《The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order》的笔记-第1页
笨笨的猪 (We are what we read)
- 页码：第1页 2018-12-01 21:27:14
P020: Michael Dibdin's novel, Dead Lagoon: “There can be no true friends without true enemies. Unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we are.”
P020: The central theme of this book is that culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world. The five parts of this book elaborate corollaries to this main proposition.
Part I: For the first time in history global politics is both multipolar and multi-civilizational; modernization is distinct from Westernization and is producing neither a universal civilization in any meaningful sense nor the Westernization of non-Western societies.
Part II: The balance of power among civilizations is shifting: the West is declining in relative influence; Asian civilizations are expanding their economic, military, and political strength; Islam is exploding demographically with destabilizing consequences for Muslim countries and their neighbors; and non-Western civilizations generally are reaffirming the value of their own cultures.
Part III: A civilization-based world order is emerging: societies sharing cultural affinities cooperate with each other; efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful; and countries group themselves around the lead or core states o f their civilization.
Part IV: The West's universalist pretensions increasingly bring it into conflict with other civilizations, most seriously with Islam and China; at the local level fault line wars, largely between Muslims and non-Muslims, generate "kin-country rallying," the threat of broader escalation, and hence efforts by core states to halt these wars.
Part V: The survival of the West depends on Americans reaffirming their Western identity and Westerners accepting their civilization as unique not universal and uniting to renew and preserve it against challenges from nonWestern societies. Avoidance of a global war of civilizations depends on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the multi-civilizational character of global politics.
P030: Simplified paradigms or maps are indispensable for human thought and action. On the one hand, we may explicitly formulate theories or models and consciously use them to guide our behavior. Alternatively, we may deny the need for such guides and assume that we will act only in terms of specific "objective" facts, dealing with each case "on its merits." If we assume this, however, we delude ourselves. For in the back of our minds are hidden assumptions, biases, and prejudices that determine how we perceive reality, what facts we look at, and how we judge their importance and merits. We need explicit or implicit models so as to be able to:
1. order and generalize about reality;
2. understand causal relationships among phenomena;
3. anticipate and, if we are lucky, predict future developments;
4. distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; and
5. show us what paths we should take to achieve our goals.
P045: The major contemporary civilization are as follows:
- Western. The term "the West" is now universally used to refer to what used to be called Western Christendom. The West is thus the only civilization identified by a compass direction and not by the name of a particular people, religion, or geographical area. This identification lifts the civilization out of its historical, geographical, and cultural context.
- Latin American
Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations, and, as Christopher Dawson said, "the great religions are the foundations on which the great civilizations rest.
P048：What about Jewish civilization? Most scholars of civilization hardly mention it. In terms of numbers of people Judaism clearly is not a major civilization. Toynbee describes it as an arrested civilization which evolved out of the earlier Syriac civilization. It is historically affiliated with both Christianity and Islam, and for several centuries Jews maintained their cultural identity within Western, Orthodox, and Islamic civilizations. With the creation of Israel, Jews have all the objective accoutrements of a civilization: religion, language, customs, literature, institutions, and a territorial and political home. But what about subjective identification? Jews living in other cultures have distributed themselves along a continuum stretching from total identification with Judaism and Israel to nominal Judaism and full identification with the civilization within which they reside, the latter, however, occurring primarily among Jews living in the West. See Mordecai M. Kaplan, Judaism as a Civilization (Philadelphia: Reconstructionist Press, 1981; originally published 1934), esp. 173-208.
P065: Yet this 20.7 percent increase in nonbelievers is closely matched by a 19.0 percent decrease in those classified as adherents of "Chinese folk-religions" from 23.5 percent in 1900 to 4.5 percent in 1980. These virtually equal increases and decreases suggest that with the advent of communism the bulk of China's population was simply reclassified from folk-religionist to non-believing. In the long run, however, Mohammed wins out. Christianity spreads primarily by conversion, Islam by conversion and reproduction. The percentage of Christians in the world peaked at about 30 percent in the 1980s, leveled off, is now declining, and will probably approximate about 25 percent of the world's population by 2025. As a result of their extremely high rates of population growth (see chapter 5), the proportion of Muslims in the world will continue to increase dramatically, amounting to 20 percent of the world's population about the turn of the century, surpassing the number of Christians some years later, and probably accounting for about 30 percent of the world's population by 2025. #碎碎念#这话说的，基督教只靠皈依？没有武力行吗？
First, there is the assumption, discussed in chapter 1, that the collapse of Soviet communism meant the end of history and the universal victory of liberal democracy throughout the world. This argument suffers from the single alternative fallacy. It is rooted in the Cold War perspective that the only alternative to communism is liberal democracy and that the demise of the first produces the universality of the second. Obviously, however, there are many forms of authoritarianism, nationalism, corporatism, and market communism (as in China) that are alive and well in today's world. More significantly, there are all the religious alternatives that lie outside the world of secular ideologies. In the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people.
Second, there is the assumption that increased interaction among peoples - trade, investment, tourism, media, electronic communication generally - is generating a common world culture. Improvements in transportation and communications technology have indeed made it easier and cheaper to move money, goods, people, knowledge, ideas, and images around the world.
Another study argues that high levels of economic interdependence "can be either peace-inducing or war-inducing, depending on the expectations of future trade." Economic interdependence fosters peace only "when states expect that high trade levels will continue into the foreseeable future." If states do not expect high levels of interdependence to continue, war is likely to result.
The failure of trade and communications to produce peace or common feeling is consonant with the findings of social science. In social psychology, distinctiveness theory holds that people define themselves by what makes them different from others in a particular context,
From sociology, globalization theory produces a similar conclusion: "in an increasingly globalized world — characterized by historically exceptional degrees of civilizational, societal and other modes of interdependence and widespread consciousness thereof — there is an exacerbation of civilizational, societal and ethnic self-consciousness." The global religious revival, "the return to the sacred," is a response to people's perception of the world as "a single place."
The third and most general argument for the emergence of a universal civilization sees it as the result of the broad processes of modernization that have been going on since the eighteenth century. Modernization involves industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of literacy, education, wealth, and social mobilization, and more complex and diversified occupational structures. It is a product of the tremendous expansion of scientific and engineering knowledge beginning in the eighteenth century that made it possible for humans to control and shape their environment in totally unprecedented ways.
P069: What were these distinguishing characteristics of Western society during the hundreds of years before it modernized? There include the following:
- The classical legacy
- Religion: Catholicism and Protestantism
- European languages, is second only to religion as a factor distinguishing people of one culture from those of another.
- Separation of spiritual and temporal authority. Compared to other civilization, only in Hindu civilization were religion and politics also so distinctly separated. In Islam, God is Caesar; in China and Japan, Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is Caesar’s junior partner. This division of authority contributed immeasurably to the development of freedom in the West.
- Rule of law. The concept of the centrality of law to civilized existence was inherited from the Romans. The tradition of the rule of law laid the basis for constitutionalism and the protection of human rights, including property rights, against the exercise of arbitrary power. In most other civilization law was a much less important factor in shaping thought and behavior.
- Social pluralism. #碎碎念#多元的包容除了受历史沿革的民族性影响外，另外一个重要原因在于经济基础啊。没有钱，别说不同民族间了，兄弟都反目啊！
- Representative bodies. Social pluralism early gave rise to estates, parliaments, and other institutions to represent the interests of the aristocracy, clergy, merchants, and other groups.
- Individualism. Individualism developed in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and acceptance of the right of individual choice. Again and again both Westerners and non-Westerners point to individualism as the central distinguishing mark of the West.
P072: Responses to the West and Modernization(非西方国家对西方和现代化的回应)
The expansion of the West has promoted both the modernization and the Westernization of non-Western societies. The political and intellectual leaders of these societies have responded to the Western impact in one or more of 3 ways: 1)rejecting both modernization and Westernization; 2)embracing both; 3)embracing the first and rejecting the second.
- Rejectionism. Japan, China & Islam extreme fundamentalists. 1)Japan: Japanese rejectionist stance came to an end with the forcible opening of Japan by Commodore Perry in 1854 and the dramatic efforts to learn from the West following the Meiji Restoration in 1868. 2)China: Chinese isolation, like Japanese isolation, was brought to an end by Western arms, applied to China by the British in the Opium War of 1839 - 1842. 3)"Only the very most extreme fundamentalists," Daniel Pipes writes concerning Islam, "reject modernization as well as Westernization. ”
- Kemalism: Turkey. A second possible response to the West is Toynbee's Herodianism(汤因比的希律党人的主张，即拥护现代化和西方化), to embrace both modernization and Westernization. This response is based on the assumptions that modernization is desirable and necessary, that the indigenous culture is incompatible with modernization and must be abandoned or abolished, and that society must fully Westernize in order to successfully modernize. Modernization and Westernization reinforce each other and have to go together. #Mustafa Kemal Ataturk#
- Reformism: Japan, China & Egypt: In China in the last stages of the Ch'ing dynasty, the slogan was Ti-Yong, "Chinese learning for the fundamental principles, Western learning for practical use." In Japan it was Wakon, Yôsei, "Japanese spirit, Western technique." In Egypt in the 1830s Muhammad Ali "attempted technical modernization without excessive cultural Westernization."
Figure 3.1 diagrams these three courses of action. The rejectionist would remain at Point A; the Kemalist would move along the diagonal to Point B ; the reformer would move horizontally toward Point C. Along what path, however, have societies actually moved? Obviously each non-Western society has followed its own course, which may differ substantially from these three prototypical paths. Mazrui even argues that Egypt and Africa have moved toward Point D through a "painful process of cultural Westernization without technical modernization." To the extent that any general pattern of modernization and Westernization exists in the responses of non-Western societies to the West, it would appear to be along the curve A - E . Initially, Westernization and modernization are closely linked, with the non-Western society absorbing substantial elements of Western culture and making slow progress toward modernization. As the pace of modernization increases, however, the rate of Westernization declines and the indigenous culture goes through a revival. Further modernization then alters the civilizational balance of power between the West and the non-Western society and strengthens commitment to the indigenous culture.
In the early phases of change, Westernization thus promotes modernization. In the later phases, modernization promotes de-Westernization and the resurgence of indigenous culture in two ways. At the societal level, modernization enhances the economic, military, and political power of the society as a whole and encourages the people o f that society to have confidence in their culture and to become culturally assertive. At the individual level, modernization generates feelings of alienation and anomie as traditional bonds and social relations are broken and leads to crises of identity to which religion provides an answer. This causal flow is set forth in simple form in Figure 3.2.
Modernization, in short, does not necessarily mean Westernization. NonWestern societies can modernize and have modernized without abandoning their own cultures and adopting wholesale Western values, institutions, and practices. The latter, indeed, may be almost impossible: whatever obstacles non-Western cultures pose to modernization pale before those they pose to Westernization. It would, as Braudel observes, almost "be childish" to think that modernization or the "triumph of civilization in the singular" would lead to the end of the plurality of historic cultures embodied for centuries in the world's great civilizations. Modernization, instead, strengthens those cultures and reduces the relative power of the West. In fundamental ways, the world is becoming more modern and less Western.
P088: It appears probable that for most of history China had the world's largest economy. The diffusion of technology and the economic development of non-Western societies in the second half of the twentieth century are now producing a return to the historical pattern. This will be a slow process, but by the middle of the twenty-first century, if not before, the distribution of economic product and manufacturing output among the leading civilizations is likely to resemble that of 1800. The two-hundred-year Western "blip" on the world economy will be over.
P091: In the 2020s, a hundred years after that apogee in 1920, the West will probably control
- about 24 percent of the world's territory (down from a peak of 49 percent),
- 10 percent of the total world population(down from 48 percent), and perhaps 15 - 20 percent of the socially mobilized population,
- about 30 percent of the world's economic product (down from a peak of probably 70 percent), perhaps 25 percent of manufacturing output(down from a peak of 84 percent),
- and less than 10 percent of global military manpower (down from 45 percent).
P301: Societies that assume that their history has ended, however, are usually societies whose history is about to decline. It was with the Roman Empire, the Abbasid Caliphate, the Mughal Empire, and the Ottoman Empire.
P097: People do not live by reason alone. They cannot calculate and act rationally in pursuit of their self-interest until they define their self. Interest politics presupposes identity. 人们并不只靠理性活着。只有在界定了自我以后，他们在追求自身利益时才能理性地筹划和行动。利益政治以认同为先决条件。Whatever universalist goals they may have, religions give people identity by positing a basic distinction between believers and nonbelievers, between a superior in-group and a different and inferior out-group.
P099: Whether additional significant shifts in religious adherence occur elsewhere depends on the extent to which the prevailing religion is able to meet these needs. Given its emotional aridity, Confucianism appears particularly vulnerable. In China in the late 1980s, as economic growth was in full swing, Christianity also spread "particularly among young people." Perhaps 50 million Chinese are Christian. The government has attempted to prevent their increase by jailing ministers, missionaries, and evangelists, prohibiting and suppressing religious ceremonies and activities, and in 1994 passing a law that prohibits foreigners from proselytizing or setting up religious schools or other religious organizations and prohibits religious groups from engaging in independent or overseas-financed activities. #碎碎念#儒家缺乏“Emotional Aridity”-情感的干枯，具体包含什么？
P101: #解答来了#Participants in religious resurgence come from all walks of life but overwhelmingly from two constituencies, both urban and both mobile. 1)Recent migrants to the cities generally need emotional, social, and material support and guidance, which religious groups provide more than any other source. 2)Religion, indigenous or imported, provides meaning and direction for the rising elites in modernizing societies. “The attribution of value to a traditional religion,” Ronald Dore noted, “is a claim to parity of respect asserted against dominant-other-nations. It is a declaration of cultural independence from the West, a proud statement that: “We will be modern but we won’t be you.”
P104: Wealth, like power, is assumed to be proof of virtue, a demonstration of moral and cultural superiority.
P105: This Western orientation, however, commanded the support of neither the few hundred people who counted in Beijing nor the 800 million peasants who lived in the countryside. Total Westernization was no more practical at the end of the twentieth century than it had been at the end of the nineteenth century. The leadership instead chose a new version of Ti-Yong: capitalism and involvement in the world economy, on the one hand, combined with political authoritarianism and recommitment to traditional Chinese culture.
- Asians believe that East Asia will sustain its rapid economic development, will soon surpass the West in economic product, and hence will be increasingly powerful in world affairs compared to the West.
- Asians believe this economic success is largely a product of Asian culture(basically Confucian - Order, Discipline, Family Responsibility, Hard Work, Collectivism, Abstemiousness), which is superior to that of the West, which is culturally and socially decadent.
- While recognizing the differences among Asia societies and civilizations, East Asians argue that there are also significant commonalities.
- East Asians argue that Asian development and Asian values are models which other non-Western societies should emulate in the efforts to catch up with the West and which the West should adopt in order to renew itself.
To sum up, Powerful societies are universalistic; weak societies are particularistic. Cultural assertion follows material success; hard power generates soft power.
P120: #对美阿关系的展望#No society can sustain double digit economic growth indefinitely, neither religious revival or cultural movement lasts indefinitely. 在21世界20或30年代，穆斯林运动将会弱化，双方的敌对情况会减少。但是不会很亲密。Quasi war有可能被冷战，或是冷和平取代。
P125: Political boundaries increasingly are redrawn to coincide with cultural ones: ethnic, religious, and civilizational. Cultural communities are replacing Cold War blocs, and the fault lines between civilizations are becoming the central lines of conflict in global politics. In coping with identity crisis, what counts for people are blood and beliefs, faith and family. In a very fluid world, people are seeking identity and security. People are looking for roots and connections to defend themselves against the unknown.
P128: Why should cultural commonality facilitate cooperation and cohesion among people and cultural differences promote cleavage and conflicts? 文化间的求同存异困难的存在根源在于哪里？
1、First, everyone has multiple identities which may compete with or reinforce each other: kinship, occupational, cultural, institutional, territorial, educational, partisan, ideological, and others. Identifications along one dimension may clash with those along a different dimension. The increased salience of cultural identity at lower levels may well reinforce its salience at higher levels. 爱屋及乌嘛！
2、Second, the increased salience of cultural identity is in large part, the result of social-economic modernization at the individual level, where dislocation and alienation create the need for more meaningful identities, and at the societal level, where the enhanced capabilities and power of non-Western societies stimulate the revitalization of indigenous identities and culture. 在个人层面，随着经济的发展，人在追寻我是谁的问题？
3、Third, identity at any level — personal, tribal, racial, civilizational — can only be defined in relation to an "other," a different person, tribe, race, or civilization. 物以类聚。同类抱团的根本原因在于：1）自我感觉良好；2）惧怕或是信任缺乏“非我族之人”；3）不同语言所带来的沟通困难；4）社交活动中的习俗。
4、Fourth, the sources of conflict between states and groups from different civilizations are, in large measure, those which have always generated conflict between groups: control of people, territory, wealth, and resources, and relative power, that is the ability to impose one's own values, culture, and institutions on another group as compared to that group's ability to do that to you. Cultural questions like these involve a yes or no, zero-sum choice. 什么都好商量，但是文化，以宗教为代表，没得商量。
5、Fifth and finally is the ubiquity of conflict. It is human to hate. For self definition and motivation people need enemies: competitors in business, rivals in achievement, opponents in politics. 人性使然，人的存在是建立在“树立敌人”的概念中的。
P131: By and large, single civilization organizations do more things and are more successful than multi-civilizational organizations. This is true of both political and security organizations, on the one hand, and economic organizations, on the other.
P135: #The Structure of Civilizations#In the post-Cold War world, countries relate to civilizations as member states, core states, lone countries(Japan), cleft countries（countries that territorially bestride the fault line between civilizations, such as Sudan.一个国家有几种文化根源), and torn countries（has a single predominant culture which places it in one civilization but its leaders want to shift it to another civilization. Kemalist/基马尔主义者，如土耳其）。这几种形式文化结构的国家会随着政权政策的改变而改变，所以只是暂时性的。
P156: The world will be ordered on the basis of civilizations or not at all. In this world the core states of civilizations are sources of order within civilizations and, through negotiations with other core states, between civilizations.
P161: With the Cold War over, NATO has one central and compelling purpose: to insure that it remains over by preventing the reimposition of Russian political and military control in Central Europe.
P168: With the end of the superpower competition, China was compelled once more to redefine its role in world affairs. It set two goals: 1)to become the champion of Chinese culture, the core state civilizational magnet toward which all other Chinese communities would orient themselves, and 2)to resume its historical position, which it lost in the nineteenth century, as the hegemonic power in East Asia.
P170: In China trust and commitment depend on personal contacts, not contracts or laws and other legal documents. Western businessmen find it easier to do business in India than in China where the sanctity o f an agreement rests on the personal relationship between the parties.
P171: The combination of growing economic power and shared Chinese culture led Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Singapore increasingly to involve themselves with the Chinese homeland. Accommodating themselves to the approaching transfer of power, Hong Kong Chinese began to adapt to rule from Beijing rather than London. Businessmen and other leaders became reluctant to criticize China or to do things that might offend China. When they did offend, the Chinese government did not hesitate #碎碎念#吃人家的嘴短，这是人之常情。虽然政体不同，自由的空间有限。但是无例证的论点就主观主义了。"blood-is-thicker-than-water kind of sentiment"
P173：In short, the Taiwan government's self-definition appeared to evolve from government of all of China, to government of part of China, toward government of none of China.
P183: The dangerous clashes of the future are likely to arise from the interaction of Western arrogance, Islamic intolerance, and Sinic assertiveness. The dominant attitude toward them in non-Western cultures range from widespread skepticism to intense opposition. What is universalism to the West is imperialism to the rest.
P183: #The West and the Rest: Inter-civilizational Issues#: 现实的国际关系处理中，特别是“西方”与其他文明关系的具体表现在3个方面：1）武器，特别是大规模杀伤性武器的扩散（包括武器本身和打击途径）；2）人权；3）移民政策。处理当中，充满了矛盾，双重标准(Hypocrisy, double standards, and "but nots" are the price o f universalist pretensions)。最大的问题在于以美国为首的西方国家在推进西方文明价值观的非协同性与“相对”弱化的能力。The central problem in the relations between the West and the rest is, consequently, the discordance between the West's - particularly America’s - efforts to promote a universal Western culture and its declining ability to do so. 最后给出的总体解决思路是：大棒+胡萝卜，分化非西方文化形态的联合，各个击破！To minimize its losses in this situation requires the West to wield skillfully its economic resources as carrots and sticks in dealing with other societies, to bolster it’s unity and coordinate its policies so as to make it more difficult for other societies to play one Western country off against another, and to promote and exploit differences among non-Western nations.
P218: Economic exchange brings people into contact; it does not bring them into agreement. Historically it has often produced a deeper awareness of the differences between peoples and stimulated mutual fears. Trade between countries produces conflict as well as profit. If past experience holds, the Asia of economic sunshine will generate an Asia of political shadows, an Asia of instability and conflict.
P219: In the mid-1990s East Asia includes one stable democracy, several new and unstable democracies, four of the five communist dictatorships remaining in the world, plus military governments, personal dictatorships, and one-party-dominant authoritarian systems.
P220: While violence between the two Koreas or the two Chinas remains possible, cultural commonalities are likely to erode that possibility over time.
P220: In East Asia it is not, and, as Aaron Friedberg has suggested, Europe's past could be Asia's future.
P223: By 1995 a broad consensus reportedly existed among the Chinese leaders and scholars that the United States was trying to "divide China territorially, subvert it politically, contain it strategically and frustrate it economically."
P224: The elementary rules of diplomacy and power politics dictate that the United States should attempt to play one off against the other or at least to sweeten relations with one if they were becoming more conflictual with the other.
P225: At the broadest level the Confucian ethos pervading many Asian societies stressed the values of authority, hierarchy, the subordination of individual rights and interests, the importance of consensus, the avoidance of confrontation, "saving face," and, in general, the supremacy of the state over society and of society over the individual. In addition, Asians tended to think of the evolution of their societies in terms of centuries and millennia and to give priority to maximizing longterm gains. These attitudes contrasted with the primacy in American beliefs of liberty, equality, democracy, and individualism, and the American propensity to distrust government, oppose authority, promote checks and balances, encourage competition, sanctify human rights, and to forget the past, ignore the future, and focus on maximizing immediate gains. The sources of conflict are in fundamental differences in society and culture.#碎碎念#儒家本无罪，但是用于帝王术就被解读为草根活该牺牲小我，拿取最少的资源，大头都应该被王者垄断。
P230: With rare exceptions, such as possibly the South China Sea, Chinese hegemony in East Asia is unlikely to involve expansion of territorial control through the direct use of military force. It is likely to mean, however, that China will expect other East Asian countries, in varying degrees, to do some or all of the following:
• support Chinese territorial integrity, Chinese control of Tibet and Xinjiang, and the integration of Hong Kong and Taiwan into China;
• acquiesce in Chinese sovereignty over the South China Sea and possibly Mongolia;
• generally support C h i n a in conflicts with the West over economics, human rights, weapons proliferation, and other issues;
• accept Chinese military predominance in the region and refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons or conventional forces that could challenge that predominance;
• adopt trade and investment policies compatible with Chinese interests and conducive to Chinese economic development;
• defer to Chinese leadership in dealing with regional problems;
• be generally open to immigration from China;
• prohibit or suppress anti-China and anti-Chinese movements within their societies;
• respect the rights of Chinese within their societies, including their right to maintain close relations with their kin and provinces of origin in China;
• abstain from military alliances or anti-China coalitions with other powers;
• promote the use of Mandarin as a supplement to and eventually a replacement for English as the Language of Wider Communication in East Asia.
P232: Since China has defined the United States as its principal enemy, the predominant American inclination will be to act as a primary balancer and prevent Chinese hegemony. Assuming such a role would be in keeping with the traditional American concern with preventing the domination of either Europe or Asia by any single power. That goal is no longer relevant in Europe, but it could be in Asia. A loose federation in Western Europe closely linked to the United States culturally, politically, and economically will not threaten American security. A unified, powerful, and assertive China could. Is it in American interest to be ready to go to war if necessary to prevent Chinese hegemony in East Asia? If Chinese economic development continues, this could be the single most serious security issue American policymakers confront in the early twenty-first century. If the United States does want to stop Chinese domination of East Asia, it will need to redirect the Japanese alliance to that purpose, develop close military ties with other Asian nations, and enhance its military presence in Asia and the military power it can bring to bear in Asia. If the United States is not willing to fight against Chinese hegemony, it will need to foreswear its universalism, learn to live with that hegemony, and reconcile itself to a marked reduction in its ability to shape events on the far side of the Pacific. Either course involves major costs and risks. T h e greatest danger is that the United States will make no clear choice and stumble into a war with China without considering carefully whether that is in its national interest and without being prepared to wage such a war effectively. #碎碎念#美国围堵中国是学术上不二的指导思想。
P234: Roderick MacFarquhar phrased it, " T h e traditional Chinese world view was a reflection of the Confucian vision o f a carefully articulated hierarchical society. Foreign monarchs and states were assumed to be tributaries of the Middle Kingdom: 'There are not two suns in the sky, there cannot be two emperors on earth.' " As a result the Chinese have not been sympathetic to "multipolar or even multilateral concepts of security." #碎碎念#马若德先生有这么一段话，是断章取义呢？还是主体思想？#英国中共党史专家##文化大革命的起源#
P238: Economic growth generates military power and political influence, but it can also stimulate political development and movement toward a more open, pluralistic, and possibly democratic form of politics. Arguably it already has had that effect on South Korea and Taiwan. In both countries, however, the political leaders most active in pushing for democracy were Christians. China's Confucian heritage, with its emphasis on authority, order, hierarchy, and the supremacy of the collectivity over the individual, creates obstacles to democratization.#碎碎念#非我族类，必存异心。所有共存的基础都是信任，从头到尾都是Plurality，但是这里不就是Paradox咯!
P242: #碎碎念#俄罗斯与北约边界的争论，将以乌克兰的分裂而暂停。这是一个准确的预测。Russian acceptance of the expansion of the European Union and NATO to include the Western Christian states o f Central and Eastern Europe, and Western commitment not to expand NATO further, unless Ukraine splits into two countries.
P254: Millennia of human history have shown that religion is not a "small difference" but possibly the most profound difference that can exist between people. The frequency, intensity, and violence of fault line wars are greatly enhanced by beliefs in different gods. #碎碎念#很重要的两个定义#communal war#vs#fault line war#
P262: The question remains as to why, as the twentieth century ends, Muslims are involved in far more intergroup violence than people of other civilizations. 为啥穆斯林在近代史上显得总是爱干仗？亨廷顿列出6个回答，三个解释穆斯林与非穆斯林干仗的原因；三个解释穆斯林内部干仗的原因：
1、First, the argument is made that Islam has from the start been a religion of the sword and that it glorifies military virtues. Islam originated among "warring Bedouin nomadic tribes" and this "violent origin is stamped in the foundation of Islam. Muhammad himself is remembered as a hard fighter and a skillful military commander."
2、Second, from its origin in Arabia, the spread of Islam across northern Africa and much of the middle East and later to central Asia, the Subcontinent, and the Balkans brought Muslims into direct contact with many different peoples, who were conquered and converted, and the legacy of this process remains. 可以理解为林子大了什么鸟都有吗？这就缺乏本质上的说服力了。
3、A third possible source of Muslim-non-Muslim conflict involves what one statesman, in reference to his own country, termed the "indigestibility" of Muslims. Indigestibility, however, works both ways: Muslim countries have problems with non-Muslim minorities comparable to those which non-Muslim countries have with Muslim minorities. Even more than Christianity, Islam is an absolutist faith. 穆斯林缺乏整合消化能力。
4、One explanation, advanced by Muslims, is that Western imperialism and the subjection of Muslim societies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries produced an image of Muslim military and economic weakness and hence encourages non-Islamic groups to view Muslims as an attractive target.
5、A more persuasive factor possibly explaining both intra- and extra Islamic conflict is the absence of one or more core states in Islam. Islam is a source of instability in the world because it lacks a dominant center.
6、Finally, and most important, the demographic explosion in Muslim societies and the availability of large numbers of often unemployed males between the ages of fifteen and thirty is a natural source of instability and violence both within Islam and against non-Muslims.
P266: Fault line wars go through processes of intensification, expansion, containment, interruption, and, rarely, resolution. These processes usually begin sequentially, but they also often overlap and may be repeated. Once started, fault line wars, like other communal conflicts, tend to take on a life of their own and to develop in an action-reaction pattern. #碎碎念#任何事物不都是这样的吗？当基因确定后，一切都会沿着这个编码走下去，优胜劣汰，直到消亡。
P267: In the course of the war, multiple identities fade and the identity most meaningful in relation to the conflict comes to dominate. That identity almost always is defined by religion. #碎碎念#宗教是成本最低的团结工具。
P271: The perception of fault line wars as civilizational clashes also gave new life to the domino theory which had existed during the Cold War. Now, however, it was the major states of civilizations who saw the need to prevent defeat in a local conflict, which could trigger a sequence of escalating losses leading to disaster. #碎碎念#小国间的战争在一定程度上是维系全球整体平衡的必然。这是大国间博弈最低成本的战场，因为纵观生物史，断了其他竞争者的活路是天性，也是理性的必然。
P291: Fault line violence may stop entirely for a period of time, but it rarely ends permanently. Fault line wars are marked by frequent truces, cease-fires, armistices, but not by comprehensive peace treaties that resolve central political issues. They have this off-again-on-again quality because they are rooted in deep fault line conflicts involving sustained antagonistic relations between groups of different civilizations. Fault line wars are intermittent; fault line conflicts are interminable.
P294: Achieving a halt in the fighting in a "full model" war thus is likely to require:
• active involvement of secondary and tertiary parties;
• negotiation by the tertiary parties of the broad terms for stopping the fighting;
• use by the tertiary parties of carrots and sticks to get the secondary parties to accept these terms and to pressure the primary parties to accept them;
• withdrawal of support from and, in effect, the betrayal of the primary parties by the secondary parties; and
• as a result of this pressure, acceptance of the terms by the primary parties, which, of course, they subvert when they see it in their interest to do so.
P301: Societies that assume that their history has ended, however, are usually societies whose history is about to decline. #碎碎念#Man who assume the highest achievement distinguished from others, either agonist or ignorant. whatever case is, about to decline.
P303: Civilizations grow, Carroll Quigley argued in 1961, because they have an "instrument of expansion," that is, a military, religious, political, or economic organization that accumulates surplus and invests it in productive innovations. Civilizations decline when they stop the "application of surplus to new ways of doing things. In modern terms we say that the rate of investment decreases.” This happens because the social groups controlling the surplus have a vested interest in using it for "nonproductive but ego-satisfying purposes. . . which distribute the surpluses to consumption but do not provide more effective methods of production." People live off their capital and the civilization moves from the stage of the universal state to the stage of decay.
P304: Far more significant than economics and demography are problems of moral decline, cultural suicide, and political disunity in the West. Oft-pointed-to manifestations of moral decline include:
1. increases in antisocial behavior, such as crime, drug use, and violence generally;
2. family decay, including increased rates of divorce, illegitimacy, teen-age pregnancy, and single-parent families;
3. at least in the United States, a decline in "social capital," that is, membership in voluntary associations and the interpersonal trust associated with such membership;
4. general weakening of the "work ethic" and rise of a cult of personal indulgence;
5. decreasing commitment to learning and intellectual activity, manifested in the United States in lower levels of scholastic achievement.
P305: the principles of the American Creed on which Americans overwhelmingly agree: liberty, democracy, individualism, equality before the law, constitutionalism, private property. Rejection of Creed and of Western civilization means the end of the United States of America as we have known it. #碎碎念#美国人世代薪火相传的是美国的形条，捍卫此信条是超越国家实体存在的根本目标。
P307: Their case was summed up by British Defense Minister Malcolm Rifkind, who, in November 1994, argued the need for "an Atlantic Community," resting on four pillars: defense and security embodied in NATO; "shared belief in the rule of law and parliamentary democracy"; "liberal capitalism and free trade"; and "the shared European cultural heritage emanating from Greece and Rome through the Renaissance to the shared values, beliefs and civilization of our own century." #碎碎念#欧洲与美国的联盟之根本基础。
P310： In the emerging world of ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, Western belief in the universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is dangerous.
It is false, because ….. is simply not true.
It is immoral, because of what would be necessary to bring it about. Imperialism is the necessary logical consequence of universalism.
It is dangerous, because of that it could lead to a major inter civilizational war between core states, and it could lead to defeat of the West. #碎碎念#这个章节很精彩！
P311: All civilizations go though similar processes of emergence, rise, and decline. The West differs from other civilizations not in the way it has developed but in the distinctive character of its values and institutions. These include most notably its Christianity, pluralism, individualism, and rule of law, which made it possible for the West to invent modernity, expand throughout the world, and become the envy of other societies. In their ensemble these characteristics are peculiar to the West. Europe, as Arthur M . Schlesinger, Jr., has said, is "the source - the unique source" of the "ideas of individual liberty, political democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and cultural freedom. . . . These are European ideas, not Asian, nor African, nor Middle Eastern ideas, except by adoption." They make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is valuable not because it is universal but because it is unique. The principal responsibility of Western leaders, consequently, is not to attempt to reshape other civilizations in the image of the West, which is beyond their declining power, but to preserve, protect, and renew the unique qualities of Western civilization.
1、This abstention rule that core states abstain from intervention in conflicts in other civilizations is the first requirement of peace in a multi-civilizational, multipolar world.
2、The second requirement is the joint mediation rule that core states negotiate with each other to contain or to halt fault line wars between states or groups from their civilizations.
3、 Thus, in addition to the abstention rule and the joint mediation rule, the third rule for peace in a multicivilizational world is the commonalities rule: peoples in all civilizations should search for and attempt to expand the values, institutions, and practices they have in common with peoples of other civilizations.
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