Cinema is a sensuous object, but in our presence it becomes also a sensing, sensual, sense-making subject. Thus argues Vivian Sobchack as she challenges basic assumptions of current film theory that reduce film to an object of vision and the spectator to a victim of a deterministic cinematic apparatus. Maintaining that these premises ignore the material and cultural-historical ...
Cinema is a sensuous object, but in our presence it becomes also a sensing, sensual, sense-making subject. Thus argues Vivian Sobchack as she challenges basic assumptions of current film theory that reduce film to an object of vision and the spectator to a victim of a deterministic cinematic apparatus. Maintaining that these premises ignore the material and cultural-historical situations of both the spectator and the film, the author makes the radical proposal that the cinematic experience depends on two "viewers" viewing: the spectator and the film, each existing as both subject and object of vision. Drawing on existential and semiotic phenomenology, and particularly on the work of Merleau-Ponty, Sobchack shows how the film experience provides empirical insight into the reversible, dialectical, and signifying nature of that embodied vision we each live daily as both "mine" and "another's." In this attempt to account for cinematic intelligibility and signification, the author explores the possibility of human choice and expressive freedom within the bounds of history and culture.
原文摘录
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However, their experience is unlike our own which, when we view a film, is grounded in our knowledge of ourselves and others as both seeing subjects and visible objects, and in our knowledge of vision as the dialectical structure of being seeing and seeing being (that is, being seen). Thus, the baby is better left home when I go out to the movies, and the cat (who seems momentarily interested in some "thing" it sees on my home movie screen) cannot be expected to stay for the entire feature. (查看原文)
索布切克的电影现象学在“电影–主体”与“观者–主体”之间建立起了一种解释学式的协商关系：““目之所及”（the address of the eye）必须在他处找到好客的住处，以实现交流。“目之所及”必须被接收，否则它将像一封被退回的信或一句未被回答的话语一样，未被实现地返回它的原点。因此，在电影体验中，必须有两个“物质居所”和两个“意向居所”，电影交流才能发生，其意义才能被协商。”【事实上，“目...索布切克的电影现象学在“电影–主体”与“观者–主体”之间建立起了一种解释学式的协商关系：““目之所及”（the address of the eye）必须在他处找到好客的住处，以实现交流。“目之所及”必须被接收，否则它将像一封被退回的信或一句未被回答的话语一样，未被实现地返回它的原点。因此，在电影体验中，必须有两个“物质居所”和两个“意向居所”，电影交流才能发生，其意义才能被协商。”【事实上，“目之所及”称不上是一个令人满意的译法，因为在索布切克那里，address兼具名词含义（地址）与动词含义（向……言说）。不过，好像也很难找到更好的译法了……】(展开)
0 有用 五乔 2019-03-18 06:58:17
太难读了，想法确实很好，很超前
1 有用 sirius_flower 2017-08-20 10:44:37
https://book.douban.com/subject/4801538/
2 有用 𝑾𝒂𝒍𝒅𝒆𝒊𝒏𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒌𝒆𝒊𝒕 2023-06-11 18:25:56 江苏
索布切克的电影现象学在“电影–主体”与“观者–主体”之间建立起了一种解释学式的协商关系：““目之所及”（the address of the eye）必须在他处找到好客的住处，以实现交流。“目之所及”必须被接收，否则它将像一封被退回的信或一句未被回答的话语一样，未被实现地返回它的原点。因此，在电影体验中，必须有两个“物质居所”和两个“意向居所”，电影交流才能发生，其意义才能被协商。”【事实上，“目... 索布切克的电影现象学在“电影–主体”与“观者–主体”之间建立起了一种解释学式的协商关系：““目之所及”（the address of the eye）必须在他处找到好客的住处，以实现交流。“目之所及”必须被接收，否则它将像一封被退回的信或一句未被回答的话语一样，未被实现地返回它的原点。因此，在电影体验中，必须有两个“物质居所”和两个“意向居所”，电影交流才能发生，其意义才能被协商。”【事实上，“目之所及”称不上是一个令人满意的译法，因为在索布切克那里，address兼具名词含义（地址）与动词含义（向……言说）。不过，好像也很难找到更好的译法了……】 (展开)
1 有用 葱油饼 2011-04-20 05:42:27
Original (although application of Merleau-Ponty's theory)
1 有用 shining 2021-10-06 14:04:46
最近终于有人翻译了维维安的东西，电影艺术杂志有刊登，是carnal thoughts里的文章，从中文上也可以感觉出维维安思考量之大，不容易懂，希望有更多学者能够引进这类新的电影理论吧，不然看英文真的挺累的