Capitalism with Chinese Characteristics

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  第147页

  bigben523

  ......in the 1980s, the RCCs were moving explicitly in the direction of autonomy and self-governance, whereas in the 1990s, the RCCs moved in the opposite direction, both in letter and in spirit......In both the 1980s and 1990s, informal finance played an active role in meeting the financial needs of rural entrepreneurs and households. The difference, however, is that informal finance was not only... (更多)

  ......in the 1980s, the RCCs were moving explicitly in the direction of autonomy and self-governance, whereas in the 1990s, the RCCs moved in the opposite direction, both in letter and in spirit......In both the 1980s and 1990s, informal finance played an active role in meeting the financial needs of rural entrepreneurs and households. The difference, however, is that informal finance was not only tolerated in the 1980s but also was actually used by the reformers to benchmark the reforms of the formal financial institutions. In the 1990s, there was a protracted, costly, and ultimately futile effort to stamp out informal finance on the one hand and to intervene and micromanage the operations of the formal financial institutions on the other.

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  2012-02-15 15:02:14   回应

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  第144页

  bigben523

  The easing of the financing for rural private entrepreneurs did not occur by chance; it occurred because financial policy was tacitly or even explicitly supportive of the private sector. This is one of the least known aspects of the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1988, the Chinese financial system became increasingly flexible as the reformers directed banks and RCCs to lend to the emerging private sector... (更多)

  The easing of the financing for rural private entrepreneurs did not occur by chance; it occurred because financial policy was tacitly or even explicitly supportive of the private sector. This is one of the least known aspects of the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1988, the Chinese financial system became increasingly flexible as the reformers directed banks and RCCs to lend to the emerging private sector. They also introduced proactive reforms of financial institutions by reducing state controls RCCs and permitting entry by private players.

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  2012-02-15 14:42:39   回应

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  第139页

  bigben523

  In the 1990s numerous rural entrepreneurs who had been forced to tap into or organize underground financing because of massive inadequacies of China's banking system were arrested......This practice, widespread in the 1980s and a legitimate source of start-up capital for many TVEs, now ran into the iron fist of the Chinese financial regulators determined to stamp out all forms of informal finance. (更多)

  In the 1990s numerous rural entrepreneurs who had been forced to tap into or organize underground financing because of massive inadequacies of China's banking system were arrested......This practice, widespread in the 1980s and a legitimate source of start-up capital for many TVEs, now ran into the iron fist of the Chinese financial regulators determined to stamp out all forms of informal finance.

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  2012-02-15 14:19:11   回应

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  第1页

  袁本初 (悲伤时读书)

  Lenovo is a success story of the market-based finance of Hong Kong, not of China’s state-controlled financial system. Until 2005, many of the high-tech and so-called strategic industries were declared off-limits to domestic pri- vate entry. Indigenous private entrepreneurs, many highly capable, could grow their businesses only via foreign registration. Professor Sull chronicles seven ot... (更多)

  Lenovo is a success story of the market-based finance of Hong Kong, not of China’s state-controlled financial system.

  Until 2005, many of the high-tech and so-called strategic industries were declared off-limits to domestic pri- vate entry. Indigenous private entrepreneurs, many highly capable, could grow their businesses only via foreign registration.

  Professor Sull chronicles seven other firms in his book: Sina, UTStar- com, AsiaInfo, Haier, Galanz, Wahaha, and Ting Hsin. Every single case Professor Sull discusses is a Lenovo-like story. The firms are all registered as foreign firms in China, or some of their main operations are so registered.

  They are Chinese to the extent that theirmanagers and owners are ethnically Chinese, but their legal status is foreign. That corporate success in China requires a combination of Chinese management and foreign legal

  status is probably the cleanest illustration of the massive distortions in China’s business environment – that this is a system that has imposed a straitjacket on the domestic private sector.

  China lacks efficient legal and financial institutions

  China’s success has less to do with creating efficient institutions and more to do with permitting access to efficient institutions outside of China

  In the 1980s, the country was moving directionally toward the virtuous kind of capitalism, or what Baumol, Litan, and Shramm (2007) describe as entrepreneurial capitalism. In the 1990s, the country stillmoved toward capitalism but of a different and less virtuous kind – the state-led brand of capitalism.

  Themost impressive poverty reduction in China occurred at a time when China had no FDI – in the early 1980s – and, in fact, after China became a member of the World

  Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, the emerging evidence is that China’s poverty level increased.

  During the entrepreneurial decade of the 1980s, fast GDP growth was accompanied by equally fast household income growth. During the state-led 1990s, fast GDP growth diverged from house- hold income growth.

  Suffice it to mention that the pre-Tiananmen and the post-Tiananmen leaderships differed in none critical aspect – their rural vis-` a-vis urban credentials. Before Tianan-

  men, many of the top Chinese leaders charged with day-to-day economic management – Zhao Ziyang, Wan Li, and Tian Jiyun – hailed from rural provinces that had pioneered in agricultural reforms. They built their eco-

  nomic credentials by having succeeded in the management of agriculture. After Tiananmen, the top Chinese leaders in charge of the economy – Jiang

  Zemin and Zhu Rongji – came from the most urban and the least reformed region of China – Shanghai.

  “If China spent precious resources on such projects, what other projects had to be given up to finance these projects?”

  I return to this issue in greater detail in the next chapter, but suffice it to say here that some of the rural reforms in the 1980s were quite far-reaching and that in the 1990s there was a reversal of some of the key elements of the reforms that had allowed for a flourishing of rural entrepreneurship in the 1980s.

  in the first 10 years of reforms, this number already declined to 96 million in 1988. The poverty headcount declined by 154 million. In the next 10 years of reforms from 1989 to 1999, the poverty headcount declined by only 62 million. This was a fraction of what China achieved in the 1980s.

  the structural explanation oddly assumes that it was easier to tackle poverty in the 1980s than in the 1990s. In the 1990s, theChinese government commanded substantially more resources than in the 1980s.

  none comes close to producing themicroeconomic success stories that have come out of some of the initially poorer agricultural provinces. The reason is that the economic policies in rural China were farmore liberal than those

  in urban China.

  In the 1980s, as SEBS1991 shows, it was the rural entrepreneurs who came to the cities and established operations there. In the 1990s, it was mainly the rural laborers who flooded the cities in search of jobs.

  Fittingly , 1989 marked both the decadal and policy turning points

  My conjecture, althought not yet an empirically settled view , is that the economic effect of Tiananmen were actually far more long-lasting than we previously believed .One observable effect of Tiananmen is that the backgrounds and outlooks of chinese leaders before and after Tiananmen-symbolized by Zhao Ziyang in particular-had first gained national prominence as a result of their economic stewardship of the poor tural provinces . More than any other politician ,Zhao Ziyang and Wan Li had lauched China's transformative rural reforms , in Sichuan and Anhui provinces .

  While farming became increasingly less lucrative , rural Chinese flocked to labor markets to contribute their labor rather than to start their own business

  The TVEs were the most dynamic economic force in the 1980s and provided a ready channel for the rural chinese to transition out of the low value-added agriculture. Their failings in the 1990s had a huge effect on the economic well-being of the rural population . The fate of the TVEs is also a barometer of the policy environment (收起)

  2011-09-25 20:28:50   回应

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  第2页

  bigben523

  Much of the received wisdom in the academic literature states that entrepreneurship, financial liberalization, and private property rights security are not significant components of Chinese economic growth. The success of the Chinese economy has inspired the idea that economic growth follows from an adept tailoring of economic policies and institutions to their local contexts rather than from an a... (更多)

  Much of the received wisdom in the academic literature states that entrepreneurship, financial liberalization, and private property rights security are not significant components of Chinese economic growth. The success of the Chinese economy has inspired the idea that economic growth follows from an adept tailoring of economic policies and institutions to their local contexts rather than from an application of universal economic principles.

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  2012-02-10 12:55:10   回应

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  第3页

  楚材斯胜 (有用的书劳心，斯言是也)

  If we believe Lenovo to be a product of China's business environment, then many of those who argue that China has created a unique, country-specific formula for cautious deregulation, state ownership, and selective government intervention in the economy have a point. If we believe Lenovo to be a product of Hong Kong and Hong Kong institutions, the success of Lenoveo then becomes a story of rule of... (更多)

  If we believe Lenovo to be a product of China's business environment, then many of those who argue that China has created a unique, country-specific formula for cautious deregulation, state ownership, and selective government intervention in the economy have a point. If we believe Lenovo to be a product of Hong Kong and Hong Kong institutions, the success of Lenoveo then becomes a story of rule of law and market-base finance.

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  2012-01-19 04:53:42   回应

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  第147页

  bigben523

  ......in the 1980s, the RCCs were moving explicitly in the direction of autonomy and self-governance, whereas in the 1990s, the RCCs moved in the opposite direction, both in letter and in spirit......In both the 1980s and 1990s, informal finance played an active role in meeting the financial needs of rural entrepreneurs and households. The difference, however, is that informal finance was not only... (更多)

  ......in the 1980s, the RCCs were moving explicitly in the direction of autonomy and self-governance, whereas in the 1990s, the RCCs moved in the opposite direction, both in letter and in spirit......In both the 1980s and 1990s, informal finance played an active role in meeting the financial needs of rural entrepreneurs and households. The difference, however, is that informal finance was not only tolerated in the 1980s but also was actually used by the reformers to benchmark the reforms of the formal financial institutions. In the 1990s, there was a protracted, costly, and ultimately futile effort to stamp out informal finance on the one hand and to intervene and micromanage the operations of the formal financial institutions on the other.

  (收起)

  2012-02-15 15:02:14   回应

  收藏

  推荐
• 

  第144页

  bigben523

  The easing of the financing for rural private entrepreneurs did not occur by chance; it occurred because financial policy was tacitly or even explicitly supportive of the private sector. This is one of the least known aspects of the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1988, the Chinese financial system became increasingly flexible as the reformers directed banks and RCCs to lend to the emerging private sector... (更多)

  The easing of the financing for rural private entrepreneurs did not occur by chance; it occurred because financial policy was tacitly or even explicitly supportive of the private sector. This is one of the least known aspects of the 1980s. Between 1980 and 1988, the Chinese financial system became increasingly flexible as the reformers directed banks and RCCs to lend to the emerging private sector. They also introduced proactive reforms of financial institutions by reducing state controls RCCs and permitting entry by private players.

  (收起)

  2012-02-15 14:42:39   回应

  收藏

  推荐
• 

  第139页

  bigben523

  In the 1990s numerous rural entrepreneurs who had been forced to tap into or organize underground financing because of massive inadequacies of China's banking system were arrested......This practice, widespread in the 1980s and a legitimate source of start-up capital for many TVEs, now ran into the iron fist of the Chinese financial regulators determined to stamp out all forms of informal finance. (更多)

  In the 1990s numerous rural entrepreneurs who had been forced to tap into or organize underground financing because of massive inadequacies of China's banking system were arrested......This practice, widespread in the 1980s and a legitimate source of start-up capital for many TVEs, now ran into the iron fist of the Chinese financial regulators determined to stamp out all forms of informal finance.

  (收起)

  2012-02-15 14:19:11   回应

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