Perception and Knowledge

This book offers a provocative, clear and rigorously argued account of the nature of perception and its role in the production of knowledge. Walter Hopp argues that perceptual experiences do not have conceptual content, and that what makes them play a distinctive epistemic role is not the features which they share with beliefs, but something that in fact sets them radically apa...

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This book offers a provocative, clear and rigorously argued account of the nature of perception and its role in the production of knowledge. Walter Hopp argues that perceptual experiences do not have conceptual content, and that what makes them play a distinctive epistemic role is not the features which they share with beliefs, but something that in fact sets them radically apart. He explains that the reason-giving relation between experiences and beliefs is what Edmund Husserl called 'fulfilment' – in which we find something to be as we think it to be. His book covers a wide range of central topics in contemporary philosophy of mind, epistemology and traditional phenomenology. It is essential reading for contemporary analytic philosophers of mind and phenomenologists alike.

Acknowledgmentsix
List of Husserl’s Worksx
Introduction1
1. Content7
1.1 Contemporary Uses of ‘Content’8
1.2 Two Arguments for Mental Content12
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Acknowledgmentsix
List of Husserl’s Worksx
Introduction1
1. Content7
1.1 Contemporary Uses of ‘Content’8
1.2 Two Arguments for Mental Content12
1.3 A Husserlian Account27
1.4 Conclusion36
2. Experiential Conceptualism37
2.1 Motivating Experiential Conceptualism40
2.2 The Argument from Conditions of Satisfaction43
2.3 The Argument from Perceiving-As47
2.4 The Argument from the Perception of Categorially Structured Objects60
2.5 The Argument from Perceptual Identification73
2.6 The Argument from Horizons76
2.7 Conclusion80
3. Conceptualism and Knowledge81
3.1 McDowell’s Position82
3.2 Brewer’s Account92
3.3 Conclusion101
4. Against Experiential Conceptualism103
4.1 Detachable Contents103
4.2 The Argument from Knowledge106
4.3 The Argument from Intentionality115
4.4 The Demonstrative Theory118
4.5 Some Arguments against the Demonstrative Theory119
4.6 Conclusion129
5. Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content130
5.1 Nonconceptual Content130
5.2 Conceptual Content141
5.3 The Argument from Horizons Revisited146
5.4 Conclusion148
6. The Contents of Perception149
6.1 The Relational View149
6.2 The Relational View and Hallucination152
6.3 Further Considerations against the Relational View161
6.4 A Defense of Moderate Disjunctivism172
6.5 Conclusion189
7. To the Things Themselves190
7.1 Epistemic Fulfillment191
7.2 Other Kinds of Fulfillment201
7.3 Departures from Husserl206
7.4 Epistemic Fulfillment and Knowledge210
7.5 Conclusion224
Bibliography226
Index241
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