快！乐！反驳！

Thinking this way avoids the model of thinking about being and non-being which derives from the ancient Greek philosopher Parmenides, namely the model in which thinking is assumed to func-tion in the same way as perception. Tugendhat argues (1992) that Hegel falls prey to this model. In perceiving an object, one either, for example, hears something or one hears nothing, so that there is indeed either being or nothing, which seem to be polar opposites. However, if we take this as a model for thinking about existence and non-existence, the result is that 'thinking x is not' - 'unicorns don't exist' - is falsely equated with 'thinking nothing'. The obvious con-sequence of this is the unanswerable question 'What doesn't exist, then?' One seems to be assuming something (the existence of uni-corns), and denying it at the same time. The wider importance of this issue becomes more apparent if we make the claim, for example, that 'race does not exist', where the racist can accuse us of presupposing what we are trying to deny.
本源主义的反驳：思考‘’事物不存在‘’并不等同于思考‘’无‘’，对事物存在的否定是基于对事物的存在之上的，而对无的叙述并非阐明而只是叙述。故而在此，存在依然是最原初的东西，黑格尔对逻辑同一性预设的去除也不再成立。（待补：同一与阐明对应的英文）