the government sides, each territorial level system has a large congress that meets infrequently; a smaller committee that consists of important people and meets somewhat more frequently; and a even smaller committee that brings together the top few people. While in theory the larger the body, the more powerful it is, in reality it is the opposite case – the smallest committee is the most powerful structure (159). It is also worth noticing that while in theory the Party Congress is the highest organ for authority, its large size and infrequent meetings actually make it a vehicle for announcing, rather than for initiating and deciding, important policies (160).

  According to Lieberthal, the Chinese political system faces several severe problems. In addition to corruption and petty dictatorship, there is also gridlock from the fragmentation of power into different bureaucracies and territorial fiefdoms; and as lower-level officials avoid responsibility by pushing decisions “up” the hierarchy, the top of the system becomes overloaded. Moreover, the system lacks accurate information because of the distortions throughout multiple layers of bureaucracy and because the CCP does not allow truly independent sources of information to develop (170 - 171).

  The Chinese policy-making is characterized by an enormous amount of negotiation and bargaining among officials. This is partially related to the Cultural Revolution and Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, which both have contributed to the loss of ideology as a resource for the central government to coordinate and enforce its priorities. As a result, “value-based” incentives for lower-level officials to obey Beijing have diminished considerably. Because of this fragmentation of authority in the political system, resolving matters below the central level would require constructing a consensus among certain officials who, in turn, need to negotiate with other related officials beforehand (172 - 174).

  In an attempt to present a view of the political power distribution from the inside, Lieberthal suggests that we focus not on the official organizational charts, but instead on the major concepts concerning the true organizaion of power: the kous, the xitongs, and the tensions of tiao/kuai relationships. The kous (“gateways”) are the functional areas inside the Party and are each headed by one or two top leaders. Xitongs are groupings of functionally-related bureaucracies below kous and are controlled by leadership small groups. There are six major xitongs: the Party Affairs xitong, the organization Affairs xitong, the Propaganda and Education xitong, the Political and Legal Affairs xitong, the Finance and Economics xitong, and the Military xitong. These xitongs are virtually invisible on China’s organization charts, but officials very much think in therms of these broad functional systems (192 - 208). (收起)

  2011-03-02 02:10:56   回应

  收藏

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• 

  第177页

  风之子

  Document types include the following: an order (mingling) must be carried out precisely by the recipient, with no deviation; an instruction (zhishi) should be modified to suit local conditions, with approval of the modification by the next higher territorial level; a circular (tongzhi) provides information for reference, with the implication that it would be a good idea to utilize whatever might b... (更多)

  Document types include the following: an order (mingling) must be carried out precisely by the recipient, with no deviation; an instruction (zhishi) should be modified to suit local conditions, with approval of the modification by the next higher territorial level; a circular (tongzhi) provides information for reference, with the implication that it would be a good idea to utilize whatever might be appropriate; and an opinion (yijian) simply expresses the current views of an official.

  (收起)

  2011-12-24 18:02:04   回应

  收藏

  推荐
• 

  第208页

  panpan (another no one)

  In Governing China, Lieberthal traces the legacies of the Chinese imperial system and its demise, studies the effects of the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party developed, examines the organizational structure of the Chinese political system in the post-1949 years, and discusses the challenges it faces. Lieberthal believes that China's history of thousands of years has left various legac... (更多)

  In Governing China, Lieberthal traces the legacies of the Chinese imperial system and its demise, studies the effects of the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party developed, examines the organizational structure of the Chinese political system in the post-1949 years, and discusses the challenges it faces.

  Lieberthal believes that China's history of thousands of years has left various legacies which contributed to the Chinese political system today. Confucianism in the imperial years, for example, valued hierarchy highly and placed social power in the hands of the older, more conservative segments of the population (5 - 8). In addition, during the Maoist era, China adopted a governing system that borrowed heavily from that of the Soviet Union, and most arrays of party and state organs still remain crucial today (77 - 121). To Lieberthal, the imperial Chinese and the Soviet Union systems have a lot in common: both stressed centralized control and bureaucratic administration, and used ideology to support its legitimacy. Moreover, both systems consciously encouraged competition among lower-level bureaucracies in order to tighten the control by top leaders (157 - 158).

  As for the Chinese political system today, Lieberthal argues that its structure duplicates itself at each of the territorial levels. On both the Party and the government sides, each territorial level system has a large congress that meets infrequently; a smaller committee that consists of important people and meets somewhat more frequently; and a even smaller committee that brings together the top few people. While in theory the larger the body, the more powerful it is, in reality it is the opposite case – the smallest committee is the most powerful structure (159). It is also worth noticing that while in theory the Party Congress is the highest organ for authority, its large size and infrequent meetings actually make it a vehicle for announcing, rather than for initiating and deciding, important policies (160).

  According to Lieberthal, the Chinese political system faces several severe problems. In addition to corruption and petty dictatorship, there is also gridlock from the fragmentation of power into different bureaucracies and territorial fiefdoms; and as lower-level officials avoid responsibility by pushing decisions “up” the hierarchy, the top of the system becomes overloaded. Moreover, the system lacks accurate information because of the distortions throughout multiple layers of bureaucracy and because the CCP does not allow truly independent sources of information to develop (170 - 171).

  The Chinese policy-making is characterized by an enormous amount of negotiation and bargaining among officials. This is partially related to the Cultural Revolution and Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, which both have contributed to the loss of ideology as a resource for the central government to coordinate and enforce its priorities. As a result, “value-based” incentives for lower-level officials to obey Beijing have diminished considerably. Because of this fragmentation of authority in the political system, resolving matters below the central level would require constructing a consensus among certain officials who, in turn, need to negotiate with other related officials beforehand (172 - 174).

  In an attempt to present a view of the political power distribution from the inside, Lieberthal suggests that we focus not on the official organizational charts, but instead on the major concepts concerning the true organizaion of power: the kous, the xitongs, and the tensions of tiao/kuai relationships. The kous (“gateways”) are the functional areas inside the Party and are each headed by one or two top leaders. Xitongs are groupings of functionally-related bureaucracies below kous and are controlled by leadership small groups. There are six major xitongs: the Party Affairs xitong, the organization Affairs xitong, the Propaganda and Education xitong, the Political and Legal Affairs xitong, the Finance and Economics xitong, and the Military xitong. These xitongs are virtually invisible on China’s organization charts, but officials very much think in therms of these broad functional systems (192 - 208). (收起)

  2011-03-02 02:10:56   回应

  收藏

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