读过 Commentary on Husserl's "Ideas I"
The difference with the world does not come from the outside, as it were, as a limitation or constraint brought onto consciousness externally. Instead, what is “wonderous” is precisely that consciousness envelops the world with its self-presence, with its consciousness, so as to allow the world to appear as what and how consciousness itself is not. To speak in the register of high metaphor: consciousness lends its light to the world such that the world itself, as other than consciousness, enters into its own appearance. If “appearance” has historically designated either a metaphysical illusion or a purely subjective apparition as set against the object itself (das Ding an sich in Kant, for example), in Husserl’s usage, appearance is the proper designation for the transcendent character of the world (thought here under the aspect of the noema) as “in principle different” from consciousness and yet essentially related to its own ways of relating to the world.引自第237页
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