KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM IN MORAL THEORY

罗尔斯在这里所说的康德式的建构主义（Kantian Constructivism），主要强调的是，客观性（Objectivity）可以通过无知之幕（veil of ignorance）等一系列程序建构出来，而不必如道德直觉主义一样需要一个先天的道德秩序（moral order）。这里的客观性并不是一种认识论意义上的，而是植根于我们对于自我概念和与之的关系之中的。
Kantian constructivism holds that moral objectivity is to be understood in terms of a suitably constructed social point of view that all can accept. Apart from the procedure of constructing the principles of justice, there are no moral facts.

罗尔斯提出了三个model-conceptions，即，一个良序社会（a well-ordered society），一个道德的个人（a moral person），以及原初地位（original position）。前两者是基本的，第三个则是二者的衔接。

关于原初地位：
This situation is the original position: we conjecture that the fairness of the circumstances under which agreement is reached transfers to the principles of justice agreed to; since the original position situates free and equal moral persons fairly with respect to one another, any conception of justice they adopt is likewise fair. Thus the name: 'justice as fairness'.

这一些概念在罗尔斯的《正义论》都有阐述，实际上无须在赘述。

文中另外一对重要的概念是Rational&Reasonable，后者较前者具有优先性：
Let us pull together these remarks as follows: the Reasonable presupposes and subordinates the Rational...The Reasonable presupposes the Rational, because, without conceptions of the good that move members of the group, there is no point to social cooperation nor to notions of right and justice, even though such cooperation realizes values that go beyond what conceptions of the good specify taken alone. The Reasonable subordinates the Rational because its principles limit, and in a Kantian doctrine limit absolutely, the final ends that can be pursued. Thus, in the original position

第二部分主要就是针对Objectivity的论述，主要以针对西季威克为代表的流派的批评与反驳展开。