The idea of civil society has long been central to the Western liberal-democratic tradition, where it has been seen as a crucial site for the development and pursuit of basic liberal values such as individual freedom, social pluralism, and democratic citizenship. This book considers how a host of other ethical traditions define civil society. Unlike most studies of the subject,...
The idea of civil society has long been central to the Western liberal-democratic tradition, where it has been seen as a crucial site for the development and pursuit of basic liberal values such as individual freedom, social pluralism, and democratic citizenship. This book considers how a host of other ethical traditions define civil society. Unlike most studies of the subject, which focus on a particular region or tradition, it considers a range of ethical traditions rarely addressed in one volume: libertarianism, critical theory, feminism, liberal egalitarianism, natural law, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, and Confucianism. It considers the extent to which these traditions agree or disagree on how to define civil society's limits and how to evaluate its benefits and harms. A variety of distinguished advocates and interpreters of these traditions present in-depth explorations of how these various traditions think of ethical pluralism within societies, asking how a society should respond to diversity among its members. Together they produce a work rich with original insights on a wide range of subjects about which little has been written to date. An excellent starting point for a comparative ethics of civil society, this book concludes that while the concept of civil society originated in the liberal tradition, it is quickly becoming an important focus for a truly cross-cultural dialogue. In addition to the editors, the contributors are Michael Banner, Hasan Hanafi, Loren E. Lomasky, Richard Madsen, Michael A. Mosher, Michael Pakaluk, Anne Philips, Adam B. Seligman, Suzanne Last Stone, and Michael Walzer.
However, issues of ethical pluralism face all societies. It is, as John Rawls has succinctly pointed out, simply a fact that people have different answers to questions like, What is the good life? What is the source of truth and meaning in the world? What are our obligations to each other? and so on. This fact of pluralism transcends self-consciously "pluralist" societies. Perhaps there is more disagreement in the heterogeneous societies that call themselves pluralist, but even the most homogeneous society will have to decide what is the right way of dealing with dissenting minorities and what are the boundaries of that homogeneity. The conscious endorsement and protection of diversity is one response to the fact of ethical pluralism. But it is not the only response. (查看原文)
The argument of this chapter is probably better described as the defense of a political position than as the exposition of a coherent or well- established tradition. But the position I mean to defend can be located within a broad current of thought that has its sources in nineteenth-century Europe. It reflects the politics of the non-Marxist secular left, whose adherents seek greater political, social, and economic equality. They differ from Marxists in believing that civil and political liberties are neither a capitalist sham nor a temporarily necessary evil, but rather are fundamental to human freedom and dignity. Unlike Christian or Utopian socialists, they do not see the achievement of equality as a salvational project or as the end of history (in either of the senses of the word end).... (查看原文)
还没人写过短评呢