第50页

It’s more art than science.
【与领导相同，投资与其说是一项科学或技术，不如说是一门艺术。】
Importantly, a philosophy like mine comes from going through life with your eyes open. You must be aware of what’s taking place in the world and of what results those events lead to. Only in this way can you put the lessons to work when similar circumstances materialize again. Failing to do this—more than anything else—is what dooms most investors to being victimized repeatedly by cycles of boom and bust.
【你必须对世界上正在发生什么以及发生的事情都有怎样的结果了如指掌，这样你就能对你工作或生活中遇到的类似的事情知道该怎么办。否则，你就会陷入许多厄运和怪圈，而这些厄运和怪圈在历史上早已发生过，甚至已经得到过证实。】
Experience is what you got when you didn’t get what you wanted.
【你没有得到你所预期的，你就获得了经验。】

>>Second-Level Thinking
Remember, your goal in investing isn’t to earn average returns; you want to do better than average.
If you’ll be satisfied with fair returns, why not invest passively in an index fund and save a lot of trouble?
【立志：你为什么要来投资，尤其是，你为什么要来投资风险更大的股票，而不是指数基金或债券一类？原因只有一个：你想要得到比平均收益更大的收益，因此你才会宁愿承担更大的风险、焦虑与烦恼。】
Different and better: that’s a pretty good description of second-level thinking.
【你需要与其它人思维方式不同，但是得到更好的结果。】
I agree that because investors work hard to evaluate every new piece of information, asset prices immediately reflect the consensus view of the information’s significance. I do not, however, believe the consensus view is necessarily correct.
【我相信投资者们努力评估每一信息的价值，这些共同观点立马反映在资产价格上，我只是不相信这些共同观点就必然是正确的。意即：可能有很大一群聪明人在为一件事情拼命努力，然而，这两点因素并不一定指向一个正确的结局。】

>>Understanding Market Efficiency
I don’t believe the notion of market efficiency deserves to be dismissed out of hand. In principle, it’s fair to conclude that if thousands of rational and numerate people gather information about an asset and evaluate it diligently and objectively, the asset’s price shouldn’t stray far from its intrinsic value. Mispricings shouldn’t be regularly extant, meaning it should be hard to beat the market.
【市场并不是那么容易打败，因为一大群聪明人在不停的估值并反映在市场上，资产的价格不会太偏离它的固有价值。但这并不意味着市场不能被打败，市场总有少数失效的时候。】
In the vocabulary of the theory, second-level thinkers depend on inefficiency.
【学会关注市场失效的时候，那会让你思考得不同，但是思考得更好。】
Inefficient markets do not necessarily give their participants generous returns. Rather, it’s my view that they provide the raw material—mispricings—that can allow some people to win and others to lose on the basis of differential skill. If prices can be very wrong, that means it’s possible to find bargains or overpay. For every person who gets a good buy in an inefficient market, someone else sells too cheap. One of the great sayings about poker is that “in every game there’s a fish. If you’ve played for 45 minutes and haven’t figured out who the fish is, then it’s you.” The same is certainly true of inefficient market investing.
【不可能所有的人都赢牌。如果你在一场牌局中玩了很久，却没发现谁输了，那么恭喜你，是你输了。投资也是如此，无效的市场只是给予了我们每一个人以机会，但并不代表你就一定能赢。你赢了，就一定有人输，你要争取做赢的那一个，不做输的那一个。】
Respect for efficiency says that before we embark on a course of action, we should ask some questions: have mistakes and mispricings been driven out through investors’ concerted efforts, or do they still exist, and why?
Think of it this way:
Why should a bargain exist despite the presence of thousands of investors who stand ready and willing to bid up the price of anything that’s too cheap?
If the return appears so generous in proportion to the risk, might you be overlooking some hidden risk?
Why would the seller of the asset be willing to part with it at a price from which it will give you an excessive return?
Do you really know more about the asset than the seller does?
If it’s such a great proposition, why hasn’t someone else snapped it up?
【我们需要认知到当下市场依然是无效的，因为市场很容易在我们未留意时就已经从无效变为有效了。你需要想这些问题：既然这么多投资者愿意去做一桩便宜买卖，这桩便宜买卖为何依然存在？如果看上去存在一个风险大大小于收益的买卖，是不是你忽视了什么潜在的风险？为什么卖主急于脱手一项你认为是绝好的资产？你对这桩买卖所了解的信息真的多于卖家吗？如果这真的是一桩好买卖，为什么只有你发现了，其它人没有趋之若骛？】
In short, I think theory should inform our decisions but not dominate them.
【理论的角色，是使我们做决定不偏离许多既有的固定规则，但却不是让这些既有固定规则限制我们，主导我们，阻扰我们。】

>>Value
To simplify (or oversimplify), all approaches to investing in company securities can be divided into two basic types: those based on analysis of the company’s attributes, known as “fundamentals,” and those based on study of the price behavior of the securities themselves. In other words, an investor has two basic choices: gauge the security’s underlying intrinsic value and buy or sell when the price diverges from it, or base decisions purely on expectations regarding future price movements.
【对公司证券的投资基本上分为两派：第一派主要针对公司的贡献，也就是我们说的“基本面”的分析，第二派主要针对证券本身的价格行为。换种方式说，作为一个投资者，我们有两种选择：或者估计公司的固有价值并在证券价格低于这个价值时买入，或者单纯的根据对未来价格走向的高效能做出决定。】
The way I see it, day traders considered themselves successful if they bought a stock at $10 and sold at $11, bought it back the next week at $24 and sold at $25, and bought it a week later at $39 and sold at $40. If you can’t see the flaw in this—that the trader made $3 in a stock that appreciated by $30—you probably shouldn’t read the rest of this book.
【日交易者将同一支股票10块钱买进11块卖出，再以24块买进25块卖出，再以39块买进40块卖出，他们就觉得自己真是成功了。但你得看出其中的破绽——他们本来可以在这支股票上赚30块，他们只赚了3块却得意洋洋！】
We are left with two approaches, both driven by fundamentals: value investing and growth investing. In a nutshell, value investors aim to come up with a security’s current intrinsic value and buy when the price is lower, and growth investors try to find securities whose value will increase rapidly in the future.
【要稳妥，我们只剩下两种选择了，这两种选择都基于基本面：价值投资与成长投资。总体说来，价值投资旨在投资于现有价格低于当今固有价值的证券，成长投资旨在投资于那些当前价值会急剧上涨的证券。】
What is it that makes a security—or the underlying company—valuable ? There are lots of candidates: financial resources, management, factories, retail outlets, patents, human resources, brand names, growth potential and, most of all, the ability to generate earnings and cash flow. In fact, most analytical approaches would say that all those other characteristics—financial resources, management, factories, retail outlets, patents, human resources, brand names and growth potential— are valuable precisely because they can translate eventually into earnings and cash flow.
【财政资源，管理，厂房，零售店，专利，人力资源，品牌名称，成长潜力，这些都能增加证券的价值。但最重要的，是其公司赚钱的能力和其现金流。实际上，之前提到的这些因素都转化为了赚钱的能力和现金流，因此才使公司增值。】
This makes it very difficult to hold, and to buy more at lower prices (which investors call “averaging down”), especially if the decline proves to be extensive. If you liked it at 60, you should like it more at 50 . . . and much more at 40 and 30. But it’s not that easy. No one’s comfortable with losses, and eventually any human will wonder, “Maybe it’s not me who’s right. Maybe it’s the market.” The danger is maximized when they start to think, “It’s down so much, I’d better get out before it goes to zero.” That’s the kind of thinking that makes bottoms . . . and causes people to sell there.
【一般人如果喜欢一支价位60的股票，他在股票持续下跌到50、40、30的时候还会那么泰然自若吗？假如下跌的趋势看上去还将持续很久，他会在股票下跌的时候持有，并觉得它更具有拥有的价值进而加仓吗？这很难。没人愿意看到资金无尽头的损失，他们会希望在股票见底之前脱身，假如人人都这样想，就会引起疯狂的抛售，进而股票很快触底，并开始回转。】

>>The Relationship Between Price and Value
Well bought is half sold.
【如果你非要在价高时候买入，你也得知道到时你会用一半的价格卖出的。】
Believe me, there’s nothing better than buying from someone who has to sell regardless of price during a crash. Many of the best buys we’ve ever made occurred for that reason. A couple of observations are in order, however:
You can’t make a career out of buying from forced sellers and selling to forced buyers; they’re not around all the time, just on rare occasions at the extremes of crises and bubbles.
Since buying from a forced seller is the best thing in our world, being a forced seller is the worst. That means it’s essential to arrange your affairs so you’ll be able to hold on—and not sell—at the worst of times. This requires both long-term capital and strong psychological resources.
【没有什么比从一个因为恐慌而不顾价格卖出的人手中接手买入更美好的事了，我们最成功的买卖都是在这时发生的。但这种时机并不多，通常都伴随着极端的危机与泡沫。正因为如此从这种人手里买入是最美好的事情，我们自己决不能成为这种人。这意味着我们必须在最艰难的时刻持仓，甚至逐渐重仓，这需要长线资金和强大的心理素质。】
The key is who likes the investment now and who doesn’t. Future price changes will be determined by whether it comes to be liked by more people or fewer people in the future.
Investing is a popularity contest, and the most dangerous thing is to buy something at the peak of its popularity.The safest and most potentially profitable thing is to buy something when no one likes it. Given time, its popularity, and thus its price, can only go one way: up.
【重点是知道谁喜欢这个投资，谁不喜欢。未来的价格由未来这个证券被更多人喜欢还是更少人喜欢。投资比的就是受欢迎度，最危险的事情就是在其欢迎度最高的时候买入，而最安全与最具获利潜力的事情就是在没人想要它的时候买入。假以时日，它的价格会与它的受欢迎度同步增长，因为它们只会增长。】
It’s essential to understand that fundamental value will be only one of the factors determining a security’s price on the day you buy it. Try to have psychology and technicals on your side as well.
【基本价值只是决定你买入价的一个因素，试着拥有自己的一套与技术分析。】
A few clever investors figure out (or perhaps even foresee) these truths, invest in the asset, and begin to show profits. Then others catch on to the idea—or just notice that people are making money—and they buy as well, lifting the asset’s price. But as the price rises further and investors become more inflamed by the possibility of easy money, they think less and less about whether the price is fair. It’s an extreme rendition of the phenomenon I described earlier: people should like something less when its price rises, but in investing they often like it more.
【一些有先见之明的投资者预知了未来行情，投资并获利。接着就有人跟着买，股票价格就会被抬高。但是随着价格上涨越多，投资者就会被这种容易生财的方式迷惑越多，因此更少的去真正考虑此时的价格是否是合适的。这就像我之前所说：人们常常在一样事物价格上涨时对其喜欢程度降低，但是在投资中他们却更喜欢它。这种喜欢是不明智的。】
The greater fool theory works only until it doesn’t.
【你看着大家赚钱你也赚，渐渐的大家都加入进来，这个买卖总有不赚钱的那一天。】
Here the problem is that using leverage—buying with borrowed money—doesn’t make anything a better investment or increase the probability of gains. It merely magnifies whatever gains or losses may materialize.
【当你运用财务杠杆赚钱时，并不意味着你就将赚得更多。赚得更多只关乎利润的绝对值，你用自己的钱或别人的钱投资，其结果不会改变，改变的仅仅是你将会取得的收益和承担的风险。如果你用别人的钱，在考虑你会履行承诺还给他们的情况下，只会增加你的风险，与此同时，将你的所得与所失都放大了。】
Selling for more than your asset’s worth. Everyone hopes a buyer will come along who’s willing to overpay for what they have for sale. But certainly the hoped-for arrival of this sucker can’t be counted on. Unlike having an underpriced asset move to its fair value, expecting appreciation on the part of a fairly priced or overpriced asset requires irrationality on the part of buyers that absolutely cannot be considered dependable.
Buying something for less than its value. In my opinion, this is what it’s all about—the most dependable way to make money. Buying at a discount from intrinsic value and having the asset’s price move toward its value doesn’t require serendipity; it just requires that market participants wake up to reality. When the market’s functioning properly, value exerts a magnetic pull on price.
【在固有价值之下的价格买入，在固有价值之上的价格卖出，这是最稳妥的方式。与其期盼股票在高位继续上涨，不如等待它从低位恢复其固有价值，因为这并不需要什么奇迹出现，市场总会恢复其有效性。】
Of all the possible routes to investment profit, buying cheap is clearly the most reliable. Even that, however, isn’t sure to work. You can be wrong about the current value. Or events can come along that reduce value. Or deterioration in attitudes or markets can make something sell even further below its value. Or the convergence of price and intrinsic value can take more time than you have; as John Maynard Keynes pointed out, “The market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.”
Trying to buy below value isn’t infallible, but it’s the best chance we have.
【在低位买入是最稳妥的方式，但不一定保证它一定成功。你得对公司当下的固有价值正确估计。有些当下发生的事会减少其固有价值。市场恶化，情绪低落，这些会导致股票恢复原值的时间比你预计的长，说不定你会在这之前资金断链。然而无论如何，在低位买入仍然是最好的方式。】