第82页 RENAUD BARBARAS. Perception and Movement: The End of the Metaphysical Approach
- 章节名：RENAUD BARBARAS. Perception and Movement: The End of the Metaphysical Approach
- 页码：第82页 2016-06-10 21:48:17
In fact, we should say ontological reduction, for Merleau-Ponty explains that the opacity that is peculiar to the perceived world is no longer a consequence of consciousness embodiment but a feature of Being itself. The classical conception of perception attributed the opacity, the depth of the perceived world to its dependence on organs of sense, that is, to consciousness embodiment. This is the reason why perception was considered an inferior mode of knowledge, the mere expression of our finitude, as, for example, in Descartes. Likewise, the fact of referring perception to consciousness, as he does in the Phenomenology of Perception, leads Merleau-Ponty to interpret the obscurity of the perceived world as the negation of a possible transparence, of an attainable knowledge. On the contrary, in The Visible and the Invisible, the withdrawal of the perceived world is interpreted as an essential feature of Being, which is part of its way of existing. Thus, strictly speaking, it is not because we are embodied consciousnesses that the perceived world is distant; it is rather because perceived being implies an essential distance that our experience is partly obscure, that is, embodied. The finitude of experience is founded on the transcendence of the perceived world or, rather, both of these dimensions are expressions of the same ontological event. 臥槽。 p87 We are now in a position to understand to what extent the Merleau- Pontian philosophy of perception and its development into an ontology is dependent on an interpretation of the history of metaphysics. By understanding the real root of the objective attitude, which grounds both intellectualism and empiricism, Merleau-Ponty manages to overcome the limitations of the Phenomenology of Perception. This insight, borrowed from Bergson, consists of a specific way of thinking the relation between Being and nothingness. To the extent that Merleau-Ponty rejects the fact of silhouetting Being against nothingness, he discovers a new meaning of Being which he defines as an irreducible transcendence, of which Being and nothingness are abstract dimensions. From this point on, Merleau-Ponty was in a position to renounce any conception of subjectivity as a positive entity and to inquire into a new meaning for it as correlated with that transcendence. My hypothesis is that Merleau-Ponty, when he died, was about to give up completely the philosophy of representation and consciousness, on which he had remained dependent, and, therefore, was about to elaborate a far more radical conception of perceiving subjectivity as self-movement, a conception that would have referred, ultimately, to a conception of the Self as desire.
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