出版社: W. W. Norton & Company
副标题: An Introduction to Game Theory
出版年: 20021
页数: 334
定价: USD 96.00
装帧: Hardcover
ISBN: 9780393976489
内容简介 · · · · · ·
This text covers the basic concepts and insights of game theory and offers classic examples and applications in a concise format. It provides a serious treatment of contract  an important, but often neglected topic in game theory  with minimal departure from the standard game coverage. Without skimping on mathematical precision, this text presents concepts and applications us...
This text covers the basic concepts and insights of game theory and offers classic examples and applications in a concise format. It provides a serious treatment of contract  an important, but often neglected topic in game theory  with minimal departure from the standard game coverage. Without skimping on mathematical precision, this text presents concepts and applications using the simplest, most straight forward model. This aims to help students understand key ideas and allows them to avoid unnecessary mathematical formality.
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oneroker (so young and so gone)
For example, to check if one of player 1â€™s strategies dominates another, just scan across the two rows of the payoff matrix, column by column. You do not have to compare the payoffs of player 1 across columns. If the payoff in one row is greater than the payoff in another, and this is true for all columns, then the former strategy dominates the latter. If a strategy is not dominated by another pu...20140309 23:16
For example, to check if one of player 1’s strategies dominates another, just scan across the two rows of the payoff matrix, column by column. You do not have to compare the payoffs of player 1 across columns. If the payoff in one row is greater than the payoff in another, and this is true for all columns, then the former strategy dominates the latter. If a strategy is not dominated by another pure strategy, you then must determine whether it is dominated by a mixed strategy.回应 20140309 23:16 
oneroker (so young and so gone)
The definition of a strategy (a complete contingent plan) requires a specification of player lâ€™s choice at his second information set even in the situation in which he plans to select O at his first information set. Furthermore, we really will need to keep track of behavior at all information setsâ€”even those that would be unreached if players follow their strategiesâ€”to fully analyze any game. T...20140308 15:23
The definition of a strategy (a complete contingent plan) requires a specification of player l’s choice at his second information set even in the situation in which he plans to select O at his first information set. Furthermore, we really will need to keep track of behavior at all information sets—even those that would be unreached if players follow their strategies—to fully analyze any game. That is, stating that player l’s plan is “O” does not provide enough information for us to conduct a thorough analysis.回应 20140308 15:23 
西泉 (我寄愁心于明月)
1. Representing Games (1) elements of games : players, strategy set, information set, payoffs, preference P.7 (2) two forms to present a game : the extensive form, the normal form (3) strategy space, strategy profile P.23 (4) classic normalform games: Matching Pennies, Prisonersâ€™ Dilemma(solution to PD: repeated interactions, contracts, other external forces), Battle of Sexes, HawkDo...20130420 14:22
1. Representing Games (1) elements of games : players, strategy set, information set, payoffs, preference P.7 (2) two forms to present a game : the extensive form, the normal form (3) strategy space, strategy profile P.23 (4) classic normalform games: Matching Pennies, Prisoners’ Dilemma(solution to PD: repeated interactions, contracts, other external forces), Battle of Sexes, HawkDove/Chicken, Coordination(solution: communication), Pareto Coordination, Pigs. P.31 2. Analyzing Behavior in Static Setting (1) strict/weak dominance. P.46 (2) best response. (3) relationship between dominance and best response IEDS (iterated elimination of dominated strategy) and UD (undominated strategies) P.60 Rationalization Strategies and BR (best response). P.60 UD=BR when there are only two players or in the situation of uncorrelated conjectures when there are more than two players .不相关推测 P.54 P.309 (4) if a game is dominant solvable with strict IEDS, then that outcome is the unique NE. if a game is dominant solvable with weak IEDS, then the outcome may not be unique NE. (5) weakly congruous: every strategy is best response. Example: NE一致性 p.81 best response complete: every best response is inside. Example: the entire strategy space both weakly congruous and best response complete are congruous. Example: the set of rationalizable strategies (6) mixedstrategy NE indifference principle U1(σ1, σ2)=U1(a, σ2)=U1(b, σ2) p.105 every finite game has at least one NE (pure or mixed) (7) applications location game and partnership game. P.67 Cournot duopoly model p.95 Bertrand duopoly model P.97 tariff setting by two countries P.98 for strictly competitive games, the NE is both players play security strategy. P.112 aside: sound strategy. Lecture4 class game: picking the right number: the one whose number is the closest to 2/3 times the group average is the winner in that group. Lecture2 (8) three kinds of strategic tensions first: the clash between individual and group interests. Example: prisoners’ dilemma. P.47 second: Strategic uncertainty. Example: coordination problem, stag hunt game. P.62 third: inefficient coordination. Example: QWERTY. P.89 aside: behavioral game theory. P.90 3. Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Setting (1) sequential rationality and backward induction P.139 subgame perfect NE (SPE): it specifies a NE in every subgame of original game. P.142 Zermelo’s Theorem: evey finite perfect information game has a backward induction solution. Moreover, if no two payoffs are the same for any player, then there is a unique backward induction solution. Lecture5 (2) applications of SPE class game: picking chalks. Lecture5 Stackelberg competition(cournot duopoly model in sequential situation). Lecture5 advertising and competition. P.150 a model of limit capacity p.154 ultimatum games: power to the proposer. P.180 twoperiod, alternatingoffer games: power to the patient. P.182 infiniteperiod, alternatingoffer game. Discounting .P.186 game of duel. Lecture6 best price guarantee. Lecture6 (3) repeated games and reputation. P.210 In a repeated game, repeatedly playing a NE in every period is always a SPE; to support cooperation(that is not a NE of the stage game), there must be credible punishments and reward in the future. Prisoners’ dilemma and renegotiation. Lecture7 all religions promised afterlife: making life an infinite game. Lecture8 when the discount factor goes to one, any individual rational payoff vector can be supported in SPE in an infinitely repeated game. P.222 goodwill and trading of a reputation. P.230 4. Information (1) asymmetric information, move of nature(chance node), type. P.238 (2) Bayesian NE(BNE): two method. P.256 (3) application of BNE private value, second price auctions. Lecute9 private value, first price auctions. Lecture9 common value, first price auctions. Lecture10 common value, second price auctions, Lecture10 a principalagent game. P.249 lemon market p.262 the Cournot model with incomplete information. Lecture10 the Bertrand model with incomplete information. Lecture10 purification of mixed strategies. Lecture10 Adverse selection. Lecture10 (3) perfect Bayesian equilibrium(PBE): separating strategy and pooling strategy. P.277 (4) application of PBE jobs and school p.282 reputation and incomplete information p.285 homework5，Ex.2 5. Summary static dynamic Complete information NE SPE Incomplete information BNE PBE回应 20130420 14:22

oneroker (so young and so gone)
The definition of a strategy (a complete contingent plan) requires a specification of player lâ€™s choice at his second information set even in the situation in which he plans to select O at his first information set. Furthermore, we really will need to keep track of behavior at all information setsâ€”even those that would be unreached if players follow their strategiesâ€”to fully analyze any game. T...20140308 15:23
The definition of a strategy (a complete contingent plan) requires a specification of player l’s choice at his second information set even in the situation in which he plans to select O at his first information set. Furthermore, we really will need to keep track of behavior at all information sets—even those that would be unreached if players follow their strategies—to fully analyze any game. That is, stating that player l’s plan is “O” does not provide enough information for us to conduct a thorough analysis.回应 20140308 15:23 
oneroker (so young and so gone)
For example, to check if one of player 1â€™s strategies dominates another, just scan across the two rows of the payoff matrix, column by column. You do not have to compare the payoffs of player 1 across columns. If the payoff in one row is greater than the payoff in another, and this is true for all columns, then the former strategy dominates the latter. If a strategy is not dominated by another pu...20140309 23:16
For example, to check if one of player 1’s strategies dominates another, just scan across the two rows of the payoff matrix, column by column. You do not have to compare the payoffs of player 1 across columns. If the payoff in one row is greater than the payoff in another, and this is true for all columns, then the former strategy dominates the latter. If a strategy is not dominated by another pure strategy, you then must determine whether it is dominated by a mixed strategy.回应 20140309 23:16 

西泉 (我寄愁心于明月)
1. Representing Games (1) elements of games : players, strategy set, information set, payoffs, preference P.7 (2) two forms to present a game : the extensive form, the normal form (3) strategy space, strategy profile P.23 (4) classic normalform games: Matching Pennies, Prisonersâ€™ Dilemma(solution to PD: repeated interactions, contracts, other external forces), Battle of Sexes, HawkDo...20130420 14:22
1. Representing Games (1) elements of games : players, strategy set, information set, payoffs, preference P.7 (2) two forms to present a game : the extensive form, the normal form (3) strategy space, strategy profile P.23 (4) classic normalform games: Matching Pennies, Prisoners’ Dilemma(solution to PD: repeated interactions, contracts, other external forces), Battle of Sexes, HawkDove/Chicken, Coordination(solution: communication), Pareto Coordination, Pigs. P.31 2. Analyzing Behavior in Static Setting (1) strict/weak dominance. P.46 (2) best response. (3) relationship between dominance and best response IEDS (iterated elimination of dominated strategy) and UD (undominated strategies) P.60 Rationalization Strategies and BR (best response). P.60 UD=BR when there are only two players or in the situation of uncorrelated conjectures when there are more than two players .不相关推测 P.54 P.309 (4) if a game is dominant solvable with strict IEDS, then that outcome is the unique NE. if a game is dominant solvable with weak IEDS, then the outcome may not be unique NE. (5) weakly congruous: every strategy is best response. Example: NE一致性 p.81 best response complete: every best response is inside. Example: the entire strategy space both weakly congruous and best response complete are congruous. Example: the set of rationalizable strategies (6) mixedstrategy NE indifference principle U1(σ1, σ2)=U1(a, σ2)=U1(b, σ2) p.105 every finite game has at least one NE (pure or mixed) (7) applications location game and partnership game. P.67 Cournot duopoly model p.95 Bertrand duopoly model P.97 tariff setting by two countries P.98 for strictly competitive games, the NE is both players play security strategy. P.112 aside: sound strategy. Lecture4 class game: picking the right number: the one whose number is the closest to 2/3 times the group average is the winner in that group. Lecture2 (8) three kinds of strategic tensions first: the clash between individual and group interests. Example: prisoners’ dilemma. P.47 second: Strategic uncertainty. Example: coordination problem, stag hunt game. P.62 third: inefficient coordination. Example: QWERTY. P.89 aside: behavioral game theory. P.90 3. Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Setting (1) sequential rationality and backward induction P.139 subgame perfect NE (SPE): it specifies a NE in every subgame of original game. P.142 Zermelo’s Theorem: evey finite perfect information game has a backward induction solution. Moreover, if no two payoffs are the same for any player, then there is a unique backward induction solution. Lecture5 (2) applications of SPE class game: picking chalks. Lecture5 Stackelberg competition(cournot duopoly model in sequential situation). Lecture5 advertising and competition. P.150 a model of limit capacity p.154 ultimatum games: power to the proposer. P.180 twoperiod, alternatingoffer games: power to the patient. P.182 infiniteperiod, alternatingoffer game. Discounting .P.186 game of duel. Lecture6 best price guarantee. Lecture6 (3) repeated games and reputation. P.210 In a repeated game, repeatedly playing a NE in every period is always a SPE; to support cooperation(that is not a NE of the stage game), there must be credible punishments and reward in the future. Prisoners’ dilemma and renegotiation. Lecture7 all religions promised afterlife: making life an infinite game. Lecture8 when the discount factor goes to one, any individual rational payoff vector can be supported in SPE in an infinitely repeated game. P.222 goodwill and trading of a reputation. P.230 4. Information (1) asymmetric information, move of nature(chance node), type. P.238 (2) Bayesian NE(BNE): two method. P.256 (3) application of BNE private value, second price auctions. Lecute9 private value, first price auctions. Lecture9 common value, first price auctions. Lecture10 common value, second price auctions, Lecture10 a principalagent game. P.249 lemon market p.262 the Cournot model with incomplete information. Lecture10 the Bertrand model with incomplete information. Lecture10 purification of mixed strategies. Lecture10 Adverse selection. Lecture10 (3) perfect Bayesian equilibrium(PBE): separating strategy and pooling strategy. P.277 (4) application of PBE jobs and school p.282 reputation and incomplete information p.285 homework5，Ex.2 5. Summary static dynamic Complete information NE SPE Incomplete information BNE PBE回应 20130420 14:22


oneroker (so young and so gone)
For example, to check if one of player 1â€™s strategies dominates another, just scan across the two rows of the payoff matrix, column by column. You do not have to compare the payoffs of player 1 across columns. If the payoff in one row is greater than the payoff in another, and this is true for all columns, then the former strategy dominates the latter. If a strategy is not dominated by another pu...20140309 23:16
For example, to check if one of player 1’s strategies dominates another, just scan across the two rows of the payoff matrix, column by column. You do not have to compare the payoffs of player 1 across columns. If the payoff in one row is greater than the payoff in another, and this is true for all columns, then the former strategy dominates the latter. If a strategy is not dominated by another pure strategy, you then must determine whether it is dominated by a mixed strategy.回应 20140309 23:16 
oneroker (so young and so gone)
The definition of a strategy (a complete contingent plan) requires a specification of player lâ€™s choice at his second information set even in the situation in which he plans to select O at his first information set. Furthermore, we really will need to keep track of behavior at all information setsâ€”even those that would be unreached if players follow their strategiesâ€”to fully analyze any game. T...20140308 15:23
The definition of a strategy (a complete contingent plan) requires a specification of player l’s choice at his second information set even in the situation in which he plans to select O at his first information set. Furthermore, we really will need to keep track of behavior at all information sets—even those that would be unreached if players follow their strategies—to fully analyze any game. That is, stating that player l’s plan is “O” does not provide enough information for us to conduct a thorough analysis.回应 20140308 15:23 
西泉 (我寄愁心于明月)
1. Representing Games (1) elements of games : players, strategy set, information set, payoffs, preference P.7 (2) two forms to present a game : the extensive form, the normal form (3) strategy space, strategy profile P.23 (4) classic normalform games: Matching Pennies, Prisonersâ€™ Dilemma(solution to PD: repeated interactions, contracts, other external forces), Battle of Sexes, HawkDo...20130420 14:22
1. Representing Games (1) elements of games : players, strategy set, information set, payoffs, preference P.7 (2) two forms to present a game : the extensive form, the normal form (3) strategy space, strategy profile P.23 (4) classic normalform games: Matching Pennies, Prisoners’ Dilemma(solution to PD: repeated interactions, contracts, other external forces), Battle of Sexes, HawkDove/Chicken, Coordination(solution: communication), Pareto Coordination, Pigs. P.31 2. Analyzing Behavior in Static Setting (1) strict/weak dominance. P.46 (2) best response. (3) relationship between dominance and best response IEDS (iterated elimination of dominated strategy) and UD (undominated strategies) P.60 Rationalization Strategies and BR (best response). P.60 UD=BR when there are only two players or in the situation of uncorrelated conjectures when there are more than two players .不相关推测 P.54 P.309 (4) if a game is dominant solvable with strict IEDS, then that outcome is the unique NE. if a game is dominant solvable with weak IEDS, then the outcome may not be unique NE. (5) weakly congruous: every strategy is best response. Example: NE一致性 p.81 best response complete: every best response is inside. Example: the entire strategy space both weakly congruous and best response complete are congruous. Example: the set of rationalizable strategies (6) mixedstrategy NE indifference principle U1(σ1, σ2)=U1(a, σ2)=U1(b, σ2) p.105 every finite game has at least one NE (pure or mixed) (7) applications location game and partnership game. P.67 Cournot duopoly model p.95 Bertrand duopoly model P.97 tariff setting by two countries P.98 for strictly competitive games, the NE is both players play security strategy. P.112 aside: sound strategy. Lecture4 class game: picking the right number: the one whose number is the closest to 2/3 times the group average is the winner in that group. Lecture2 (8) three kinds of strategic tensions first: the clash between individual and group interests. Example: prisoners’ dilemma. P.47 second: Strategic uncertainty. Example: coordination problem, stag hunt game. P.62 third: inefficient coordination. Example: QWERTY. P.89 aside: behavioral game theory. P.90 3. Analyzing Behavior in Dynamic Setting (1) sequential rationality and backward induction P.139 subgame perfect NE (SPE): it specifies a NE in every subgame of original game. P.142 Zermelo’s Theorem: evey finite perfect information game has a backward induction solution. Moreover, if no two payoffs are the same for any player, then there is a unique backward induction solution. Lecture5 (2) applications of SPE class game: picking chalks. Lecture5 Stackelberg competition(cournot duopoly model in sequential situation). Lecture5 advertising and competition. P.150 a model of limit capacity p.154 ultimatum games: power to the proposer. P.180 twoperiod, alternatingoffer games: power to the patient. P.182 infiniteperiod, alternatingoffer game. Discounting .P.186 game of duel. Lecture6 best price guarantee. Lecture6 (3) repeated games and reputation. P.210 In a repeated game, repeatedly playing a NE in every period is always a SPE; to support cooperation(that is not a NE of the stage game), there must be credible punishments and reward in the future. Prisoners’ dilemma and renegotiation. Lecture7 all religions promised afterlife: making life an infinite game. Lecture8 when the discount factor goes to one, any individual rational payoff vector can be supported in SPE in an infinitely repeated game. P.222 goodwill and trading of a reputation. P.230 4. Information (1) asymmetric information, move of nature(chance node), type. P.238 (2) Bayesian NE(BNE): two method. P.256 (3) application of BNE private value, second price auctions. Lecute9 private value, first price auctions. Lecture9 common value, first price auctions. Lecture10 common value, second price auctions, Lecture10 a principalagent game. P.249 lemon market p.262 the Cournot model with incomplete information. Lecture10 the Bertrand model with incomplete information. Lecture10 purification of mixed strategies. Lecture10 Adverse selection. Lecture10 (3) perfect Bayesian equilibrium(PBE): separating strategy and pooling strategy. P.277 (4) application of PBE jobs and school p.282 reputation and incomplete information p.285 homework5，Ex.2 5. Summary static dynamic Complete information NE SPE Incomplete information BNE PBE回应 20130420 14:22
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0 有用 [已注销] 20140130
从高中以来就最期待的一门课，大三了，终于上了。
0 有用 wzhenhua 20090712
读的是第二版，正如书封面上评论所说，对contract theoey的介绍超过了一般的入门教材，每章后面的习题不错。
0 有用 熊阿猫猫猫猫 20120922
我想要中文版....T_T....求拯救。。
0 有用 [已注销] 20170130
Joel选自己的书上课可以的www...
0 有用 西泉 20110623
博弈论的经典之作
0 有用 [已注销] 20170130
Joel选自己的书上课可以的www...
0 有用 Vanished 20150902
觉得整本书的tone有点太口语化，不过解释得还是挺详细的。
0 有用 [已注销] 20140130
从高中以来就最期待的一门课，大三了，终于上了。
0 有用 熊阿猫猫猫猫 20120922
我想要中文版....T_T....求拯救。。
0 有用 西泉 20110623
博弈论的经典之作