Why do Internet, financial service, and beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why does repetition characterize anthems and ritual speech? Why were circular forms favored for public festivals during the French Revolution? This book answers these questions using a single concept: common knowledge. Game theory shows that...
Why do Internet, financial service, and beer commercials dominate Super Bowl advertising? How do political ceremonies establish authority? Why does repetition characterize anthems and ritual speech? Why were circular forms favored for public festivals during the French Revolution? This book answers these questions using a single concept: common knowledge. Game theory shows that in order to coordinate its actions, a group of people must form "common knowledge." Each person wants to participate only if others also participate. Members must have knowledge of each other, knowledge of that knowledge, knowledge of the knowledge of that knowledge, and so on. Michael Chwe applies this insight, with striking erudition, to analyze a range of rituals across history and cultures. He shows that public ceremonies are powerful not simply because they transmit meaning from a central source to each audience member but because they let audience members know what other members know.For instance, people watching the Super Bowl know that many others are seeing precisely what they see and that those people know in turn that many others are also watching. This creates common knowledge, and advertisers selling products that depend on consensus are willing to pay large sums to gain access to it. Remarkably, a great variety of rituals and ceremonies, such as formal inaugurations, work in much the same way. By using a rational-choice argument to explain diverse cultural practices, Chwe argues for a close reciprocal relationship between the perspectives of rationality and culture. He illustrates how game theory can be applied to an unexpectedly broad spectrum of problems, while showing in an admirably clear way what game theory might hold for scholars in the social sciences and humanities who are not yet acquainted with it.
作者简介
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Michael Suk-Young Chwe is Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles.
I recently finished listening to the book, “Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge” by Prof. Michael Chwe, on Audible. Overall, I think this is a great book on using rational choice theory (specifically, common knowledge) to explain ...
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arthur_z_yu
Princeton University Press2013版
0 有用 Joe Christmas 2023-09-10 03:03:59 美国
可爱的同行。圆形监狱是边沁设计的，福柯都没能领会经济学家关于【你知道我知道你知道……】的深意……
3 有用 Theophilus 2017-04-23 02:03:56
以前太低估chwe了，他确实是少有的那种能大量的混乱的细节里（比如简奥斯丁的小说😂）提炼模型的人。从common knowledge的生成机制到仪式的形成这个抽象过程把很多博弈论难题给串起来了。目前的博弈论几乎忽略了belief formation和belief hierarchy 除经典模型以外的可能。而这些alternative其实涉及到的都是比经典博弈论有意义多，应用领域也广的多的方向。当然... 以前太低估chwe了，他确实是少有的那种能大量的混乱的细节里（比如简奥斯丁的小说😂）提炼模型的人。从common knowledge的生成机制到仪式的形成这个抽象过程把很多博弈论难题给串起来了。目前的博弈论几乎忽略了belief formation和belief hierarchy 除经典模型以外的可能。而这些alternative其实涉及到的都是比经典博弈论有意义多，应用领域也广的多的方向。当然作为半只脚踏入这个方向的人来说，这个领域有两个死结目前还没解开：1.common knowledge以外的情形数学上几乎无法简要描述 2.和common knowledge相关的概念大多出于un-falsifiable 的境地，所以也就无法实证。 (展开)
0 有用 Sussex 2016-09-15 19:59:47
小书认为理性仪式完成了社会共有知识mutual knowledge向共同知识common knowledge的转化，有助社会团结形成，从而利于协作悖论的解决。作者从博弈论共同知识出发，试图冲破“理性——资源配置”、“非理性——情感认同”的二元解释框架，提出理性仪式引向群体认同的传导机制。作为经济学出身，从亚里士多德引到阿伦特、福柯实属难能可贵，然而实证部分是不是太粗糙了。。。
0 有用 暮色·朝阳 2018-11-14 00:17:21
福柯的毒，不知所云
0 有用 扁嘴鸭 2020-02-13 18:41:34
论领导拉一个工作微信群的重要性以及为什么直播平台要显示观看人数。