Conversations with Husserl and Fink

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• I turned the conversation to Husserl's ethics, as I had in mind in a letter to McGill (who is writing on ethics). Fink thinks that Husserl's ideal of a world which one can bejahen (affirm) is not a necessary result of his phenomenological investigations, but a matter of personal feeling, an expression of a hard-won optimism. Fink is more inclined to think of the relativization of the absolute as an Ausschweifung (digression, excess) of the absolute (Hegel). As such it is gleichgültig (indifferent) yet necessary. I suggested analogies with Indian speculation. He seemed reluctant, but advanced the idea that the various phases of Buddhistic self-discipline were necessary phases of phenomenological reduction. The phenomenological reduction is not to be regarded as merely an event in the histor... (查看原文)

  豆友58906132 1 回复 1赞 2017-04-29 01:22:18

• But in the end he holds these views of his own to be, like Husserl's optimism, unjustified by phenomenological investigations. He spoke of the pathos of phenomenology as a philosophy subordinated to the ideal of cooperative labor toward a goal which must be beyond the range of every finite and any finite social continuity. Every phenomenologist must always, qua phenomenologist, be able clearly to distinguish between his "scientific" work and his personal speculations. Yet the Einzeluntersuchungen (single, detailed investigations) of philosophy have in themselves no sense, save as guided by the larger, "speculative" ideals. Philosophy is essentially a speculation inhibited by the urge to Einzeluntersuchungen. Unless we assume a speculative urge, the painful working over and over of seemingl... (查看原文)

  豆友58906132 1 回复 1赞 2017-04-29 01:22:18

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