出版社: Pearson Academic
出版年: 199261
页数: 288
定价: USD 80.00
装帧: Paperback
ISBN: 9780745011592
内容简介 · · · · · ·
Game theory has revolutionized economics research and teaching during the past two decades. There are few undergraduate or graduate courses in which it does not form a core component. Game theory is the study of multidecision problems and such problems occur frequently in economics. Industrial organization provides many examples where firms must consider the reactions of other...
Game theory has revolutionized economics research and teaching during the past two decades. There are few undergraduate or graduate courses in which it does not form a core component. Game theory is the study of multidecision problems and such problems occur frequently in economics. Industrial organization provides many examples where firms must consider the reactions of others. But there are many other areas in which it is applicable  from individual workers vying for promotion to countries competing or colluding to choose trade policies. Bob Gibbons provides an introduction to the branches of game theory that have been widely applied in economics. He emphasizes the applications as much as the pure theory. This not only helps to teach the theory, but also illustrates the process of model building  the process of translating an informal description of a multiperson decision situation into a formal, game theoretic problem to be analyzed. The approach aims to serve as both an introduction to those who will go on to specialize as pure gametheorists. It also introduces game theory to those who will later construct (or at least use) gametheoretic models in applied fields of economics.
作者简介 · · · · · ·
Robert Gibbons
Sloan Distinguished Professor of Organizational Economics and Strategy
Sloan School and Department of Economics
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A Primer in Game Theory的书评 · · · · · · (全部 12 条)
最好的博弈论入门教材
great introductory text
最好的博弈论入门教材
经典的博弈论入门教材
> 更多书评12篇
读书笔记 · · · · · ·
我来写笔记
In the normalform game /公式内容已省略/, let /公式内容已省略/ and /公式内容已省略/ be feasible strategy for player /公式内容已省略/. Strategy /公式内容已省略/ is strictly dominated by strategy /公式内容已省略...
20120507 15:48
In the normalform game ($G=\{S_1,\dots,S_n;u_1,\dots,u_n\}$), let ($s_i'$) and ($s_i''$) be feasible strategy for player ($i$). Strategy ($s_i'$) is strictly dominated by strategy ($s_i''$) if for each feasible combination of other players' strategies, ($i$)'s payoff from playing ($s_i'$) is strictly less than playing ($s_i''$):\begin{equation} u_i(s_1,\dots,s_{i1},s_i',s_{i+1},\dots,s_n) < u_i(s_1,\dots,s_{i1},s_i'',s_{i+1},\dots,s_n) \end{equation}\noindent for each ($(s_1,\ldots,s_{i1},s_{i+1},\ldots,s_n)$) that can be constructed from the other players' strategy spaces ($S_1,\dots,S_{i1},S_{i+1},\ldots,S_n$).Rational players do not play strictly dominated strategy, because there is no belief that a player could hold (about other players will choose) such that it would be optimal to play such a strategy.回应 20120507 15:48 
The normalform representation of an nplayer game specifies the players' strategy spaces /公式内容已省略/ and their pay off functions /公式内容已省略/, we denote this game by /公式内容已省略/.
20120507 15:27

sevennick (读书是为了抵抗这个世界的不美好)
关于mixed strategy的一个remark：Stated more generally, the idea is to endow player j with a small amount of private information such that, depending on the realization of the private information, player j slightly prefers one of the relevant pure strategy. Since player i does not observe j's private information, howevwe, i remains uncertain about j's choice, and we represent i's uncertainty by j's...20120130 04:08
关于mixed strategy的一个remark：Stated more generally, the idea is to endow player j with a small amount of private information such that, depending on the realization of the private information, player j slightly prefers one of the relevant pure strategy. Since player i does not observe j's private information, howevwe, i remains uncertain about j's choice, and we represent i's uncertainty by j's mixed strategy.
回应 20120130 04:08 
小鸥 (小和尚)
The comparison scheme (domination criteria) used for strategies seem to bear a great similarity with the one used in hypotheses testing to judge dominance relations of hypothesis using values of the two types of errors. I am not sure if both are essentially the same with what has been preference relations, used in optimization problems, or if there are still differences. Games are decisions made ...20120110 03:29
The comparison scheme (domination criteria) used for strategies seem to bear a great similarity with the one used in hypotheses testing to judge dominance relations of hypothesis using values of the two types of errors. I am not sure if both are essentially the same with what has been preference relations, used in optimization problems, or if there are still differences.Games are decisions made without thorough communication, resulting in less than optimal outcomes for all parties who could have achieved optimal solutions if confidence is built. This should be a different kind of deficiency than the systemuser equilibrium distinction, where utilities are calculated differently.回应 20120110 03:29

The normalform representation of an nplayer game specifies the players' strategy spaces /公式内容已省略/ and their pay off functions /公式内容已省略/, we denote this game by /公式内容已省略/.
20120507 15:27

In the normalform game /公式内容已省略/, let /公式内容已省略/ and /公式内容已省略/ be feasible strategy for player /公式内容已省略/. Strategy /公式内容已省略/ is strictly dominated by strategy /公式内容已省略...
20120507 15:48
In the normalform game ($G=\{S_1,\dots,S_n;u_1,\dots,u_n\}$), let ($s_i'$) and ($s_i''$) be feasible strategy for player ($i$). Strategy ($s_i'$) is strictly dominated by strategy ($s_i''$) if for each feasible combination of other players' strategies, ($i$)'s payoff from playing ($s_i'$) is strictly less than playing ($s_i''$):\begin{equation} u_i(s_1,\dots,s_{i1},s_i',s_{i+1},\dots,s_n) < u_i(s_1,\dots,s_{i1},s_i'',s_{i+1},\dots,s_n) \end{equation}\noindent for each ($(s_1,\ldots,s_{i1},s_{i+1},\ldots,s_n)$) that can be constructed from the other players' strategy spaces ($S_1,\dots,S_{i1},S_{i+1},\ldots,S_n$).Rational players do not play strictly dominated strategy, because there is no belief that a player could hold (about other players will choose) such that it would be optimal to play such a strategy.回应 20120507 15:48 
sevennick (读书是为了抵抗这个世界的不美好)
关于mixed strategy的一个remark：Stated more generally, the idea is to endow player j with a small amount of private information such that, depending on the realization of the private information, player j slightly prefers one of the relevant pure strategy. Since player i does not observe j's private information, howevwe, i remains uncertain about j's choice, and we represent i's uncertainty by j's...20120130 04:08
关于mixed strategy的一个remark：Stated more generally, the idea is to endow player j with a small amount of private information such that, depending on the realization of the private information, player j slightly prefers one of the relevant pure strategy. Since player i does not observe j's private information, howevwe, i remains uncertain about j's choice, and we represent i's uncertainty by j's mixed strategy.
回应 20120130 04:08 
小鸥 (小和尚)
The comparison scheme (domination criteria) used for strategies seem to bear a great similarity with the one used in hypotheses testing to judge dominance relations of hypothesis using values of the two types of errors. I am not sure if both are essentially the same with what has been preference relations, used in optimization problems, or if there are still differences. Games are decisions made ...20120110 03:29
The comparison scheme (domination criteria) used for strategies seem to bear a great similarity with the one used in hypotheses testing to judge dominance relations of hypothesis using values of the two types of errors. I am not sure if both are essentially the same with what has been preference relations, used in optimization problems, or if there are still differences.Games are decisions made without thorough communication, resulting in less than optimal outcomes for all parties who could have achieved optimal solutions if confidence is built. This should be a different kind of deficiency than the systemuser equilibrium distinction, where utilities are calculated differently.回应 20120110 03:29

In the normalform game /公式内容已省略/, let /公式内容已省略/ and /公式内容已省略/ be feasible strategy for player /公式内容已省略/. Strategy /公式内容已省略/ is strictly dominated by strategy /公式内容已省略...
20120507 15:48
In the normalform game ($G=\{S_1,\dots,S_n;u_1,\dots,u_n\}$), let ($s_i'$) and ($s_i''$) be feasible strategy for player ($i$). Strategy ($s_i'$) is strictly dominated by strategy ($s_i''$) if for each feasible combination of other players' strategies, ($i$)'s payoff from playing ($s_i'$) is strictly less than playing ($s_i''$):\begin{equation} u_i(s_1,\dots,s_{i1},s_i',s_{i+1},\dots,s_n) < u_i(s_1,\dots,s_{i1},s_i'',s_{i+1},\dots,s_n) \end{equation}\noindent for each ($(s_1,\ldots,s_{i1},s_{i+1},\ldots,s_n)$) that can be constructed from the other players' strategy spaces ($S_1,\dots,S_{i1},S_{i+1},\ldots,S_n$).Rational players do not play strictly dominated strategy, because there is no belief that a player could hold (about other players will choose) such that it would be optimal to play such a strategy.回应 20120507 15:48 
The normalform representation of an nplayer game specifies the players' strategy spaces /公式内容已省略/ and their pay off functions /公式内容已省略/, we denote this game by /公式内容已省略/.
20120507 15:27

sevennick (读书是为了抵抗这个世界的不美好)
关于mixed strategy的一个remark：Stated more generally, the idea is to endow player j with a small amount of private information such that, depending on the realization of the private information, player j slightly prefers one of the relevant pure strategy. Since player i does not observe j's private information, howevwe, i remains uncertain about j's choice, and we represent i's uncertainty by j's...20120130 04:08
关于mixed strategy的一个remark：Stated more generally, the idea is to endow player j with a small amount of private information such that, depending on the realization of the private information, player j slightly prefers one of the relevant pure strategy. Since player i does not observe j's private information, howevwe, i remains uncertain about j's choice, and we represent i's uncertainty by j's mixed strategy.
回应 20120130 04:08 
小鸥 (小和尚)
The comparison scheme (domination criteria) used for strategies seem to bear a great similarity with the one used in hypotheses testing to judge dominance relations of hypothesis using values of the two types of errors. I am not sure if both are essentially the same with what has been preference relations, used in optimization problems, or if there are still differences. Games are decisions made ...20120110 03:29
The comparison scheme (domination criteria) used for strategies seem to bear a great similarity with the one used in hypotheses testing to judge dominance relations of hypothesis using values of the two types of errors. I am not sure if both are essentially the same with what has been preference relations, used in optimization problems, or if there are still differences.Games are decisions made without thorough communication, resulting in less than optimal outcomes for all parties who could have achieved optimal solutions if confidence is built. This should be a different kind of deficiency than the systemuser equilibrium distinction, where utilities are calculated differently.回应 20120110 03:29
其他版本有售 · · · · · ·
这本书的其他版本 · · · · · · ( 全部3 )
 北京中国社会科学出版社版 1999 / 573人读过 / 有售
 Princeton University Press版 1992713 / 147人读过
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订阅关于A Primer in Game Theory的评论:
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0 有用 ChineseIdiot 20120304
惊现预科tutor书评！
0 有用 Albus 20151226
值得再读
0 有用 Atsu 20140103
智力所限，老A指定的教材只能看懂这本。
0 有用 Renco 20120529
typo不少 不过是好书
0 有用 Tina_小添 20131004
advanced game theory就是有意思
0 有用 Sussex 20160322
普林斯顿的那版叫 Game Theory for Applied Economics，其实是同一本书。依次介绍四种博弈，完全信息的静态与动态博弈、不完全信息下的静态与动态博弈，以及相应博弈下的均衡形式。每种均衡都辅之以详细证明与例证，很好的入门教程
0 有用 Albus 20151226
值得再读
0 有用 1234567 20140816
框架非常好，学博弈论一定会接触到的经典
0 有用 Xueheng 20140731
An excellent introduction to game theory.
0 有用 Atsu 20140103
智力所限，老A指定的教材只能看懂这本。