Comments on Chap. 2: Can There be a Theory of Law?

茁蕀 评论 Between Authority and Interpretation 5 2017-09-14 03:40:23

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Tacitus
Tacitus (A pupil to priesthood) 2017-09-14 21:24:33

An interesting read.

Two comments are in place. First, it seems not entirely clear whether Raz intends his theory of authority and law to be capable of guiding practice. To use his own term, his method is 'normative-explanatory' which seems to indicate that he is primarily concerned with explaining this social phenomenon we call law, rather than telling us what those who share a life in law in general and judges in particular should do in practice. Indeed, you are quite right that, for Raz, that the laws can figure in our practical reasoning as exclusionary reason is the core in his explanatory theory of law. It seems to me, however, that this does not necessarily imply anything practically useful. I take it that what Raz tries to do with 'exclusionary reason' here is to explain the normativity of law, that is, how come law can be a reason for action--this is still explanatory in nature. I would like to share one quote from Raz to conclude this remark:

'It is a major task of legal theory to advance our understanding of society by helping us to understand how people understand themselves.'--p237 Ethics in the Public Domain

Tacitus
Tacitus (A pupil to priesthood) 2017-09-14 21:36:39

Secondly, I think you are quite right that what Raz and Dworkin embark on seem to be two entirely different projects. And I think this is also related to Hart's version of legal philosophy.

There seems to be three questions underlying these three theorists
What pre-occupies Hart seems to be 'what is law, how is it different from other means of social control?'--I would use Dworkin's word, this appears to be an 'taxonomic' account of law.

For Dworkin, as you have already rightly pointed out, the question worth pursuing is 'what are the true conditions for a proposition of law? how judges should decide case?'--this is indeed an account embedded in Anglo-American in particular and legal practice in general.

For Raz, as aforementioned and as some part of your essay indicated, it is concerned with 'how we should understand law as a social phenomenon, what are the essential features of law that are crucial to this understanding.'

茁蕀
茁蕀 (既非归人,也非过客) 2017-09-14 21:40:00
An interesting read. Two comments are in place. First, it seems not entirely clear wh... An interesting read. Two comments are in place. First, it seems not entirely clear whether Raz intends his theory of authority and law to be capable of guiding practice. To use his own term, his method is 'normative-explanatory' which seems to indicate that he is primarily concerned with explaining this social phenomenon we call law, rather than telling us what those who share a life in law in general and judges in particular should do in practice. Indeed, you are quite right that, for Raz, that the laws can figure in our practical reasoning as exclusionary reason is the core in his explanatory theory of law. It seems to me, however, that this does not necessarily imply anything practically useful. I take it that what Raz tries to do with 'exclusionary reason' here is to explain the normativity of law, that is, how come law can be a reason for action--this is still explanatory in nature. I would like to share one quote from Raz to conclude this remark: 'It is a major task of legal theory to advance our understanding of society by helping us to understand how people understand themselves.'--p237 Ethics in the Public Domain ... Tacitus

谢谢澄清我可能的误解。我其实并不太了解拉兹理论(而且也不太欣赏)。我觉得可以归纳你的解读为:法律具有规范性但理论可以是描述的(描述或分析这一规范性)。我困惑或质疑的是实证主义者们这一(防卫性)立场能否得到妥当辩护:一方面承认法律是具有规范性的,而法理论是探寻法律这一“本质”的为真命题;另一方面认为法理论不必然是可以指引实践的……这似乎有些悖谬:如果拉兹权威理论并没有把握住法律本质,那么他反而可以证成自己的观点(理论与实践不是谁指导谁的问题),但如果他的理论是正确的,那就意味着1)任何规则若成为法律则需要有拉兹意义上的权威否则不是法律(在立法、完善法体系、判定某一具体法律规则时,立法者、法官于律师肯定会从权威角度“识别”法律);2)任何试图把握法律的学者要从权威角度入手。这意味着理论已经在对实践产生指引作用,拉兹应该也不否认这一点。这其实是我很困惑的一点(不理解他的理论目标设定)。

Tacitus
Tacitus (A pupil to priesthood) 2017-09-14 21:53:45
谢谢澄清我可能的误解。我其实并不太了解拉兹理论(而且也不太欣赏)。我觉得可以归纳你的解... 谢谢澄清我可能的误解。我其实并不太了解拉兹理论(而且也不太欣赏)。我觉得可以归纳你的解读为:法律具有规范性但理论可以是描述的(描述或分析这一规范性)。我困惑或质疑的是实证主义者们这一(防卫性)立场能否得到妥当辩护:一方面承认法律是具有规范性的,而法理论是探寻法律这一“本质”的为真命题;另一方面认为法理论不必然是可以指引实践的……这似乎有些悖谬:如果拉兹权威理论并没有把握住法律本质,那么他反而可以证成自己的观点(理论与实践不是谁指导谁的问题),但如果他的理论是正确的,那就意味着1)任何规则若成为法律则需要有拉兹意义上的权威否则不是法律(在立法、完善法体系、判定某一具体法律规则时,立法者、法官于律师肯定会从权威角度“识别”法律);2)任何试图把握法律的学者要从权威角度入手。这意味着理论已经在对实践产生指引作用,拉兹应该也不否认这一点。这其实是我很困惑的一点(不理解他的理论目标设定)。 ... 茁蕀

确实,我觉得拉兹在他的理论是否能被“实践”有点暧昧不清(虽然我倾向于认为他本人是觉得不是用来实践的)。但他的权威理论有实践意义的impliacation是一回事(正如你说“描述或分析这一规范性”,得出来的结论可能对实践有指导意义),他是否从实践的角度去建构又是另一回事(在后这一点上德沃金简直就是开宗明义了)。如果尝试把拉兹的理论放到实践中理解,例如如果你把拉兹理论带入到实践中,问“拉兹的理论对法律从业者是否有用?” —我个人认为是有很大的困难(我的LLM学位论文就是写这个XDDD)—这也似乎从侧面反映说,他从一开始就没往“指导实践”这个角度去架构这个理论。

不过我现在已经很少去想实证主义/非实证主义的辩论了,一方面我认为法律的规范性是可以被描述的,但另一方面我认为这种描述就算做出来似乎其价值不是那么不言自明。

我同意你所说的,并且和你share类似的困惑。

Tacitus
Tacitus (A pupil to priesthood) 2017-09-14 21:58:50

前几天我尝试去问他他是否有想过他的理论对someone concerned with action是否有用,他马上dismiss了我并且给出的理由我听不懂,场面一度非常尴尬。。。

茁蕀
茁蕀 (既非归人,也非过客) 2017-09-14 22:02:02
Secondly, I think you are quite right that what Raz and Dworkin embark on seem to be tw... Secondly, I think you are quite right that what Raz and Dworkin embark on seem to be two entirely different projects. And I think this is also related to Hart's version of legal philosophy. There seems to be three questions underlying these three theorists What pre-occupies Hart seems to be 'what is law, how is it different from other means of social control?'--I would use Dworkin's word, this appears to be an 'taxonomic' account of law. For Dworkin, as you have already rightly pointed out, the question worth pursuing is 'what are the true conditions for a proposition of law? how judges should decide case?'--this is indeed an account embedded in Anglo-American in particular and legal practice in general. For Raz, as aforementioned and as some part of your essay indicated, it is concerned with 'how we should understand law as a social phenomenon, what are the essential features of law that are crucial to this understanding.' ... Tacitus

拉兹从来没有特别清晰论证自己的立场,而是将反对他的观点一一踢开,在法律的性质问题上尤为如此。德沃金从来无法清晰阐明自己立场,旁征博引后读者很难精准把握他的思想。哈特对于法律本质的执念倒没有拉兹那么深。

茁蕀
茁蕀 (既非归人,也非过客) 2017-09-14 23:12:31
前几天我尝试去问他他是否有想过他的理论对someone concerned with action是否有用,他马上di... 前几天我尝试去问他他是否有想过他的理论对someone concerned with action是否有用,他马上dismiss了我并且给出的理由我听不懂,场面一度非常尴尬。。。 ... Tacitus

我听老师说过访学期间的一个故事,Coleman请他去耶鲁讲刚性实证主义,然后讲完第二天,问在坐学生,谁听懂了。大家都说不懂。科尔曼说我听到最后才发现他在批评我....

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Tacitus
Tacitus (A pupil to priesthood) 2017-09-14 23:36:36
我听老师说过访学期间的一个故事,Coleman请他去耶鲁讲刚性实证主义,然后讲完第二天,问在坐... 我听老师说过访学期间的一个故事,Coleman请他去耶鲁讲刚性实证主义,然后讲完第二天,问在坐学生,谁听懂了。大家都说不懂。科尔曼说我听到最后才发现他在批评我.... ... 茁蕀

哈哈哈哈这个是的,先不论内容,他说起话来气若柔丝,而且有很重的口音,和他的样子有剧烈的反差...他写作style难读似乎大家公认,他说话就比他的写作更难懂了。当然在场的学界大佬们似乎都懂...