Thymόs对《Metaphysics》的笔记(6)

Thymόs
Thymόs (何妨吟啸且徐行)

读过 Metaphysics

Metaphysics
  • 书名: Metaphysics
  • 作者: Michael J. Loux
  • 副标题: A Contemporary Introduction Third Edition
  • 页数: 328
  • 出版社: Routledge
  • 出版年: 2006-6-25
  • 第3页 Introduction
    But Aristotle is not satisfied to describe metaphysics as the investigation of first causes. He also tells us that it is the science that studies being qua being. As this characterization gets fleshed out, metaphysics turns out to be not another departmental discipline with a special subject matter of its own. It is rather a universal science, one that considers all the objects that there are. On this characterization, then, metaphysics examines the items that constitute the subject matter for the other sciences. What is distinctive about metaphysics is the way in which it examines those objects; it examines them from a particular perspective, from the perspective of their being beings or things that exist. So metaphysics considers things as beings or as existents and attempts to specify the properties or features they exhibit just insofar as they are beings or existents. Accordingly, it seeks to understand not merely the concept of being, but also very general concepts like unity or identity, difference, similarity, and dissimilarity that apply to everything that there is. And central to metaphysics understood as a universal science is the delineation of what Aristotle calls categories. These are the highest or most general kinds under which things fall. What the metaphysician is supposed to do is to identify those highest kinds, to specify the features peculiar to each category, and to identify the relations that tie the different categories together; and by doing this, the metaphysician supposedly provides us with a map of the structure of all that there is.
    引自 Introduction

    只要来一个所谓的“先验还原”,这个being qua being不就是现象学么,怪不得Dan Zahavi说"eventually I got interested in Husserl, which I back then took to be an interesting synthesis of Aristotle and Kant." "considers all the objects there are""universal science" 胡塞尔不也是继承了这个“科学之科学”的取向么?区别在哪里? “as”似乎是哲学乃至一般论理中很神奇的一个词。

    2013-08-27 00:15:15 回应
  • 第9页 Introduction
    If the conceptual schemer is correct in claiming that the activity of conceptual representation bars us from an apprehension of anything we seek to represent, then why should we take seriously the schemer’s claims about conceptual representation? Those claims, after all, are just further conceptual representations; but, then, so far from revealing the nature of the activity of conceptual representation, the claims would seem to preclude our getting a hold on what those claims are supposed to be about – the activity of conceptual representation.
    引自 Introduction

    呵呵。笛卡尔会怎么说呢。以及从布伦塔诺开始,现象学派就确立了the apodicticity of inner perception。胡塞尔似乎有更细致的考虑具体我忘了

    2013-08-27 01:25:14 回应
  • 第20页 The Problem of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism
    Whereas objects exemplify properties by #possessing# them, things exemplify kinds by #belonging to# them. Philosophers who draw this distinction frequently tell us that while kinds constitute the particulars that exemplify them as #what# they are, properties merely modify or characterize particulars antecedently so marked out; and they often claim that kinds are #individuative# universals.
    引自 The Problem of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism

    这么解释起来,哪是属性哪是类,首先不是一个逻辑学的区分,其次似乎也无需非此即彼,这取决于一个共相多大程度上赋予了一个对象以特色。【人分成两类,上豆瓣的,和不上豆瓣的。。。 此外呢,在关系中也能做这个区分吗,就是说关系是否也有更individuative的? 还有吐个也许很琐碎的槽:像文中这样泛泛地将A is F转写成A exemplify F-ness,这样做是离开了“exemplify”的日常用法的——本来只有典型、典范才称得上exemplify 。。。 还有这样一来我还真有点懂了“metaphysics”之为metaphysics的意思: 1 声称共相是实在的,说有跟具体对象不同的另一个范畴叫抽象对象,很容易引向一个认识论的想法,就是我们对于这些抽象对象也是用的一种不同的【认知方式】,乃至一种跟感性直观不同的“直观”的。后世的【哲学】批判形而上学基本上是从知识论的角度去批判的。 2 声称共相是实在的,并基于1,我们有关于它们的知识,还会进一步引向一个想法,就是我们会考虑用关于它们的知识去【解释】一阶的现象。【自然科学】代替形而上学的方式则是这个角度的,即其解释力和预测力优于形而上学。

    2013-08-27 12:59:33 回应
  • 第36页 The problem of universals I: Metaphysical realism
    These doubts have led some realists to set very severe restrictions on the analysis of predication so far delineated. They have insisted on a distinction between what they call undefined and defined predicates. The idea is that there are certain predicates that are not defined in terms of other predicates; these primitive predicates get their meaning by being directly correlated with universals. All other predicates are defined in terms of these primitive predicates. On this view, then, there is not a separate and distinct universal correlated with every semantically nonequivalent predicate; it is only in the case of the primitive or undefined predicates that this is so. The semantical properties of defined predicates can be explained by reference to the universals correlated with the primitive predicates in terms of which they are defined.
    引自 The problem of universals I: Metaphysical realism

    忽然觉得我还在看形而上学简直弱爆了。。。处理“最简义素集”这个问题的学科不是叫形式语义学么。。。

    2013-08-28 01:20:27 3回应
  • 第53页 The problem of universals II
    Frequently, the austere nominalist defends this strategy by challenging the explanatory power of the Platonic schema. If the Platonic schema is to provide a genuine explanation of attribute agreement, universals have to be things that can be identified and characterized independently of the facts they are introduced to explain; otherwise, any application of the schema represents the proverbial sort of pseudoexplanation in which the phenomenon of sleep is explained by a virtus dormitiva, a faculty that can be identified only as the one causally responsible for sleep.
    引自 The problem of universals II
    2013-08-29 00:19:34 回应
  • 6 Causation, Neo-Humean approaches

    一个疑难,出现于对INUS condition作为一种对“原因”概念的分析的一节中:

    Lewis mentions another problem for an account like Mackie’s. This is the problem of causal preemption. Here, we have two events, a and b, each of which, taken by itself, would cause a third event, c. However, when a and b both occur, a acts to block b’s normal causal role and goes on to cause c all by itself. a→c ↘ b || So b occurs, but is preempted by a. However, since the circumstances are such that had a not blocked b, b would have caused c, b is an insufficient, but necessary component in a bundle of factors (including b and the relevant circumstances) that while sufficient for c is not necessary for c. So b is an INUS condition for c; but it is not the cause of c, so, again, a counterexample to Mackie’s analysis.
    引自 6 Causation, Neo-Humean approaches

    不懂b怎么就算一个necessary component了啊。。。 necessary condition的定义(P.197):

    Thus, he proposes that we understand the claim (1) Event x was a necessary condition for event y in terms of the counterfactual conditional (2) If x had not occurred, y would not have occurred;
    引自 6 Causation, Neo-Humean approaches

    可是如上例,b如果不出现,c仍然会出现啊。。。 我怀疑其实是作者写错了,这里的反例其实是a:In this counterexample to Mackie's analysis, a alone is the cause of c. However, since the circumstances are such that had a not occurred, c would have occurred anyway because b would have caused c, a is not a necessary component in this bundle of factors, thus a is not an INUS condition.

    2013-09-04 17:03:41 16回应