But Aristotle is not satisfied to describe metaphysics as the investigation of first causes. He also tells us that it is the science that studies being qua being. As this characterization gets fleshed out, metaphysics turns out to be not another departmental discipline with a special subject matter of its own. It is rather a universal science, one that considers all the objects that there are. On this characterization, then, metaphysics examines the items that constitute the subject matter for the other sciences. What is distinctive about metaphysics is the way in which it examines those objects; it examines them from a particular perspective, from the perspective of their being beings or things that exist. So metaphysics considers things as beings or as existents and attempts to specify the properties or features they exhibit just insofar as they are beings or existents. Accordingly, it seeks to understand not merely the concept of being, but also very general concepts like unity or identity, difference, similarity, and dissimilarity that apply to everything that there is. And central to metaphysics understood as a universal science is the delineation of what Aristotle calls categories. These are the highest or most general kinds under which things fall. What the metaphysician is supposed to do is to identify those highest kinds, to specify the features peculiar to each category, and to identify the relations that tie the different categories together; and by doing this, the metaphysician supposedly provides us with a map of the structure of all that there is. 引自 Introduction
只要来一个所谓的“先验还原”，这个being qua being不就是现象学么，怪不得Dan Zahavi说"eventually I got interested in Husserl, which I back then took to be an interesting synthesis of Aristotle and Kant."
"considers all the objects there are""universal science" 胡塞尔不也是继承了这个“科学之科学”的取向么？区别在哪里？
If the conceptual schemer is correct in claiming that the activity of conceptual representation bars us from an apprehension of anything we seek to represent, then why should we take seriously the schemer’s claims about conceptual representation? Those claims, after all, are just further conceptual representations; but, then, so far from revealing the nature of the activity of conceptual representation, the claims would seem to preclude our getting a hold on what those claims are supposed to be about – the activity of conceptual representation. 引自 Introduction
呵呵。笛卡尔会怎么说呢。以及从布伦塔诺开始，现象学派就确立了the apodicticity of inner perception。胡塞尔似乎有更细致的考虑具体我忘了
Whereas objects exemplify properties by #possessing# them, things exemplify kinds by #belonging to# them. Philosophers who draw this distinction frequently tell us that while kinds constitute the particulars that exemplify them as #what# they are, properties merely modify or characterize particulars antecedently so marked out; and they often claim that kinds are #individuative# universals. 引自 The Problem of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism
还有吐个也许很琐碎的槽：像文中这样泛泛地将A is F转写成A exemplify F-ness，这样做是离开了“exemplify”的日常用法的——本来只有典型、典范才称得上exemplify
These doubts have led some realists to set very severe restrictions on the analysis of predication so far delineated. They have insisted on a distinction between what they call undefined and defined predicates. The idea is that there are certain predicates that are not defined in terms of other predicates; these primitive predicates get their meaning by being directly correlated with universals. All other predicates are defined in terms of these primitive predicates. On this view, then, there is not a separate and distinct universal correlated with every semantically nonequivalent predicate; it is only in the case of the primitive or undefined predicates that this is so. The semantical properties of defined predicates can be explained by reference to the universals correlated with the primitive predicates in terms of which they are defined. 引自 The problem of universals I: Metaphysical realism
Frequently, the austere nominalist defends this strategy by challenging the explanatory power of the Platonic schema. If the Platonic schema is to provide a genuine explanation of attribute agreement, universals have to be things that can be identified and characterized independently of the facts they are introduced to explain; otherwise, any application of the schema represents the proverbial sort of pseudoexplanation in which the phenomenon of sleep is explained by a virtus dormitiva, a faculty that can be identified only as the one causally responsible for sleep. 引自 The problem of universals II
Lewis mentions another problem for an account like Mackie’s. This is the problem of causal preemption. Here, we have two events, a and b, each of which, taken by itself, would cause a third event, c. However, when a and b both occur, a acts to block b’s normal causal role and goes on to cause c all by itself.
So b occurs, but is preempted by a. However, since the circumstances are such that had a not blocked b, b would have caused c, b is an insufficient, but necessary component in a bundle of factors (including b and the relevant circumstances) that while sufficient for c is not necessary for c. So b is an INUS condition for c; but it is not the cause of c, so, again, a counterexample to Mackie’s analysis. 引自 6 Causation, Neo-Humean approaches
Thus, he proposes that we understand the claim
(1) Event x was a necessary condition for event y
in terms of the counterfactual conditional
(2) If x had not occurred, y would not have occurred; 引自 6 Causation, Neo-Humean approaches
我怀疑其实是作者写错了，这里的反例其实是a：In this counterexample to Mackie's analysis, a alone is the cause of c. However, since the circumstances are such that had a not occurred, c would have occurred anyway because b would have caused c, a is not a necessary component in this bundle of factors, thus a is not an INUS condition.