Survival and Consolidation

With victory in sight, the Bolsheviks turned their attention to the consolidation of power within the former Russian empire. When they took power in 1917, the Bolsheviks believed their revolution had to spread beyond Russia or perish. Neither happened, and in the spring of 1921, at the end of hostilities, they stood alone in the wreckage of the former Tsarist empire. The Bolshe...

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With victory in sight, the Bolsheviks turned their attention to the consolidation of power within the former Russian empire. When they took power in 1917, the Bolsheviks believed their revolution had to spread beyond Russia or perish. Neither happened, and in the spring of 1921, at the end of hostilities, they stood alone in the wreckage of the former Tsarist empire. The Bolsheviks had, in Lenin's words, "won the right to an independent existence." This entirely unforseen situation surprised both them and their enemies. Debo shows, however, that nothing predetermined that Soviet Russia would, at the end of the civil war, enjoy an "independent existence" -- or even exist at all. He suggests that a wide range of circumstances contributed to the eventual outcome of the war and that it could have ended indecisively. In his evaluation of the Soviet diplomatic achievement, Debo describes their successes with Britain, Poland, and Germany, their continuing difficulties with Romania, France, and the United States, and the threat from the Far East. This diplomatic success, he maintains, was the result of Soviet victory in the civil war and the patient pursuit of realizable objectives.

·Acknowledgments
·Preface
·Introduction
·"We are not accustomed to waiting": Soviet Russia, the German revolution, and eastern Europe
·Audiatur et altera pars: The Soviets propose peace
·"Concessions to imperialism": Soviet Russia and the Bullitt Mission
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·Acknowledgments
·Preface
·Introduction
·"We are not accustomed to waiting": Soviet Russia, the German revolution, and eastern Europe
·Audiatur et altera pars: The Soviets propose peace
·"Concessions to imperialism": Soviet Russia and the Bullitt Mission
·Defence against "disguised intervention": Soviet policy in the Baltic and Poland
·"The Intruder": Soviet Russia and the final months of the Paris peace conference
·"Don't halloo until you're out of the woods": Soviet nationalities policy and the Baltic
·The end of "spontaneous victories": Ukraine, Hungary, and Bessarabia
·The peace of Dorpat: "A dress rehearsal for an agreement with the Entente"
·"Co-existence of socialist and capitalist states": The Soviet initiation of peace negotiations with Great Britain
·"We should take Baku": Soviet policy in the Caucasus, 1919-1920
·"Astoundingly attractive offers": Attempted peace negotiations with Poland
·"A frantic acceleration of the offensive against Poland": Soviet policy in eastern Europe, April-August 1920
·"The policy of the bayonet, as usual, has broken down": The end of the Polish ephemeron
·Seeking a "substitute for peace": Anglo-Soviet negotiations, May-November 1920
·Final French failure: The preliminary peace of Riga and the destruction of Wrangel
·"Getting Poland away from the Entente": Soviet-German relations
·"The right to an independent existence": The treaties with Britain, Poland, and Germany
·Federation and alliance: Soviet policy in Southwest Asia, 1920-1921
·"Not a step further towards the East": The creation of the Far Eastern Republic
·Conclusion
·Notes
·Bibliography
·Index
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