15页，“莫斯科的克里姆林宫”应为： the Zhongnanhai in Beijing.
28页，最后一段(“作为一个分析体系……”前)：Marxism, as applied in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries, led to tyranny and failure,
（ “……必须要问‘受益的是谁？’”后）：One of the enduring problems and weaknesses of Marx is that capitalism, contrary to his prediction, has not collapsed. Marx thought the Paris Commune of 1870–1871 was the first proletarian uprising. (It was not.) True, capitalism has gone through some major depressions, in the 1890s and 1930s and a big scare in 2008–2009, but it has always bounced back.
Marx erred in at least a couple of ways. First, he failed to understand the flexible, adaptive nature of capitalism. Old industries fade, and new ones rise. Imagine trying to explain Bill Gates and the computer software industry to people in the 1960s. They wouldn’t believe you. Capitalism rarely gets stuck at one stage; it is the system of constant change. Second, Marx failed to understand that capitalism is not just one system; it is many. U.S., French, Singaporean, and Japanese capitalisms are distinct from each other. Marx’s simplified notions of capitalism illustrate what happens when theory is placed in the service of ideology: Unquestioning followers believe it too literally.
35页，第一段（“……通常会比较持久”到“当墨西哥……”）：When South Korea and Taiwan were poor, they were dictatorships. As they industrialized, their middle classes and education levels grew, and by the 1990s both had turned into democracies. Much U.S. thinking on China is based on these hopeful examples. China’s rapid economic growth suggests that it could soon become a middle-income country and hence be ripe for democracy. However, economic growth is rarely smooth, and China is a huge, complex nation ruled by a Communist Party that refuses to relinquish power.
47页，第一段（“它将‘逐步消亡’”后）：Communism, then, was the predicted utopia beyond socialism.
Marx focused on the ills and malfunctions of capitalism and never specified what socialism would be like. He only said that socialism would be much better than capitalism; its precise workings he left vague. This has enabled a wide variety of socialist thinkers to put forward their own vision of socialism and say it is what Marx really meant. This has ranged from the mild “welfarism” of social-democratic parties, to anarcho-syndicalism (unions running everything), to Lenin’s and Stalin’s hypercentralized tyranny, to Trotsky’s denunciation of same, to Mao’s self-destructive permanent revolution, to Tito’s experimental decentralized system. All, and a few more, claim to espouse “real” socialism. These different interpretations of socialism caused first the socialist and then the communist movement to splinter.
48页，第四段最后：Marx would probably not have endorsed such a redo of his theory.
49页，第四段最后：Mao pursued a radical course that included a failed attempt at overnight industrialization (the Great Leap Forward of 1958), the destruction of bureaucratic authority (the Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966–1976), and even border fighting with the Soviet Union in 1969. After Mao’s death in 1976, pragmatic leaders moved China away from his extremism, which had ruined China’s economic progress. A few revolutionary groups stayed Maoist: Cambodia’s murderous Khmer Rouge and India’s Naxalites. Maoism is an ultraradical form of communism.
50页， 第一段最后：and, in China, nationalism was always more important than communism.
第四段（“……被俄罗斯人统治”到“即便是某些加拿大人……”）：Some Chinese and Iranians, feeling they have been repressed and controlled by outside powers, lash out with nationalistic military and diplomatic policies.
74页，第二段最后：Exemplified by the former Soviet Union, government owns nearly all the means of production, claiming it runs the economy in the interests of the society as a whole. However, the collapse of Communist regimes (which called themselves “socialist”; we called them “Communist”) indicates they worked poorly. Today, only North Korea and Cuba remain as (negative) examples of socialism, and their systems seem ripe for change.
95页，第一段（“……措施比较得当”后）：its economy continued to grow fast. Beijing’s brainy nine-man Standing Committee quickly tripled bank lending, then throttled back to head off inflation. There were no delays, political fights, or backtalk. Some people, especially in the developing lands, began to wonder if Western democracy was the right model; maybe Chinese-style “market authoritarianism” was better and faster.
104页，第一段（“……这种政体是不完善的”到“20世纪初……”）：Few people are now attracted to such political models. Only North Korea remains as a pristine example of totalitarianism, while China and Vietnam have opened up economically if not politically.第三段（“1922年意大利……”之前）：Totalitarianism began with Lenin’s 1917 seizure of power in Russia. 第五段：Mao
105页，（“……民众的无助”到“苏联后来抛弃了……”）：Not counting deaths in war, the Soviet Union killed an estimated 62 million civilians, Communist China 35 million, and Nazi Germany 21 million.
106页，关键概念第三段（“……而不是它的结果”后）：Starting in late 1989, as one country in Eastern Europe after another cast off its Communist system, we beheld how weak the system was.As to ideology, many citizens, even former Party members, detested communism. The single ruling parties collapsed and handed power over to non-Communists. Organized terror lost its punch. The official mass media, widely ignored for years, was simply discarded in favor of a free press. The controlled economies were turned, with much pain, into market economies. We now realize that these Communist regimes had never exercised total control.
107页，威权主义 第三段（“……有限制的多元化”后）：Some observers now see a new model, the “authoritarian capitalist” regimes of China and Russia, which allow market economies but tightly retain political control. Their selling point is continual economic growth and rising living standards, and most citizens accept it and show no interest in democracy. But what happens when growth slows?
111页，第一段（ “……许多国家都有这种现象”后）：The collapse of Communist regimes shows the role of the economy in a negative sense.It was poor economic performance and slow growth—especially in comparison with the West and with the rapid-growth countries—that persuaded relatively liberal Communists, such as Mikhail Gorbachev, to attempt to reform their systems. They knew they were falling behind, especially in crucial high-tech sectors, and thought they could energize the system by bringing elements of the free market into an otherwise socialist economy. But communism, like other brands of totalitarianism, doesn't tolerate reform.By attempting to control everything, as in Friedrich's and Brzezinski's six points, they have created a brittle system that can break but not bend. Once they started admitting that the system needed to be fixed, they admitted that they were wrong. The ideology was wrong, single-party control was wrong, the centralized economy was wrong, and so on.The reform attempt turned into system collapse.
128页，关键概念第一段（“……相互信任”后）：(Most also turned into democracies.)
（“……倡导这些价值”）后：Some point to their common Confucian heritage, which promotes such values. China, the origin of Confucianism, has enjoyed incredible economic growth recently.
130页，比较研究第三段（“……统一的整体”后）：The old ideal of one China may at last turn into a reality.
201页，第三段后：Communist systems—that is, countries ruled by Communist parties—have become rare. In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, Communist parties were voted out of power. China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba try to preserve the party-controlled state, but they too appear ripe for change.
202页，最后一段后：Study Communist systems while you can; soon there may be none left.
204页， 第四段：The Soviet Union, China, and many of the emerging nations of Africa and Asia are or were one-party states.
233页，第二段：such as China
265页，第三段后：In China too officials are party members. The party is supposed to fight corruption, but China’s administration is dangerously decentralized to the provincial and local levels, leaving officials free to collect bribes and fake “taxes” and to transfer land from peasants to developers. In 2008, provincial and local officials managed to not notice that milk was being poisoned. Major riots break out in China every year over such corruption, which is the system’s Achilles’ heel. The Communist Party’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection has broad powers to demote or expel party members or send cases to criminal courts, where some are sentenced to death. The regime touts its Central Commission as the cure for corruption, but it continues, probably because the local officials are precisely who the regime depends on to maximize economic growth.
315页，第一段后：China currently experiences thousands of “mass incidents” a year in which citizens gather to protest corrupt local officials, the seizure of their land, or police coverup of crimes. The regime tries to handle protests with warnings but sometimes resorts to tear gas and gunfire. The message to Beijing is clear: Institute reforms to clean up the corruption and misuse of power before widespread anger explodes. Instead, the regime figures that rapid economic growth, rising living standards, and nationalism will buy off or deflect discontent. It may be mistaken.
328页，第二段后：More recent scholarship has shown that Lenin was ruthless and willing to exterminate all opposition; there was nothing moderate or humane about him. Some Russian thinkers are now willing to admit that Lenin was wrong from the start.
第三段（“解决了问题”与“在xxxx年”间）：The Soviet Union and China, earlier the models for many revolutionaries, admitted that they were in economic difficulty and tried to change to a more open, market system.
第三段后：The worst revolutionary horror was Cambodia. In the late 1970s, the Khmer Rouge (Red Cambodia) murdered an estimated 1.7 million of their fellow citizens. The nonfiction movie about this bloodbath, The Killing Fields, shocked the world. And Vietnam, united by the Communists in 1975 after its fierce war with the United States, turned itself into one of the poorest countries in the world. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese “boat people” risked the open sea and Thai pirates to leave their starving land. Sadly, few countries wanted them. In 1995, Vietnam and the United States established diplomatic relations, and the Vietnamese economy turned to the world market with rapid growth. In Cuba, the Castro brothers continued to proclaim their regime revolutionary, but most Cubans were tired of the shortages and restrictions. And in Nicaragua, a free election in 1990 voted out the revolutionary Sandinistas and replaced them with a democratic coalition.
第六段后：Embarrassment may be a factor here. Comparing itself with free countries, the revolutionary country sees itself falling behind. Chinese in the 1970s could note with regret that on China’s rim—in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Taiwan—Chinese were prosperous, but not in China. Under Deng Xiaoping, China turned to capitalist industry and foreign investment, and the economy set growth records, suggesting that the great Communist revolution had been a colossal mistake.
第七段后：Now only holdout Maoists in India and Peru and al Qaeda want revolution.
330页，比较研究最后一段：Faced with this prospect, some regimes attempt to crush mass demands with military force. An example is the bloody 1989 crackdown in China. Hundreds of protesting students were gunned down in Beijing’s Tiananmen Square because the elderly party elite feared what they called a “counterrevolutionary revolt.” Deng Xiaoping had attempted economic reform only to find that it awoke demands for democracy. Partial reform of a corrupt dictatorship is difficult, because, as soon as you let people criticize it, they demand to replace it. Give them a free speech inch, and they want a democratic mile. That, of course, would mean ousting the Communist elite, which then fights tenaciously for its power and privileges. But by digging in their heels and refusing to institute major reform, the rulers just build up a head of steam for a later and greater explosion. The party can crush political opponents, but it cannot produce the economic growth necessary to feed and house the people, who just get angrier. Ironically, Communist countries, who always claimed to be “revolutionary,” indeed led the way to revolution. Other countries may be ripe for velvet revolutions.
349页，最后一段后：The big problem is how to handle a rapidly rising China. Already the world’s largest exporter and second-largest economy, China demands respect. Some IR theorists argue that rising powers must collide with other powers, usually resulting in war. That is true of the Athenian, Roman, Arab, British, Japanese, and several other empires. The United States too emerged on the world stage through a series of wars. The rising Portuguese and Spanish empires, though, never fought each other; they agreed to let Spain dominate in Latin America and Portugal in Asia. The trick seems to be to make an agreement in advance as to who has what. China historically never expanded overseas, although it easily could have. Currently Beijing defines its national interest as economic growth and will not likely do anything that disrupts it. This insight explains why China claims Taiwan but has not invaded it, why it is reluctant to let its currency rise, and why it lines up energy and raw materials deals around the globe. Things could go wrong, however. Strong nationalism smolders just beneath the surface in China. The Chinese military is constructing a major fleet and itches to take over Taiwan. Border claims trouble relations with India. And China’s rapid economic growth may not always be smooth.
350页，（“和平相处”到“我们成功地度过”间）：Beware of misleading analogies (see page 321) that equate China to Imperial Japan or the Soviet Union. China is neither of these. Handled with calm and reason, the world can live in peace with a rising China.