How should a judge's moral convictions bear on his judgments about what the law is? Lawyers, sociologists, philosophers, politicians, and judges all have answers to that question: these range from "nothing" to "everything." In his new book Ronald Dworkin argues that the question is much more complex than it has often been taken to be and charts a variety of dimensions--seman...
How should a judge's moral convictions bear on his judgments about what the law is? Lawyers, sociologists, philosophers, politicians, and judges all have answers to that question: these range from "nothing" to "everything." In his new book Ronald Dworkin argues that the question is much more complex than it has often been taken to be and charts a variety of dimensions--semantic, jurisprudential, and doctrinal--in which law and morals are undoubtedly interwoven. He restates and summarizes his own widely discussed account of these connections, which emphasizes the sovereign importance of moral principle in legal and constitutional interpretation, and then reviews and criticizes the most influential rival theories to his own. He argues that pragmatism is empty as a theory of law, that value pluralism misunderstands the nature of moral concepts, that constitutional originalism reflects an impoverished view of the role of a constitution in a democratic society, and that contemporary legal positivism is based on a mistaken semantic theory and an erroneous account of the nature of authority. In the course of that critical study he discusses the work of many of the most influential lawyers and philosophers of the era, including Isaiah Berlin, Richard Posner, Cass Sunstein, Antonin Scalia, and Joseph Raz. Dworkin's new collection of essays and original chapters is a model of lucid, logical, and impassioned reasoning that will advance the crucially important debate about the roles of justice in law. </p>
Academic defenders of legal positivism, like Coleman and Raz, remain. But their rguments, as i have tried to show, have the artificiality and strain of theories that defenders of a sacred faith construct in the face of embarrassing evidence. What is that sacred faith? The remaining positivists are not political conservatives who hope to resist the spread of individual and minority righs by insisting on a majoritarian conception of law. On the contrary, they argue that legal positivism imposes no constraints on what judges and legal officials actually do; they have traveled far from Bentham and from Erie. They celebrate positivism as an accurate description of the very concept of law or as the most illuminating theoretical description of legal phenomena over time. Sometimes they treat these... (查看原文)
clearly, Dworkin is in a discourse w/ a bunch of hard-core legal philosophers here. he knows for sure that he can get credits and critics on this position, which is why he has fabricated a systematic ...clearly, Dworkin is in a discourse w/ a bunch of hard-core legal philosophers here. he knows for sure that he can get credits and critics on this position, which is why he has fabricated a systematic starter as an index. as for the left part, it's a suffer. (展开)
这学期有幸和陈弘儒老师、冠廷兄以及以及台湾的朋友一起细读完了这本法袍正义，前后5个月近10多次，收获颇丰亦感触良多，也算是祭奠整整十年前我在台大美好的半年时光。这本书算是法律帝国和刺猬正义之间过渡的重要著作，主要可分为三部分，一个是对Hart Raz Coleman等实证主义阵营不同版本的反驳，一个是对其关于法理学性质的论述，一个是回应一些相关的理论议题，比如多元主义、法经济学、宪法解释等。最受启...这学期有幸和陈弘儒老师、冠廷兄以及以及台湾的朋友一起细读完了这本法袍正义，前后5个月近10多次，收获颇丰亦感触良多，也算是祭奠整整十年前我在台大美好的半年时光。这本书算是法律帝国和刺猬正义之间过渡的重要著作，主要可分为三部分，一个是对Hart Raz Coleman等实证主义阵营不同版本的反驳，一个是对其关于法理学性质的论述，一个是回应一些相关的理论议题，比如多元主义、法经济学、宪法解释等。最受启发的当属前两方面，大致是intro和ch6-9这五个章节。从最开始的规则-原则，到后来的建构性诠释、理论争议以及最后的法概念类属和法理学性质的讨论，德沃金无论如何都是实证主义者不得不面对的重要论敌。此外，其语言风格，尤其是对于波斯纳的嘲讽、对于罗尔斯的敬重以及对于实证主义者的批驳和调侃也颇为精彩！(展开)
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罗纳德·德沃金 作者
AZUKI七
北京大学出版社2014版
青也
北京大学出版社2014版
afternoon
北京大学出版社2009版
5 有用 法妹儿 2017-11-05 09:38:24
导言、哈特后记、三十年来、法律概念以及罗尔斯等篇澄清了埋藏在诸多讨论中德沃金不易被把握的论点。整全性在导言中被具体化为合法性，柔性实证主义被判为背离初衷与不切题。隐约闪现既不认同形而上学又不认同怀疑论的融贯论真理观，通往刺猬正义第一部分。
2 有用 工具人 2021-06-03 18:26:02
德沃金区分判准性概念、自然性概念和解释性概念，并把法律归为解释性概念的做法是他对法律实证主义的关键性反驳，在这一点上，仅仅指出理论争议的例外性或者论证描述性法理论的可行性都未能回应德沃金的这个关键性反驳，这样的回应也是不切题的。
1 有用 綦 2010-05-06 11:36:03
clearly, Dworkin is in a discourse w/ a bunch of hard-core legal philosophers here. he knows for sure that he can get credits and critics on this position, which is why he has fabricated a systematic ... clearly, Dworkin is in a discourse w/ a bunch of hard-core legal philosophers here. he knows for sure that he can get credits and critics on this position, which is why he has fabricated a systematic starter as an index. as for the left part, it's a suffer. (展开)
2 有用 Guildurrey 2019-08-14 19:10:28
这学期有幸和陈弘儒老师、冠廷兄以及以及台湾的朋友一起细读完了这本法袍正义，前后5个月近10多次，收获颇丰亦感触良多，也算是祭奠整整十年前我在台大美好的半年时光。这本书算是法律帝国和刺猬正义之间过渡的重要著作，主要可分为三部分，一个是对Hart Raz Coleman等实证主义阵营不同版本的反驳，一个是对其关于法理学性质的论述，一个是回应一些相关的理论议题，比如多元主义、法经济学、宪法解释等。最受启... 这学期有幸和陈弘儒老师、冠廷兄以及以及台湾的朋友一起细读完了这本法袍正义，前后5个月近10多次，收获颇丰亦感触良多，也算是祭奠整整十年前我在台大美好的半年时光。这本书算是法律帝国和刺猬正义之间过渡的重要著作，主要可分为三部分，一个是对Hart Raz Coleman等实证主义阵营不同版本的反驳，一个是对其关于法理学性质的论述，一个是回应一些相关的理论议题，比如多元主义、法经济学、宪法解释等。最受启发的当属前两方面，大致是intro和ch6-9这五个章节。从最开始的规则-原则，到后来的建构性诠释、理论争议以及最后的法概念类属和法理学性质的讨论，德沃金无论如何都是实证主义者不得不面对的重要论敌。此外，其语言风格，尤其是对于波斯纳的嘲讽、对于罗尔斯的敬重以及对于实证主义者的批驳和调侃也颇为精彩！ (展开)
0 有用 Asuka 2023-05-01 19:26:42 印度
主要看了导言和后记回应，反二阶元理论