Page 338

Since different segments of any country’s population have different preferences over selection institutions, we know that there are always people in a society who, given free reign, would rather change how leaders are chosen. This means that there also must always be others who would rather block such changes in order to preserve their personal benefits from current arrangements. Indeed, every society adopts methods of preventing the existence of free reign over institution selection. Such free reign is part of what Hobbes had in mind when he described the state of nature. Some societies erect orderly methods of change that revolve around the rule of law and focus specifically on amending constitutions. In other societies, a common means of preventing alterations in selection institutions is by oppressing those who are dissatisfied with current arrangements.
Members of the selectorate outside the winning coalition are always willing to support the challenger in the model because his challenge offers some hope of entering the winning coalition. Leaders can use oppression to discourage this source of support for the challenger. The intensity and magnitude of oppression of the selectorate should rise as the prospect of joining the winning coalition becomes more attractive to selectors. That is, a leader has the greatest incentive to oppress selectors when the selectors stand to gain the most from unseating her. Since the difference in welfare between selectors inside and outside the coalition is equivalent to the value of private goods, the leader’s incentive to oppress the selectorate is highest when institutions promote high levels of private goods, namely, small-W systems, particularly those with small S. Hence oppression of the selectorate should be more common in juntas and monarchies than in rigged-election autocracies and democracies.