- 页码：第1页 2018-06-11 05:33:46
2016-01-20 10:04:45 I want to spoil the joke, so I’ll give away the punch line: the average expert was roughly as accurate as a dart-throwing chimpanzee.
2016-01-20 21:10:04 Unpredictability and predictability coexist uneasily in the intricately interlocking systems that make up our bodies, our societies, and the cosmos. How predictable something is depends on what we are trying to predict, how far into the future, and under what circumstances.
2016-01-21 09:46:49 The other conclusion is what makes these superforecasters so good. It’s not really who they are. It is what they do. Foresight isn’t a mysterious gift bestowed at birth. It is the product of particular ways of thinking, of gathering information, of updating beliefs. These habits
2016-01-21 09:46:59 of thought can be learned and cultivated by any intelligent, thoughtful, determined person.
2016-01-21 09:49:24 But another discovery of that research didn’t receive nearly as much attention even though it was far more important: one group of experts had modest but real foresight.
2016-01-22 13:56:45 If I ask, “Why did you buy that car?” you can trot out reasons: “Good mileage. Cute
2016-01-22 13:56:51 style. Great price.” But you can only share thoughts by introspecting; that is, by turning your attention inward and examining the contents of your mind. And introspection can only capture a tiny fraction of the complex processes whirling inside your head—and behind your decisions.
2016-01-22 20:30:28 He speculated that intelligence and knowledge would improve forecasting but the benefits would taper off fast.
2016-01-23 11:08:46 As anyone who has done media training knows, the first rule is “keep it simple, stupid.”
2016-01-23 12:23:32 I failed because I only looked at the problem from one perspective—the perspective of logic.
2016-01-23 12:24:10 What I should have done is look at the problem from both perspectives—the perspectives of both logic and psycho-logic—and combine what I saw.
2016-01-23 19:11:36 “Here’s a very simple example,” says Annie Duke, an elite professional poker player, winner of the World Series of Poker, and a former PhD-level student of psychology. “Everyone who plays poker knows you can either fold, call, or raise [a bet]. So what will happen is that when a player who isn’t an expert sees another player raise, they automatically assume that that player is strong, as if the size of the bet is somehow correlated at one with the strength of the other person’s hand.” This is a mistake. Duke teaches poker and to get her students to see like dragonflies she walks them through a game situation. A hand is dealt. You like your cards. In the first of several rounds of betting, you wager a certain amount. The other player immediately raises your bet substantially. Now, what do you think the other player has? Duke has taught thousands of students “and universally, they say ‘I think they have a really strong hand.’” So then she asks them to imagine the same situation, except they’re playing against her. The cards are dealt. Their hand is more than strong—it’s unbeatable. Duke makes her bet. Now, what will you do? Will you raise her bet? “And they say to me, ‘Well, no.’” If they raise, Duke may conclude their hand is strong and fold.
2016-01-23 19:13:07 They don’t want to scare her off. They want Duke to stay in for each of the rounds of betting so they can expand the pot as much as possible before they scoop it up. So they won’t raise. They’ll only call. Duke then walks them through the same hypothetical with a hand that is beatable but still very strong. Will you raise? No. How about a little weaker hand that is still a likely winner? No raise. “They would never raise with any of these really great hands because they don’t want to chase me away.” Then Duke asks them: Why did you assume that an opponent who raises the bet has a strong hand if you would not raise with the same strong hand? “And it’s not until I walk them
2016-01-23 19:13:11 through the exercise,” Duke says, that people realize they failed to truly look at the table from the perspective of their opponent.
2016-01-23 19:26:40 A novice may overestimate the probability that the next card will win her the hand, bet big, get lucky, and win, but winning doesn’t retroactively make her foolish bet wise. Conversely, a pro may correctly see that there is a high probability of winning the hand, bet big, get unlucky, and lose, but that doesn’t mean her bet was unwise. Good poker players, investors, and executives all understand this. If they don’t, they can’t remain good at what they do—because they will draw false lessons from experience, making their judgment worse over time.
2016-01-25 19:31:23 illusion of control,
2016-01-25 19:31:27 illusion of prediction
2016-01-26 08:43:09 So regression to the mean is an indispensable tool for testing the role of luck in performance. “Slow reversion is consistent with activities dominated by
2016-01-26 08:43:18 skill,” Mauboussin noted, “while rapid reversion comes from luck being the more dominant influence.”15
2016-01-26 08:53:35 Note three things. First, the big jumps in intelligence and knowledge are from the public to the forecasters, not from forecasters to superforecasters. Second, although superforecasters are well above average, they did not
2016-01-26 08:53:41 score off-the-charts high and most fall well short of so-called genius territory, a problematic concept often arbitrarily defined as the top 1%, or an IQ of 135 and up.
2016-01-26 21:22:16 “Need for cognition” is the psychological term for the tendency to engage in and enjoy hard mental slogs.
2016-01-26 21:22:39 An element of personality is also likely involved. In personality psychology, one of the “Big Five” traits is “openness to experience,” which has various dimensions, including preference for variety and intellectual curiosity.
2016-01-28 09:38:22 So finding meaning in events is positively correlated with well-being but negatively correlated with foresight.
2016-01-28 09:39:18 superforecasters often tackle questions in a roughly similar way—one that any of us can follow: Unpack the question into components. Distinguish as sharply as you can between the known and unknown and leave no assumptions unscrutinized. Adopt the outside view
2016-01-28 09:39:32 and put the problem into a comparative perspective that downplays its uniqueness and treats it as a special case of a wider class of phenomena. Then adopt the inside view that plays up the uniqueness of the problem.
2016-01-28 11:39:03 Keynes quotation about changing your mind in light of changed facts
2016-01-28 11:41:37 The Yale professor Dan Kahan has done much research showing that our judgments about risks—Does gun control make us safer or put us in danger?—are driven less by a careful weighing of evidence than by our identities, which is why people’s views on gun control often correlate with their views on climate change, even though the two issues have no logical connection to each other.
2016-01-28 17:56:49 A forecaster who doesn’t adjust her views in light of new information won’t capture the value of that information, while a forecaster who is so impressed by the new information that he bases his forecast entirely on it will lose the value of the old information that underpinned his prior forecast. But the forecaster who carefully balances old and new captures the value in both—and puts it into her new forecast. The best way to do that is by updating often but bit by bit.
2016-01-29 09:18:55 We need “tacit knowledge,” the sort we only get from bruising experience
2016-01-29 09:25:55 Once we know the outcome of something, that knowledge skews our
2016-01-29 09:26:05 perception of what we thought before we knew the outcome: that’s hindsight bias.
2016-01-29 21:59:28 For the same reason a college student might take all the toughest courses with the hardest-grading professors: she cared more about learning than getting top grades. “I am always trying to grow, to learn, to change,
2016-01-30 06:24:18 precision questioning
2016-01-30 10:15:33 All this brings us to the final feature of winning teams: the fostering of a culture of sharing.
2016-01-31 13:16:51 How can leaders be confident, and inspire confidence, if they see nothing as certain?
2016-01-31 13:23:02 “The first criterion in war remains decisive action.”
2016-01-31 13:23:25 The Wehrmacht also drew a sharp line between deliberation and implementation: once a decision has been made, the mindset changes. Forget uncertainty and complexity. Act!
2016-01-31 13:24:18 The art of leadership consists of the timely recognition of circumstances and of the moment when a new decision is required.”7
2016-01-31 13:25:04 Auftragstaktik blended strategic coherence and decentralized decision making with a simple principle: commanders were to tell subordinates what their goal is but not how to achieve it.
2016-01-31 13:28:12 Despite the evil nature of the regime that it served,” noted the historian James Corum, “it must be admitted that the Germany Army of World War II was, man for man, one of the most effective fighting forces ever
2016-01-31 13:28:16 seen.”14
2016-02-01 09:06:25 Never tell people how to do things,” he wrote, succinctly capturing the spirit of Auftragstaktik: “Tell them what to do, and they will surprise you with their ingenuity.”17
2016-02-01 09:16:33 The humility required for good judgment is not self-doubt—the sense that you are untalented, unintelligent, or unworthy. It is intellectual humility.
2016-02-01 09:17:24 Understanding what worked in the Wehrmacht requires engaging in the toughest of all forms of perspective taking: acknowledging that something we despise possesses impressive qualities.
2016-02-01 09:22:35 Kahneman cut to the chase: “Do you see them as different kinds of people, or as people who do different kinds of things?”
2016-02-01 09:22:53 What makes them so good is less what they are than what they do—the hard work of research, the careful thought and self-criticism, the gathering and synthesizing of other perspectives, the granular judgments and relentless updating.
2016-02-01 23:23:06 scope insensitivity.
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