……许多人因为有一种确信存在自由意愿的特殊感觉而反对心理的全盘决定论。这种深信不疑的感觉存在着，在决定论信仰面前毫不退缩。与一切正常感觉一样，这种感觉必然由一种根据支持着。但据我目前所能观察到的，这种感觉在意愿的重大决定中无法表露：在这种情况中，此感觉只是一种心理冲动，而我们很乐意为了我们自己实行它……另一方面，只有在芝麻小事里，在可此可彼的决定中，我们才相信自己原也能那么做，我们有自由意志能任意而行，得无因的果。根据我们的分析，驳斥这种自由意愿的感觉是毫无必要的。如果我们考虑到有意识动机同无意识动机之间的分别，我们对自由意愿的确信就会提醒我们有意识动机并非适用于所有原动的决定。但剩下的一部分决定可以从另一方面，从无意识中获得动机，如此，精神领域的命定论依然完整无缺。
Many people, as is well known, contest the assumption of complete psychical determinism by appealing to a special feeling of conviction that there is a free will.
This feeling of conviction exists; and it does not give way before a belief in determinism.
Like every normal feeling it must have something to warrant it. But so far as I can observe, it does not manifest itself in the great and important decisions of the will: on these occasions the feeling that we have is rather one of psychical compulsion, and we are glad to invoke it on our behalf. (‘Here I stand: I can do no other.’)
On the other hand, it is precisely with regard to the unimportant, indifferent decisions that we would like to claim that we could just as well have acted otherwise: that we have acted of our free - and unmotivated - will.
According to our analyses it is not necessary to dispute the right to the feeling of conviction of having a free will.
If the distinction between conscious and unconscious motivation is taken into account, our feeling of conviction informs us that conscious motivation does not extend to all our motor decisions....
But what is thus left free by the one side receives its motivation from the other side, from the unconscious; and in this way determination in the psychical sphere is still carried out without any gap.引自 第十二章：决定论、偶然与迷信之信仰——一些观点
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