温特：《国际政治的社会理论》读书笔记

中文版前言

【主论点】温特自己概括为“社会共有观念建构了国际体系的结构并使这种结构具有动力。”政策意义是国家之间原则上可以成为朋友。【39】批评新现实主义和新自由主义，“以社会共有观念的概念重新定义了国际政治结构，据此表明友谊和集体身份的形成在无政府条件下是可以实现的。”【39】强调观念对于权力和利益的建构作用。【40】国际体系层次无法还原地整体规范结构造就国家身份和利益。【40】三种无政府状态文化，“自我实现的预言”。【41】最后指出，“21世纪对外政策决策者面临的最大挑战是发现一种方式，既可以相互尊重主权的个体性，同时又可以吧各国纳入建立真正的国际共同体的进程。如果国家能够解决个体性和共同体之间的矛盾，就一定会创建一个康德无政府文化的体系。”【43】

一、建构主义

【温和建构主义】建构主义的两条基本原则越来越被普遍接受，理念主义而非物质主义的，整体主义/结构主义而非个体主义的。【1】（students of international politics have increasingly accepted two basic tenets of ‘‘constructivism’’: (1) that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature. The first represents an ‘‘idealist’’ approach to social life, and in its emphasis on the sharing of ideas it is also ‘‘social’’ in a way which the opposing ‘‘materialist’’ view’s emphasis on biology, technology, or the environment, is not. The second is a ‘‘holist’’ or ‘‘structuralist’’ approach because of its emphasis on the emergent powers of social structures, which opposes the ‘‘individualist’’ view that social structures are reducible to individuals. Constructivism could therefore be seen as a kind of ‘‘structural idealism.’’pp.1）温特采取的是温和的建构主义/弱式建构主义，借鉴结构化和符号互动的社会学理论。【1-2】（The version of constructivism that I defend is a moderate one that draws especially on structurationist and symbolic interactionist sociology.pp.1）批评关于国际体系的个体主义和物质主义，以沃尔兹为例和基欧汉为例。【3】两个层面，基础性层面（第二层面问题）和实质性层面（第一层面问题）。【5】（in this book I address these issues on two levels: at the level of foundational or second-order questions about what there is and how we can explain or understand it – ontology, epistemology and method; and at the level of substantive, domain-specific, or first-order questions.pp.4-5）第二层面问题属于社会理论问题。【5】（Second-order questions are questions of social theory.pp.5）温特检讨四种社会理论，提出一种建构主义的范式。【6】进而，他指出社会理论不是国际政治理论，并提出国际政治理论。【6】（Social theories are not theories of international politics. Clarifying the differences and relative virtues of constructivist, materialist, and individualist ontologies ultimately may help us better explain international politics, but the contribution is indirect. A more direct role is played by substantive theory, which is the second concern of this book.pp.6）

【对新现实主义的批评】温特表示其主要意图是批判沃尔兹为代表的新现实主义。【9】（I am offering a theory of the states system critical of Waltz’s.pp.8）强调施动者属性和互动，否则结构无法产生影响。【14】批评沃尔兹说到底遵循个体主义理论方法。【18】（Despite Waltz’s professed structuralism, ultimately he is an individualist.pp.15）“个体主义、物质主义和对国际互动的忽略构成了新现实主义结构主义的核心成分。”【19】（Individualism, materialism, and neglect of interaction form the core of Neorealist structuralism.pp.17）对新现实主义的三种重要批评。【20-1】温特希望重新概化国际结构的构成，包括：（1）对国际结构的界定，不是物质现象而是观念现象。【23】In my view it is exactly what Waltz says it is not: a social rather than material phenomenon. And since the basis of sociality is shared knowledge, this leads to an idealist view of structure as a ‘‘distribution of knowledge’’ or ‘‘ideas all the way down’’ (or almost anyway). pp.20 （2）国家的身份和利益由国际体系建构而成。【24】（A sociological turn is also evident in the second move, which is to argue that state identities and interests are more constructed by the international system than can be seen by an economic approach to structure.pp.20-1）（3）国家间的互动或进程应被纳入体系理论考虑范围，并认为互动时被建构而成的。【24-5】（My last move follows Buzan, Jones, and Little in arguing that interaction or process is a proper concern of systemic theory, but takes the argument considerably further.……anarchy has no logic apart from process and that interaction is structured, albeit not at the macro-level.pp.21）据此，温特试图重新思考国际结构的主导本体论。【25】（These three moves are an attempt to rethink the dominant ontology of international structure.pp.22）

【国际结构本体论】温特检讨了两对社会理论：物质主义-理念主义；个体主义-整体主义：

1. 物质主义-理念主义。二者分歧在于观念作用有多大。（1）物质主义，Materialists believe the most fundamental fact about society is the nature and organization of material forces.……t the materialist claim is that effects of non-material forces are secondary.pp.23.物质主义的假设，The materialist hypothesis must be that material forces as such – what might be called ‘‘brute’’ material forces – drive social forms.pp.23-24.（2）理念主义，Idealists believe the most fundamental fact about society is the nature and structure of social consciousness (what I later call the distribution of ideas or knowledge). Sometimes this structure is shared among actors in the form of norms, rules, or institutions; sometimes it is not.……the idealist claim is that material forces are secondary, significant insofar as they are constituted with particular meanings for actors.pp.24.相应地，二者分别重视因果关系和建构关系。In contrast to the materialist tendency to treat ideas in strictly causal terms, therefore, idealists tend to emphasize what I call the constitutive effects of ideas.pp.24.又，Materialists and idealists tend to understand the impact of ideas differently. Materialists privilege causal relationships, effects, and questions; idealists privilege constitutive relationships, effects, and questions.pp.25.

2. 个体主义-整体主义。这是关于施动者-结构问题的两种进路，【30】分歧很大程度上涉及结构在多大程度上“建构”施动者的问题。The disagreement between individualists and holists turns in important part on the extent to which structures ‘‘construct’’ agents.pp.26个体主义认为结构能够对施动者的属性产生因果关系的影响。【32】Individualism tends to be associated with causal effects on behavior, but I shall argue that the individualist view is compatible in principle with more possibilities than its critics (or even proponents) typically acknowledge, most notably with structures having causal effects on agents’ properties, for example through a socialization process.pp.27.它排斥的是社会结构具有建构施动者作用的命题。【32】individualism in principle is compatible with a theory of how structures cause agents’ properties. What it rules out is the possibility that social structures have constitutive effects on agents, since this would mean that structures cannot be reduced to the properties or interactions of ontologically primitive individuals.pp.27.温特认为体系结构既有因果作用，也有建构作用。【33】（I believe the structure of the international system exerts both kinds of effects on state identities.pp.28）

据此，温特建立了分别以观念作用-结构作用为x轴和y轴的坐标系，【34】（pp.29），并把既有的国际关系理论纳入其中，建构主义则在第一象限。【38】（pp.32）他解释了诸理论在第二层面取向的差别，包括方法论的差别、本体论的差别、经验主义的差别。【40-5】

二、社会理论

【中间道路】既采取理念主义本整体主义本体论，同时又坚持科学精神或广义上的实证精神，温特建构了一条中间道路，构成其现代性建构主义理论的基础。【61】（How is it possible to adopt an idealist and holist ontology while maintaining a commitment to science, or positivism broadly understood? This chapter constructs the ‘‘via media’’ that grounds my modernist constructivism.pp.47）在他看来，由于涉及的指涉理论不同，兼收或分裂两派的做法行不通，因此通过改变讨论的主题，把辩论核心从认识论转向本体论，开辟中间道路。【110】（In this chapter I have tried to construct a via media between the two camps. Rather than an eclectic or split-the-difference approach, which given the different theories of reference involved cannot succeed, my strategy has been to try to change the terms of the discussion. I have suggested that since both sides are tacit realists in their substantive research, epistemological issues are relatively uninteresting. The debate should be about what the international world is made of ontology – not how we can know it.pp.90）温特批评反实在论，坚持科学实在论观点，“国家和国家体系是实在的体系，它的本质是可以通过科学方法探索接近的。”【61】（The state and states system are real structures whose nature can be approximated through science.pp.47）“国家和国家体系虽然是不可观察的，但却是实在的（本体论）和可知的（认识论）。”【63】In this chapter I provide the foundation for the realist claim that states and the states system are real (ontology) and knowable (epistemology), despite being unobservable.pp.48.温特对科学实在论给出定义，认为其核心是反对世界上的事物在一定程度上依赖于我们的认知和信仰而存在这一观点，并认为它有三条核心原则：（1）世界独立于个体观察者的大脑和语言；（2）成熟科学理念通常是指涉客观世界的；（3）即便是客观事物不能被直接观察，成熟科学也是指涉客观世界的。【65-6】（The core of scientific realism is opposition to the view, held in various forms by its skeptical critics, that what there is in the world is somehow dependent on what we know or believe.……1 the world is independent of the mind and language of individual observers; 2 mature scientific theories typically refer to this world, 3 even when it is not directly observable.pp.51）他讨论了科学实在论的终极论断，科学之所以成功是因为我们更加接近客观现实的结构。【81】（The realist answer is that we know things about the world that the Romans did not. More generally, science is successful because it gradually brings our theoretical understanding into conformity with the deep structure of the world out there. If mature theories did not correspond roughly to that structure, it would be a ‘‘miracle’’ they worked so well. This is an inference to the best explanation: given that being a miracle is not an explanation, and seeing no better explanations, realists argue that the best explanation for the success of science is that we are getting closer to the structure of reality.pp.65）社会生活本体论与社会实在论的观点是一致的。【95】（the ontology of social life is consistent with scientific realism.pp.76-7）并说明理念主义的社会类别观没有混淆主体-客体的区别，也没有破坏实证主义理论。最后，温特了区分因果关系和建构关系两种理论研究方式，并强调建构理论的重要意义。【96】（pp.78）据此，理解观念或社会结构的建构作用。【108】

【观念的作用：权力与利益的建构】新现实主义和新自由主义都注重权力欲利益，忽略了观念的建构作用。【121】（what makes a theory materialist is that it accounts for the effects of power, interests, or institutions by reference to ‘‘brute’’ material forces,……Materialists cannot claim power and interest as ‘‘their’’ variables; it all depends on how the latter are constituted.pp.94）“权力的意义和利益的内容在很大程度上是由观念决定的。”【123】（In sum, the goal of this chapter is to show that much of the apparent explanatory power of ostensibly ‘‘materialist’’ explanations is actually constituted by suppressed constructivist assumptions about the content and distribution of ideas. The central thesis is that the meaning of power and the content of interests are largely a function of ideas. As such only after the ideational conditions of possibility for power and interest explanations have been exposed and stripped out can we assess the effects of materiality as such.pp.95-6）温特指出，并非只有现实主义认为国际关系本质是由权力关系塑造的，新自由主义和马克思主义亦然。他根据权力是怎样建构而成的标准对理论予以区分，认为现实主义的独特论点在于物质主义假设，理念主义则认为权力主要是由观念和文化情景建构的。【124-5】（Better instead to differentiate theories according to how power is constituted. From this perspective, the distinctively Realist claim is the materialist hypothesis that the effects of power are constituted primarily by brute material forces. The rival idealist hypothesis is that power is constituted primarily by ideas and cultural contexts.pp.97）他批评了沃尔兹，认为其明晰结构模式依赖“利益分配”的含蓄模式【125】或权力分配因素的解释能力依赖于国家利益分配的因素。【138】Waltz’s explicit model can only explain what it purports to explain by relying on an implicit model of the ‘‘distribution of interests.’’pp.98）又，Waltz has done more than make an assumption about the motivations of individual states, who then interact with an independently existing material structure. He has made an assumption about the distribution of interests in the system as a whole, and in so doing he has added to his theory of structure two things which he says do not belong there: non-capability attributes (egoistic motivations), and the quality of relations among units (self-help). He has in other words made an implicit assumption about the social structure of international politics (leaving aside for now whether it has a material or ideational basis). This does not make his theory of structure wrong, just underspecified. Making the distribution of interests an explicit dimension of structure would take care of the problem. （pp.107）并为弱式物质主义作了辩护，【126】即“只有在利益使权力具有意义的情况下，权力才能够解释所要解释的现象。”【139】（I am saying that power only explains what it explains insofar as it is given meaning by interest. The argument is constitutive, not causal.pp.109）利益最重要有一个物质主义基础，这就是人性。【162】（I turn around and defend the rump materialist view that they nevertheless must ultimately hook on to a material ground, human nature.pp.130）最后，温特总结道：国际政治中的权力分配的意义在很大程度上是由利益分配建构的，利益的内容在很大程度上又是由观念建构的。强调建构而非因果作用【167】（The argument of this chapter has been that the meaning of the distribution of power in international politics is constituted in important part by the distribution of interests, and that the content of interests are in turn constituted in important part by ideas.pp.135）身份和利益取决于两种因素：话语形成（即体系中的观念分配）和物质力量。【170-1】

【结构、施动和文化】结构包括物质条件、利益和观念三个因素，【138】强调观念是决定利益的主要因素。【179】温特提出社会共有知识或文化，“社会共有知识是个体之间共同的和相互关联的知识。”……“我说的‘共有’是指社会意义上的共有。共有知识可以是合作性质的，也可以是冲突性质的。像博弈游戏一样，文化分析在分析意义上对于社会关系的内容是中性的。互为敌人和互为朋友同样是文化事实。”【181】（while the argument in this chapter bears on distributions of privately held knowledge, its primary focus is on a subset of social structure, socially shared knowledge or ‘‘culture.’’ Socially shared knowledge is knowledge that is both common and connected between individuals.……When I say ‘‘shared’’ I will mean socially shared. Shared knowledge can be conflictual or cooperative; like game theory, cultural analysis is analytically indifferent toward the content of social relationships. Being enemies can be as much a cultural fact as being friends. pp.141）在批评沃尔兹的过程中，温特诉诸共有知识的博弈论概念说明文化怎样在体系层次上形成（强调了建构层面），并以涂尔干关于“集体”表象或知识的观点思考宏观层次上的结构。【200-1，3】（1）温特（综合了结构化理论和符号互动理论）从“施动者-结构问题”讨论文化问题，区分微观-宏观层次，相应地文化分别表现为共同知识和集体知识。【182】（2）区分了结构的两种作用，因果关系（互动或相互决定）和建构关系（概念的依赖或相互构成）【207】（3）文化结构对行为产生的作用和对身份和利益产生的作用之间的区别。【236】温特指出，文化理论把施动性和结构至于同样重要的位置，并提出“施动者和结构是相互建构、相互决定的。”【229】（The approach to culture laid out above is intended to give equal weight to agency and structure. They are mutually constitutive and codetermined.pp.184）“施动者是由社会建构而成的，结构不断地存在于进程之中。……结构和施动性之间的辩证关系提出了这样一个假设：文化是一个自我实现的预言。”【232】（The fact that agents are constructed by society and that structure is continually in process might seem to suggest that society is infinitely changeable and even highly unstable, especially in comparison to Waltz’s more deterministic argument. Yet if anything the opposite is true, because the dialectical relationship between structure and agency suggests the following hypothesis: culture is a self-fulfilling prophecy.pp.186）强调河水体系如何被共有知识的逻辑“固定”为某种行为方式，增加一种社会惯性或社会“粘合剂”，“预言”中的自我指的是共同体，而不是个体，因此社会变化必须是共同行动的结果。【233-4】（In contrast to the voluntarism and social plasticity that is sometimes associated with idealism, therefore, the argument here emphasizes how social systems can get ‘‘locked in’’ to certain patterns by the logic of shared knowledge, adding a source of social inertia or glue that would not exist in a system without culture. The Self in the ‘‘prophecy’’ is the community not the individual, and as such social change must be a joint affair.pp.188）据此，物质力量的意义和人的意图的内容很大程度上取决于包含这样的意义和内容的共有观念，因此文化史权力和利益理论的可能条件。【247】（In this ontology material forces still matter and people are still intentional actors, but the meaning of the former and the content of the latter depend largely on the shared ideas in which they are embedded, and as such culture is a condition of possibility for power and interest explanations.pp.193）

三、国际政治理论

温特指出，“本书的目的是通过建构主义社会理论的逻辑和含义来阐述国家体系，所以，最恰当的名号是建构主义国家体系理论。”它包括国家行为体、国际体系的结构、国家行为体与国家体系结构通过国际政治进程而产生的互动关系三个方面。【248】（This book is an attempt to shed light on the states system by thinking through the logic and implications of constructivist social theory, and as such a constructivist theory of the states system best describes what it is about. Since constructivist social theory emphasizes the co-determination of agents and structures through process, my presentation of this approach is organized around the three elements of the agent–structure problem: chapter 5 addresses state actors, 6 the structure of the states system, and 7 their interaction through the process of international politics.pp.194）

【国家与团体施动问题】温特关注国家行为体的建构问题。【250】以往忽略是共同预设国家行为体地位不过是一个“有用的杜撰”或“隐喻”，温特则认为国家是真实的行为体【251】（states are real actors to which we can legitimately attribute anthropomorphic qualities like desires, beliefs, and intentionality.pp.197）他通过三个方面展开讨论：

1. 国家是行为体，不能被还原到各个部分，这就给予国家模式“躯体”。【252】（The first is to give our model of the state a ‘‘body’’ by showing that it is an actor which cannot be reduced to its parts.pp.197）温特检讨了三种国家理论，即韦伯理论、多元理论、马克思主义理论（组织理论、还原理论、结构理论），【254-6】指出国家的指涉客体应该被概化为一种组织行为体，后者与国家凭借权威结构所统治的社会有着内在联系，由此把三种理论结合。【256】（From this standpoint, in other words, the referent object of ‘‘the state’’ should be conceptualized as an organizational actor that is internally related to the society it governs by a structure of political authority, which in effect rolls all three views up into one.pp.201）他采纳最小主义的国家观（把国家的一切附带成分通通剥离开来），关注的是“本质国家”或“国家自身”。【256】认为实质国家有着五个基本特征，即国家是：（1）制度-法律秩序；（2）唯一可以合法使用有组织暴力的组织；（3）具有主权的组织；（4）社会；（5）领土。【257】The discussion in the preceding section suggests that the essential state has five properties: (1) an institutional-legal order, (2) an organization claiming a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence, (3) an organization with sovereignty, (4) a society, and (5) territory.pp.202.又，In sum, the essential state is an organizational actor embedded in an institutional-legal order that constitutes it with sovereignty and a monopoly on the legitimate use of organized violence over a society in a territory.pp.213国家行为体是真实的，不可能被还原到支承国家的个人，结构成为施动者必须具备的三个特征：团体施动的“观念”、既可以使集体行动制度化、又可以认可集体行动的决策结构。【276】（state actors are real and not reducible to the individuals who instantiate them. This is true of most social structures, not just states. Most social structures are not corporate agents and as such are not capable of intentional action. In order to become an agent a structure must have three particular features: an ‘‘Idea’’ of corporate agency and a decision structure that both institutionalizes and authorizes collective action. pp.218）但又指出国家人格化的三个局限，即团体施动者的单一程度比个体施动者低、对于国家意图和行为的估测更容易、国家有许多不同方式进行“互动”。【279-280】（The first difference is that corporate agents are less unitary than individual ones.pp.221……Second, and in some sense conversely, it may actually be easier to assess the intentions and therefore predict the behavior of states than it is of individuals.pp.222……Finally, states have alternatives to ‘‘interaction’’ that people do not.pp.223）这样国家才可能被赋予意图特征。【303】

2. 国家的内在动机特性即“国家利益”，赋予国家模式“生命”。【252】（The second objective is to give our model of the state ‘‘life’’ by identifying its intrinsic motivational dispositions or ‘‘national interests.’’pp.197）国家是可以具有身份和利益的实体。【281】（states are the kinds of entities to which we can attribute identities and interests.pp.224）温特首先考察了（1）国家身份，包括个人后团体、类属、角色和集体。【282】四者都包含了利益成分，但又不能还原到利益。【289】All four kinds of identity imply but are not reducible to interests. Identities refer to who or what actors are. They designate social kinds or states of being. Interests refer to what actors want. They designate motivations that help explain behavior. (I say ‘‘help’’ because behavior also depends on beliefs about how to realize interests in a given context.) Interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural content so will interests.……Identities belong to the belief side of the intentional equation (desire+belief=action) I discussed in chapter 3, while interests belong to the desire side. As such there will always be at least implicit assumptions about identity in ‘‘interest explanations’’ and vice-versa. They play complementary explanatory roles, and so rather than define them as rivals we should explore how they work in tandem. pp231区分客观利益和主观利益。【290】（2）国家利益，国家-社会复合体的再造要求或安全要求，它指的是客观利益。【293】（The concept of national interest refers to the reproduction requirements or security of state–society complexes. An important feature of this definition is that it refers to objective interests.pp.234）乔治和基欧汉指出三种国家利益：生存、独立、经济财富；温特加上“集体自尊”。【294】（George and Keohane identify three national interests – physical survival, autonomy, and economic well-being – which they describe informally as ‘‘life, liberty, and property.’’ I will add a fourth, ‘‘collective self-esteem.’’pp.235）集体自尊指一个集团对自我有着良好感觉的需要，对尊重和地位的需要。【295】（Collective self-esteem refers to a group’s need to feel good about itself, for respect or status. pp.236）集体自我形象有正面或负面，部分取决于与有意义的他者之间的关系。【296】国家利益使国家具有自我实现的“性质”，但反对这种性质是现实主义的。【298】虽然个人有着天生寻求自我利益的特征，但仍可克服并形成集体身份。【302】Despite their biological bias toward self-interest, individuals routinely have overcome such thinking and formed collective identities.pp.242

3. 国家在本体地位上是先于国家体系的。【253】（states are ontologically prior to the states system. The state is pre-social relative to other states in the same way that the human body is pre-social. Both are constituted by self-organizing internal structures, the one social, the other biological. In effect, what emerges in this chapter is a theory that is ‘‘essentialist’’ in certain key respects, which supports the key intuition that motivates individualist approaches to the states system.pp,198）

【三种无政府文化】变异问题，“无政府状态在宏观层次上至少有着三种结构，属于哪种结构取决于什么样的角色——敌人，竞争对手，还是朋友——在体系中占主导地位。我借鉴马丁·怀特和英国学派的语言，把这些结构称为或不是结构、霍克结构和康德结构。”【314】反对存在无政府逻辑。【314-5】（Against this I argue that anarchy can have at least three kinds of structure at the macro-level, based on what kind of roles – enemy, rival, and friend – dominate the system. Adapting language from Martin Wight and the English School, I will call these structures Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian, although in doing so I claim no close adherence to their views; the labels are intended merely as metaphors or stylized representations. I argue that only the Hobbesian structure is a truly self-help system, and as such there is no such thing as a ‘‘logic of anarchy.’’pp.247）建构问题，认为国际政治机构对于国家也有着建构作用。【315】（Against this I argue the holist hypothesis that the structure of international politics also has construction effects on states.pp.248）相比于现实主义强调不依赖于单元的无政府逻辑，自由主义把无政府逻辑还原到单元，温特指出，“我们既可以研究结构也可以研究施动者，同时，无政府结构也不是要么只有一个逻辑，要么根本没有逻辑。我赞成的是第三种可能，包括：（1）无政府结构建构结构单位成分；但是，（2）这些结构在宏观层次上会发生变化，所以可以呈现多种逻辑。无政府秩序本身是空洞的概念，没有内在逻辑。诸多无政府状态之所以产生了逻辑内容，是因为我们赋予这些逻辑的意义的结构所导致的。”【316】In effect, we can either study structure or study agents; either anarchic structure has one logic or none at all. I defend a third possibility: (1) anarchic structures do construct their elements, but (2) these structures vary at the macrolevel and can therefore have multiple logics. Anarchy as such is an empty vessel and has no intrinsic logic; anarchies only acquire logics as a function of the structure of what we put inside them. This accommodates Liberalism’s emphasis on domestic politics, but within a structural approach to the international system.pp.249.关键是从社会角度而非物质角度概化结构。【316】在温特看来，结构具有“社会性”，指的是行为体在选择行动的时候“考虑到”其他行为体。这一进程是基于行为体对自我和他者本质及角色的认识观念，正因为如此，社会结构是“观念分配”或称为“知识储存”。有些观念是共有的，有些是私有的。共有观念构成了社会结构的次结构，即“文化”。【317】（To say that a structure is ‘‘social’’ is to say, following Weber, that actors take each other ‘‘into account’’ in choosing their actions. This process is based on actors’ ideas about the nature and roles of Self and Other, and as such social structures are ‘‘distributions of ideas’’ or ‘‘stocks of knowledge.’’ 8 Some of these ideas are shared, others are private. Shared ideas make up the subset of social structure known as ‘‘culture’’.pp.249）另一个重要的概念是“角色”，“角色是结构属性，不是施动者个体属性。国际体系文化是基于角色结构的。”【318】（I believe this misunderstands the nature of roles, which are properties of structures, not agents. The culture of an international system is based on a structure of roles.pp.251）温特对角色结构的定义是“共有观念使持这些观念的行为体所具有的主体位置格局。主体位置是由自我和他者的再现建构的，这种再现是对自我和他者行为以某些方式联系在一起的特别类型施动者的再现，它又建构了独特文化体系的逻辑和再造条件（如学校、教会、政体等等）、这些体系的再造只有当真实的人填充了某种角色的时候才可能发生。但是，由于不同的人在不同的时间可以占据同样的位置，并且能够以不同的方式实现角色目的，所以角色不能被还原到个人。角色是结构特征，不是施动者个体特征。”【325】A key aspect of any cultural form is its role structure, the configuration of subject positions that shared ideas make available to its holders. Subject positions are constituted by representations of Self and Other as particular kinds of agents related in particular ways, which in turn constitute the logics and reproduction requirements of distinct cultural systems (schools, churches, polities, and so on). The reproduction of these systems only occurs when roles are filled by real people, but since different people can fill the same position over time and realize it in different ways, roles cannot be reduced to individuals. Roles are attributes of structures, not agents.pp.257.温特讨论的是作为集体再现的角色（宏观结构属性的角色而非微观的）：我假设，任何一种无政府状态的核心不过是一种主体位置：霍布斯文化的主体位置是“敌人”，洛克文化的主体位置是“对手”，康德文化的主体位置是“敌人”。【326】（I propose that at the core of each kind of anarchy is just one subject position: in Hobbesian cultures it is ‘‘enemy,’’ in Lockean ‘‘rival,’’ and Kantian ‘‘friend.’’ Each involves a distinct posture or orientation of the Self toward the Other with respect to the use of violence, which can be realized in multiple ways at the micro-level. The posture of enemies is one of threatening adversaries who observe no limits in their violence toward each other; that of rivals is one of competitors who will use violence to advance their interests but refrain from killing each other; and that of friends is one of allies who do not use violence to settle their disputes and work as a team against security threats.pp.257-8）无政府体系的结构和趋势取决于三种角色——敌人、对手、朋友——中哪一种在体系中占主导地位。国家会处于相应的压力之下将这种角色内化于它们的身份和利益之中。【327】（The structure and tendencies of anarchic systems will depend on which of our three roles – enemy, rival, and friend – dominate those systems, and states will be under corresponding pressure to internalize that role in their identities and interests.pp.259）

1. 霍布斯文化。敌意作为对他者的位置。【328】敌人是由对他者的再现建构的，这种再现把他者表现为具有如下特征的行为体：（1）不承认自我作为独立的行为体存在的权利；（2）不会自愿限制对自我使用暴力的程度。这种定义借鉴了施密特的观点。【329】Enemies are constituted by representations of the Other as an actor who (1) does not recognize the right of the Self to exist as an autonomous being, and therefore (2) will not willingly limit its violence toward the Self. Taking its cue from Schmitt, this is a narrower definition than one normally finds in IR, where ‘‘enemy’’ is often used to describe any violent antagonist, as in ‘‘Britain and Argentina were enemies during the Falklands War.’’pp.260.这会导致至少四种含义的对外政策及互动逻辑：（1）国家往往会采取强烈的改变现状的方式对待敌人，即试图摧毁或征服敌人，根据“不是杀人就是被杀”的原则行事；（2）决策往往需要在很大程度上不考虑未来前景，向最坏处做准备；（3）相对军事力量被视为至关重要；（4）如果真正爆发了战争，国家就会以（自己认为的）敌人的方式来进行战争，这就意味着无限制地使用暴力。【330-1】Representing the Other as an enemy tends to have at least four implications for a state’s foreign policy posture and behavior, which in turn generate a particular logic of interaction.……First, states will tend to respond to enemies by acting like deep revisionists themselves, i.e., they will try to destroy or conquer them.……a state might actually have status quo interests, but the threat of the enemy forces it to behave ‘‘as if’’ it were a deep revisionist, on the principle of ‘‘kill or be killed.’’……Second, decision-making will tend to heavily discount the future and be oriented toward the worst-case.……Third, relative military capabilities will be seen as crucial.……Finally, if it comes to actual war, states will fight on the enemy’s (perceived) terms. This means observing no limits on their own violence, since that would create a competitive disadvantage, unless it is clear that self-limitation is safe.……What states facing a enemy must do, in sum, is engage in no-holds-barred power politics. pp.262.温特进一步考察了霍布斯无政府状态的逻辑，即“所有人反对所有人的战争”，行为体的行为原则是不顾一切地保全生命，是杀戮或被杀，这是真正的“自助”体系。安全是高度竞争的零和博弈，安全困境问题尖锐。【334】The logic of the Hobbesian anarchy is well known: the ‘‘war of all against all’’ in which actors operate on the principle of sauve qui peut and kill or be killed. This is the true ‘‘self-help’’ system (by which I mean to suggest that the anarchy described by Waltz is not that; see below), where actors cannot count on each other for help or even to observe basic self-restraint. Survival depends solely on military power, which means that increases in the security of A necessarily reduce that of B, who can never be sure that A’s capabilities are defensive. Security is a deeply competitive, zero-sum affair, and security dilemmas are particularly acute not because of the nature of weapons – the offense–defense balance – but because of intentions attributed to others. Even if what states really want is security rather than power their collective beliefs force them to act as if they are power-seeking. pp.265.先是完全私有知识，后形成权力政治文化规范的共有知识，可以在三个等级内化和三种实现途径：武力、代价与合法性。【337】This culture can be internalized to three degrees, which yield three pathways, and corresponding hypotheses, for how it may be realized: force (the traditional Realist hypothesis), price (Neoliberal or rationalist), and legitimacy (Idealist or constructivist).pp.268（1）第一等级假设，行为体知道规范是什么，但只有在外力胁迫的情况下才服从规范。【338】（When a cultural norm has been internalized only to this degree an actor knows what the norm is, but complies only because he is forced to, directly or by the threat of certain, immediate punishment that would force him. He is neither motivated to comply of his own accord, nor does he think that doing so is in his self-interest.pp.268-9）（2）存在一个行为体免受直接和逼近的胁迫的社会空间或时间空间，行为体出于利己动机服从规范。【340-1】In the Second Degree case actors do have a meaningful choice, which implies the existence of a social or temporal space where actors are free from direct and immediate coercion. Second Degree internalization exists when actors in this space obey cultural norms not because they think the norms are legitimate (the Third Degree case), but because they think it is in their self-interest.pp.271.（3）行为体认为规范具有合法性，所以愿意遵循规范。【343】（Sometimes people follow norms not because they think it will serve some exogenously given end but because they think the norms are legitimate and therefore want to follow them. To say that a norm is legitimate is to say that an actor fully accepts its claims on himself, which means appropriating as a subjectively held identity the role in which they have been positioned by the generalized Other.pp.272-3）

2. 洛克文化。角色结构是竞争。【350】竞争的基底是主权。【351】The Lockean culture has a different logic from the Hobbesian because it is based on a different role structure, rivalry rather than enmity. Like enemies, rivals are constituted by representations about Self and Other with respect to violence, but these representations are less threatening: unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their sovereignty, their ‘‘life and liberty,’’ as a right, and therefore not to try to conquer or dominate them. Since state sovereignty is territorial, in turn, this implies recognition of a right to some ‘‘property’’ as well. Unlike friends, however, the recognition among rivals does not extend to the right to be free from violence in disputes. Moreover, some of these disputes may concern boundaries, and so rivalry could involve some territorial revisionism. The right to some property – enough to ‘‘live’’ – is acknowledged, but which property may be disputed, sometimes by force. Underlying rivalry is a right to sovereignty.pp.279-280.竞争对国家对外政策至少有四种意义：（1）无论国家之间有什么冲突，它们对待相互的主权必须持维护现状的态度。（2）安全不再稀缺，绝对收益可能比相对损失更为重要。（3）相对军事实力仍然重要，因为对方可能会使用武力解决争端，但军事实力不再具有头等重要地位。（4）如果争端导致战争，竞争对手会限制自己的暴力行为。【353-4】（Rivalry has at least four implications for foreign policy. The most important is that whatever conflicts they may have, states must behave in a status quo fashion toward each other’s sovereignty. The second implication concerns the nature of rational behavior.……The institution of sovereignty makes security less ‘‘scarce,’’ so risks are fewer, the future matters more, and absolute gains may override relative losses. If prospect theory defines rational behavior for enemies, then expected-utility theory does for rivals. This does not mean that states no longer worry about security, but their anxiety is less intense because certain pathways on the ‘‘game tree’’ – those involving their own ‘‘death’’ – have been removed. Third, relative military power is still important because rivals know that others might use force to settle disputes, but its meaning is different than it is for enemies because the institution of sovereignty changes the ‘‘balance of threat.’……In the Hobbesian world military power dominates all decision-making, whereas in the Lockean it is less of a priority.……Finally, if disputes do go to war, rivals will limit their own violence.pp.282）温特考察了洛克无政府状态的逻辑，（1）战争既被接受也受到制约。【355】（The first is that warfare is simultaneously accepted and constrained.pp.283）（2）相对稳定的体系成员和在相当长时期内国家的低死亡率。【356】（Limited warfare underpins a second tendency, which is for the system to have a relatively stable membership or low death rate over time.pp.284）（3）国家间均势达成实际上是相互承认主权的结果。因为它不是生存的根本条件，所以得以成为秩序的基础。【356-7】（A third tendency is for states to balance power. Waltz sees this as an effect of anarchy as such, but the argument here suggests that balancing is actually more of an effect of the mutual recognition of sovereignty.pp.284……It is precisely because balancing is not essential for survival, in other words, that it becomes a basis for order in the first place.pp.285）（4）中立和不结盟成为一个得到承认的状态。【357】（A final tendency is that neutrality or non-alignment becomes a recognized status.pp.286）沃尔兹描述的无政府状态实际上是一种洛克体系而不是霍布斯体系，他主要关心的威斯特伐利亚体系就是洛克文化。【357】（These tendencies suggest that the anarchy portrayed by Waltz is actually a Lockean rather than Hobbesian system.pp.285）温特考察了三个等级的内化，即强迫、利己与合法性，第一等级对应现实主义解释，【358】第二等级对应自由主义解释，【359】第三等级即建构主义的假设。如美国为什么不吞并巴哈马？完全凭借强迫或自我利益因素解释当代国际政治的理论实际上是以洛克文化所产生的合法效应为先决条件的，它已经成为背景知识的一部分，现代国家据此界定国家利益。【362-3】（What the Bahamas Problem suggests, in other words, is that theories purporting to explain contemporary international politics solely by reference to coercion or self-interest in fact presuppose the legitimacy effects of the Lockean culture. That culture has become part of the background knowledge in terms of which modern states define their national interests.……I now want to argue that this tendency to take the culture’s deepest effects for granted goes deeper, to the kinds of actors that get to have interests at all.pp.290）据此，为国竞体系部分也是助人体系提供基础。【369】

3. 康德文化。康德文化的基础是友谊的角色结构。【371】（Lockean assumptions have dominated Westphalian politics for the past three centuries.pp.297）友谊角色结构遵循两条基本规则，即非暴力规则和互助规则。【372】friendship is a role structure within which states expect each other to observe two simple rules: (1) disputes will be settled without war or the threat of war (the rule of non-violence); and (2) they will fight as a team if the security of any one is threatened by a third party (the rule of mutual aid).pp.298-9.温特指出，这些规则是独立存在且同样必要的，友谊只涉及国家安全而不必外溢到其他领域，友谊在时间上是无限制的（区别于结盟）。【372】（First, the rules are independent and equally necessary.……Second, friendship concerns national security only, and need not spill over into other issue areas.……Finally, and most importantly, friendship is temporally open-ended, in which respect it is qualitatively different from being ‘‘allies.’’pp.299）温特考察了康德无政府状态的逻辑，指出友谊的两条规则产生了与“多元安全共同体”和“集体安全”等概念相似的宏观层次上的逻辑和趋势。【373】（The two rules of friendship generate the macro-level logics and tendencies associated with ‘‘pluralistic security communities’’ and ‘‘collective security.’’pp.299）多元共同体和集体安全体系的区别，前者涉及一个群体之内的争端，后者涉及一个群体和外来者之间的争端。集体安全的基础是互助原则（大家为一人，一人为大家）。【273-4】（One way to think about the difference between a pluralistic security community and a collective security system is that the former concerns disputes within a group, while the latter concerns disputes between a group and outsiders (whether non-members or erstwhile members who have renounced the group’s norms). Collective security is based on the principle of mutual aid, or ‘‘all for one, one for all’’: when the security of any one member of the system is threatened by aggression all members are supposed to come to its defense even if their own individual security is not at stake. The norm is one of ‘‘generalized’’ reciprocity, in which actors help each other even when there is no direct or immediate return, as there is in ‘‘specific’’ reciprocity. When such a norm is functioning properly the dominant behavioral tendency will be one of multilateralism or other-help with respect to national security. Because of this collective security is usually juxtaposed to the balance of power, which relies on the alternative principle of self-help.pp.300）康德文化也可以在三个等级上得以内化。【376】在温特看来，康德文化对无政府难题的两个核心假定提出了质疑，即“无政府状态”和“国家”的传统理解（即沃尔兹的看法）。【381】（Kantian culture calls into question two core assumptions of the anarchy problematique on which this chapter has been based, namely our traditional understandings of ‘‘anarchy’’ and ‘‘state.’’pp.307）康德文化创造的是权力分散的权威，基础是法治。【382】（And since legitimate constraint or power is the basis for ‘‘authority,’’ this raises the intriguing possibility that what the Kantian culture creates is decentralized authority – an ‘‘internationalization of political authority’’ in Ruggie’s wordspp.307）

温特强调观念对于权力和利益的建构作用，“导致产生无政府体系结构和逻辑的是文化结构，不是无政府体系本身。”【383】（it is not that anarchic systems have no structure or logic, but rather that these are a function of social structures, not anarchy. Anarchy is a nothing, and nothings cannot be structures.pp.309）根据三种角色关系（敌人、竞争对手、朋友），提出无政府体系至少存在三种文化（霍布斯文化、洛克文化、康德文化），又讨论了三种实现文化的途径（强迫、利己与合法性），分别对应新现实主义、新自由主义和建构主义。【384】温特进一步指出，尽管没有什么可以保证国际政治的文化时间会向前迈进，但也不会向后倒退，除非发生外来的震撼性冲击，因为某种文化一旦内化就很难倒退。【386】（The twist, however, is that even if there is no guarantee that cultural time in international politics will move forward, I do think one can argue that it will not move backward, unless there is a big exogenous shock. Once a Lockean culture has been internalized there is little chance of it degenerating into a Hobbesian one, and similarly for a Kantian into a Lockean.pp.312）

【进程与结构变化】温特指出，进程是先于结构和施动性的，二者都是人类行为的结果。【397】（Although this discussion of process comes after my discussions of structure and agency, there is a sense in which it is prior to both. Structures and agents are both effects of what people do. Social structures do not exist apart from their instantiation in practices.pp.313）由于温特把结构理解为一种文化，结构变化亦即文化变化，他观察到国际政治的结构变化，即从霍布斯文化到洛克文化再到康德文化。【398】（Once understood as a culture it is hard to sustain the argument that the deep structure of international politics has never changed. For much of international history states lived in a Hobbesian culture where the logic of anarchy was kill or be killed. But in the seventeenth century European states founded a Lockean culture where conflict was constrained by the mutual recognition of sovereignty. This culture eventually became global, albeit in part through a Hobbesian process of colonialism. In the late twentieth century I believe the international system is undergoing another structural change, to a Kantian culture of collective security. So far this change is limited mostly to the West, and even there it is still tentative, but a case can be made that change is happening. With each change the international system has achieved a qualitatively higher capacity for collective action, despite its continuing anarchic structure. States periodically have made something new of anarchy.pp.314）他区分出两种社会进程模式，即外生性和内生性的，【399】并认为建构主义的进程理论是第二种。【400】基于施动者和结构的互动（符号互动论），温特提出两条元假设：（1）国家通过互动能够发现刺激因素和制裁措施的混合体并克服搭便车而合作；（2）国家通过互动能够创造新的利益而较少为搭便车困扰。【401】（What we have, then, are two meta-hypotheses for thinking about structural change in international politics. If different levels of institutionalized collective action are the effects, and measures, of structure, then one hypothesis is that through interaction states with given interests are finding that elusive mix of incentives and sanctions which enables them to cooperate in spite of the free rider problem. The other hypothesis is that through interaction states are creating new interests which make them less vulnerable to the free rider problem in the first place.pp.316-7）这就意味着，自我的界限会受到互动的影响，所以在互动过程中可能发生变化，合作过程中国家可以建构集体认同，从而区别于理性主义模式。【401】（The difference between the two hypotheses can now be seen to concern the givenness of the ‘‘Self’’ in ‘‘self-interest.’’ The rationalist model is saying that the boundaries of the Self are not at stake in and therefore do not change in interaction, so that in learning to cooperate states do not come to identify with each other. The constructivist model is saying that the boundaries of the Self are at stake in and therefore may change in interaction, so that in cooperating states can form a collective identity.pp.317）据此，温特建立了一个一般的、进化性的身份生成模式，认为文化选择而非自然选择是主导逻辑，身份通过模仿和社会习得建立。【422】（In this section I used mostly symbolic interactionist ideas to develop a constructivist model of the social process, with special reference to the evolution of identities and interests. The model engaged both materialist and rationalist alternatives. Whereas materialists tend to privilege natural selection as the dominant logic of identity formation, I privileged cultural selection.……Within the framework of cultural selection, in turn, I sketched a simple model of how identities are formed by imitation and social learning, with special reference to the latter. What distinguishes this model from its rationalist counterpart is a different conception of what is going on or at stake when actors interact, namely the production and reproduction of identities and interests versus strategic choices on the basis of given identities and interests. The two models are not mutually exclusive, at least not if the rationalist model is taken to be a special case of the constructivist, but they do call attention to different aspects of the social process.pp.336）进一步，他讨论了结构变化涉及的集体身份构成问题。理性主义理论把身份和利益作为外生给定的因素和常数对待，建构主义则把身份和利益作为内生于互动的因素和因变量。【423】（Structural change occurs when the relative expected utility of normative vs. deviant behavior changes. The constructivist strategy treats identities and interests as endogenous to interaction and thus a dependent variable in process.pp.336）温特重点讨论洛克文化怎样转化为康德文化，即主导角色如何从竞争角色转化为朋友角色。【425】循环式的社会关系的原始规律。【429】讨论了四种因果机制或主变量（相互依存、共同命运、同质性、自我约束），前三者是集体身份形成的有效原因，因此也是结构变化的有效原因，这些因素的加强会使行为体更加具有从事亲社会行为的动因，后者削弱自我的利益边界，并扩大至能够包括他者的范围。【445】（Interdependence, common fate, and homogeneity are efficient causes of collective identity formation and thus structural change. As they increase actors have more incentive to engage in prosocial behavior, which erodes egoistic boundaries of the Self and expands them to include the Other. This process can only proceed, however, if actors can overcome their fear of being engulfed, physically or psychically, by those with whom they would identify.pp.357）自我约束则推动建立安全共同体，减少国家在把照顾自己的部分责任交托给他者时产生的担心，使其他主变量的积极刺激因素发生作用，从而在与它们结合的作用下造就集体身份。【452】（by helping to constitute a security community self-restraint also reduces states’ anxieties about being engulfed if they give the Other some responsibility for the care of the Self, enabling the positive incentives provided by the other master variables to work. In the sociobiological terms above, it reduces the tension between levels of selection: by lowering the likelihood of within-group selection against altruists, self-restraint favors the selection of altruists in between-group competition. Self-restraint generates collective identity only in conjunction with the other factors in the model, but its role in that combination is essential.pp.363）两处局限性。【453】