The Machiavellian Moment

通过弗蒂斯丘讨论一个问题：temporality如何与哲学思考的universality相结合。

The philosopher can see only the universal aspects of things; there is no method, no self-critical or self-verifying intellectual procedure, yet evolved for dealing with their particular aspects. Consequently, the goodness of a good custom can be inferred from the fact of its preservation; it can hardly be demonstrated, since demonstration consists in deduction from a universal premise, and no such premise can contain the particular character and circumstances of the people whose custom it is. We cannot give the 'reason' why a custom is good or bad; we can only say 'there is reason to believe' that it is good (because preserved) or bad (because abandoned).

换言之，在law of nature, custom, and statute之间，就前两者而言存在着悖论性的关系：理性只能从普遍原则推出普遍原则，而这些普遍原则无法坐落到某个特殊性的东西（英国法）上去；要谈论英国或任何特殊地区的法律的“合理”，只能诉诸custom，而其标准是usage或experience。因此，一个地区的custom越是古老，这个事实本身就表明它越有效、从而也越合适于当地人——也就是说，越合理。（“好的”=“古老的”）重要的是第三项，即君主颁布的statute。看第25页：

Statute was based upon experience and expected the confirmation of further experience; it was therefore a step taken at a moment when a new emergency had arisen a number of times, and experience had accumulated to the point where the process of generalizing it into custom could begin.

在此experience就有两种作用：既是保存原先的法律，也有创制新法律的功能——这也就是说，事实上起到的作用是改革。微妙的是，当紧急时刻以前所未有的面目出现时，只有君主的手腕能够应付，而又不足以制定statute，这种力量被称为

craft rather than a science, concerned with the unique rather than the recurrent, with the management of policy rather than the establishment of laws. (p29)