吉登斯：《超越左与右：激进政治的未来》读书笔记

导论

在今天，政治上的激进意味着什么？（What can it mean to be politically radical today? pp.1.）政治激进主义长期与社会主义思想相联系，进步主义（而非革命）是根本特征。（The idea of political radicalism has long been bound up primarily with socialist thought. …… Yet the notion of revolution was never the defining feature of political radicalism; this feature consisted in its progressivism. pp.1.） 但衰落，保守主义？新社会运动？吉登斯认为人类进入风险社会，人为不确定性闯入生活，由于人类对社会生活和自然的干预造成认为风险，它带来的不确定性（以及机会）很大程度上是全新的，“它们今天引发的各种反应常常既是破坏性控制和修补，也是控制不断增强的无尽过程。”【4】[The uncertainties thus created I shall refer to generically as manufactured uncertainty. Life has always been a risky business. The intrusion of manufactured uncertainty into our lives doesn’t mean that our existence, on an individual or collective level, is more risky than it used to be. Rather, the sources, and the scope, of risk have altered. Manufactured risk is a result of human intervention into the conditions of social life and into nature. The uncertainties (and opportunities) it creates are largely new. They cannot be dealt with by age-old remedies; but neither do they respond to the Enlightenment prescription of more knowledge, more control. Put more accurately, the sorts of reactions they might evoke today are often as much about damage control and repair as about an endless process of increasing mastery. pp.4.] 吉登斯把人为不确定性的出现看作现代制度长期成熟的结果。（The advance of manufactured uncertainty is the outcome of the long-term maturation of modern institutions pp.4.）

【全球化、传统、不确定性】吉登斯列举了全球化的后果：（1）空间和时间的转变，远距离行动。大规模体系的产生、社会体验的本土化以及个人环境的转变；（Globalization is really about the transformation of space and time. I define it as action at distance, and relate its intensifying over recent years to the emergence of means of instantaneous global communication and mass transportation. …… Globalization does not only concern the creation of large-scale systems, but also the transformation of local, and even personal, contexts of social experience. pp.4-5.）（2）后传统的社会秩序出现，即传统地位发生改变而非消失的秩序，传统必须自我解释、公开接受质问或对话。（the emergence of a post-traditional social order. A post-traditional order is not one in which tradition disappears – far from it. It is one in which tradition changes its status. Traditions have to explain themselves, to become open to interrogation or discourse. pp.5.）（3）社会自反性的拓展。个人获得更多的自主性，习惯过滤所有与他们生活状况有关的信息，并有条理地根据信息的过滤过程来行动。社会自反性的增加是推动知识和控制分离的主要因素，也是人为不确定性出现的主要原因。（The third basic change affecting contemporary societies is the expansion of social reflexivity. In a detraditionalizing society individuals must become used to filtering all sorts of information relevant to their life situations and routinely act on the basis of that filtering process. pp.6. ……The growth of social reflexivity is a major factor introducing a dislocation between knowledge and control – a prime source of manufactured uncertainty.……A world of intensified reflexivity is a world of clever people. pp.7.）

【社会主义、保守主义以及新自由主义】（1）社会主义。大部分风险是外部的（而非人为的），全球化和社会反省性程度较低的情况下，社会主义可以良好运转，否则就陷于崩溃或守势，因为其基础是：控制论模式，依靠大量低层次的输入实现和谐，类似哈耶克的批评。[Socialism was based on what might be called a ‘cybernetic model’ of social life, one which strongly reflects the Enlightenment outlook mentioned at the beginning. According to the cybernetic model, a system (in the case of socialism, the economy) can best be organized by being subordinated to a directive intelligence (the state, understood in one form or another). But while this set-up might work reasonably effectively for more coherent systems – in this case a society of low reflexivity, with fairly fixed lifestyle habits – it doesn’t do so for highly complex ones. pp.8.] （2）保守主义，区分保守主义和右派（新自由主义），保守传统和激进变革。[we must distinguish conservatism from the right. ‘The right’ means many different things in differing contexts and countries. But one main way in which the term is used today is to refer to neoliberalism, whose links with conservatism are at best tenuous. For if conservatism means anything, it means the desire to conserve – and specifically the conserving of tradition, as the ‘inherited wisdom of the past’. Neoliberalism is not conservative in this (quite elemental) sense. On the contrary, it sets in play radical processes of change, stimulated by the incessant expansion of markets. As noted earlier, the right here has turned radical, while the left seeks mainly to conserve – trying to protect, for example, what remains of the welfare state. pp.8-9.] 后传统社会中保守主义的困境：[In a post-traditional society, the conserving of tradition cannot sustain the sense it once had, as the relatively unreflective preservation of the past. For tradition defended in the traditional way becomes fundamentalism, too dogmatic an outlook on which to base a conservatism which looks to the achievement of social harmony (or ‘one nation’) as one of its main raisons d’être. pp.9.] 新自由主义的矛盾，对传统有敌意和依靠传统继续存在，如家庭价值的争论。[Neoliberalism, on the other hand, becomes internally contradictory and this contradiction is increasingly plain to see. On the one hand neoliberalism is hostile to tradition – and is indeed one of the main forces sweeping away tradition everywhere, as a result of the promotion of market forces and an aggressive individualism. On the other, it depends upon the persistence of tradition for its legitimacy and its attachment to conservatism – in the areas of the nation, religion, gender and the family. Having no proper theoretical rationale, its defence of tradition in these areas normally takes the form of fundamentalism. pp.9.] 福山的自由主义（资本主义加自由民主，但去掉新右翼的原教旨主义），吉登斯认为没必要。在他看来，既有的意识形态衰竭，如何面对因人为风险扩大体现的知识与控制之间模糊不清的联系？

【激进政治的框架】共有六点：（1）关注修复被破坏的团结，这可能有时意味着有选择地保留传统，甚至可能重塑传统。【12】（There must be a concern to repair damaged solidarities, which may sometimes imply the selective preservation, or even perhaps reinvention, of tradition. pp.12.）吉登斯特别关注个人主义，他理解为社会自反性的扩大而非利己主义，并以家庭为例。（the expansion of social reflexivity. In a world of high reflexivity, an individual must achieve a certain degree of autonomy of action as a condition of being able to survive and forge a life; but autonomy is not the same as egoism and moreover implies reciprocity and interdependence. The issue of reconstructing social solidarities should therefore not be seen as one of protecting social cohesion around the edges of an egoistic marketplace. It should be understood as one of reconciling autonomy and interdependence in the various spheres of social life, including the economic domain. pp.13.）（2）生活政治相对于政治秩序的正式领域和正统性更少的领域的中心性不断增加。【14】[We should recognize the increasing centrality of what I call life politics to both formal and less orthodox domains of the political order. …… Life politics is a politics, not of life chances, but of life style. It concerns disputes and struggles about how (as individuals and as collective humanity) we should live in a world where what used to be fixed either by nature or tradition is now subject to human decisions. pp.14-15.] （3）与社会自反性的普遍化有关，积极信任意味着能动性政治，它存在于这样的空间中，该空间把国家与社会中自由的反思性动员联系在一起，并非国家与市场的对立，而是建立积极信任。【14-5】[In conjunction with the generalizing of social reflexivity, active trust implies a conception of generative politics. Generative politics exists in the space that links the state to reflexive mobilization in the society at large.…… Generative politics is a defence of the politics of the public domain, but does not situate itself in the old opposition between state and market. It works through providing material conditions, and organizational frameworks, for the life-political decisions taken by individuals and groups in the wider social order. Such a politics depends on the building of active trust, whether in the institutions of government or in connected agencies. pp.15.] 也并非panacea （4）更彻底的民主化，强调对话民主的重要性。近代世界提出对话民主可以推进至个人生活领域，提倡把自主与团结结合在一起的“情感的民主”而非基于武断的权力。【15-6】[The shortcomings of liberal democracy in a globalizing, reflexive social order suggest the need to further more radical forms of democratization. Here I stress the importance of dialogic democracy. pp.15-16.…… The extension of dialogic democracy would form one part (although not the only one) of a process of what might be referred to as the democratizing of democracy. ……Outside the arena of the state, it may be suggested, dialogic democracy can become promoted in several main contexts. In the area of personal life – parent–child relations, sexual relations, friendship relations – dialogic democracy advances to the degree to which such relationships are ordered through dialogue rather than through embedded power. What I call a ‘democracy of the emotions’ depends on the integrating of autonomy and solidarity mentioned earlier. It presumes the development of personal relationships in which active trust is mobilized and sustained through discussion and the interchange of views, rather than by arbitrary power of one sort or another. pp.16.] 这种主张有一种走火入魔之感，政治侵入日常生活的，因而似乎也是自相矛盾的。（5）为根本上反思福利国家做好准备，且要把它与更广泛的全球贫困问题联系在一起。不能再采用利益自上而下分配的形式，消除两极分化的福利措施必须是授权店而不仅仅是分配到，必须关注家庭以及更广的公民文化层面上的社会团结的重建，并必须给予性别应有的重视而不能只注意阶级。【17-8】（A new ‘settlement’ is urgently required today; but this can no longer take the form of a top down dispensation of benefits. Rather, welfare measures aimed at countering the polarizing effects of what, after all, remains a class society must be empowering rather than merely ‘dispensed’. They must be concerned with just that reconstruction of social solidarity mentioned earlier, on the level of the family and that of the wider civic culture. And such a settlement has to be one that gives due attention to gender, not only to class pp.18.）（6）激进政治方案必须准备解决人类事务中的暴力的作用，吉登斯强调对话解决冲突。（A programme of radical politics must be prepared to confront the role of violence in human affairs. pp.18.）最后一节谈及agency，吉登斯的答案在于承认风险的不可避免性，这种承认也是解放的根源。

第一章 Conservatism: Radicalism Embraced

吉登斯意在讨论保守主义和激进主义之间关系变化的情况。（changing relations between conservatism and socialism pp.23.）在他看来，老保守主义者（如伯克），“它死了”。【26】（What has happened to Old Conservatism? Not to put too fine a point on things, it is dead. pp.26.）战后的保守主义分为三种：哲学保守主义（如奥克肖特）、新保守主义（社会学的）和新右派（新自由主义，如哈耶克）。新右派把自己看作保守主义思想的继承人，但与保守主义的关系？分离。【43】保守主义的自相矛盾，导言中已提及。【51】激进主义，认识到哲学保守主义坚持的连续性之重要性而变得温和了的激进主义。【52】（Radicalism is not, however, here valued for its own sake but instead is tempered by that awareness of the importance of continuity on which philosophic conservatism insists. pp.50.）

第二章 Socialism: the Retreat from Radicalism

吉登斯从控制模式理解社会主义，果然提及米塞斯和哈耶克的观点。根据马歇尔谈社会主义者关于福利国家的讨论已经转向维护福利国家。

第三章 The Social Revolutions of our Time

人为不确定性问题。吉登斯区分了简单现代性和自反性现代性，（the impact of globalization; changes happening in everyday and personal life; and the emergence of a post-traditional society. These influences flow from Western modernity, but now affect the world as a whole – and they refract back to start to reshape modernization at its points of origin. pp.80.）贝克后来在《风险社会》和《再造政治》中的不少观点可以在吉登斯这里发现痕迹。吉登斯在这一章对“生活政治”有较详细的阐发。在他看来，左翼关注解放，解放政治是一种生活机会的政治，是关于提高行动自主权的政治。【94】（The political outlook of the left – and therefore, in counter-reaction, the right – has always centred on a notion of emancipation. Emancipation means freedom, or rather freedoms of various kinds: freedom from tradition, from the shackles of the past; freedom from arbitrary power; and freedom from the constraints of material poverty or deprivation. Emancipatory politics is a politics of life chances. It is about enhancing autonomy of action. pp.90.）吉登斯所说的生活政治是认同政治、选择政治，左与右已经过时，它涉及的要素遍及社会生活的许多方面，涵盖非常宽泛的领域（正统的政治事务，以及女性主义、生态主义等）【95】（Life politics is a politics of identity as well as of choice.……Life politics is not, or not only, a politics of the personal; the factors involved have become generic to many aspects of social life, including some of very wide span indeed. Ecological and feminist concerns are of major importance in life-political struggles, but they certainly do not exhaust them. …… Life politics also covers quite orthodox areas of political involvement. pp.91.）积极政治和能动性政治（pp.93.）人为不确定性导致的全球风险环境，主要有对世界生态体系的冲击、大规模贫困的发展、破坏性武器的普遍存在、对民主权利的大规模压制。【101-3】

第四章 Two Theories of Democratization

两种民主理论，即自由民主（福山）和对话民主（吉登斯）。对话民主不是自由民主的延伸也非补充，而是从一开始就创造了社会交流的形式，有益于重建社会团结，推进文化世界主义，其中心不是国家。【116-7】（Dialogic democratization is not an extension of liberal democracy or even a complement to it; in so far as it proceeds, however, it creates forms of social interchange which can contribute substantially, perhaps even decisively, to the reconstructing of social solidarity. Dialogic democracy is not primarily about either the proliferation of rights or the representation of interests. Rather it concerns the furthering of cultural cosmopolitanism and is a prime building-block of that connection of autonomy and solidarity I have spoken about earlier pp.112. …… Dialogic democracy is not centred on the state but, as I shall argue, refracts back on it in an important way. Situated in the context of globalization and social reflexivity, dialogic democracy encourages the democratizing of democracy within the sphere of the liberal democratic polity. pp.113. “民主化反对权力，试图把它变成一种协商关系”。但不平等可能影响。【137】（Democratization combats power, seeking to turn it into negotiated relationships, whether these be between equals or are relations of differential authority. pp.132.）

第五章 Contradictions of the Welfare State

战后福利国家在推进经济效能和尝试进行再分配的紧张，其证明了不可能实现财富和收入的再分配，而实际上成了扩大中产阶级利益的手段，阶级妥协是一种巩固社会秩序中间部门的妥协。（One of the most important structural weaknesses of the postwar welfare state was contained in the tenuous relation between the promotion of economic efficiency and attempts at redistribution. Welfare systems proved not only incapable of bringing about much redistribution of wealth and income; the welfare state actually became in some part a vehicle helping to promote the interests of an expanding middle class. The class compromise wasn’t directly between capital and the working class; it was a compromise which solidified the middle sectors of the social order. pp.149.）在今天，外在风险和人为风险相对立的问题是重新思考福利及其与国家的关系问题的根本，再分配分担风险（社会保险的普遍化），同时也为这风险可能非政治化或通过“包容”来解决。（Redistribution can however also refer to the sharing of risk. It is here that the successes of the welfare state have been most marked. What welfare programmes have effectively achieved is a generalization of social insurance, particularly across the life-cycle. This success is very real and significant. It presumes, however, a relatively stable distribution of risk across society; and also that risk can be depoliticized, or dealt with by being ‘contained’. pp.149-150.）

第六章 Generative Politics and Positive Welfare

吉登斯强调人为不确定性深深进入日常生活。福利条件受全区和影响，第三世界国家被迫处于从属地位，其内部也可以看到两极差距。一种可供替代的发展方案。【164-8】吉登斯提出钻石结构：性别、家庭、工作、代际。【175】

第七章 Positive Welfare, Poverty and Life Values

吉登斯强调，福利国家的问题不应该被视为财政危机，而非风险管理的危机。【187】[the current problems of the welfare state should not be seen as a fiscal crisis (nor are they the result of the need of the Western societies to compete more fiercely than before on world markets), but one of the management of risk. pp.180.] 因此，应该摆脱把“预后关怀”当作解决风险的主要手段及依赖，要比生产主义更关怀生命，发展一种二次机会的政治，在不同阶级以及其他团体或职别中创立一系列社会契约和协定，关注平等的启发性等。（Such systems would have to escape from reliance on ‘precautionary aftercare’ as the main means of coping with risk; be integrated with a wider set of life concerns than those of productivism; develop a politics of second chances; create a range of social pacts or settlements, not only between classes but between other groups or categories in the population; and focus on what I have earlier called a generative conception of equality. pp.182.）

第八章 Modernity under a Negative Sign: Ecological Issues and Life Politics

生态政治是一种损失政治，但也是恢复政治。它对政治更新形式而言是根本的，是现代性限度的物质表现形式，修补被破坏的环境与其被理解为环境本身的终结，不如被理解为重新解决贫困。【239】（Ecological politics is a politics of loss – the loss of nature and the loss of tradition – but also a politics of recovery. We can’t return to nature or to tradition, but, individually and as collective humanity, we can seek to remoralize our lives in the context of a positive acceptance of manufactured uncertainty. Put in this way, it isn’t difficult to see why the ecological crisis is so basic to the forms of political renewal discussed in this book. It is a material expression of the limits of modernity; repairing the damaged environment can no more be understood as an end in itself than can the redress of poverty. pp.227.）摆脱生产主义，要在自主、团结以及追求幸福的主题引导下恢复积极的生活价值。【240】（For moving away from productivism, as I have tried to show, implies a recovery of positive life values, guided by the themes of autonomy, solidarity and the pursuit of happiness. pp.227-228.）

第九章 Political Theory and the Problem of Violence

组织或限制暴力发生：对话民主；反对原教旨主义、控制感情交流退化。【256】（three sets of circumstances relevant to how they might be inhibited or contained. The first is the potential influence of dialogic democracy; the second, the countering of fundamentalism; the third, controlling what I shall call degenerate spirals of emotional communication. pp.243.）

第十章 Questions of Agency and Values

吉登斯总结全书，认为今天的激进政治方案必须建立在生活政治和能动政治的结合点上：Radical political programmes today, I have argued, must be based on a conjunction of life politics and generative politics. Life political issues come to prominence as a result of the combined influence of globalization and detraditionalization – processes that have a strong Western connotation, but which are affecting societies throughout the world. Political policies need to be generative in character in so far as social reflexivity comes to be the connecting link between the two other sets of influences. Life politics centres on the problem: how shall we live after the end of nature and the end of tradition? Such a question is ‘political’ in the broad sense that it means adjudicating between different lifestyle claims, but also in the narrower sense that it intrudes deeply into orthodox areas of political activity. pp.246. 全面来看，激进政治的框架是按照空想现实主义的世界观发展起来的，并与现代性的四种基本维度有关：Seen in a comprehensive way, a framework of radical politics is developed in terms of an outlook of Utopian realism and in relation to the four overarching dimensions of modernity. Combating poverty, absolute or relative; redressing the degradation of the environment; contesting arbitrary power; reducing the role of force and violence in social life – these are the orienting contexts of Utopian realism. pp.246. 生产主义（工作是自主的，且经济发展机制替代了个人发展以及与他人和谐共存、过幸福生活的目标）不再处于统治地位，而是后匮乏秩序。（The notion of a post-scarcity order, as an orienting ideal, and the critique of productivism, flow from these concerns. A post-scarcity system is not one in which economic development comes to a halt. It is, simply put, a system in which productivism no longer rules. I define productivism as an ethos where work is autonomous and where mechanisms of economic development substitute for personal growth, for the goal of living a happy life in harmony with others. pp.247.）对生产主义的批判完全不同于社会主义，首要目标是克服强制性。（Its prime object is the overcoming of compulsiveness, whether in respect of the autonomy of work or of other areas of social life; and its guiding positive aim is the expansion of human happiness. As integrated with the concept of generative equality, the critique of productivism draws on philosophical conservatism to suggest a retrieval of suppressed moral concerns. More concretely, it presupposes the creation of a range of social pacts, including that between affluent and poor but also especially between the sexe. pp.247-8.）不是要多少管制、多少市场，而是折中：The main question to be asked and answered here isn’t ‘how much regulation and how much market?’ It is: ‘how can productivity be disentangled from productivism?’ Capitalism is not all of a piece, and the conditions of productivity, especially where the term is used in a wide sense, cut across pre-existing divisions between ‘socialized production’ and market forces. A post-scarcity order would look to markets as signalling devices, but wouldn’t accept the theorem that everything has its price. Its guiding impetus isn’t the restricting of market forces by centralized agencies, but the generative encouragement of lifestyle change. pp.248. 反对资本主义孕育社会主义，不接受有拯救我们的历史能动者（如无产阶级）的观点，必须承认风险就是风险，从人为风险到外部风险没有回头路可走。（Today we must break with providentialism, in whatever guise it might present itself. Not for us the idea that capitalism is pregnant with socialism. Not for us the idea that there is a historical agent – whether the proletariat or any other – that will more or less automatically come to our rescue. Not for us the idea that ‘history’ has any necessary direction at all. We must accept risk as risk, up to and including the most potentially cataclysmic of high-consequence risks; we must accept that there can be no way back to external risk from manufactured risk. pp.247.）乌托邦主义和现实主义之间。全球化秩序的两面，无法预测性，人为不确定性、碎裂；相互依赖环境中产生的共享价值。（Unpredictability, manufactured uncertainty, fragmentation: these are only one side of the coin of a globalizing order. On the reverse side are the shared values that come from a situation of global interdependence, organized via the cosmopolitan acceptance of difference. A world with no others is one where – as a matter of principle – we all share common interests, just as we face common risks. Empirically, many disastrous scenarios are possible – the rise of new totalitarianisms, the disintegration of the world’s ecosystems, a fortress society of the affluent in permanent struggle with the impoverished majority. But there are counter-trends to these scenarios in reality, just as there are forces counterposed to moral nihilism. An ethics of a globalizing post-traditional society implies recognition of the sanctity of human life and the universal right to happiness and self-actualization – coupled to the obligation to promote cosmopolitan solidarity and an attitude of respect towards non-human agencies and beings, present and future. Far from seeing the disappearance of universal values, this is perhaps the first time in humanity’s history when such values have real purchase. pp.253.）