p. 34, p. 41. Skow评Neo-Davidsonians对events和states的区分，以及Kim

Parsons对events和states的区分是：events可以culminate或finish，而states不能。Skow认为这个区分难以理解，而且欠缺启发，他还碎碎念地做了个改进版本：event的独特之处不在于they can finish，而在于they can happen。
对于Kim，一方面，Skow认为Kim的“event”概念，其实是介于Skow本书所谓events和states之间的一个中性术语，event和states并未被严格区分。另一方面，Kim的The “existence condition” of his “property exemplification account of events”是说：“Event [x, P, t]existsjustin case the substance x has the property P at time t” (1993, 35)。这显然不符合Skow对events correspond only to non-stative pridicate的规定（尽管它们都是三元的）。因此Kim is wrong。
我可能会倾向于觉得Skow在这里只是拿着锤子找钉子。下文（p. 44）马上就说“it would be too much to expect me to have a completely adequate theory of background conditions”（别指望我有个完全充分的background conditions理论），实在哭笑不得。
p. 34:
But before I say more, it’s worth asking Neo-Davidsonians if they have views on the metaphysical differences between events and states. I have not found them very helpful here. Parsons takes a stab at listing some differences in his (1990, 20–1). For example he claims that only events can culminate, or finish; states cannot. (To be precise, the claim is that if something that is either an event or state culminated, it is an event; he does not say that every kind of event can culminate.) Now “culminate” is a technical term, and I’m not sure what it means, so the claim about culmination isn’t much help. What about the claim about finishing? It’s not helpful either. The problem is that Parsons uses “finish” as an intransitive verb. He wants to say that, since a stabbing can finish, stabbings are events. But I can’t make sense of “The stabbing finished” when I’m told “finish” is to be understood intransitively. Of course, if I’m allowed to interpret “finish” transitively, then I can make sense of the target sentence by supplying a missing object: certainly a stabbing can finish happening.Butthenitlookslike what is distinctive of events is not that they can finish, but that they can happen. And the claim that what sets events apart from states is that only they can happen, while true, isn’t very illuminating.
p. 41:
Kim’s theory is false because it fails to entail the existence of events that it certainly should. Kim at one point addressed the objection that his view cannot beright, the existence of an event cannot consist in something’s having a property, since events involve change, but having a property does not involve change. Kim replied: “some properties already imply changes in the substance that has them; for example, fading in color, falling, and freezing” (34). Kim is arguing thathistheorydoesentailtheexistenceofsucheventsasfreezings, because the requisite property exists. He tries to identify the property by using the word “freezing.” But there is no such property as “the property of freezing” that something has iff it is (in the process of) freezing.15 Kim’s theory says that there is a freezing here where this water is iff this water has “the property of freezing”; 16 sincethereisa freezing here, but the water does not have this property (there is no such property), Kim’s theory is false. 
While there is no such property as the property of freezing, there is the act of freezing, and water that is freezing is engaged in this act. The counterexample does not work if your theory links the existence of events, not to the having of properties, but to the engaging-in of acts, as mine does.
note 16: Technically, Kim’s theory says that the event [this portion of water, the property of freezing, now] exists (not: a freezing exists) iff this portion of water now has the property of freezing. But presumably the event [this portion of water, the property of freezing, now], if it exists, is a freezing.