出版社: Routledge
出版年: 20019
页数: 106
定价: USD 17.95
装帧: Paperback
丛书: Routledge Classics
ISBN: 9780415254083
内容简介 · · · · · ·
Perhaps the most important work of philosophy written in the twentieth century, Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme brilliance, it captured the imagination of a generation of philosophers. For Wittgenstein, logic was something we use to c...
Perhaps the most important work of philosophy written in the twentieth century, Tractatus LogicoPhilosophicus was the only philosophical work that Ludwig Wittgenstein published during his lifetime. Written in short, carefully numbered paragraphs of extreme brilliance, it captured the imagination of a generation of philosophers. For Wittgenstein, logic was something we use to conquer a reality which is in itself both elusive and unobtainable. He famously summarized the book in the following words: 'What can be said at all can be said clearly; and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence.' David Pears and Brian McGuinness received the highest praise for their meticulous translation. The work is prefaced by Bertrand Russell's original introduction to the first English edition.
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Walt (事必躬亲)
2.026 P/M:There must be objects, if the world is to have an unalterable form. Deutsch:Nur wenn es Gegenstände gibt, kann es eine feste Form der Welt geben. Ogden:Only if there are objects can there be a fixed form of the world. P/M错 Ogden对20160806 11:34

1. "a R b" should not be said as "a stands in a certain relation R to b", but that "a stands in a certain relation to be which could be said as 'a R b'". 2. The proposition and the fact must exhibit the same logical manifold, and this cannot be itself represented since it has to be in common between the fact and the picture.So the manifold cannot be said, but only ...
20130120 14:12
1. "a R b" should not be said as "a stands in a certain relation R to b", but that "a stands in a certain relation to be which could be said as 'a R b'".2. The proposition and the fact must exhibit the same logical manifold, and this cannot be itself represented since it has to be in common between the fact and the picture.So the manifold cannot be said, but only can be SHOWN.3. The world is not described by merely naming all the objects in it; it is necessary also to know the atomic facts of which these objects are constituents. Given this total of atomic facts every true proposition, no matter how complex. can theoretically be INFERRED.4.回应 20130120 14:12 
Most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters are not false but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senseless. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. They are of the same kind as the question wther the Good is more or le...
20121020 13:35
Most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters are not false but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senseless. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. They are of the same kind as the question wther the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful
回应 20121020 13:35 
罗素导读笔记 The possibility of a proposition representing a fact rests upon the fact that in it objects are represented by signs, but are themselves present in the proposition as in the fact. The proposition and the fact must exhibit the same logical ``manifold,'' and this cannot be itself represented since it has to be in common between the fact and t...
20120518 13:48
罗素导读笔记
This part takes me three times to work out... What the hell is in those philosophers' bloody brains???The possibility of a proposition representing a fact rests upon the fact that in it objects are represented by signs, but are themselves present in the proposition as in the fact. The proposition and the fact must exhibit the same logical ``manifold,'' and this cannot be itself represented since it has to be in common between the fact and the picture. Mr Wittgenstein maintains that everything properly philosophical belongs to what can only be shown, or to what is in common between a fact and its logical picture. It results from this view that nothing correct can be said in philosophy. Every philosophical proposition is bad grammar, and the best that we can hope to achieve by philosophical discussion is to lead people to see that philosophical discussion is a mistake.
看完这一大段，我惊喜地明白了为什么初等数学中集合的表示方法除了列举法还有描述法，其中"┐p且┐q”代表了所有元素It has been shown by Dr. Sheffer (Trans. Am. Math. Soc., Vol. XIV. pp. 481488) that all truthfunctions of a given set of propositions can be constructed out of either of the two functions ``notp or notq'' or ``notp and notq''. Wittgenstein makes use of the latter, assuming a knowledge of Dr. Sheffer's work. The manner in which other truthfunctions are constructed out of ``notp and notq'' is easy to see. ``Notp and notp'' is equivalent to ``notp,'' hence we obtain a definition of negation in terms of our primitive function: hence we can define ``p or q,'' since this is the negation of ``notp and notq,'' i.e. of our primitive function. The development of other truthfunctions out of ``notp'' and ``p or q'' is given in detail at the beginning of Principia Mathematica. This gives all that is wanted when the propositions which are arguments to our truthfunction are given by enumeration. Wittgenstein, however, by a very interesting analysis succeeds in extending the process to general propositions, i.e. to cases where the propositions which are arguments to our truthfunction are not given by enumeration but are given as all those satisfying some condition. For example, let fx be a propositional function (i.e. a function whose values are propositions), such as ``x is human''  then the various values of fx form a set of propositions. We may extend the idea ``notp and notq'' so as to apply to simultaneous denial of all the propositions which are values of fx. In this way we arrive at the proposition which is ordinarily represented in mathematical logic by the words "fx is false for all values of x.'' The negation of this would be the proposition ``There is at least one x for which fx is true'' which is represented by ``(5.54): ``In the general propositional form, propositions occur in a proposition only as bases of truthoperations.'' At first sight, he goes on to explain, it seems as if a propositions could also occur in other ways, e.g. ``A believes p.'' Here it seems superficially as if the proposition p stood in a sort of relation to the object A. ``But it is clear that 'A believe that p,' 'A thinks p,' 'A says p' are of the form enumerated arguments p, q, r 'p says p'; and here we have no coordination of a fact and an object, but a coordination of facts by means of a coordination of their objects'' (5.542).
existentialism?......from which of course it results that nothing can be deduced from an atomic proposition. All the propositions of logic, he maintains, are tautologies, such, for example, as “p or not p”.
回应 20120518 13:48

Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts. 逻辑的东西不会仅仅是可能的。逻辑研究每一可能性，一切可能性都是它的事实。 克里朴克你妈逼是没看见这句还是没看懂哇！
20110507 18:01

这本书的第一句话是： Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in itor at least similar thoughts.So it is not a textbook.Its purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it. 他讲的是些绝逼无聊的事情，只有曾经为这些事杞人忧天过的人，才会因为找到同类和解除忧虑而感到愉快。如果没有...
20110516 16:10
这本书的第一句话是：
他讲的是些绝逼无聊的事情，只有曾经为这些事杞人忧天过的人，才会因为找到同类和解除忧虑而感到愉快。如果没有心病，就没必要读哲学。他讲的事情我刚好有不少还真想过，这导致我感到槽点太多了：1 经验世界与理想世界Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in itor at least similar thoughts.So it is not a textbook.Its purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it.
几周前我等Sophia吃饭，它拿了一本《天才在左疯子在右》让我看。然后就走着去食堂。它问我看多少了，我说刚开头。它说它看电视鲁豫采访一个精神病院长，问它怎样判断一个人疯没疯。院长说给它一个勺子，让它把浴盆里的水排干。鲁豫说要是我我就用勺子舀啊。院长说正常人都是拔浴盆的塞子。我说：这个故事和《天才在左疯子在右》里的故事很像啊。用勺子是合理的，但不符合生活经验和社会习俗。我以前说过，我们不把数学不及格的人叫疯子。判断一个人疯没疯依据的不是它有没有逻辑，而是生活经验和社会习俗。这本书里的人，有好多都好有想法的，它们的理论也是自洽的。问题是，它们心中的理想世界缺少经验的支撑。这是它们被叫做疯子的原因。实际上，人类有着相同的语言/逻辑本能。一个例子是几何学的推理。如果使用同样的推理逻辑，但是作为逻辑体系基础的公理不同，那么可以有无数种不同的几何学体系和空间理念。但是我们只能选取一种来给现实世界的空间命名，这取决于哪个体系符合我们的经验。独立于经验之外的是逻辑/语法，而非物体。2属性与状态2.021 Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite. 2.0211 If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. 2.0212 In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false). 2.022 It is obvious that an imagined world, however difference it may be from the real one, must have something a formin common with it.
我曾经认为世界图景的最小单元是一个物体的一个属性，比如圆，红，1米长，1斤重...共同组成一个小球，一个小球又是世界图景的单元。或者，更专业一点，质量，速度，电荷数共同组成一个原子，而原子是世界的最小单元...类似的想法。我在当时又意识到：2.0231 The substance of the world can only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are representedonly by the configuration of objects that they are produced.
这些想法导致了一大堆我当时不能解决的问题。http://www.douban.com/note/100631336/维特根斯坦的想法和我不同，在他看来，属性并非先验存在的，而只是对一坨关于该物体的经验的归纳。而每一个关于物体的经验，是这个物体的一个状态。在他看来，a state of things才是构成世界的最基本单元。3 词语搭配和物体的意义在上面那个日记的回复8楼里，我说“”一个物体的名字和其他词建立链接的问题。比如声音类名词，只能和特定的几个动词库链接。比如听之类的，叫之类的。真名不但包含它所指客体的根本信息，而且必须附带它可链接的词库类型。”这同样也是本书作者曾经考虑过的问题：属性不是物体的一个组成部分，而是一个处理/测量施加到一个物体上的后果。属性和物体之间的关系基于时间和因果律存在。20101114
上面一段话挺絮叨的，好在最后两句（2.014和2.0141）总结的很给力！道出了我的心声啊我去！4 世界的几何系统和可言说部分2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself. 2.0121 It would seem to be a sort of accident, if it turned out that a situation would fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its own. If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning. (Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts.) Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is no object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others. If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from the possibility of such combinations. 2.0123 If I know an object I also know all its possible occurrences in states of affairs. (Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot be discovered later. 2.0124 If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given. 2.014 Objects contain the possibility of all situations. 2.0141 The possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object.
我之前还真因为这件事想过很久。数字和几何是一一对应的。人类的空间想象和逻辑是通用的——奇异的本能！这个数学世界是没有颜色的。什么是红？红可以被说成是某个色值，一个数字，从而被语言定义。但是那只是一个客观的数字，不是红的主观感受——两个不同世界里的东西。至于温度和声音也是一样：2.0232 In a manner of speaking, objects are colourless.
http://www.douban.com/note/90840189/人把冰的温度定为0度，把沸水的温度定为100度。然后，人将视觉中的水银柱在这两个温度之间的涨缩划分100个视觉上的等分，从而规定其它温度。 再想想声音，音色是由波形定义的，响度是由振幅定义的，频率是由振动次数来定义的，这些都是视觉中的运动轨迹神马的。 第一个例子中，温度引发的后果的几何属性：“长”，被用来定义温度；第二个例子中，声音被在微观上还原成点的运动轨迹——又一套几何属性。 人习惯将各种感官的感受翻译，还原成视觉信息，然后再把视觉信息抽象成几何属性，从而构成世界系统的通用内核。 物体的几何属性和其它感官属性的区别是什么？ 一个区别是：几何系统是分析系统，它由定义/命名和逻辑构成，是一套重言式的符号系统。几何属性是与经验无关的，而其他感受是主观甚至是心理的。实际上，几何属性并不是物体的属性，而是物体被抽象成的符号的属性。20100914
回应 20110516 16:10 
Walt (事必躬亲)
2.026 P/M:There must be objects, if the world is to have an unalterable form. Deutsch:Nur wenn es Gegenstände gibt, kann es eine feste Form der Welt geben. Ogden:Only if there are objects can there be a fixed form of the world. P/M错 Ogden对20160806 11:34

Most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters are not false but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senseless. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. They are of the same kind as the question wther the Good is more or le...
20121020 13:35
Most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters are not false but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senseless. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. They are of the same kind as the question wther the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful
回应 20121020 13:35

Walt (事必躬亲)
2.026 P/M:There must be objects, if the world is to have an unalterable form. Deutsch:Nur wenn es Gegenstände gibt, kann es eine feste Form der Welt geben. Ogden:Only if there are objects can there be a fixed form of the world. P/M错 Ogden对20160806 11:34

1. "a R b" should not be said as "a stands in a certain relation R to b", but that "a stands in a certain relation to be which could be said as 'a R b'". 2. The proposition and the fact must exhibit the same logical manifold, and this cannot be itself represented since it has to be in common between the fact and the picture.So the manifold cannot be said, but only ...
20130120 14:12
1. "a R b" should not be said as "a stands in a certain relation R to b", but that "a stands in a certain relation to be which could be said as 'a R b'".2. The proposition and the fact must exhibit the same logical manifold, and this cannot be itself represented since it has to be in common between the fact and the picture.So the manifold cannot be said, but only can be SHOWN.3. The world is not described by merely naming all the objects in it; it is necessary also to know the atomic facts of which these objects are constituents. Given this total of atomic facts every true proposition, no matter how complex. can theoretically be INFERRED.4.回应 20130120 14:12 
Most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters are not false but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senseless. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. They are of the same kind as the question wther the Good is more or le...
20121020 13:35
Most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters are not false but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senseless. Most questions and propositions of the philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. They are of the same kind as the question wther the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful
回应 20121020 13:35 
罗素导读笔记 The possibility of a proposition representing a fact rests upon the fact that in it objects are represented by signs, but are themselves present in the proposition as in the fact. The proposition and the fact must exhibit the same logical ``manifold,'' and this cannot be itself represented since it has to be in common between the fact and t...
20120518 13:48
罗素导读笔记
This part takes me three times to work out... What the hell is in those philosophers' bloody brains???The possibility of a proposition representing a fact rests upon the fact that in it objects are represented by signs, but are themselves present in the proposition as in the fact. The proposition and the fact must exhibit the same logical ``manifold,'' and this cannot be itself represented since it has to be in common between the fact and the picture. Mr Wittgenstein maintains that everything properly philosophical belongs to what can only be shown, or to what is in common between a fact and its logical picture. It results from this view that nothing correct can be said in philosophy. Every philosophical proposition is bad grammar, and the best that we can hope to achieve by philosophical discussion is to lead people to see that philosophical discussion is a mistake.
看完这一大段，我惊喜地明白了为什么初等数学中集合的表示方法除了列举法还有描述法，其中"┐p且┐q”代表了所有元素It has been shown by Dr. Sheffer (Trans. Am. Math. Soc., Vol. XIV. pp. 481488) that all truthfunctions of a given set of propositions can be constructed out of either of the two functions ``notp or notq'' or ``notp and notq''. Wittgenstein makes use of the latter, assuming a knowledge of Dr. Sheffer's work. The manner in which other truthfunctions are constructed out of ``notp and notq'' is easy to see. ``Notp and notp'' is equivalent to ``notp,'' hence we obtain a definition of negation in terms of our primitive function: hence we can define ``p or q,'' since this is the negation of ``notp and notq,'' i.e. of our primitive function. The development of other truthfunctions out of ``notp'' and ``p or q'' is given in detail at the beginning of Principia Mathematica. This gives all that is wanted when the propositions which are arguments to our truthfunction are given by enumeration. Wittgenstein, however, by a very interesting analysis succeeds in extending the process to general propositions, i.e. to cases where the propositions which are arguments to our truthfunction are not given by enumeration but are given as all those satisfying some condition. For example, let fx be a propositional function (i.e. a function whose values are propositions), such as ``x is human''  then the various values of fx form a set of propositions. We may extend the idea ``notp and notq'' so as to apply to simultaneous denial of all the propositions which are values of fx. In this way we arrive at the proposition which is ordinarily represented in mathematical logic by the words "fx is false for all values of x.'' The negation of this would be the proposition ``There is at least one x for which fx is true'' which is represented by ``(5.54): ``In the general propositional form, propositions occur in a proposition only as bases of truthoperations.'' At first sight, he goes on to explain, it seems as if a propositions could also occur in other ways, e.g. ``A believes p.'' Here it seems superficially as if the proposition p stood in a sort of relation to the object A. ``But it is clear that 'A believe that p,' 'A thinks p,' 'A says p' are of the form enumerated arguments p, q, r 'p says p'; and here we have no coordination of a fact and an object, but a coordination of facts by means of a coordination of their objects'' (5.542).
existentialism?......from which of course it results that nothing can be deduced from an atomic proposition. All the propositions of logic, he maintains, are tautologies, such, for example, as “p or not p”.
回应 20120518 13:48
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订阅关于Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (Routledge Classics)的评论:
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0 有用 蒲花柳絮 20111203
由德文翻译而来，翻译的比较简单易读。个别翻译有争论，多参考些相关资料就无碍了。
0 有用 Aimée 20110207
好玩儿！
0 有用 S/Z 20130530
highly overrated…nothing really original & creative...Frege+Husserl would be enough...
0 有用 Walt 20160806
翻译仍有瑕疵 不过本来每一种译法理就带着理解
0 有用 mothercourage 20141216
罗素在introduction里summarize的太到位了 维特根斯坦个熊孩子写了九十页都没讲清楚 个别段落清晰明了读到我精神高潮 但是作为整本书却给人感觉逻辑上不顺 感觉没structure好 5.65.63太太太嗲
0 有用 李瞬生 20161125
给定肉身带有局限性的输入，真实是可计算的一切 。对于不可计算之物 ，人当保持沉默。
0 有用 Walt 20160806
翻译仍有瑕疵 不过本来每一种译法理就带着理解
0 有用 马斯特 20160708
因为懵逼而精神高潮这大概是第一次😃
0 有用 mothercourage 20141216
罗素在introduction里summarize的太到位了 维特根斯坦个熊孩子写了九十页都没讲清楚 个别段落清晰明了读到我精神高潮 但是作为整本书却给人感觉逻辑上不顺 感觉没structure好 5.65.63太太太嗲
0 有用 刘德维希 20140717
Among the productions of the twentieth century the Tractatus continues to stand out for its beauty and its power.#论脑残粉的修养#