The Sociology-Philosophy Connection

Most social scientists and philosophers claim that sociology and philosophy are disjoint fields of inquiry. Some have wondered how to trace the precise boundary between them. Mario Bunge argues that the two fields are so entangled with one another that no demarcation is possible or, indeed, desirable. In fact, sociological research has demonstrably philosophical pre-supposition...

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Most social scientists and philosophers claim that sociology and philosophy are disjoint fields of inquiry. Some have wondered how to trace the precise boundary between them. Mario Bunge argues that the two fields are so entangled with one another that no demarcation is possible or, indeed, desirable. In fact, sociological research has demonstrably philosophical pre-suppositions. In turn, some findings of sociology are bound to correct or enrich the philosophical theories that deal with the world, our knowledge of it, or the ways of acting upon it.

While Bunge’s thesis would hardly have shocked Mill, Marx, Durkheim, or Weber, it is alien to the current sociological mainstream and dominant philosophical schools. Bunge demonstrates that philosophical problematics arise in social science research. A fertile philosophy of social science unearths critical presuppositions, analyzes key concepts, refines effective research strategies, crafts coherent and realistic syntheses, and identifies important new problems.

Bunge examines Marx’s and Durkheim’s thesis that social facts are as objective as physical facts; the so-called Thomas theorem that refutes the behaviorist thesis that social agents react to social stimuli rather than to the way we perceive them; and Merton’s thesis on the ethos of basic science which shows that science and morality are intertwined. He considers selected philosophical problems raised by contemporary social studies and argues forcefully against tolerance of shabby work in academic social science and philosophy alike.

Acknowledgements
Foreword
Preface
1. The Relevance of Philosophy to Sociology
1.1. Problems
1.2. Approaches
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Acknowledgements
Foreword
Preface
1. The Relevance of Philosophy to Sociology
1.1. Problems
1.2. Approaches
1.3. General Concepts
1.4. General Presuppositions
1.5. General Hypotheses
1.6. Theory
1.7. Theory-Data Bridges: Indicators
1.8. Inter-Theory Bridges
1.9. Values and Morals
1. 10. Conclusions
2. Mechanism
2.1. The Importance of Mechanism
2.2. Mechanisms in General
2.3. Conjecturing and Formalizing
2.4. Mechanismic Hypotheses and Theories
3. Explanation
3.1. Conditions on Mechanismic Explanation
3.2. Mechanismic Explanation Subsumes Subsumption
3.3. Biosocial Mechanism and Explanation
3.4. Social Mechanism and Sociological Explanation
3.5. Conclusions: Some Methodological Rules
4. Quality, Quantity, Pseudoquantity, and Measurement in Social Science
4.1. Quality and Quantity
4.2. A Sample of Genuine Social Quantities
4.3. Can Every Feature be Quantitated?
4.4. Pseudoquantitation in Social Science
4.5. Confusing Quantitation with Measurement
4.6. Conclusions
5. The Lure and Disappointment of Rational Choice Theory
5.1. Individualism
5.2. Subjective Probability
5.3. Subjective Utility
5.4. Empirical Support
5.5. Applicability
5.6. Conclusions
6. Popper's Social Philosophy
6.1. Rationality
6.2. Individualism
6.3. Libertarianism
6.4. Antinomianism
6.5. Negative Utilitarianism
6.6. Piecemeal Social Engineering
6.7. Social Order: The Broken Pillar
6.8. Conclusions
Coda
7. The Enlightenment and Its Enemies
7.1. Peculiarities of the Enlightenment
7.2. The First Counter-Enlightenment
7.3. The Second and Third Romantic Waves
7.4. Critical Theory and Phenomenological Sociology
7.5. Ethnomethodology and Interpretive Anthropology
7.6. Conclusions
8. Sociology of Science: From Marx to Merton and Beyond
8.1. Marxist Roots
8.2. Flowering of the Marxist Sociology of Science
8.3. Scientific Beginnings: The Merton School
8.4. The "Strong Programme"
8.5. Externalism
8.6. The Micro-Macro, or Agency-Structure Question
9. The Constructivist-Relativist Sociology of Science
9.1. Constructivism
9.2. Relativism
9.3. Cryptobehaviorism and Overt Pragmatism
9.4. Ordinarism
9.5. Ideology and Science
9.6. Nonscience
9.7. Conclusions
10. In Praise of Intolerance toward Academic Charlatanism
10.1. Academic Antiscience
10.2. Academic Pseudoscience
10.3. Two Kinds of Ignorance: Straight and Willful
10.4. Conclusions
References
Index of Names
Index of Subjects
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