.对《Critique of Practical Reason》的笔记(1)

第98页

Complete conformity of the will with the moral law is, however, holiness, a perfection of which no rational being of the sensible world is capable at any moments of his existence. Since it is nevertheless required as practically necessary, it can only be found in an endless progresst toward that complete conformity, and in accordance with principles of pure practical reason it is necessary to assume such a practical progress as the real object of our will.
This endless progress is, however, possible only on the presupposition of the existence and personality of the same rational being continuing endlessly (which is called the immortality of the soul). Hence the highest good is practically possible only on the presupposition of the immortality of the soul, so that this, as inseparably connected with the moral law, is a postulate of pure practical reason (by which I understand a theoretical proposition, though one not demonstrable as such, insofar as it is attached inseparably to an a priori unconditionally valid practical law).