Bachelard’s topophilicorientation, as he calls it, limits him to those “spaces we love,” to “quite simple images of felicitous space” (xxxi). As such, even where he focuses on the real spaces within a house, such as the cellar or the wardrobe, he is always most interested in the individual subject’s imaginative response to the experience of those spaces. Attached to the domestic space’s protective value,which can be a positive one, are also imagined values, “which soon become dominant” (xxxi–xxxii).
Given the significance that he attaches to reverie, memory, and space for the individual psychologicalsubject, Bachelard suggests topoanalysis as a necessary supplement to psychoanalysis (8)...Hence, the experience of time is actually frozen in discrete moments in our memory, photographic or spatial arrangements, such that space assumes a greater importance than a temporality that is no longer understood in terms of a fluvial metaphor. In his assessment of Bachelard’s argument, David Harvey concludes, “if it is true that time is always memorialized not as flow, but as memories of experienced places and spaces, then history must indeed give way to poetry, time to space, as the fundamental material of social expression”(1990: 218). （the interior spaces of the mind and the imagination, less attuned to the geographic or cartographic projects）
Space, here meaning social space, is not the empty container of Cartesian or Kantian thought, but a social product made possible by human effort. ➡️“(social) space is a (social) product” (1991: 30)
Is space a social relationship? Certainly—but one which is inherent to property relationships (especially the ownership of the earth, of land) and also closely bound up with the forces of production (which impose a form on that earth or land); here we see the polyvalence of social space, its“reality” at once formal and material. Though a product to be used,to be consumed, it is also a means of production; networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy fashion space and are determined by it. Thus the means of production, produced assuch, cannot be separated either from the social division of labour which shapes it, or from the state and the superstructures of society. (1991: 85)
Lefebvre establishes a “conceptual triad” related to the various ways in which we experience and represent social space. The three elements of this triad are spatial practice, representations of space, and representational spaces, and they correspond to three modes of being and apprehending space, respectively the domains of the perceived, the conceived, and the lived (Lefebvre 1991: 33–40).
Foucault’s historical analysis of power and knowledge draws heavily upon a discourse of spatiality, which appears only sometimes metaphorically, as in his use of the phrase, “carcerelarchipelago,” in Discipline and Punish (1977; originally 1975), and at others quite literally, as in his careful discussion of panopticism in the same book. In his earliest “archaeologies” of madness,sickness, and the human sciences more generally, Foucault employed methods that uncovered the layers of sedimented knowledge in order to pinpoint the “birth” of the asylum, theclinic, or the human sciences at large. He identified the spatialsignificance of the order of things, both in a geographical sense,such as the movement from exile to enclosure as public responses to appearance of contagious diseases in a population, and in a more abstract sense, as with the collection and organization of data into charts or tables. Later, with his genealogical researches into the disciplinary formations of individuality and the history ofsexuality, he mapped the mobile circuitry of power relations in a distinctly spatial array, even as the trajectory of his historical narrative enfolded the spaces upon each other. Deleuze, in his review of Discipline and Punish, famously named Foucault a“new cartographer,” one who maps social forces organized intodiagrams, which Deleuze claims is “a map, or several super-imposed maps” (Deleuze 1988: 44).
在《另类空间》一文中，福柯将巴什拉在《空间的诗学》和其他论著中分析的内部空间与我们生活的外部空间（I'espace du dehors）区分开来，而外部空间构成了我们的生活、我们的时间和我们的历史。正如福柯所说，“这个啃咬着、抓挠着我们的空间”是一个异质的空间（Foucault 1986：23）。他的权力绘图他对这个异质空间的耐心而引人入胜的分析——这个空间将个人和群体形塑为主体，同时也代表着一个社会力量在其中流动的动态环境——在他对特定社会机构，尤其是精神病院、诊所和监狱的研究中显现出来引自 文学史的新空间 126
For Jameson’s Marxist analysis these types of space “are all the result of a discontinuous expansion of quantum leaps in the enlargement of capital” (1991: 410). Like Foucault, Jameson finds that the organization of social space is subject to discontinuous changes or ruptures, which then call for new ways of mapping. Unlike Foucault, however, Jameson’s understanding of these shifting social and spatial forms is rooted in the material processes and functions of capital itself, rather than in what Jameson somewhat dismissively refers to as “that shadowy and mythical entity Foucault called ‘power’” (410), a complaint that Lefebvre would likely share. Jameson understands capital itself to be the motive force behind spatial and political order, and the nearly unrepresentable space in which we find ourselves situated at any given moment must be grasped in connection with such vital economic relations as labour, wages, monetary policies and financialization.
Deleuze opposes Spinoza’s conception of Being to the Cartesian theory of sub-stances that, like the agricultural or statist model, distributes elements of Being by dividing them into fixed categories,demarcating territories and fencing them off from one another. He notes that the statist or Cartesian distribution of Being is rooted in the agricultural need to set proprietary boundaries and fix stable domains. Alternatively, there is “a completely otherdistribution, which must be called nomadic, a nomad nomos,without property, enclosure or measure,” that does not involve“a division of that which is distributed but rather a division among those who distribute themselves in an open space—a space which is unlimited, or at least without precise limits” (Deleuze1994: 36).
Deleuze’s nomad versus state spaces must not be confused with the simpler idea of liberated versus repressive spaces or even something like de Certeau’s mobile pedestrians versus the eye of power gazing down from above.Indeed, as Deleuze and Guattari state, “smooth spaces are not in themselves liberatory. But the struggle is changed or displaced in them, and life reconstitutes its stakes, confronts new obstacles,invents new paces, switches adversaries. Never believe that smooth space will suffice to save us” (500).
表示其中内容是对原文的摘抄