Heidegger's Analytic

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• The problem with Tugendhat’s account is that it confines intelligibility and practice to an exclusively linguistic context. For example,Tugendhat simply folds the pragmatic notions of acceptance and refusal, or assent and dissent, into the specifically semantic concepts of affirmation and negation, assertion and denial. But, of course, we can reject what someone says by uttering affirmative statements, just as we can embrace what they say using negations. Tugendhat’s “linguisticanalytical” reconstruction of the question of being therefore tends to suppress the distinction between pragmatic and linguistic intelligibility on which, as we shall see, Heidegger insists. For Heidegger, by contrast, being is not restricted to the intelligibility we can explicitly affirm or deny in linguistic utte... (查看原文)

  波士顿驴 3 回复 1赞 2020-08-03 11:25:57

• Heideggerian hermeneutic conditions are like Kantian epistemic conditions in the first two respects but not in the third, since the point of fundamental ontology is precisely to deny any sense of ontological commitment independent of an account of our own everyday, preontological understanding of being. So, although the analytic of Dasein is “transcendental” inasmuch as it inquires into the conditions of interpretation in general, it does not pretend to any sort of ontological neutrality. Indeed, for Heidegger, “Every disclosure of being as the transcendens” – including fundamental ontology itself, of course – “is transcendental knowledge” (SZ 38). (查看原文)

  波士顿驴 1赞 2020-08-04 09:14:57

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