迈克尔·曼：《社会权力的来源》（第二卷）读书笔记

Preface to the new edition

范围上与其他三卷不同（Unlike them, it is not global.… Here I am resolutely focused from beginning to end on Europe and America. vii）19世纪欧洲及其白人定居者殖民地构成了构成了世界权力的 "前沿"，这也是世界历史上第一个由一个地区文明支配全世界范围内的四种社会权力来源的时期。（I narrowed my focus firstly because in the "long nineteenth century" Europe and its white settler colonies constituted the "leading edge" of power in the world. This was the first period in world history in which one regional civilization came to dominate all four sources of social power across the world - ideological, economic, military, and political. vii.）否认欧洲中心论的指责。方法问题（vii-viii）阶级和民族国家相互纠缠和影响而非各自独立（ix）偏好“意识形态”而非“文化”或“话语”，后者过于宽泛（xiv）对批评的回应（xv-xvii）

第一章 导论

【总论】第二卷的范围是工业革命到一战爆发的“漫长的19世纪”，重点论述具有权力优势的五个西方国家：法国、大不列颠、哈布斯堡王朝的奥地利、普鲁士-德国以及美国，核心问题和基本理论是四种权力的来源。【1】在曼看来，（1）18世纪，经济和军事的社会权力来源占据主导作用，军事革命和资本主义兴起改造西方。【1】（2）19世纪，军事权力被纳入“现代国家”，资本主义对经济进一步的根本改造，经济和政治权力来源开始占上风；这一时期意识形态权力处于衰落状态，最重要的现代意识形态关注阶级和民族，更具有内在性而非超越性，并促成了军国主义和国家的出现。【2】曼始终反对单因理论，四种权力来源与台球不同。【2】个别权力和集体权力。阶级和民族国家的交织。【3】社会权力来源之间、集体权力运作者和个别权力运作者之间、市场与领土之间、阶级、民族和地方性的、部门性的、跨民族的和区域性的组织之间的互动关系产生的全面的复杂性。【4】简要概括本书内容。

【EMP权力组织模式】集体权力和个别权力；广泛性和深入性；权威性和弥散性【7】四种意识形态来源：

（1）意识形态权力，源于人对寻求生活终极意义、共享规范和价值、参与审美实践和仪式活动的需求，控制兼有终极意义、价值观、规范、审美和意识的意识形态就能造成普遍性的社会权力（Ideological power derives from the human need to find ultimate meaning in life, to share norms and values, and to participate in aesthetic and ritual practices. Control of an ideology that combines ultimate meanings, values, norms, aesthetics, and rituals brings general social power. p.7.）弥散性的，通过说服，“真理”生成和参与仪式“自由”行使支配权，两种弥散方式：① 超越社会空间的，穿越经济、军事和政治权力组织的边界弥散，形成社会互动网络，基本独立的权力形式；② 强化现有的权力组织，促进“内在士气”（Ideological power is predominantly diffused, commanding through persua- sion, a claim to "truth" and "free" participation in ritual. Its diffusion has two principal forms. It may be sociospatially "transcendent." That is, an ideology may diffuse right through the boundaries of economic, military, and political power organizations. Human beings belonging to different states, classes, and so forth face similar problems to which an ideology offers plausible solutions. Then ideological power spreads transcendentally to form a new, distinctive and powerful network of social interaction. Second, ideological power may solidify an existing power organization, developing its "immanent morale." Transcendence is a radically autonomous form of power; immanence reproduces and strengthens existing power relations. p.7.）

（2）经济权力，源于人类榨取、改造、分配和消费自然资源的需求，它把深入的日常劳动合作同广泛的商品分配、交换和消费环网结合在一起形成稳定混合体，兼有深入性和广泛性的权力，通常还兼有权威性和弥散性。曼抛弃了第一卷中“实践环网”的术语。Economic power derives from the need to extract, transform, distribute, and consume the resources of nature. It is peculiarly powerful because it combines intensive, everyday labor cooperation with extensive circuits of the distribution, exchange, and consumption of goods. This provides a stable blend of intensive and extensive power and normally also of authoritative and diffused power (the first of each pair centers on production, the second on exchange). Volume I calls such economic power organizations "circuits of praxis," but the term is too abstruse. I now abandon it in favor of more conventional labels for the forms of economic cooperation and conflict discussed in these volumes: classes and sectional and segmental economic organizations. p.7. 任何复杂社会都是对经济资源实行不均等的控制，因此阶级无所不在。部门和地区与阶级的关系。【9】（All complex societies have unequally distributed control over economic resources. Thus classes have been ubiquitous. p.7.）反对马克思阶级和阶级斗争是历史的火车头的观点，坚持工业革命迁徙阶级才变成政治性的和广泛性的。【9-10】

（3）军事权力，物质力量的社会组织，源于有组织的防卫必要和对外侵略的效率，既有深入性的一面，又有广泛性的一面，因为既是掌握生杀予夺大权的密集组织，又必须能把广阔社会空间领域的大量民众组织起来。垄断军事权力者都能行使某种程度的一般社会权力。军事组织基本是威权性和集中强制性，集中的核心，强制导致积极的合作；但也造成规模宏大的消极恐怖的军事现象。【10】Military power is the social organization of physical force. It derives from the necessary of organized defense and the utility of aggression. Military power has both intensive and extensive aspects, for it concerns intense organization to preserve life and inflict death and can also organize many people over large sociospatial areas. Those who monopolize it, as military elites and castes, can wield a degree of general social power. Military organization is essentially authoritative and "concentrated-coercive." The military provides disciplined, routinized coercion, especially in modern armies. (Chapter 12 stresses the role of military discipline in modern society.) In its impact on the broader society, military power is sociospatially dual. It provides a concentrated core in which coercion ensures positive cooperation – for example, in slave labor in earlier historic societies or in ritualized "shows of force," as discussed in this volume. But it also provides a far larger military striking range of a more negative, terroristic form. Volume I stresses this especially in its Chapter 5, "The First Empires of Domination." In the modern West military power differs. It has been formally monopolized and restricted by states, yet military elites have kept considerable autonomy inside states, impacting considerably on society, as we shall see. p.8-9.

（4）政治权力，源于领土内集中管理的有效性，意味着国家权力，基本是权威性的，由一个中心发号施令。两个方面：对内领土范围内中央集权的，对外涉及地缘政治。【10】Political power derives from the usefulness of territorial and centralized regulation. Political power means state power. It is essentially authoritative, commanded and willed from a center. State organization is twofold: Domestically, it is "territorially centralized"; externally, it involves geopolitics. Both have impact on social development, especially in modern times. p.9.

理念型，实际权力组织是混合的，产生出重叠的、间隙的权力关系网络，各有其社会空间边界和动力，相互关系产生了对权力运作着而言意外的突发后果。【11】（The power sources thus generate overlapping, intersecting networks of power relations with different sociospatial boundaries and dynamics; and their interrelations produce unanticipated, emergent consequences for power actors. p.9-10.）

【漫长的革命世纪？】相较于第一卷缩小范围，只涉及西欧及其主要的白人殖民地（Whereas it covered 10,000 years of human social experience and 5,000 years of civilized history worldwide, Volume II covers a mere 154 years and only the core area of a single civilization, Western Europe and its principal white colonial offshoot. p.10.）缩小范围的理由，西方文明已经改造了全球；文献资料丰富；（Western civilization now transformed the globe, and its wealth of documentation allows a finer grained narrative, linking macrostructures, group decision making, and individual human agency. p.10.）强调五个案例都是国家或列强而不是社会整体（my five cases were merely "countries" or "Powers," and not total "societies," p.10.）全球社会，并非一元整体的社会，也不是一个意识系统共同体，也不是一个国家，而是一个权力网络。【12】（Today, we live in a global society. It is not a unitary society, nor is it an ideological community or a state, but it is a single power network. p.11.）对人类历史的二分法或三分法的两个主要假设和内部的一个分歧提出批评。“首先，它们假定，这个时期改变了整个社会的性质。其次，它们把这次转型确定为在一次经济革命中实现的。”曼表示反对【13-4】内部分歧，工业化还是资本主义？【14】在他看来，就个别权力的转型而言，连续性而非革命（男女之间权力关系是例外）【18】摩尔、罗坎、李普塞特、迈耶的研究，“传统是起重要作用的。资本主义也罢，工业化也罢，都不能扫荡一切，自身反倒要被纳入旧的形式之中。”其次超越了经济领域。【19】（tradition matters. Neither capitalism nor industrialism swept all away but were molded into older forms. p.17.）经济转型不是一维的而是多维的；集体权力被彻底改造，多数个别权力发生变化但未彻底转变；传统的支配权力运作着的生命力超出想象；权力运作者意识到结构性转变但转型极其复杂【20】（Economic transformation was not singular but multiple; collective power was revolutionized; most forms of distributive power were altered but not revolutionized; traditional dominant power actors survived better than expected; and power actors were aware of structural transformations but these were extremely complex. p.17-8.）本卷将认真考察工业革命和政治革命（殖民地革命不在讨论之内）【20-1】批评马歇尔的公民权利理论，单线发展进程；其进化论、对地缘政治的忽视以及英国中心论都立足不稳。【22】

第二章 经济和意识形态权力关系（Economic and ideological power relations）

市民社会和国家的划分是危险的，政治化地把自由和道德安置在社会而非国家（黑格尔持异议），但国家并非脱离社会生活的。【26】such a clear division between society and state carries dangers. It is, paradoxically, highly political, locating freedom and morality in society, not the state (obviously Hegel differed in this respect).…… Yet states are not as distinct from the rest of social life as these ideologies suggest. p.23.

【经济权力：资本主义和阶级】曼根据马克思把资本主义定义为：商品生产；生产手段的私人排他所有制；劳动是“自由”的，但脱离生产手段。但他不赞同马克思对意识形态、军事和政治权力的忽略，反对其阶级斗争理论和革命倾向。【27-8】马克思的阶级定义，对经济资源的“实际占有”【29】拥有组织能力【30】阶级意识（身份认同；对立；整体；取代）【31】曼不认为阶级是纯粹的，也不应该仅仅从与生产手段的关系来界定，反对整体的和纯粹的阶级。【32】（unlike Marxists, I do not see classes as pure, defined only in terms of relations to the means of production. Whole, pure classes never organize major social change. p.28.）四种经济缺陷却若阶级整体：经济部门、单个企业产业或行业为界限的较小集团、阶层和宗派、民族国家。【32-3】阶级冲突是由意识形态、军事和政治权力关系促成和规定的【33-4】“阶级的形成过程是不完善的和断断续续的，因为正是政治、意识形态和军事权力网络与经济斗争相互交织，把多种经济身份融合在一起。”【35】（classes were imperfectly, haltingly formed as multiple economic identities were welded together by the political, ideological, and military power networks with which economic struggles were always entwined. p.31.）资本主义的阶级可能的三种社会空间形式：超民族的、民族主义的、民族的。【36】地缘政治对阶级以及经济利益、利润等影响。【37】六种战略：自由放任、民族保护主义、重商主义、经济帝国主义、社会帝国主义、地缘政治帝国主义。【38】

【意识形态权力关系】意识形态权力大大削弱但并非无关紧要。【39】（1）与市民社会其他重要方面（资本主义经济及阶级）一样，意识形态权力网络也分为跨民族和民族的领域。欧洲（逐渐发展成“西方”）是一个规范共同体，意识形态间隙地、超越地弥散于各国，但国家构筑了限制信息自由流通的屏障。（2）18世纪，论述沟通的媒体经历了革命性扩张，使得意识形态权力能够具有某种自主的作用。【39-40】（I make two general points about ideological power in 1760. First, just like the other principal aspect of civil society, the capitalist economy and its classes, ideological power networks were split between transnational and national terrains. On the one hand, Europe – increasingly the "West" - was a normative community, its ideologies diffusing interstitially, "transcendentally" across states. On the other hand, states erected barriers to the free flow of messages – more effective if linguistic communities coincided with state boundaries. Then, throughout the period, the national tended to strengthen at the expense of the transnational, though the latter always survived. Second, the media of discursive communication were undergoing revolutionary expansion during the eighteenth century, enabling ideological power to play a somewhat autonomous role. p.35.）统一的基督教意识形态共同体，教会失去国家权力后仍在家庭和地方上（尤其是农村）根深蒂固，历史遗产：沟通媒体成为间隙性的，不受任何单一的权力组织控制，也就是意识形态的自主性。【40】曼持“组织唯物主义”的看法：“意识形态是应付现实社会问题的尝试，但它们只能通过特定的沟通媒体而得以扩散，它们的特点会改变意识形态信息，从而使意识形态权力获得自主性。”【40】（My position is one of "organizational materialism": Ideologies are attempts to grapple with real social problems, but they are diffused through specific media of communication and their characteristics may transform ideological messages, so conferring ideo关注1760年前后“论述能力”logical power autonomy. p.36.），本尼迪克特·安德森的想象的共同体，曼把阶级也看做想象的共同体；印刷文化而非印刷资本主义提供了大部分意识形态基础结构。【41】九种主要媒体：教会、军事系统、国家行政机构、商业、法律行业、文学媒体、定期媒体、话语交流中心【42-3】康德等哲学家的暧昧性【44-5】（Kant embodied this ambivalence, believing both in enlightened absolutism and in the transnational diffusion of the Enlightenment to bring "perpetual peace" to the world. Philosophes using a "civil society versus the state" model could not sustain its fundamental dualism. p.40.）意识形态权力精英，即知识分子的出现。【47】（An ideological power elite - the intelligentsia, the intellectuals - appeared as a collective actor, just as the clerical, priestly caste had done in earlier ages. p.41.）

第三章 一种现代国家理论（A theory of the modern state）

现代国家在形式上垄断了军事暴力手段；但这并未结束军事权力组织的自主性，而是通过形式上属于国家的各种组织改造了军事权力。【50】（it redirected it through organizations that were formally the state's. Hence this chapter treats military power within a broader discussion of political power. p.44.）五种流行的国家理论：阶级论的、多元论的、精英论的（真正的精英主义和制度国家主义）、混杂理论。【51】现实主义和相互依赖论者的共同盲点，都只关注温和的和平主义国际规范如何产生的，但许多超国家和超政府的规范和意识形态并非温和的。【57】（Realist and interdependence theorists also share a curious blind spot: They concentrate on how benign pacific international norms appear. p.50.）把“制度国家主义”纳入更具包容性的“组织唯物主义”【60】韦伯的政治概念，国家的制度性发展分为三阶段：政治权力、国家和现代国家。【63】曼选择用军事权力和政治权力的联系提出定义：① 国家是一组分工合作的制度和人员；② 具有向心性，即与中心有双向交流的政治关系；③ 具有明确的地域；④ 借助某种有组织的暴力，行使某种程度的权威，确保令行禁止。【64】（1. The state is a differentiated set of institutions and personnel 2. embodying centrality, in the sense that political relations radiate to and from a center, to cover a 3. territorially demarcated area over which it exercises 4. some degree of authoritative, binding rule making, backed up by some organized physical force. This is an institutional, not a functional, definition of the state. p.55.）四个政治制度特征：对一定地域范围实现中央集权；包含两种二元关系（既是地方又是人群，既有中心又有疆域）；由不同机构为地域内不同利益集团担负不同的功能（但不需要统一性乃至一致性）；地缘政治。【64-5】专制性权力和基础性权力。【68-71】19世纪的政治制度，对内和对外政策。功能分析，借用化学中的多形体，国家有多重制度，履行多重指责，并通过它们的地域和地缘政治动员选区。【89】六种高级西方国家成形的方式：资本主义的、意识形态-道德的、军国主义的、易变立场下的代议制连续体，以及从中央集中的民族-国家到联邦政体的成形；家长制国家。【96】曼还是强调国家比单一理论认为的要混杂，却没有那么系统和统一，其“制度国家主义”理论关注国家成形。【104-5】（I believe that states are messier and less systemic and unitary than each single theory suggests. I thus borrowed from another type of statist theory and from Max Weber to develop what I labeled "institutional statism." To under- stand states and appreciate their causal impact on societies, we must specify their institutional particularities. Because the modern state has massively enlarged its institutional infrastructures, it has come to play a much greater structuring role in society, enhancing the power of all crystallizations. My history of Western society will focus increasingly on the entwined, nonsystemic development of capitalist, representative, national, and militarist state crystallizations. p.88.）

第四章 英国工业革命和旧的资本主义政权，1760-1880年（The Industrial Revolution and old regime liberalism in Britain, 1760-1880）

英国在世界历史上集体权力最伟大的冲击（工业革命）中扮演先锋角色，但在个别权力方面没有任何变革，原因何在？【108】曼借鉴了修正经济史学、汤普森、会各党派以及摩尔等观点并加入对均势和地缘政治的侧重。工业化的结构由时间更久的市场资本主义组成，英国政府很早就把民权和一种初步的政党民主形成为制度，但在旧政权和小资产阶级之间存在冲突。各阶级身份最终被强化，随后因战争压力妥协，共同支持现代民族国家的发展，19世纪40年代两个阶级的核心融合成单一的资本主义统治阶级。在曼看来，四种社会权力来源的综合发展导致旧政权和小资产阶级走向妥协，实现了政权现代化和民主。【109】（I borrow freely from all these views and add my own emphasis on military and geopolitical power relations. Industrialization was indeed structured by an older market capitalism. The British state had early institutionalized civil rights and a rudimentary party democracy. Yet there was conflict between the old regime and the petite bourgeoisie (more than the "bourgeoisie"), but these classes were "impure," partly molded by noneconomic sources of social power. Class identities were first intensified, then compromised by war pressures, leading both to favor the development of a modern nation-state. By the 1840s, the cores of the two classes were merging into a single capitalist ruling class embodying an "old regime liberalism" that survives today. My explanation entwines ideological, economic, military, and political power organizations. I pay special attention to the particular institutions of the state. Neither old regime liberalism nor the triumph of reform can be reduced to industrialism or capitalism. The entwined development of all four sources of social power led old regime and petite bourgeoisie toward compromise, to state modernization, and toward the nation. pp.92-3.）经济权力，在17世纪晚期和18世纪，英国农业使商业市场的资本主义制度化，这是工业革命的主要原因；宗教和国家扩张产生大众意识形态网，由消费者市场推动产生；政府特征有助于产生“改革”而非“革命”；地缘政治创造军国主义具体化的财政和政治压力。【150-1】国家和社会的现代化基本依靠市场资本主义的地缘政治斗争的联合，二者相互加强；地缘政治霸权与资本主义和工业革命的相互促进。【152】

第五章 美国革命和联邦自由资本主义的确立（The American Revolution and the institutionalization of confederal capitalist liberalism）

曼把美国描述成自由资本主义、联邦、政党民主、不均匀的军事体制，显著的国内而非地缘政治特色的组合体。【156】（I characterize the new American state as crystallizing as capitalist-liberal, confederal, and party democratic, adding an uneven militarism, more pronounced domestically than geopolitically. p.137.）兴起的特点，以及是否是革命。曼认为，“早期殖民革命的制度决定性地形成了美国以后的权力结构。”【183】（The early institutionalization of a colonial revolution decisively structured later American power structure. p.164.）

第六章 法国革命和资产阶级国家（The French Revolution and the bourgeois nation）

法国革命是否是一场阶级革命？曼部分吸收了法国史学家的争论并糅合了四种权力的所有方面。[除农民阶级外，革命在一开始的时候不是阶级斗争，但是当它一旦成为阶级斗争时，也就成了民族斗争。阶级不是“单纯”的，同样要受到意识、军事和政治力量的限制。革命之所以成为资产阶级革命和民族斗争，不仅仅是因为从封建主义生产方式到资本主义生产方式的发展逻辑，而更多是因为其军国主义（造成财政困难），是因为对战时精英和党派关系制度化的失败，也是因为带有可选择的话语意识结构的扩张。]【186】[The Revolution did not begin as a class struggle, except for the peasantry, but it became a class struggle, just as it became a national struggle. Classes were not "pure" but also were defined by ideological, military, and political forces. The Revolution became bourgeois and national, less from the logic of development from feudal to capitalist modes of production than from state militarism (generating fiscal difficulties), from its failure to institutionalize relations between warring elites and parties, and from the expansion of discursive ideological infrastructures carrying principled alternatives. p.167.] 阶级冲突的一般争论，统治阶级控制政权的组织性优势，使他们可以镇压或赵福对方以避免革命。阶级冲突与其它冲突交织在一起，统治阶级便不能权力维护其阶级利益。广泛的抗议导致其失去平衡，以至发生错误，从而导致革命【187】I also provide evidence to support a general argument about class conflict made in this volume: Where class conflict is relatively "pure" - where classes emerge more directly out of modes of production to confront one another head-on - they more accurately perceive one another. The organizational advantages of the dominant class, in control of the state, permit it to repress or incorporate, thus evading revolution. Where class conflict is entwined confusingly with other conflicts, dominant classes lose concentration on their class interests. Then popular discontent may push them off balance, induce mistakes, and fuel a revolutionary situation as in France. p.167. 错误估计对革命是必需的。【189】曼指出，法国革命的原因既非资产阶级的也非民族性的更非阶级的，是政府的军国主义造成财政危机，又没能使征服精英与特权阶层之间正常的派系主义制度化，因而使整个旧政权失去机动性。这一危机又因军队和教会中的派系主义没有解决而加剧。【229】（In its origins, the French Revolution was neither bourgeois nor national, nor was it dominated by classes. It began because state militarism produced a fiscal crisis in which failure to institutionalize the normal factionalism among state elite and privileged parties immobilized the entire old regime. This was reinforced by unresolved factionalism in army and church. p.207.）农民的阶级革命，城镇中权力为意识精英控制（资产阶级和旧政权的现代化者），此后五年被左右夹击，重负下意式精英集团有了创造性权力的发现，发展连续的原则性思想和权力技艺强制实行这些事项，精英集团与阶级的相互作用强化了第二种间隙权力运作着的现实性，推翻了君主制并迫使教会回到地方组织；但意识精英集团的联盟也被分化，资产阶级和小资产阶级派别的最后斗争取代了意识精英集团，并承认了民族资产阶级的胜利和大革命的结束。法国过去是并仍然是一个资产阶级国家；依靠民族国家的资本主义文明社会。【229-230】（France was not now an aggregation of particularistic, authoritative corporations, welded together by monarchy and church. It was a capitalist civil society like Britain, but with a civil society depending more on a nation-state. Europe now had more than one model of modernization. p.208.）

第七章 四至六章的总结：阶级和国家的出现（Conclusion to Chapters 4-6: The emergence of classes and nations）

阶级和国家不是对立的，而是同时兴起的，而且由社会权力的所有四种来源形成。【234】far from being opposites, classes and nations rose together, structured by all four sources of social power; and though rival segmental and local-regional organizations were diminished, they survived, transformed. p.214.（1）经济革命与其说依赖工业主义不如说依赖资本主义，英国为例。【234】（the economic revolution turned more on capitalism than on industrialism. p.214.）曼赞同马克思资本主义是革命性的判断，但反对从封建主义到资本主义的过渡，在封建地主和资本家之间带来广泛的政治阶级冲突意义上彻底变革了的个体权力【239】认为把生产力和市场的经济组织结合不能解释广泛但仍不太政治化阶级或体制上的民主改革或革命。【241】（So combining the economic organizations of production and market can explain latent class conflict plus intensive local protests that might lead toward regime concessions. But it cannot explain extensive, still less political, classes or structural democratic reform or revolution. p.221.）把小资产阶级作为整体的资产阶级，夸大了无产阶级的力量【270】（2）强化了的地缘政治军国主义刺激了大规模政府的增长和现代化，反对马克思借机组织直接出现于生产关系的看法【235,242】（intensifying geopolitical militarism spurred massive state growth and modernization. p.214.）（3）资本主义与国家政权的交织发展激起了仪式性权力领域内的革命，由教会开始，共同要求扩大并使话语能力网发生转变，而后发展成为自主权力。【235】（the entwined growth of capitalism and states fueled a revolution in ideological power, already begun by churches. Their joint demands expanded and transformed networks of discursive literacy - the ability to read and write nonformulaic texts - which then developed autonomous powers. p.215.）民族主义。【262-270】民族并非阶级的对立物，二者同时兴起，都是现代化教会、商业资本主义、军国主义和现代政府兴起的产物。意识形态权力控制了第一个原国家阶段，教会通过控制大众话语来传播更广泛的社会认同；第二阶段不同的商业资本主义结合和现代化中的政府围绕着排他主义的经济作用、方位和地区继续传播更普遍的原国家（和阶级）认同；第三阶段即军国主义阶段，加强的地缘政治斗争把更广泛的认同推想民族国家，原国家成为自觉的、跨阶级的、有一定侵略性的民族；家庭和地方社区网络与广泛的剥削联系起来，同时阶级和国家强化的到的狂热要求更具代表性的政府，向民主制的演进及抉择。【272】I have presented a predominantly modernist theory of the emergence of the nation into world history. Nations are not the opposite of classes, for they rose up together, both (to varying degrees) the product of modernizing churches, commercial capitalism, militarism, and the rise of the modern state. Thus my theory has combined all four sources of social power. Ideological power had dominated the first protonational phase, as churches diffused broader social identities through sponsorship of mass discursive literacy. In the second protonational phase, varying combinations of commercial capitalism and modernizing states continued to diffuse more universal protonational (and class) identities, enveloping particularistic economic roles, localities, and regions. In the decisive third, militarist phase, the increasing costs of eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century geopolitics propelled broader identities toward the national state, just as they politicized class and regional grievances. Intensifying geopolitical rivalries gave national identities the first aggressive sentiments toward each other. Thus protonations became actual self-conscious, cross-class, somewhat aggressive nations. Yet emerging nations (and classes) also mobilized a distinctive moral passion, as ideological power relations linked intense familial and local community networks to perceptions of extensive exploitation by capitalism and military state. Extensive and political class and national discontent were principally organized by discursive literacy networks staffed by secular and religious intelligentsia. p.249. 现代社会并未向民主和公民权利发展，把民主制看作社会限制的结果，被控制的“牢笼”【274】I have shown that modern societies have not strained toward democratic and national citizenship as part of some general human evolution toward the realization of freedom. Rather, modern societies reinvented democracy, as the ancient Greeks had reinvented it, because their states could not be escaped, as medieval states could be escaped. What we call "democracy" is not simply freedom, because it had resulted from social confinement. Giddens describes the modern state as a "power container." I prefer the more charged "cage." In the early modern period people became trapped within national cages and so sought to change the conditions within those cages. p.251.

第八章 地缘政治和国际资本主义（Geopolitics and international capitalism）

这一章说明地缘政治和资本主义的关系，加入第三个因素：欧洲（变成了西方）文明[European (becoming Western) civilization p.254.] 曼批评二元理论和霸权理论，强调社会权力的四种来源的渗透和部分塑造作用。反对帝国观念和霸权观念，认为需要公认的规范和审慎的多国外交。【321】The world was not dual. Neither capitalism nor the sovereign state emerges as powerful as diverse theoretical schools have suggested. Both were entwined with, and partly shaped by, all four sources of social power. In particular, I have rejected the self-serving imperial ideologies of nineteenth-century Britain and twentieth-century America. Peace and order have not depended on their benign hegemony; nor was "order" more complexly produced necessarily benign. Just as history has disconfirmed Hobbes's belief that domestic peace and order required a single powerful sovereign, so it disconfirms the notion that international peace and benign order need an imperial hegemon. Rather, it needs shared norms and careful multistate diplomacy. p.293.

第九章 围绕德国的斗争（一）：普鲁士与集权民族资本主义（Struggle over Germany: I. Prussia and authoritarian national capitalism）

曼描述了德国的崛起，民族资本主义出现，不彻底的成功。【357】

第十章 围绕德国的斗争（二）：奥地利与联邦代议制（Struggle over Germany: II. Austria and confederal representation）

现代工业社会的发展逻辑并未注定哈布斯堡王朝的覆灭，事实上它很成功地发展了资本主义；曼认为其失败在于军国主义的王朝统治，没有施行公民权以适应现代社会，面对阶级和民族问题的解决方案是狭隘和不协调的，战争及其导致的复杂局势。【364】（In rather an old-fashioned argument I maintain the Habsburgs failed because of their militaristic dynasticism. They did not move to a citizenship appropriate to a modern society. This might have been liberal or semiauthoritarian, confederal or federal, achieved by agreement or force. In this period Prussia and the United States solved comparable class and national problems by such mixtures. But the Habsburgs developed only particularistic, inconsistent solutions to class and nation. This eventually destroyed them, first in war, then in the unexpected denouement of war. Because these military dynasts chose war, this was not doom but hubris, self-induced. p.332-3.）德国三条现代化道路的可能性，半独裁联合取得成功，民主邦联主义和王朝邦联主义失败，因此德国资本主义更具有独裁性、区域性和民族性，而不是分散性、市场性和跨民族性。【387】（three alternative modernizing tracks across German Central Europe. All were capitalist, but all involved other political crystallizations that then acted back to structure capitalism. One ensuing regime strategy, semi-authoritarian incorporation, apparently triumphed while the other two, democratic and dynastic confederalism, foundered. Thus German capitalism became more authoritative, territorial, and national than diffuse, market, and transnationa p.353.）特别强调资本主义商业化和工业化，以及地缘政治军国主义这两种权力的联合作用。【388】

第十一章 现代国家的兴起（一）：定量统计资料（The rise of the modern state: I. Quantitative data）

国家现代化的四个发展过程：国家规模、职能范围、行政上的官僚主义和政治上的代议制，最后一项的斗争通常与其他三个分开。【393】（What is meant by state modernization encompasses four processes of growth: in state size, in the scope of its functions, in administrative bureaucratization, and in political representation. The struggle for representation is usually separated from the three administrative processes, which are assumed to constitute a single, overall modernizing process occurring more or less continuously over a long period of time. p.358.）检讨了既有的理论后，曼指出，现代国家兴起是错综复杂、情况迥异，不能一概而论的进程，在漫长的19世纪国家并没有变得更大，但这一趋势的缺乏使得三种进程混淆，即衰落而日益离散的军队，官僚作风日渐膨胀和平民范围的极大补充。【396】（The rise of the modern state was a differentiated, complex, and uneven process. Rather surprisingly, the state did not become larger in relation to its civil society over the "long nineteenth century." Yet this overall lack of a trend confuses three processes - a declining but increasingly insulated military, an increase in bureaucracy, and a large increase in civilian scope. p.360-1.）自相矛盾的历程：On the one hand the nineteenth century saw the emergence of a state justifiably termed modern - no larger in relation to its civil society, but undertaking many more civil functions, quasirepresentative, becoming more centralized, bureaucratic and meritocratic, its infrastructures able to penetrate efficiently all its territories. On the other hand, this modernization was not unitary but polymorphous, in each phase responding to diverse political crystallizations. This resulted in an infrastructurally powerful state that was in certain respects less coherent than its predecessors. p.361.临时性结论：19世纪的两次伟大转变，国家职责从狭隘的传统军事转向三种扩大的民事职责，双重职能即半军半民国家的转变；官僚化。【431】

第十二章 现代国家的兴起（二）：军事权力的自治（The rise of the modern state: II. The autonomy of military power）

1760-1910年间军事活动左右国家职能，并消耗国家一半资源；二十世纪亦重要。这一章介绍军事权力三大要素的总体关系：谁控制着军队、军队的内部组织、军队的职能。【437】military activities dominated state functions in 1760 and still absorbed half of state resources in 1910. Militarism remained central to the modern state through 1914 - indeed, on into the twentieth century. Yet the unusual period of geopolitical and social peace dominating the West since World War II has led sociology to neglect the importance of military organization for modern society. This chapter shows the general relevance of three key issues of military power: who controlled the military, how it was internally organized, and what functions it served. p.402.）曼发现一个相互矛盾的趋势：形式上军事权力被纳入国家，国内公民权已广泛增加，但军事集团的自治和部门性权力也在增长。【438】（I trace a surprising paradoxical trend: Despite the formal incorporation of military power into the state, despite the growth of broad national citizenship, military caste autonomy and segmental power increased through the period, bringing profound consequences and some danger for Western society. p.403.）

第十三章 现代国家的兴起（三）：官僚机构化（The rise of the modern state: III. Bureaucratization）

把韦伯的官僚制特征简化为五：(1) separated from ownership of office by an employed, salaried status and (2) appointed, promoted, and dismissed according to impersonal criteria of competence. Bureaucratic offices are (3) organized within departments, each of which is centralized and embodies a functional division of labor; (4) departments are integrated into a single overall administration, also embodying functional division of labor and centralized hierarchy. Finally, bureaucracy presupposes (5) insulation from the wider society's struggles over values. p.444. 五个部分在19世纪得到如下发展：1. By 1914, almost all central, and most local-regional, officials received salaries. Office owning by hereditary right or purchase had virtually disappeared. Only part-time honorific office holding survived in large numbers at the local level. 2. Appointment and promotion by impersonal measurement of competence also developed, but rather later and still incompletely in some countries by 1914. 3. The ordering of offices within departments at first varied considerably, but by the 1880s, virtually all resembled the bureaucratic model, divided by function under a centralized hierarchy. 4. The integration of all departments into a single, centralized national administration came early to the United States, which then regressed strongly away from it. It came later in Britain and France and had not come fully to Germany and Austria by the end of the period under discussion. 5. The insulation of party politics from administration came latest. At the top of central government it remained incomplete everywhere, but was feeblest in Germany and Austria. p.472.

第十四章 现代国家的兴起（四）：民事机构的扩展（The rise of the modern state: IV. The expansion of civilian scope）

西方是一个独一无二的“多重权力运作者的文明世界”【541】（The West was a single "multi-power-actor civilization," circulating cultural messages, goods, and services regulated by geopolitical rivalries, diplomacy, and war. p491.）曼总结了这四章的内容，两次巨变，强调社会不是一个系统。【558】（It is a basic tenet of my work that societies are not systems. There is no ultimately determining structure to human existence - at least none that social actors or sociological observers, situated in its midst, can discern. What we call societies are only loose aggregates of diverse, overlapping, intersecting power networks. States had now moved half-way to representing and bureaucratically organizing that diversity- but without systematically confronting, ranking, and compromising the ensuing polymorphous crystallizations. The danger of this for human existence was that these states were now mobilizing terrifying collective powers over which their- or, indeed, any collective - sovereign control was highly imperfect. Chapter 21 will show that in July 1914 the casual additive polymorphism of European states began to overwhelm the entire multi-power-actor civilization.pp.506-7.）

第十五章 英国工人阶级抵抗的兴起，1815-1880年（The resistible rise of the British working class, 1815-1880）

工业资本主义的早期弥散性得到国家军国主义的进一步加强，也使得其历史的“联邦”形式更加中央集权化，三者紧密结合产生了极早熟的工人阶级运动，以注重家庭和社区为特征。但遭遇同样果断的、有阶级意识并且伪善的统治政权和资本家阶级，后者控制了军国主义，工人阶级最终失败。【599】（The early development of the British labor movement was unique. The main power relations charted in this chapter will not recur in later chapters. The early diffusion of manufacturing capitalism, reinforced by state militarism, made its historic "federal" crystallization rather more centralized. Entwined, these three forces generated a uniquely early and uniquely family- and community-oriented working-class movement. In the late 1830s and early 1840s, it launched Chartism, as insurrectionary a workers' movement as we find anywhere later in other countries. It encountered, however, an equally resolute, class-conscious, and self-righteous ruling regime and capitalist class, wielding greater, disciplined militarism. They clashed head-on, and there was no dialectical resolution. The working class lost, as it has lost all such head-on clashes. Its defeat was made final, with little apparent residue in subsequent decades, because workers' sectionalism could extract consolations for craft workers who possessed exclusionary powers in internal or external labor markets. p.541.）19世纪中其地方主义对阶级的替代也涉及家庭（The midcentury replacement of class with sectionalism also involved the family. Whereas the early class movement derived strong sustenance from family and community - stronger than Marx realized – later sectionalism became predominantly masculine, employment-centered, and productivist. p.542.）与马克思与恩格斯不同，并没有将阶级间的相互作用视为辩证的，而认为部门主义和地方主义也破坏和削弱了阶级，且阶级冲突极少是单纯的和正面的，而是包括了复杂的权力网络。【600】（Unlike Marx and Engels, I have not treated class interactions as dialectical, composed of the head-on clash and resolution of whole organized classes.…… First, segmentalism and sectionalism also inherently crosscut and weakened classes.…… Second, class conflict is rarely pure and head-on, because it involves multiple power networks whose interrelations are not systemic or transparent to actors. p.542.）

第十六章 中产阶级国家（The middle-class nation）

在西方社会形成的过程中，中产阶级具有与工人阶级同样重要的作用。【604-5】（The middle class has been as important as the working class in shaping Western society. p.546.）曼对中产阶级的定义采取了三个步骤：职业关系、分散的权力关系和所有的社会权力的来源，这三个标准给中产阶级加上共同的性质，他们与上层统治阶级主要是一种增强效忠的部门关系。这样就成了常规定义的单一阶级的组成部分，在资本主义和民族国家的等级制度中起辅助作用的中间参与部分。【608-9】（all three of these criteria - employment relations, diffused power relations, and all the sources of social power - confer an additional common quality on middle-class persons: They have predominantly segmental relations with dominant classes above, reinforcing their loyalty - if for some generating a worrying "superloyalty." Thus they are fractions of a single middle class defined by the formula: segmental middling participation in the hierarchies of capitalism and nation-state. I start with economic relations. pp.549-550.）包括小资产阶级、流动职业者、专业人员，三各阶层都有不同的生产关系。【631】中产阶级意识形态上的公民权的增长。经济权力依靠国家教育，并因此依靠争取公民权的斗争。中产阶级分享了意识形态的公民权，其内容和机会由他们中的较优越者决定。同时，教育也加强了国家的民族成形。【637】（These are variations on a theme: the growth of a middle-class ideological citizenship. Economic power depended on state education and therefore on the struggle for citizenship. The middle class participated in an ideological citizenship whose content and opportunities was defined by its betters. pp.574-5.）中产阶级的保守主义，向资产阶级表示忠诚。【651】政治民族主义，民族主义的政治性多于经济性，然而政治使国家分派，减少了它的内聚力。【652】（Nationalism was more political than economic, whereas politics factionalized the state, reducing "its" cohesion. p.588.）中产阶级的出现由分散的资本主义和权威国家的相互作用塑造。【654】（A middle class emerged with a distinctive relation to power resources, with its own organizations and collective consciousness - a relation summed up by the "impure" dual formula: segmental middling participation in organizations generated by the diffused circuits of capital and more independent, varied participation in the authoritative nation-state. Once again the entwinings of diffuse capitalism and authoritative states were shaping the modern world. p.590.）

第十七章 第二次工业革命中的阶级斗争，1880-1914年（一）：英国（Class struggle in the Second Industrial Revolution, 1880-1914: I. Great Britain）

曼认为，集体劳工阶级部分出现于第二次工业革命，与完全扩散性经济出现有关，资本家感到这种“完全”是全世界范围内的，但反应是在全国范围内对劳工阶级的进攻，为了防御全国性的工人阶级形成。【690-1】（The collective class laborer partially emerged in the Second Industrial Revolution, as Marxian theory argues. In the economy this was due less to transformations in the labor process at the point of production than to the appearance of a total diffused economy. Capitalists experienced this totality as international but reacted to it with nationally organized class aggression against labor. In defense, a more national working class formed, though led by skilled workers with partly sectionalist interests and organized partly into segmental internal labor markets. Unions emerged as class actors in Britain while still pursuing sectional and segmental goals. The ambiguities of economic power relations did not resolve themselves. p.624.）工人运动的扩大仍保持在男性工人之间，且随着职业的两极分化与家庭和社区的发展隔离开，剥削本质狭隘化，阶级更广泛但可能不那么激进了。【691】（This expanding movement remained masculine, and its gut sense of exploitation narrowed as employment polarization became segregated from more complex family and community trends. Class, though becoming more extensive, was probably becoming less intensive. p.624.）由于国家政治摇摆不定，男性化的阶级斗争主要是由英国政治定型，即主要通过跨阶级的政党民族、民族问题和国家的部分民主化解决，这限制了资本家和体制的压迫，革命的社会主义限制阶级政策的部门性和地区性变化，使阶级冲突的集中制度化进一步加快，国家缓和将占据主导地位。【691】（Because national and political, the still-ambiguous but masculine class struggle was largely "solved" by British political crystallizations, primarily by cross-class party democracy, the national issue, and the partial civilianization of the state. These restrained capitalist and regime repression, and its doppelganger, revolutionary socialism, restrained sectoral and regional variations in class strategies and furthered centralized institutionalization of class conflict. National moderation would predominate, unless some major disaster, like defeat in war, struck. p.624.）直到1914年，政府对劳工的温和政策的形式还未确定，尽管可选择的范围已经很小。占主导的是互助主义者，并带有一些自由主义和改良主义的色彩。【691】（The form of labor's national moderation was not decided by 1914, though the choices had narrowed. They would be predominantly mutualist, with some liberal and reformist hues, coming in one of two alternative politics - either from the Liberal party or from an autonomous Labour party. p.624.）

第十八章 第二次工业革命中的阶级斗争，1880-1914年（二）：工人阶级运动的比较分析（Class struggle in the Second Industrial Revolution, 1880-1914: II. Comparative analysis of working-class movements）

工业经济和农地经济的相互作用解释这一时期的阶级斗争，二者的相似性主要是由政治成形规定的，工人阶级团体的结构所起的作用要小，“现代社会结构更多地被经济和政治权力组织围绕和支撑。”【696】（I explain class conflicts in this period in terms of interaction between essentially similar industrial and agrarian economies with the variety provided primarily by political crystallizations and to a lesser extent by the structure of working-class communities. This reinforces one of the broadest generalizations of this volume: Modern society came to be increasingly structured by the entwining of economic and political power organizations. p.628.）这一章比较英国、美国、俄罗斯帝国、法国、德国及其他欧洲国家的情况。

第十九章 第二次工业革命中的阶级斗争，1880-1914年（三）：农民（Class struggle in the Second Industrial Revolution, 1880-1914: III. The peasantry）

从马克思开始进一步发展的阶级划分理论大部分是以英国状况为基础的。【762】（Most stratification theories from Marx onward were based on the British experience. p.692.）在曼看来，农村政治的差异主要是随着民主政党和国家政治具体化互相结合而产生的，因而决定性地构造了我们的现代世界。【764】（I shall argue that variations in agrarian politics principally resulted as party-democratic and national political crystallizations entwined, thus decisively structuring our modern world. p.694.）小土地所有者与温和改革，追求具体的政府干预反对无管制的为大资本控制的国际市场，改革要求在诸阶级之间与政治而非经济关系更大。【788】农民对联盟的偏离。【789】“经济问题几乎不决定农民政治……国家具体化解释了农村斗争的主要特色。”【791】Economic issues, though principally motivating political action, rarely determined peasant politics. Rather, the crystallizations of the states in which peasants pursued their interests explain the main colorations of rural struggles. I have not argued that politics simply determines class struggle, weighting economic versus political variables in some ultimate sense. Rather, outcomes were determined by (1) underlying similarities of class and sectoral interests, under the impact of an essentially similar global commercialization of capitalism, interacting with (2) very different political crystallizations on representation and the national question, connecting peasants to state regimes and party alliances in fundamentally different ways. This is strikingly similar to my conclusions about the outcomes of industrial class struggles. p.718.

第二十章 理论总结：阶级、国家、民族及社会权力的来源（Theoretical conclusions: Classes, states, nations, and the sources of social power）

这一张总结阶级和民族国家这两个现代主要权力运作者及社会权利四个来源。[由于国家通过18世纪后期军事扩张和19世纪后期工业资本主义扩张而变得更具社会性，因此它在某种程度上给西方社会和阶级“赋予了国籍”。]【796】（As the state became more socially significant through late eighteenth-century military and late nineteenth-century industrial capitalist expansion, it partially "naturalized" the West and its classes. p.723.）

【阶级和国家】资本主义加速了人类集体权力，【796】也改造了各国的权力分配关系。【797】马克思未能预料到权力分配冲突的结果，原因有四：（1）资本主义主要是分散性的权力组织，其权威性借机组织自始的两难，即资产阶级、小资产阶级和中产阶级在经济地位上是异质的，农业阶级造就了三个相互竞争的集体组织：生产阶级、信贷阶级和一个经济部门，无产阶级也造就了阶级、地方主义和部门主义三个集体组织，阶级未必占上风。【797】[Because capitalism was predominantly a diffused power organization, its authoritative class organization emerged as essentially ambivalent. Bourgeoisies, petite bourgeoisies, and middle classes were economically heterogeneous. Without intervention from the other sources of social power, their conflicts with dominant classes and re- gimes turned out partial, mild, and particularistic. Over the first half of the period many compromised and even merged without much drama. Agrarian classes, especially the peasantry, developed as heterogeneous, generating three competing collective organizations: as "production classes," as "credit classes," and as an economic sector (in a segmental alliance with large estate farmers, their usual opponents on the other two dimensions). The proletariat also generated three collective organizational tendencies: class, sectionalism, and segmentalism. Thus the economic development of capitalism produced multiple collective organizations, among which classes, though inherently developing the dialectical conflict Marx expected, by no means dominated. p.724.]（2）三种竞争经济组织相互争夺的结果主要是由更具权威性的 统治阶级和统治政权的战略或趋势决定的，它们控制着权威性的国家和武装力量。革命只发生在统治阶级及政权被多样化的、非辩证的但相互交织的斗争所迷惑的地方。【798】（The outcomes of competition among these competing economic organizations were determined predominantly by the strategies or drifts of more authoritatively organized dominant classes and ruling regimes, which, after all, controlled existing authoritative states and armed forces.…… Revolutions, I argued, occur where ruling classes and regimes become confused by the emergence of multiple, nondialectial but entwined conflicts. p.724.）（3）统治阶级及政权的政策或趋势以及工人阶级自身主要由其他三种社会权力决定，1900年前后西方劳资冲突后果主要由两个因素相互作用决定：基本相似的资本主义全球扩散导致了各种集体组织和利益关系的普遍混淆；各种权威性国家的成型，特别是代议制和民族问题。【798】[the strategies or drifts of dominant classes and regimes, and so therefore of workers themselves, were predominantly determined by the other three sources of social power.…… about 1900, outcomes of capital-labor conflict throughout the West were determined by (1) an essentially similar global diffusion of capitalism generating a common ambiguity of collective organizations and interests, interacting with (2) various crystallizations of authoritative states - ideological, patriarchal, military, but especially their two citizen crystallizations, on "representative" and "national" issues. p.725.]（4）这种相互作用并非台球式独立个体的碰撞，而是非辩证地交织在一起，有助于彼此相互塑造。【798】（These interactions were not like billiard-ball collisions of separate objects. Classes, segments, and sections all "entwined nondialectically" with authoritative political crystallizations, thus helping to shape one another. Actors' very identities and interests were changed behind their backs by the unintended consequences of action. In such an uncertain environment, actors were prone to make "systemic mistakes." p.725.）四个决定因素相互交织、密不可分、相互塑造（These four determinants were not merely external to one another. They were entwined, shaping one another's form. The relevance of regime strategies-drifts, of representative and national citizen struggles, of unintended consequences, and of mistakes derived from the way they strengthened class, sectional, or segmental identities according to context. Class, sectionalism, and segmentalism continued to battle over the souls of workers and peasants. p.725.）普遍弥散的资本主义与权威性国家相互交织的政治滞后理论。【800】（In all these encounters state institutions also changed, but more slowly than capitalism developed and classes emerged. The theoretical model appropriate for this phase of world history-with common diffusing capitalism entwined with more particular authoritative state institutions - is a kind of "political lag" theory, p.729.）

【民族和国家】国家四段式理论，宗教和商业资本主义阶段；军国主义阶段；功业资本主义阶段。19世纪后半叶和20世纪早期的资本主义工业阶段，阶级斗争及其对国家的影响促进了民族的兴起，国家第一次承担重大民事干预功能，主要回应资本家（也包括其他阶级，如军事集团、国家精英）提出的工业资本主义需求。而国家对基础设施的建设又增强了社会交流的密度，但受国家领土范围制约，社会行为更具民族同一性，民族把内在的、情感化的家庭邻里组织和更广泛的、机构性的权力组织连接在一起，尽管民族并非统一的共同体，地方主义仍然存在。【804】（During the second half of the nineteenth century and the early twentieth, the industrial phase of capitalism, its class struggles, and its impact on the state reinforced emerging nations. States for the first time undertook major civilian functions, sponsoring communications systems; canals, roads, post offices, railways, telegraph systems, and, most significantly, schools. States were largely responding to the needs of industrialism, as articulated primarily by capitalists, but also by other classes, by militaries, and by state elites. Because almost all valued the increasing collective powers of an industrial society, they urged the state on toward greater social coordination. In turn, state infrastructures enhanced the density of social interaction, but bounded by the state's territorial reach. We saw that social behavior – even intimate social behavior such as sexual mores- became "naturalized," more nationally homogeneous. Quite unconsciously, most state activities furthered the nation as an experienced community, linking the intensive and emotional organizations of family and neighborhood with more extensive and instrumental power organizations. p.730.）普遍的、跨阶级的民族必定涉及公民权，各种公民权概念孕育着19世纪两个支配性政治定型，引发了代议制问题，强调民族问题重要并与代议制一样有争议【805】Nor was the nation an uncontested community. The popular, cross-class nation necessarily involved conceptions of citizenship (though of varying types). But these raised the two dominant political crystallizations of the nineteenth century, turning on the "representative" issue - who should be full citizens - and the "national" issue – where citizenship should be located, that is, how centralized the state and nation should be. I have stressed throughout that the national issue was important and as contentious as was representation. Few states started the period as nationally homogeneous: Most contained regions with distinct religious and linguistic communities, and many regions had their own political institutions, or memories of them. p.731. 国家扩张的军国主义阶段和工业资本主义阶段强化了代议制问题和民族问题。【805】民族的好战激情，源出于国家和家庭交流的强烈的情感范围之间更紧密的联系，意识形态把国家视为母亲或父亲，家庭观念得以表彰。家庭生活和地方社区生活强化了剥削民众的民族的差异感，压迫民族反过来认为用国内军国主义对付他们是理所应当对，颠覆国家的民族主义的激情与狂热。【806】（In this phase, nations also became more passionate and aggressive. Passion derived principally from the tighter links between the state and the intensive, emotional sphere of family and neighborhood interaction in which state education and physical and moral health infrastructures loomed large. Ideologies saw the nation as mother or father, hearth and home writ large. Aggression resulted because all states continued to crystallize as militarist; all were geopolitically militarist, and some remained domestically so. p.732.）国家强化的民族主义暴力主要集中于国家间的战争。【807】民族在工业资本主义按三个基本途径发展：获得国籍，民族成为相互影响和情感依附的广泛社区；公民进一步引向民族主义组织，民族利益和荣誉看作与其他民族的利益和荣誉的必然冲突；实际的民族主义核心不成比例地源于国家在文职和军职雇用方面的扩张。国家理想在公民家庭中产生很肤浅的共鸣。【808】So in the fourth, industrial capitalist, phase of its relatively short life, the nation had advanced in three essential ways. First, much of the population, largely unconsciously, had become naturalized, making the nation an extensive community of interaction and emotional attachment. Thus what I call "national" organization increased at the large expense of the local and the regional (unless that now turned into a nation itself) and at the lesser expense of transnational organization. This is where the nation rested for most of the population. Second, many citizens - at this point drawn from middling and upper classes and from dominant religious and linguistic communities - were drawn further toward nationalist organization, regarding national interests and honor as essentially conflicting with those of other nations. Third, the actually nationalist core was disproportionately drawn from state expansion itself, in civilian and military cadre employment. Its ideals then resonated rather shallowly among the families of the citizens. Combined, they could aspire to mobilize the merely national remainder. p.734. 国家强化的民族被简单描述为三个同心环带：外层由全体民族国家圈定，并依附于全体民族国家，中层和内核联系更紧，内核即国家主义【808】In the industrial capitalist phase the state-reinforcing nation can be simply represented as three concentric circular bands: the outer one circumscribed by and attached to the total national state, the middle more linked to the inner circle, the statist core. p.734. 军国主义、独裁主义和资本主义的极端结合，即纳粹。【809】

第二十一章 经验主义的巅峰——超越巅峰：地缘政治、阶级斗争和第一次世界大战（Empirical culmination - over the top: Geopolitics, class struggle, and World War I）

曼把一战看作社会历史的转折点，其后果明确决定了20世纪的命运。【815】一战爆发的原因，对内还是对外政策？曼强调决策是由国内和国外政策决定的，并牵涉民族国家内部和民族国家间，反对把社会和国家看作单一的体系。【877】（Both Innen and Aussen schools mistakenly see societies and states as systems, unitary and homogeneous. p.796.）