弗洛伊德文集（全8册）

……我们知道，愿望的实现是梦以一种幻觉的方式产生的，而且，在快乐原则的支配下这种满足已成为梦的功能。但是，它却不符合这个原则，即遭受创伤性神经症的病人的梦，使他们有规律地回到这种创伤发生的情境中。相反，我们可以假定，在这里梦有助于完成另一项任务，在快乐原则能够开始它的统治之前，这项任务就必须被完成。这些梦正试图通过产生焦虑而对刺激进行内省的控制，遗漏了这些梦是导致创伤性神经症的原因。它们就是这样使我们洞悉了心理结构的一种功能，虽然它和快乐原则并不矛盾，但它却独立于快乐原则，并且比获得快乐和避免不快乐的目的有更早的起源。 因此，这似乎就是第一次承认梦是一种愿望满足的命题有一个例外的地方。正如我一再详细地表明的那样，焦虑的梦却没有提供这样的例外。“惩罚的梦”也没有，因为它们只是以适合于它的惩罚代替了被禁闭的愿望满足；就是说，它们满足的是罪疚感的愿望，罪疚感是对受蔑视的冲动做出的反应。但是，不能把我们所讨论的患有创伤性神经症的病人的梦归类为愿望满足，也不能把在精神分析期间发生的是病人回想起童年的心理创伤的梦做这样的分类。它们的产生毋宁说是服从强迫性原则，虽然在分析中，这种强迫性重复确实得到了那种愿望的支持（那种愿望则是受“暗示”鼓励的），以便把那些被遗忘和被压抑的东西回想起来。因此，把通过实现扰乱冲动的愿望而可能引起睡眠中断的任何动机摒弃，这样一些梦的功能并不是原始的功能。梦只有在全部心理生活已经接受了对快乐原则的支配后，才有可能执行这种功能。如果有一个“超越快乐原则”，那么，在梦的目的就是愿望满足之前还有一段时期，承认这一点才能与该原则相一致。这样做并不等于否认它们以后的功能。但是，如果这个普遍规律一旦被打破，就会出现另外的问题：为了从心理上约束创伤的印象而服从强迫性重复的这些梦难道不能也在分析之外发生吗？而答案只能是非常肯定的。

……The fulfillment of wishes is, as we know, brought about in a hallucinatory manner by dreams, and under the dominance of the pleasure principle this has become their function. But it is not in the service of that principle that the dreams of patients suffering from traumatic neuroses lead them back with such regularity to the situation in which the trauma occurred. We may assume, rather, that dreams are here helping to carry out another task, which must be accomplished before the dominance of the pleasure principle can ever begin. These dreams are endeavouring to master the stimulus retrospectively, by developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause of the traumatic neurosis. They thus afford us a view of a function of the mental apparatus which, though it does not contradict the pleasure principle, is nevertheless independent of it and seems to be more primitive than the purpose of gaining pleasure and avoiding unpleasure. This would seem to be the place, then, at which to admit for the first time an exception to the proposition that dreams are fulfillments of wishes. Anxiety dreams, as I have shown repeatedly and in detail, offer no such exception. Nor do ‘punishment dreams’, for they merely replace the forbidden wish-fulfillment by the appropriate punishment for it; that is to say, they fulfill the wish of the sense of guilt which is the reaction to the repudiated impulse. But it is impossible to classify as wish-fulfillments the dreams we have been discussing which occur in traumatic neuroses, or the dreams during psycho-analyses which bring to memory the psychical traumas of childhood. They arise, rather, in obedience to the compulsion to repeat, though it is true that in analysis that compulsion is supported by the wish (which is encouraged by ‘suggestion’) to conjure up what has been forgotten and repressed. Thus it would seem that the function of dreams, which consists in setting aside any motives that might interrupt sleep, by fulfilling the wishes of the disturbing impulses, is not their original function. It would not be possible for them to perform that function until the whole of mental life had accepted the dominance of the pleasure principle. If there is a ‘beyond the pleasure principle’, it is only consistent to grant that there was also a time before the purpose of dreams was the fulfillment of wishes. This would imply no denial of their later function. But if once this general rule has been broken, a further question arises. May not dreams which, with a view to the psychical binding of traumatic impressions, obey the compulsion to repeat - may not such dreams occur outside analysis as well? And the reply can only be a decided affirmative. -P3735