查尔斯·泰勒：《自我的根源》读书笔记

序言

现代认同的历史[an attempt to articulate and write a history of the modern identity. With this term, I want to designate the ensemble of (largely unarticulated) understandings of what it is to be a human agent: the senses of inwardness, freedom, individuality, and being embedded in nature which are at home in the modern West. iv.]

第一编 认同与善（Identity and the Good）

第一章 无法逃避的框架（inescapable frameworks）

检讨道德和精神直觉背后的背景图景，并希望表达这些直觉的道德本体论【16】（I spoke at the outset about exploring the 'background picture' lying behind our moral and spiritual intuitions. I could now rephrase this and say that my target is the moral ontology which articulates these intuitions. p.8.）批评当代对道德本体论有目的的压制，泰勒则着手做出修复性尝试。【18】[It will be my claim that there is a great deal of motivated suppression of moral ontology among our contemporaries, in part because the pluralist nature of modern society makes it easier to live that way, but also because of the great weight of modern epistemology (as with the naturalists evoked above} and, behind this, of the spiritual outlook associated with this epistemology. So the work I am embarked upon here could be called in large degree an essay in· retrieval. p.10.] “无论我们是否意识到这一点，这种或那种本体论事实上是我们道德回应的惟一充分的基础。”【19】（Rather it could only be carried forward by showing that one or another ontology is in fact the only adequate basis for our moral responses, whether we recognize this or not. p.10.）现代道德世界，主体权利是关键特征，对人类生活和整全性的尊重与自主概念结合（To talk of universal, natural, or human rights is to connect respect for human life and integrity with the notion of autonomy. It is to conceive people as active cooperators in establishing and ensuring the respect which is due them. And this expresses a central feature of the modern Western moral outlook. p.12.）三个轴心：对他人的尊重和责任感、对怎样过完满生活的理解，以及“主动的”尊重（active respect）【24】对还原论自然主义的异议，强调性质差别（qualitative distinction）

第二章 道德空间中的自我（the self in moral space）

泰勒坚持没有框架情况下生活是不可能的【39】（I want to defend the strong thesis that doing without frameworks is utterly impossible for us; otherwise put, that the horizons within which we live our lives and which make sense of them have to include these strong qualitative discriminations. Moreover, this is not meant just as a contingently true psychological fact about human beings, which could perhaps turn out one day not to hold for some exceptional individual or new type, some superman of disengaged objectification. Rather the claim is that living within such strongly qualified horizons is constitutive of human agency, that stepping outside these limits would be tantamount to stepping outside what we would recognize as integral, that is, undamaged human personhood. p.27.）认同问题，由提供框架或视界的恒诺和身份决定。【40】泰勒反对从认知角度看待自我的进路，而是把自我与善相关联，并认为这是关键的、不可逃避的（My underlying thesis is that there is a close connection between the different conditions of identity, or of one's life making sense, that I have been discussing. One could put it this way: because we cannot but orient ourselves to the good, and thus determine our place relative to it and hence determine the direction of our lives, we must inescapably understand our lives in narrative form, as a 'quesf. But one could perhaps start from another point: because we have to determine our place in relation to the good, therefore we cannot be without an orientation to it, and hence must see our life in story. From whichever direction, I see these conditions as connected facets of the same reality, inescapable structural requirements of human agency. pp.51-2.）他所说的道德空间包括两个方面，由性质差别规定的空间，以及与善之间的距离【62】[By analogy, our orientation in relation to the good requires not only some framework(s) which defines the shape of the qualitatively higher but also a sense of where we stand in relation to this. Nor is this question a potentially neutral one, to which we could be indifferent, taking any answer which effectively oriented us as satisfactory, no matter how distant it placed us from the good. On the contrary, we come here to one of the most basic aspirations of human beings, the need to be connected to, or in contact with, what they see as good, or of crucial importance, or of fundamental value. And how could it be otherwise, once we see that this orientation in relation to the good is essential to being a functional human agent? The fact that we have to place ourselves in a space which is defined by these qualitative distinctions cannot but mean that where we stand in relation to them must matter to us. Not being able to function without orientation in the space of the ultimately important means not being able to stop caring where we sit in it. p.52.]

第三章 非表达的伦理（ethics of inarticulacy）

泰勒在这一章提出BA原则（best account）：我们选择的术语，必须能够在解释性和生活运用两个方面活的意义。直到我们能用更有洞察力的替代物取代它们，否则对后者不可缺少的术语，也构成使我们有最佳意义叙说的部分。这种寻找洞察力的结果，产生出在任何给定时代我们可以提供的最好论述，而且没有关于科学或自然的更一般类型的认识论或形而上学的考虑，能够恰当地取消这一点。【86-7】（The terms we select have to make sense across the whole range of both explanatory and life uses. The terms indispensable for the latter are part of the story that makes best sense of us, unless and until we can replace them with more clairvoyant substitutes. The result of this search for clairvoyance yields the best account we can give at any given time, and no epistemological or metaphysical considerations of a more general kind about science or nature can justify setting this aside. The best account in the above sense is trumps. Let me call this the BA principle. p.58.）在他看来，把道德判断看作投射的理论，把价值与事实区别的企图都与BA原则冲突。【87】对超善、性质差别等实体的讨论，泰勒希望抵抗现代道德意识的压制（This is what has been suppressed by these strange cramped theories of modern moral philosophy, which have the paradoxical effect of making us inarticulate on some of the most important issues of morality. Impelled by the strongest metaphysical, epistemological, and moral ideas of the modern age, these theories narrow our focus to the determinants of action, and then restrict our understanding of these determinants still further by defining practical reason as exclusively procedural. They utterly mystify the priority of the moral by identifying it not with substance but with a form of reasoning, around which they draw a firm boundary. They then are led to defend this boundary all the more fiercely in that it is their only way of doing justice to the hypergoods which move them although they cannot acknowledge them. p.89.）

第四章 道德来源（moral sources）

泰勒的起点是善只通过某种表达为我们而存在，与文化相关联。【132】（The obvious point to begin with is that the goods I have been talking about only exist for us through some articulation. The rather different understandings of the good which we see in different cultures are the correlative of the different languages which have evolved in those cultures. A vision of the good becomes available for the people of a given culture through being given expression in some manner. p.91.）他希望表达能使我们更接近作为道德根源的善，能给予其力量（The central notion here is that articulation can bring us closer to the good as a moral source, can give it power. p.92.）对现代道德哲学倾向于压制的表达持有异议，试图恢复它们而非保持沉默。【141】（There are good reasons to keep silent. But they cannot be valid across the oard. Wtthout any articulation at all, we would lose all contact with the good , however conceived. We would cease to be human. The severest Injunctions to silence can only be directed to certain classes of articulation, and must spare others. The issue is to define which ones. Our question then returns about articulations in descriptive prose of our sense of qualitative distinctions. These are the ones which modern moral philosophy tends to suppress. Should we try to recover them for moral thought, or are they best left in implicit limbo? pp.97-8.）极其需要有关善的视野的为被曲解的表达，实际上善的视野奠定着我们道德反映、共鸣和渴望的基础。【145】（In face of both these constricting meta-views, there is a great need for undistorted articulacy about the visions of the good that actually underlie our moral reactions, affinities, and aspirations. p.101.）诉诸“历史”，对善的现代理解的表达必定是历史的视野【149】（But there is one great recourse here, and that is history. The articulation of modern understandings of the good has to be a historical enterprise; p.103.）

第二编 内在深度（Inwardness）

第五章 道德地形学（moral topography）

关于自我的现代观念与一种特定的内在感相联系或说由其构成，泰勒将水素其起源和发展[Our modern notion of the self is related to, one might say constituted by, a certain sense (or perhaps a family of senses) of inwardness. Over the next chapters, I want to trace the rise and development of this sense. p.11.] 内部/外部的差别，区分普遍性与历史丛结的困难。

第六章 柏拉图的自制（plato’s self-mastery）

泰勒提出，他所描述的古今之变能够在词汇的变迁中得到反映【163】柏拉图《理想国》中理性（思想）占据支配地位就是善的，而非为欲望控制，这在西方占据主导地位且从未受到挑战，理性的霸权【165】通过理性的自我控制带来三个成果：与自我相统一、镇定和泰然自若的冷静【164】（The mastery of self through reason brings with it these three fruits: unity with oneself, calm, and collected self-possession. p.116.）自制在于理性控制欲望，自我控制是与被人的嗜好和情感所控制对立的。【175】泰勒指出“内在化”的转变，柏拉图到笛卡尔

第七章 内在的人类（in interiore homine）

这一章考察柏拉图到笛卡尔之间的奥古斯丁。奥古斯丁是“我思”论证的发明者，因为他首先提出第一人称立场，这对我们探索真理来说是根本性的【187】（Augustine was the inventor of the argument we know as the 'cogito', because Augustine was the first to make the first-person standpoint fundamental to our search for the truth. p.133.）内在地寻找上帝的确定性这条西方精神路线的创始人【197】（Augustine is the originator of that strand of Western spirituality which has sought the certainty of God within. p.140.）

第八章 笛卡尔的分解式理性（descartes’s disengagen reason）

笛卡尔把道德根源置于我们内心（But Descartes gives Augustinian inwardness a radical twist and takes it in a quite new direction, which has also been epoch-making. The change might be described by saying that Descartes situates the moral sources within us. p.143.）笛卡尔提供了对理性及其霸权的新理解，理性与激情均被看作道德的本质【202】（First, in relation to Plato Descartes offers a new understanding of reason, and hence of its hegemon; over the passions, which both see as the essence of morality. p.144.）

第九章 洛克的点状自我（locke’s punctual self）

分解和理性控制的主体的现代形象，由洛克及其影响的启蒙思想家发展至完备形式，即点状自我，其关键是通过分解获得控制【228】（The subject of disengagement and rational control has become a familiar modern figure. …. As it develops to its full form through Locke and the Enlightenment thinkers he influenced, it becomes what I want to call the 'punctual' self. The key to this figure is that it gains control through disengagement. p.160.）泰勒指出：hat probably made Locke the great teacher of the Enlightenment was his combination of these two factors: that he offered a plausible account of the new science as valid knowledge, intertwined with a theory of rational control of the self; and that he brought the two together under the ideal of rational self-responsibility. Many things have been declared authoritatively true, both in science and in practice, which have no real tide to the name. The rational, self-responsible subject can break with them, suspend his adhesion to them, and by submitting them to the test of their validity, remake or replace them. … Holding the package together is an ideal of freedom or independence, backed by a conception of disengagement and procedural reason. This has given Locke's outlook its tremendous influence, not only in the eighteenth century, but right through to today. p.174. 由第一人称视角转向个体自己，转向作为自我的自我。【251】（his is what distingushes the classical writers from followers of Descartes, Locke, Kant, or just about anyone in the modern world. The turn to oneself is now also and inescapably a turn to oneself in the first-person perspective a turn to the self as a self. That is what I mean by radical reflexivity. Because we are so deeply embedded in it, we cannot but reach for reflexive language. p.176.）

第十章 探索“人类条件”（exploring ‘L Humaine Condition）

追溯导致现代化认同形成的内在化的线索，从柏拉图，奥古斯丁到笛卡尔和洛克。个体对自我采取分解的态度规定着人类主体性及其特点的力量的新理解，随之出现了善的新概念和道德根源的新区域“自我负责的理想，泰勒称为“指导性线索”。【252】[I have been following one strand of the internalization which has gone into making the modern identity. This took me from Plato through the inward turn of Augustine to the new stance of disengagement which Descartes inaugurates and Locke intensifies. To follow this development is to trace the constitution of one facet of the modern self. Adopting the stance of disengagement towards oneself-even if one doesn't push it to the Lockean extreme of punctuality-defines a new understanding of human agency and its characteristic powers. And along with this come new conceptions of the good and new locations of moral sources: an ideal of self-responsibility, with the new definitions of freedom and reason which accompany it, and the connected sense of dignity. To come to live by this defination a s we cannot fail to do, since it penetrates and rationalizes so many of the ways and practices of modern life-is to be transformed: to the point where we see this way of being as normal, as anchored in perennial human nature in the way our physical organs are. So we come to think that we 'have' selves as we have heads. But the very idea that we have or are 'a self', that human agency is essentially defined as 'the self', is a linguistic reflection of our modern understanding and the radical reflexivity it involves. Being deeply embedded in this understanding, we cannot but reach for this language; but it was not always so. p.177.] 另一种激进反省的态度，蒙田。【253】笛卡尔主体的科学，蒙田不可重复的差别认同个体；分别是现代个人主义和寻求个人独特性的创始人【260】

第十一章 内在本性（inner nature）

早期现代个人主义的三个侧面：自我负责的独立性；被意识到的特殊性；个人承诺的个人主义【265】（These are the ground, respectively, of two important facets of the nascent modern individualism, that of self-responsible independence, on one hand, and that of recognized particularity, on the other. … A third facet must also be mentioned. We might describe this as the individualism of personal commitment. p.185.）现代认同的三个特征：（1）区位化（2）原子论/工具主义。泰勒提到，我们继承了十七世纪的原子论。不是因为我们仍信奉契约论……而是因为我们仍然发现易于把政治社会考虑成经由意志建立的，或工具般地思考它。在后一种情况下，即使我们不再把社会的起源理解为依赖于同意，可我们仍既这样理解也这样评估社会的作用，即它是我们达到归因于个体或选民集团的目标的工具。【279】（We inherit atomism from the seventeenth century. Not that we still espouse social contract theories (although various transposed versions are still popular). But we still find it easy to think of political society as created by will or to think of it instrumentally. In the latter case, even though we no longer understand the origins of society as reposing in agreement, we nevertheless both understand and evaluate its workings as an instrument to attain ends we impute to individuals or constituent groups. p.195.）现代西方民主制的制度张力：原子论-工具主义；公民参与行政治学（3）创造性能力（poietic power），精神和道德生活中构建的秩序和人工制品新的中心地位【281-2】

第十二章 背离历史解释（a digression on historical explanation）

泰勒澄清自己的研究与历史解释的关系【284】二者有区别但相关【289】（What I'm doing has to be seen as distinct from historical explanation, and yet relevant to it. p.202.）着重于阐释性问题上，并试图以各阶段的形式表达现代认同，但不能错当作历史解释；实践语境的事业，以及形成实践的强大动力【296】（All this, which would have to be a central part of any answer to the question of historical causation, won't figure in my analysis, except at the boundaries. I shall be concentrating on the interpretive question and trying to articulate the modern identity in its various phases. This discussion should be a warning to the reader not to mistake this study for a historical explanation. But it also has to serve as a warning to me not to lose from sight the context of practices in which this identity developed, and the powerful forces shaping them. Pressures so massive on the history of a civilization as those I have been describing have to be kept in mind even when they are not-rightly not-the focus of attention. p.207.）

第三编 日常生活的肯定（The Affirmation of Ordinary Life）

第十三章 “上帝喜爱副词”（god loveth adverbs）

在讨论自我多面性以后，考察现代自然观的兴起，“日常生活”，涉及生产和再生产，也就是劳动、生活必需品的制造以及我们作为有性存在物的生活（包括婚姻和家庭）【300】（Ordinary life' is a term of art I introduce to designate those aspects of human life concerned with production and reproduction, that is, labour, the making of the things needed for life, and our life as sexual beings, including marriage and the family. p.211.）亚里士多德；市民人文主义，阿伦特《人的境况》；泰勒注意到的转变颠覆了等级制，把善从特定高级活动范围移出并置于生活本身之内，根据劳动和生产、婚姻和家庭对完满的人类活动进行定义。【302】The transition I am talking about here is one which upsets these hierarchies, which displaces the locus of the good life from some special range of higher activities and places it within 'life' itself. The full human life is now defined in terms of labour and production, on one hand, and marriage and family life, on the other. At the same time, the previous 'higher' activities come under vigorous criticism. p.213. 他从基督教中寻找根源（What is important for my purpose is this positive side, the affirmation that the fulness of Christian existence was to be found within the activities of this life, in one's calling and in marriage and the family. The entire modern development of the affirmation of ordinary life was, I believe, foreshadowed and initiated, in all its facets, in the spirituality of the Reformers. This goes as much for the positive evaluation of production and reproduction as for the anti-hierarchical consequences of the rejection of sacramental authority and higher vocations.p.218.）犹太-基督教肯定生活，工作和日常生活的清教神学，科学革命。

第十四章 理性化的基督教（rationalized christianity）

日常生活的肯定给现代认同定型的方式，关键阶段是日常生活伦理和分解性自由和合理性的哲学融合【331】[the affirmation of ordinary life has shaped the modern identity. A crucial stage in this story has been the fusion of the ethic of ordinary life and the philosophy of disengaged freedom and rationality: a bringing together of the outlook derived from the Reformers (partly through Bacon) with that so influentially formulated by Descartes. p.234.] 由英国而西方，洛克的关键地位。引用霍尔“上帝喜爱副词”，洛克对伦理学的改造中关键性副词正在改变，虔诚地为了上帝而生活变成了有理性地生活的问题【344】（"God loveth adverbs", as Joseph Hall put it. In Locke's new transposition of the ethic, the crucial adverbs are shifting. Where in the pure Reform variant, it was a matter of living worshipfully for God, now it is becoming a question of living rationally. p.242.）

第十五章 道德情感（moral sentiments）

与洛克的自然神论不同的变种，沙夫茨伯里创立，哈奇森详述。【351】与洛克的差异：道德根源不同，不是分解性主体的尊严，不是中性的自然客观化，而是我们对作为善的整体挚爱的自然的内在爱好中寻找它们【362】（Here we have a rival to Lockean Deism, which embraces autonomous reason and sidelines grace but which has an utterly different view of moral sources. Instead of finding these in the dignity of a disengaged subject, objectifying a neutral nature, it seeks them in the inherent bent of our nature towards a love of the whole as good. Lockean self-disengagement is not just an error, it is a sure way of making these sources invisible, of losing contact with them and hence with the good. That is why Shaftesbury has to combat the extrinsic theory as an abomination. It stands in the way of a reengagement with our own love of the whole. p.254.）沙夫茨伯里的语言有两方面是现代的，反映在其“自然情感”术语中，“如果我们正确地理解我们的状况，我们的自然情感会超越我们直接的家庭和环境，达到对全人类的无私的爱。”把社会团结在一起的东西，正确理解它会凝聚整个社会。【363】（The thesis that we by nature love the whole is expressed by saying that our natural affections would carry beyond our immediate family and entourage to a disinterested love of all mankind, if we rightly understood our situation. Natural affection is what holds societies together, and rightly understood it would bind the whole species. It is part of everyone's innate endowment, along with the sense of right and wrong, and this is what is forgotten by the proposers of the extrinsic theory. p.255.）哈奇森。泰勒比较了两种自然神论：The two kinds of Deism share some such vision; and they share the inspiration which this vision provides. To that extent, their respective senses of moral sources overlap. But where they differ is in how we take our place in this order. For the Lockean, we do so through the exercise of disengaged reason. For the Deism which comes from Shaftesbury (and also from Leibniz, as we shall see in Chapter 16), though disengaged reason is not repudiated, we participate in God's plan through are-engagement: we have to recover the movement towards the good within us, and allow it to take its proper shape. We turn within to retrieve the true form of our natural affection or our benevolent sentiments; and in doing that we give them their full force. … And thus in this respect the moral sources of the two variants radically differ. In one case, we find them in the dignity of the disengaged, self-responsibly clairvoyant, rational, controlling subject. In the other case, we also look for them in the sentiments we find within. When Deism was at its height, in the first half of the century, this difference may not always have seemed significant. But it becomes of crucial importance later, with the developing conception of nature as an inner source. With Rousseau and the Romantics, it flares up into one of the deepest oppositions of our culture. p.265.

第十六章 天意秩序（the providential order）

澄清对自然神论的误解，即它在通往激进的启蒙运动道路上是不彻底的，追问是什么力量促使人们形成宗教世界观。【381】（Paradoxically, the best way to appreciate this point is to take seriously the cliche that Deism is halfway on the road to the radical Enlightenment, because then we will see how coming to understand what could inspire the former will give us insight into the latter. p.266.）所谓天意秩序，指的是上帝为了人类的善而设计万物，采用了对自然善的秩序的信仰形式。【389】（The idea that God designs things for the human good took the form of a belief in good order of nature. Providence was understood in general terms; it was reflected in the regular disposition of things. The Deists had no more place for the "particular providences", God's interventions in the stories of individuals and nations, which were at the centre of much popular piety and were extremely important to the orthodox-and to a contemporary popular movement like Methodism, for instance. p.272.）情感的新地位，完成了把自然作为规范的现代观点的革命（The new place of sentiment completes the revolution which has yielded a modern view of nature as normative, so utterly different from the ancient view. For the ancients, nature offers us an order which moves us to love and instantiate it, unless we are depraved. But the modern view, on the other hand, endorses nature as the source of right impulse or sentiment. So we encounter nature paradigmatically and centrally, not in a vision of order, but in experiencing the right inner impulse. Nature as norm is an inner tendency; it is ready to become the voice within, which Rousseau will make it, and to be transposed by the Romantics into a richer and deeper inwardness. p.284.）

第十七章 现代性的文化（the culture of modernity）

泰勒回顾到：I have been tracing a movement, indeed, a massive shift in the notion of the constitutive good connected with nature: from a hierarchical notion of reason to a conception of providential design, which marks certain activities as significant. These activities included those which had been affirmed in the preceding theology of ordinary life. But the Deist shift, which gave more and more weight to the perfectly interlocking natural order, opened the way for a new and unprecedented role for sentiment. p.285. 这一章超出哲学而探求十七和十八世纪的文化运动：对商业的新评价、小说的兴起、对婚姻和家庭变化的理解、情感的新重要性【408-9】这就勾勒出从理性化到基督教到现代性文化的历程。

第四编 本性的呼声（The Voice of Nature）

第十八章 断裂的视野（fractured horizons）

个人主义文化（It is a culture which is individualist in the three senses I invoked earlier: it prizes autonomy; it gives an important place to self-exploration, in particular of feeling; and its visions of the good life generally involve personal commitment. As a consequence, in its political language, it formulates the immunities due people in terms of subjective rights. Because of its egalitarian bent, it conceives these rights as universal. p.305.）这种文化赋予生产性工作和家庭以意义。【438】泰勒认为世俗人文本主义根植于犹太-基督教信仰中，这是生活善和构成性善的表达之间循环关系的例证。（But secular humanism also has its roots in Judaeo·Christian faith; it arises from a mutation out of a form of that faith. p.319.）他希望考察产生无信仰形式的两大观念群（What I want to do in the ensuing chapters is follow, with highly selective attention, the continuing development of these frontiers, the mutations that occur on them, and their relations. The principle of selection is my goal of illuminating the modem identity as we live it today and the understandings of moral sources it incorporates. My claim wm be that the expository device of the three frontiers remains valid, even though the original form in which they were opened has been radically challenged. Along with the power of rational control, we now also recognize one of expressive articulation, whose proper exercise is sometimes seen as antithetical to that of the first. The conception of nature as good has been challenged by visions of it as a source of amoral, even wild and irrational, energy. I will argue that in spite of this, the notion of frontiers of exploration of moral sources, situated respectively in our own powers and in nature, remains illuminating and useful. p.319.）

第十九章 激进的启蒙运动（radical enlightenment）

这一章考察激进的、不信神的启蒙思想从自然神论中涌现出来。泰勒认为激进的启蒙主义者无须天意秩序，伦理学建立在功利基础上【458】激进功利主义者拒绝自然神论的构成性善，拒绝天意秩序，却坚持生活的善，三个突出看法：自我负责的理性理想，追求日常生活满足；普遍和公平的仁慈理想【459-460】（1. The ideal of self-responsible reason. This entailed, as we saw, a freedom from all authority, and was linked with a notion of dignity. 2.. The notion that the ordinary fulfilments that we seek by nature, the pursuit of happiness in the characteristic human way, through production and family life, have a central significance; that is, they not only are what we desire but are worthy of being pursued and furthered. 3. The ideal of universal and impartial benevolence. p.322.）反消除差别的反驳，由卢梭和康德继续，但激进的功利主义者却忘却，而在消除一切道德差别上走得更远。【460】（This anti-levelling attack will be taken up by Rousseau and Kant. The radical utilitarians were oblivious of it, and went further towards levelling all moral distinctions even than their predecessors. But they did take up the anti-Panglossian objection. In a sense, they proposed to save the life goods of Deism from the distortions and discredit of Deism itself. p.322.）在泰勒看来，边沁或爱尔维修的功利主义只认识到一种善：快乐，他们的全部观点是消除道德利益和非道德礼仪的区别，从而使所有人类欲望都有同样的考虑价值，强势评估问题被迫退出，关于日常欲望的意义问题不再能够获得表达【475】（These thinkers recognized only one good: pleasure. Moreover, even this was not defined as a strongly valued good. The whole point was to do away with the distinction between moral and non-moral goods and make all human desires equally worthy of consideration. …. With the sidelining of the question of strong evaluation, the very issue about the significance of our ordinary desires can no longer find expression; and a similar fate befalls benevolence as a moral ideal. p.332.）对边沁《道德与立法原理导论》首段的批评，认为功利主义心理学和伦理学不一致，无法回答为什么应当去追求普遍的善。【482-3】（But this doesn't answer the question, Why ought I to seek it? p.337.）充满了语用学的矛盾，建立在自身不能承认的道德观点上。【486】这里泰勒对功利主义的理解非常粗糙。

第二十章 作为根源的本性（nature as source）

启蒙主义的自然主义，使反消除差别的观点更中肯，推进了对意志中任何性质差别的否定：一切都是欲望甚至说肉体欲望。【510】（Enlightenment naturalism took up the anti-Panglossian objection. It broke the dependence on a doctrine of providence-even though one could still complain that it retained a pretty optimistic view of the human prospect. But it made, if anything, the anti-levelling objection even more relevant. It pushed further the denial of any quafitative distinction in the will; all was desire; in the more radical variants, even physical desire. p.355.）泰勒在这一章考察了卢梭和康德。

第二十一章 表现主义转向（the expressivist turn）

这一章考察浪漫主义，以本性为根源的哲学，二者不可分割【528】加入我们是通过内在声音或冲动接近本性，，那么我们只有通过表达我们在自身发现了什么才能充分了解这种本性，泰勒称为“表达主义”，新自然哲学的另一重要特征。【538】（If our access to nature is through an inner voice or impulse, then we can only fully know this nature through articulating what we find within us. This connects to another crucial feature of this new philosophy of nature, the idea that its realization in each of us is also a form of expression. This is the view that I have called elsewhere 'expressivism' . I am focussing on particular features of expression in using this term. To express something is to make it manifest in a given medium. p.374.）表现主义是新的更完整的个体性的基础，个体独特性决定应该怎样生活，差异限定我们必须遵循独特的道路并践行独特性的责任【540】（Expressivism was the basis for a new and fuller individuation. This is the idea which grows in the late eighteenth century that each individual is different and original, and that this originality determines how he or she ought to live. Just the notion of individual difference is, of course, not new. Nothing is more evident, or more banal. What is new is the idea that this really makes a difference to how we're called on to live. The differences are not just umimportant variations within the same basic human nature; or else moral differences between good and bad individuals. Rather they entail that each one of us has an original path which we ought to tread; they lay the obligation on each of us to live up to our originality. p.375.）对启蒙运动叙事方式的打破【560】

第五编 更微妙的语言（Subtler Languages）

第二十二章 维多利亚的“同时代人”（our victorian contemporaries）

启蒙运动与浪漫主义的持久影响，这也是维多利亚时代同时代人的意涵，脱胎、超越于他们的；而这种超越前人的历史图景也是维多利亚时代的观念【566】连续性。【567】两个道德观念的合力：日常生活的重要性和普遍仁慈的理想。【568】（We see here the joint force of two moral ideas whose development we have been tracing through the modern period: the significance of ordinary life and the ideal of universal benevolence. The first has made the issues of life itself and the avoidance of suffering of supreme importance; the second imposes the obligation to secure them universally. pp.394-5.）自由、自决的主体观念。【568】普遍正义【569】有神论成为选择，道德根源从本体论上成为多元的【578-9】（It was then that they moved from a horizon in which belief in God in some form was virtually unchallengeable to our present predicament in which theism is one option among others, in which moral sources are ontologically diverse. p.401.）维多利亚时代的信仰危机给盎格鲁-萨克逊文化带来的是，上帝信仰的可替代的道德视界第一次成为可能，信仰和非信仰以相互对立和紧张的状态存在。【588】（What came about for the Anglo-Saxon cultures in the Victorian crisis of faith was that for the first time an alternative moral horizon was available to belief in God. Henceforth, belief and unbelief exist in contrast and tension with each other, and both are made problematic by the fact that they exist in this field of alternatives. p.408.）十九世纪两个相互关联的变化：自然图景的变化，浪漫主义的表现主义与道德热望混杂，作为它们主要支持的根源或正常补充。【600-3】

第二十三章 后浪漫时代的视野（visions of the post-romantic age）

浪漫主义时代以来，显现概念贯穿于现代世界。【614】（I have been arguing that a certain understanding of art has run continuously through the modern world since the Romantic era. It is the conception I've been calling epiphanic, and it encompasses not only an aesthetic of the work of art but also a view about its spiritual significance and about the nature and situation of the artist. It is a view not only about art but about the place of art in life, and its relation to morality. It is in fact an exaltation of art; for this becomes the crucial locus of what I have been calling moral sources. Realizing an epiphany is a paradigm case of what I called recovering contact with a moral source. The epiphany is our achieving contact with something, where this contact either fosters and/or itself constitutes a spiritually significant fulfilment or wholeness. p.425.）浪漫主义在十九世纪延续的三个重要变形：现实主义非精神的自然的艺术；波德莱尔反自然的显现艺术；与非道德的本性的野性力量相关的艺术，据此探讨道德视界的变化：创造性想象力的意思增加；自我肯定【649】克尔凯郭尔、陀思妥耶夫斯基、尼采。

第二十四章 现代主义的显现（epiphanies of modernism）

二十世纪现代主义的显现和反显现的冲击，浪漫时代的延续。

第二十五章 结论：现代性的冲突（conclusion: the conflicts of modernity）

泰勒把道德根源划分为三大领域：有神论的；自然主义的分解式理性；浪漫的表现主义或其现代主义后继。【724】（The map distributes the moral sources into three large domains: the original theistic grounding for these standards; a second one that centres on a naturalism of disengaged reason, which in our day takes scientistic forms; and a third family of views which finds its sources in Romantic expressivism or in one of the modernist successor visions. p.495.）现代认同的肖像。现代道德文化中持续紧张或有崩溃危险的三个领域：构成性善的不确定性和分裂；分解工具主义及对其批评；【727】善的多元和冲突。泰勒写道，这部著作的意图是一种恢复（The intention of this work was one of retrieval, an attempt to uncover buried goods through rearticulation-and thereby to make these sources again empower, to bring the air back again into the half-collapsed lungs of the spirit. p.520.）