读过 Commentary on Husserl's "Ideas I"
自然态度类似于把自我世间化The insight into the purity of consciousness of which phenomenology is to be the science, necessitates making explicit the stance we ordinarily take unto the world. In this stance, we do not and cannot get pure consciousness into view, because we are directed at things in the world, and take ourselves as part of this world, one object among others. We take consciousness, in other words, as an empirical and worldly fact. As an empirical fact, experienced in our normal way of viewing it, it is contaminated by worldly “matter,” for instance, my personal first-person access (and my personal history, my character etc.). As such a fact, it is also viewed as one “thing” next to others in the world, and not as that agent that is privileged among all other things as that which experiences the world. To view it as that which has the world as its object and is not itself another object in the world and in its purity (consciousness as such), we need to suspend this view in its entirety. This pre-phenomenological view is called the natural attitude.引自 自然态度但它不是绝对的错误，而是自成一真理。悬搁它只是为了超出它而达到一个它触及不到的领域。How is the suspension of this view accomplished? It is not negated or doubted, since we cannot avoid returning back to it. The natural attitude is, thus, not comparable to, for instance, a Platonic or Hegelian view of common sense of the everyday life, which is shown to be wrong and fundamentally misguided (“inverted”) from the philosophical standpoint. It has its relative right but needs to be suspended to get into view what it never can get into view; thus it is bracketed, held in suspension for the time in which phenomenology is being done. We withhold judgment as to its existence, veracity, and knowledge claims.引自 自然态度p137世界实存，并不是关于世界的本体论陈述，而是关于我对世界的存在信念的陈述。The statement “the world is,” thus, is not strictly speaking a statement with respect to the world, but a statement concerning consciousness’ taking of the world, namely to consider it to exist mind-independently. It is not an ontological but a transcendental proposition, and hence the “bracketing” is a suspension of the ontological claim that the world exists. The general thesis of the natural attitude, then, may be interpreted as a transcendental statement comparable to the Kantian “I think” that must be able to accompany all my representations, only on a more basic level (cf. Ideen 104/123). 引自 自然态度
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