费正清编：《中国的世界秩序：传统中国的对外关系》读书笔记

一种初步的设想

费正清认为，朝贡秩序，This normative pattern, the Chinese world order, was a set of ideas and practices developed and perpetuated by the rulers of China over many centuries. pp.1

【中国中心主义及其问题】“远东”世界以中国为中心。【1】费正清指出，[中国人与其周围地区，以及与一般“非中国人”的关系，都带有中国中心主义和中国优越的色彩。中国人往往认为，外交关系就是向外师范中国国内体现于政治秩序和社会秩序的相同原则。因此，中国的外交关系也像中国社会一样，是等级制的和不平等的。久而久之，便在东亚形成了一个大致相当于欧洲国际秩序的中外关系网络。不过，正如我们所看到的，“国际”甚或“邦际”这些名词对于这种关系似乎都不恰当。我们更愿意称它为中国的世界秩序。]【2】（The relations of the Chinese with surrounding areas, and with non-Chinese peoples generally, were colored by this concept of Sinocentrism and an assumption of Chinese superiority. The Chinese tended to think of their foreign relations as giving expression externally to the same principles of social and political order that were manifested internally within the Chinese state and society. China's foreign relations were accordingly hierarchic and nonegalitarian, like Chinese society itself. In the course of time, there grew up a network of Sino-foreign relations that roughly corresponded in East Asia to the international order that grew up in Europe, although, as we shall see, international and even interstate do not seem appropriate terms for it. We prefer to call it the Chinese world order.pp.2.）在他看来，“以中国为中心的、等级制的中国外交关系，所包括的其他民族和国家可以分为三个大圈：第一个是汉字权，由几个最邻近而文化相同的属国组成，即朝鲜、越南（它们的一部分在古代曾受中华帝国的统治），还有琉球群岛，日本在某些短暂时期也属于此圈。第二个是内亚权，由亚洲内陆游牧或半游牧民族等属国和从属部落构成，它们不仅在种族和文化上异于中国，而且处于中国文化区以外或边缘，有时甚至进逼长城。第三个是外圈，一般由关山阻绝、远隔重洋的‘外夷’组成，包括在贸易时应该进贡的国家和地区，如日本、东南亚和南亚其他国家，以及欧洲。……所有这些中国以外的国家和民族，在理论上都应向‘中央之国’的天子朝贡。”【2】（The graded and concentric hierarchy of China's foreign relations included other peoples and countries which we may group in three main zones—first, the Sinic Zone consisting of the most nearby and culturally similar tributaries, Korea and Vietnam, parts of which had anciently been ruled within the Chinese empire, and also the Liu-ch'iu (Ryukyu) Islands and, at brief times, Japan. Secondly, the Inner Asian Zone, consisting of tributary tribes and states of the nomadic or seminomadic peoples of Inner Asia, who were not only ethnically and culturally non-Chinese but were also outside or on the fringe of the Chinese culture area, even though sometimes pressing upon the Great Wall frontier. Third, the Outer Zone, consisting of the "outer barbarians" (wai-i) generally, at a further distance over land or sea, including eventually Japan and other states of Southeast and South Asia and Europe that were supposed to send tribute when trading.…… All these non-Chinese states and peoples were expected in theory to be properly tributary to the Son of Heaven in the Central Country. pp.2）费正清认为中国为中心的国际秩序的根本缺陷在于，它同中国文化区的范围没有密切关联。（The basic fault underlying this Sinocentric world order was the fact that it was not coterminous with the Chinese culture area. The non-Chinese states of that area, forming the Sinic Zone, were umbilically tied to China by cultural bonds such as the Chinese written language and Confucianism, but the Inner Asian Zone was composed of peoples of distinctly non-Chinese culture.pp.3）他认为这种国际秩序与欧洲民族国家主权平等的国际关系传统大相径庭，并认为这是近代中国难以适应民族国家体系的部分原因。【4】（Nationalist and Communist China have inherited a set of institutionalized attitudes and historical precedents not easily conformable to the European tradition of international relations among equally sovereign nation states. Modern China's difficulty of adjustment to the international order of nation-states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has come partly from the great tradition of the Chinese world order. This tradition is of more than historical interest and bears upon Chinese political thinking today.pp.4）

【一些假设：中国的世界秩序的源流】现代语言研究的困难。他提出如下假设框架，从起源探讨中国世界秩序的产生和发展：（1）以农为本的文化孤岛；【4】（The Chinese world originated as an agrarian-based culture island.pp.5）（2）“天下”从未丧失其大一统的意义和文化的完整性；The Chinese world (t'ien-hsia) never lost its sense of all-embracing unity and cultural entity.pp.5（3）等级制的和反平等主义的；the Chinese world was hierarchic and anti-egalitarian. Its people were organized in status levels according to sex, kinship, and social function. Men were superior to women, elders to juniors, and the literate few to the illiterate mass. However, caste was avoided. In theory and to some degree in practice, the outstanding individual's mobility into the elite was made possible through his virtuous conduct as a "superior man" and through his achievement in examinations or otherwise. The Confucian philosophy that sanctioned this hierarchic order became an orthodoxy. It was supported and perpetuated by the literate elite through doctrines of superordination-subordination summed up in the Three Bonds (san-kang) governing the relations of benevolence and obedience, respectively, between father and son, husband and wife, and prince and minister. pp.5-6（4）天子主宰；（At the apex of the Chinese world was the Son of Heaven, who eventually became in theory omnicompetent, functioning as military leader, administrator, judge, high priest, philosophical sage, arbiter of taste, and patron of arts and letters, all in one. In performing his multiple roles he was more than human. The ancient Shang kings had been buried with hundreds of sacrificed retainers; Sons of Heaven remained superior to ordinary mortals because of their unique function in maintaining order among mankind and maintaining harmony between human society and the rest of the cosmos.pp.6）（5）大量超乎寻常的思想成分或正统思想；【5】The hierarchic social order under the Son of Heaven included among its structural elements an unusually large ideological component. In other words, the system was sustained by a heavy stress on ideological orthodoxy, especially on the idea that adherence to the correct teachings would be manifested in virtuous conduct and would enhance one's authority and influence (te). Right conduct according to the proper norms was believed to move others by its example. According to this mystique, proper ceremonial forms (li) influenced the beholder and confirmed in his mind the authority of a ruler, official, or superior man. Thus, right principles exhibited through proper conduct, including ceremonies, gave one prestige among others and power over them. pp.6.（6）教育和经典中的教义，对小人则通过有效的、必要的法规和奖惩制度（法）管理，两套统治工具兼施并用；Education and indoctrination in the classics instilled the right standards in men, promoted harmony between rulers and ruled, and so sustained the social order. But inferior persons were not susceptible of being influenced by proper ceremonies (li) and right principles (another character also pronounced li). For them, regulation and punishment by criminal law (fa) were the available and necessary means of control. The canny administrator (fa-chia or Legalist) knew how to combine these two tools of government. pp.6（7）天子两方面的主导权，即礼法，人民效忠和敬畏天子而非国家、民族、人民等非人格化的抽象概念，天子的统治是人治。Leadership both in the propagation of the classical doctrines manifested in li (ceremonies) and in the alternative application of fa (regulations) to dispense rewards and punishments was taken by the Son of Heaven. Society, including government, centered in his person as its apex. His personality was the concrete object of loyalty and awe, rather than any impersonal and abstract concept of state, people, or nation. His rule was personal.pp.6-7.（8）皇帝利用两种行政结构进行统治，即基于君臣之间的个人关系和官僚制；The emperor in ruling used two types of administrative structure. The more ancient type was based on personal relations between emperor and subject. The less ancient type was bureaucratic. The two structures existed side by side.pp.7.费正清看作广义的贵族政治或封建制度；（9）官僚制度，郡县制。【6】（10）皇帝及其臣僚并不直接统治乡村，而由信奉儒家学说的地方精英支配乡村。We are now able to see that the rule of the central and unique Son of Heaven could be maintained over so broad and diverse a terrain and so vast a population precisely because it was so superficial. The emperor remained supreme as a symbol of unity because his officials did not attempt to rule directly in the villages. Instead, the indoctrinated local elite, mainly holders of examination degrees, dominated the villages while remaining loyal to the emperor as the keystone of the social order. Their training in Confucianism gave this local elite, or so-called gentry class, an inner-directed commitment to orthodox beliefs and a faith in the social order of which they formed the privileged upper stratum.pp.7-8（11）效忠意识不仅及于中国的世界内的精英统治者，而且及于中国境外与中国有过任何接触的藩属统治者；This ideological commitment was expected not only from the ruling elite within the Chinese world but also from the rulers of states outside China, insofar as they had any contact with it. It became established in the Chinese view that the mystical influence of the all-wise example and virtue (te) of the Son of Heaven not only reached throughout China proper but continued outward beyond the borders of China to all mankind and gave them order and peace, albeit with gradually decreasing efficacy, as parts of a concentric hierarchy. But since rulers outside China, or on the fringe, were beyond the reach of the bureaucratic structure of territorial administration, they became attached to the emperor directly as part of the surviving structure of personal or "feudal" administration described above. pp.8.（12）优越的中华文明对异族的来化，外藩逐渐变为内藩；【7-8】Typically, as the area under Chinese rule expanded, the tendency was for exterior vassals of one period (for example, the Chou) to become interior vassals of a later period (for example, the Ch'in and Han).pp.8……In theory, they were irresistibly drawn into this relationship, they "came and were transformed" (lai-hua), by the superior blessings of (Chinese) civilization.pp.9他认为欧洲各民族国家彼此独立、主权平等，欧洲秩序依靠各国间的权力平衡维持，中国的世界秩序理论上由真命天子统一和集中管理，上下统属的组织原则而非按主权平等划分疆界。【8】In comparison, Europe saw the development of a number of nation-states theoretically equal in sovereignty and mutually independent within the culture area of Christendom. The European order, with its interest in precise division of territories and its own concepts of legitimacy, came to depend upon a balance of power among the nation states. The Chinese world order, in contrast, was unified andcentralizedin theory by the universal preeminence of the Son of Heaven. It was not organized by a division of territories among sovereigns of equal status but rather by the subordination of all local authorities to the central and awe-inspiring power of the emperor. This organizing principle of superordination-subordination was also used in East Asia between non-Chinese regimes in situations in which the rulers of China did not participate at all—for example, between Manchus and Mongols, or between Satsuma and Liu-ch'iu, or even between Nepal and Tibet. The Sinocentric relationship was evidently the archetype of a whole set of often interlocking relations that developed in the East Asian area.pp.9.（13）内亚草原骑兵崛起后，异族统治者实际上也能成为皇帝。As cavalry from the Inner Asian grasslands gradually became the final arbiter of battle in East Asia, it became an established practice that in eras of Chinese weakness non-Chinese rulers could become actual emperors of China, Sons of Heaven at the apex of the structure. Non-Chinese were not only admitted to the Chinese world, they could even reach the point of taking over the imperial function.pp.9.（14）中国世界秩序广泛性，官方用语的证明，如藩、贡。【8-9】（15）参与中国的世界秩序的异族统治者在于天子接触时，都要遵循适当的礼仪，它们形成朝贡制度。【9】Non-Chinese rulers participated in the Chinese world order by observing the appropriate forms and ceremonies (li) in their contact with the Son of Heaven. Taken together, these practices constituted the tribute system.pp.10.在费正清看来，中国认为帝国政府的对外关系是内政的外延，因此每一个同中国接触的国家都在中国的世界秩序中占有一席之地，这种观点以文化为依据，以政治为指针。【10】（Preceding pages stress the Chinese view, in which the imperial government's foreign relations were merely an outward extension of its administration of China proper, so that everyone in contact with China could have a place in the Chinese world order. This view was culturally based and politically oriented.pp.11）他认为中国的世界秩序只是中国一方的天下观念，只是一种标准，一种理想模式。【11】（the Chinese world order was a unified concept only at the Chinese end and only on the normative level, as an ideal pattern.pp.12）考察了对外关系的主要手段，非此即彼的极端做法（军事征伐和行政同化）。

杨联陞：从历史看中国的世界秩序

中国中心的等级体系，三方面层级。【18】区分神话与事实。【20】郭嵩焘《绥边征实》。【20】经典儒家对待外族的两种传统：绥靖主义和理想主义【23】帝制时期的绥边观点，最后历史考察羁縻政策。

王赓武：明初中国与东南亚的关系：背景分析

朝贡体系，“经典制度的核心是优越感。这种优越感是历史的产物，经过一个漫长且持续不断的时期逐渐形成的，不是中国人与生俱来的特性。”兼有神话和现实。【31】（Central to the classical system was the attitude of superiority. This idea of superiority developed over a long and continuous period as the product of history and not as an inherent trait of the Chinese.pp.36）王强调传统中国对待异民族的态度常常被描述为以等级原则为基础，但他认为更重要的是优越性原则与安全性原则或不可侵犯性原则的结合。【56】（Traditional Chinese dealings with non-Chinese peoples are often described as having been based on hierarchical principles. This I believe to be inadequate for an understanding of the tributary system. More important is the principle of superiority together with that of security or inviolability.pp.61）

马克·曼考尔：清代朝贡制度新解

“朝贡制度”是为了描述而用。实际上，中国并不是“国”，而是初创时期的文明社会的管理者；皇帝并非一国统治者，而是天地之间的调任、宇宙间的重要坐标、文明顶峰、天下独一无二的人，是宇宙空间的一个角色（德的化身及有序文明顶端的人）【58-9】（the Chinese state was not a state at all, in the conventional meaning of that word, but rather the administration of civilized society in toto; and the emperor, far from being the ruler of one state among many, was the mediator between heaven and earth, a cardinal point in the universal continuum, the apex of civilization, unique in the universe. In other words, the emperor was not only a temporal political ruler but a figure of cosmic dimensions. The rituals he performed, or those performed about him, were not particularistic but universal. In the annual fertility rite he plowed the sacred furrow not so that Chinese crops could grow but so that crops per se could grow.……The emperor was possessed of two distinct but related personalities. As a key point in the cosmos he was the embodiment of virtue who by his very nature carried out the rites required for the continuing harmony of the universe, in both its natural and its social aspects. This personality was identified by his title of fien-tzu, Son of Heaven, a son not in a biological but in a holistic sense. His second personality was that of a human being, the man at the apex of organized civilization, and in this personality he was styled huang-ti, emperor, the first one having been the first emperor of the Ch'in dynasty. In this personality he could stray from the path of true virtue, betray his role as Son of Heaven, and cause disharmony in the universe.pp.63-4）他考察了朝贡关系如何被其他国家从不同角度接受，以及实际情况如朝贡与贸易之间的三种模式。【68】最后考察了清初的对外贸易政策。

全海宗：清代中朝朝贡关系考

考察了朝鲜使华使团、中国使朝使团以及朝贡关系经济面相的实际情况。朝贡制度的创建和维持并非基于经济原因，也非为了施加直接的文化影响，而是政治的动机，也就是希望朝鲜谦逊有礼和服从。【103-4】

罗伯特·酒井：作为萨摩藩属地的琉球群岛

萨摩藩把琉球视为藩属国，这同时与中琉的朝贡关系并存。【106】中日世界秩序都以各国之间不平等观念为基础，中国对承认文化主导地位满意，萨摩藩则控制了经济资源并提供军事保护。【125】

陈大端：清代琉球王的册封

考察中国皇帝对琉球王的册封，涵盖政治、经济和文化活动的综合性使命。【126】册封典礼对琉球的好处。【149-150】琉球欺瞒臣服于萨摩藩的事实，守住行政上臣服的秘密，但不可能隐瞒日本具有影响力的事实。【151】中国的漠不关心。【152】

张宝林：中越关系中的干涉与朝贡，1788-1790

考察越南新王朝崛起时，中越朝贡关系的中断和恢复，这一系列事件强化了双方在朝贡关系中的基本利益。【154】For China it was a clever and economical device for dealing with a bordering country which the Chinese rulers did not consider practical to control directly and yet wanted to keep revolving within the orbit of China's influence. For the Vietnamese rulers tribute provided a way to remain relatively independent of their giant neighbor, avoiding both excessive cost and Chinese interference in their internal affairs.pp.165“上天裂土而不分民”的原则奠定中外尤其是与邻国关系的模式。【168】the principle of " Heaven has divided up territories but not peoples" set the pattern of China's relations with foreign countries, particularly with neighboring countries. This subtle notion gave China a highly flexible tool with which to conduct her external relations. She could recognize independent rulers because territories could be independent, but she could also intervene whenever and wherever she judged it necessary because the Chinese emperor was responsible for all the peoples under Heaven and because their rulers were viewed as his appointed representatives. pp.179

铃木中正：中国与内亚的关系：匈奴和西藏

中国文化优越论在朝鲜、日本和越南等地有效，但在北部和西部的游牧和半游牧民族中则完全不同，他们自古与中国人激烈斗争。【169】作者考察的是中国与内亚关系，并基于此对清藏关系进行梳理。清朝实力的三个阶段与清藏关系的三个阶段大体相同。【183】

戴维·法夸尔：满足蒙古政策的起源

满蒙关系，满足承认二者具有同质性，满族文化受惠于蒙古文化，并认为蒙古是平等的。共同的文化基础是成功统治的原因。

约瑟夫·弗莱彻：1368-1884年间的中国与中亚

对中亚来说，与中国的关系意味着贸易；对中国而言，贸易的基础是朝贡。【203】世界宗主的神话及其障碍。【232】

卫思韩：清朝与荷兰的关系，1662-1690

荷兰是外圈的活跃国家，考察了两国关系的历史，最后回到中国的外交传统上。对朝贡礼仪的维护。【268】

费正清：中国的世界秩序中的早期条约体系

【朝贡体系与条约体系】费正清开篇即写道：中国不是通过抛弃帝制时代的传统进入近代世界的，而是通过调适传统以应对19世纪中叶的种种问题而进入近代世界的。这种调适使得「条约体系」在其初始阶段即成为「朝贡体系」的副产品。【277】（China entered the modern world not by abandoning her imperial tradition but by adapting it to meet the problems of the mid-nineteenth century. This adaptation made the "treaty system" in its early stages an outgrowth of the "tribute system." pp.257）因而，鸦片战争和第一批条约被今日的北京和全世界视为新体系的黎明。与此相反，本文认为它们仅仅意味着旧体系的黄昏。【277】(And so the Opium War and the first treaties, in Peking today and around the world, are viewed as the dawn of the New. This essay, per contra, suggests that they only began the twilight of the Old. pp.257）他进一步指出，传统体系是在转变和延续，而非截然断裂。【278】（The concept asserted here is that of transition, continuity with tradition, no sharp break.pp.257）条约体系在其早期阶段（19世纪40年代至80年代）仅仅是西方想把中国带入西方世界的一个手段。它也许可以同样被视为清朝适应西方和在中国的世界秩序中给予西方一个位置的手段。以中国的传统观点来看，条约是「羁縻」海上来的强大蛮夷的工具，到19世纪80年代为止的早期条约时期仅仅被看作「筹办」夷务的这一传统做法的最新阶段。19世纪中叶的新开端是传统秩序延续过程中的一个小片段。随着条约逐渐占据优势，朝贡体系慢慢消失了。【278】Thus the treaty system in its early decades from the 1840's to the 1880's was not merely a Western device for bringing China into the Western world; it may equally well be viewed as a Ch'ing device for accommodating the West and giving it a place within the Chinese world. In the traditional Chinese view, the treaties were a means of "bridling and reining in" (chi-mi) the powerful sea "barbarians"; the early treaty period down to the 1880's was seen as only the latest phase in this tradition of "management" {ch'ou-pan) of barbarian affairs. 3 The new beginnings of the mid-century decades were a small leaven amid the continuation of the old order. The tribute system petered out slowly as the treaties gradually took hold.pp.258他反对西方的外来刺激没有引起反应的观点，“认为清政府是根据自己的传统对西方做出反应的；它没有把对外关系西方化，是因为它觉得没这个必要；它的反应在外人看来之所以有些迟缓，恰恰是由于其传统体系在初始阶段仍运行良好。简言之，西方化不是它可以选择的唯一反应。”……在中国人看来，英国领事们认为非常新的条约体系实际上不过是传统的朝贡体系的翻版，是久经考验的古代主题的变种。【279】（the Ch'ing regime responded to the West in terms of its own tradition; it did not Westernize its foreign relations because it saw no need to do so; it seemed to outsiders to be responding slowly precisely because its traditional institutions in fact continued at first to function so well. In short, Westernization was not the only response available to it.……The result was that the treaty system, which gleamed so new in the eyes of British consuls, was actually from the Chinese point of view little more than a refurbishing of the traditional tribute system, a variation on ancient and well-tested themes.pp.259）

【条约延续中国传统】考察1842年后条约体系的初始阶段。清朝接受条约的根本原因是它运用了自古就有的羁縻观念。通过羁縻政策，崇尚物质主义的外国人被赐予一些好处和特权，这将形成他们的既得利益，他们为此将依靠皇帝，由此皇帝就可以控制他们。外国人则把这些条约看作一种特权契约；巴夏礼一类活跃领事竭力要在这种契约中增加条款。但是，清朝官员把这些条约视为有界限的契约，如果外国人逾越这些界限，就必定会使他们的商业利益遭受威胁。自古以来，势力强大的夷狄一直因贪图皇帝的礼物而与中国保持和平关系，甚至接受朝贡国的地位。现在，西方的贸易列强带着他们对贸易的强烈贪欲，在皇帝批准条约时确认他们的利益。清朝希望这些物质利益能激励他们保持和平。【280-1】The Ch'ing rationale in accepting the treaties had been an application of the hoary concept of chi-mi. By this the materialistic foreigners were granted certain benefits and privileges that would grow into vested interests, for which they would depend upon the emperor and by which he might therefore control them. Foreigners viewed the treaties as a charter of privileges; kinetic consuls like Harry Parkes strove to add to the charter. But Ch'ing officials took the treaties as a charter of limitations that set boundaries which the foreigners could not overstep without endangering their commercial profits. From ancient times powerful barbarians had been led to keep the peace and even accept tributary status by their greed for the emperor's gifts. 4 Now the Western trading powers, with their uncouth avidity for trade, were assured of their profits when the emperor confirmed their treaties. By these material interests they would be motivated, it was hoped, to keep the peace.pp.261.早期条约本身并没有改变中国的世界秩序观。对中国来说，条约代表着西方的实力至上观念，并未引入西方的法律至上观念。当西方外交官盛赞条约的神圣性时，中国人只是把条约看作书面契约，而未看到条约背后的法律制度。……我认为，部分是由于这个原因，清政府从未像明治时期的日本和国民党中国那样真正发起过修订条约和收回权利运动。【282】（Thus the early treaties in themselves did not remake the Chinese view of the world. To China they represented the supremacy of Western power, but this did not convey the Western idea of the supremacy of law. When Western diplomats extolled the sanctity of the treaties, their Chinese listeners could see the treaty documents as written compacts, but not the institution of law that underlay them.pp.262.……Partly for this reason, I suggest, the Ch'ing regime never really launched a movement for treaty revision and rights recovery, like those of Meiji Japan and Kuomintang China.pp.262-3）费正清考察了朝贡体系在其固有渠道中的持久性及新变化。【283】

【一种解释：权力结构和文化】费正清通过权力结构和文化进行解释。“权力结构建立在军事实力和后备力量的基础之上，包括皇帝、文官、御史和维持政府控制机制的其他所有官员的行政管理能力。另一方面，文化包括至高无上的儒家意识形态、关于社会秩序的经典哲学，以及礼仪，这些东西结合起来赋予统治权力以合法性。”【291】在他看来，“文化是以中国为中心的，而权力结构是共治性的；西方入侵者能够而且确实进入了清朝的权力结构，但他们很难像以前入侵的夷狄那样接受中国文化。”【291-2】（Our analysis is that the culture was Sinocentric whereas the power structure was synarchic; and the invading Westerners could and did participate in the Ch'ing power structure but were quite incapable of taking on Chinese culture as previous barbarian invaders had done.pp.272）这一观点假设了，传统中国只能作为一个国家-文化统一实体加以统治。换言之，政治权力在相当大的程度上是依靠文化手段来维持的；社会—政治秩序主要依赖意识形态——如通过能够塑造地方精英或「士绅」的科举考试而被不断强调的儒家学说等——来维持。其结果是，非汉族出身的皇帝们不得不借助中国政府和中国文化，以中国的方式来进行统治。非汉族的满族人征服了明朝，采纳了中国人的方式。他们在统治方面使用了中国文化的多种形式，并同时使用满族人、蒙古人和汉族人。此时，其他的非汉族人可以被纳入这种统治结构。【292】（The underlying assumption here is that traditional China could be ruled only as a combined state-and-culture. To put it another way, political power was maintained, in larger part than usual, by cultural means; the socio-political order relied heavily on ideological props—such as the teachings of imperial Confucianism inculcated through the examinations that produced the local elite or "gentry." As a result, non-Chinese emperors had to rule in Chinese style using, or functioning in, both the Chinese state and the Chinese culture. The non-Chinese Manchus had conquered the Ming state and taken on Chinese ways. In ruling they used Chinese cultural forms and Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese personnel. To this structure additional non-Chinese could now be added.pp.273）他指出，人们通常认为，西方蛮夷进入晚清的中国权力体系是（不幸的）半殖民地剥削的起始，或者（更积极的看法）是现代化的一个促进因素。另一方面，从被人们忽略的清朝的观点看来，引入外国人是延长清王朝寿命的一种手段。【292】中国与西方的合作。但“由于在华西方人一直围绕他们自己的中心生活，且收到治外法权的保护，所以未能维护或参与中国的传统文化。……因此，「西方的征服」事实上是失败的。中国的世界秩序并没有被新的入侵者所承袭，而是最终瓦解了。”【293】(All the time, however, the Westerners in China, clinging to their own centers and protected by their extraterritoriality, failed to sustain or participate in the traditional culture.pp.274.……Thus the "Western conquest" proved abortive. Instead of being taken over by the new invaders, the Chinese world order finally disintegrated.pp.275）

史华慈：中国的世界秩序观：过去与现在

史华慈在开篇追问：Is there a persistent Chinese perception of world order? If one can speak of such a perception in the past, to what extent does it persist in the present and to what extent may it continue to affect Chinese political behavior in the future? pp.276. “中国人的观念”表明并非把以中国为中心的世界秩序观当作客观的政治事实。（The phrase "Chinese perception" is used advisedly. What is involved is not the existence of a Sinocentric world order as an "objective" political fact, that is, as an order accepted by all who became involved in it.……In fact, only the Koreans seem to provide a fairly convincing example of wholehearted acceptance of the Chinese perception by a non-Chinese ethnic group out-side the Chinese heartland.pp.276）蛮夷王朝的接受可能初衷仅仅是利用这一观念控制中国的臣民。【294】在他看来，Without possessing even a fraction of the erudition required to answer this question in any definitive way, I would suggest that after all the qualifications and corrections have been made, the notion of a Chinese perception of world order will still prove generally valid in the sense in which all general propositions about entities such as Chinese society or Chinese culture are valid.pp.277.他认为朝贡制度预设的等级观念或普天王权观存在于古代所有君主国中。【295】诸子时代仍坚持此普天王权观。【296】佛教的挑战，以及宋代来自辽、金、西夏的挑战。【297】如何理解这种秩序观的力量？在于古代文明的比较中，史华慈指出，“除历史偶然性的外部因素外，中国的普天王权观和世界秩序观也许比其他文化中的类似观念具有更坚实的宗教-宇宙论基础。”【299】也就是“道”，君王拥有崇高、永久和及其重要的地位。【300】The foregoing comparisons lead to speculations that in addition to external factors of historic contingency the Chinese conception of universal kingship and of world order may have had a much firmer religio-cosmo-logical foundation than was the case in other cultures. pp.282……In China, during the Chou period, something like the concept of an impersonal order, a tao had already emerged; this was a cosmic-social order within which the kingship occupied a well-established, permanent, and pivotal locus.pp.283.儒家学说中，普天王权受道德体系支持。Within its Confucian interpretation the universal kingship is, of course, associated with and supported by a moral system which is itself part of the ultimate fabric of the cosmos.pp.283.史华慈认为这一世界秩序观在20世纪遭到根本性破坏。这固然不意味着彻底消失（如在农村），但在国际政治行为领域已经不复存在。【301】（I should like to argue here that however real the Chinese perception of world order may have been in the past, it was fundamentally undermined in the twentieth century; we should be extremely skeptical of assertions that assign it great causal weight in explaining present or future Chinese policies.pp.284……It would be exceedingly foolish to maintain that the older Chinese image of world order has totally disappeared. There may be millions of Chinese living in villages who still think—to the extent that they think of these matters—in terms of China as t'ien-hsia and the surrounding world as the habitat of barbarians; who may assimilate Mao to the imperial tradition and interpret China's role in the world in traditional terms. The average Chinese villager lives in a world that remains profoundly Chinese. I would, nevertheless, maintain that the intellectually and politically articulate elements have in the main come to accept the fact of the disintegration of the older image of world order. Both the internal and external bases of this order have decidedly crumbled. Although it is quite conceivable that many elements of Confucianism as a total philosophy may live on into the twentieth century, the specific cosmology on the basis of which the Chinese universal kingship occupied a unique ontological status has, it seems to me, irrevocably collapsed. On the other hand, the external situation that made it quite plausible for the Chinese to regard their state as unique has also disappeared beyond recall. It may be maintained, of course, that deep-laid habits of thought continue long after the conditions that give rise to their existence have disappeared. I would suggest that this might be least true in the area of international political behavior where survival may depend on adjustment to new realities.pp.284-5.）如严复、梁启超甚至康有为都全盘接受西方的国际体系，彻底抛弃了中国的世界秩序观，引用列文森。【301】（Yen Fu, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, and even K'ang Yu-wei accepted the Western multistate system with an astonishing lack of reservation. They were all willing to see the emperor reduced from his unique, cosmic status to the position of national monarch. K'ang Yu-wei, it is true, had a vision of a universal world order in the future but it would, after all, be entirely different in nature from the Chinese traditional world order.pp.285）进一步指出孙中山的民族主义和蒋《中国之命运》似乎源于博丹而非孔子的传统。【301-2】共产主义的吸引力也主要在于民族主义，中国已经不再是高级文明，而在世界秩序中地位很低。【302】西方体系比源于古代中国的任何体系更贴近世界政治现实。【304】