Why Adjudicate?

The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal disp...

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The World Trade Organization (WTO) oversees the negotiation and enforcement of formal rules governing international trade. Why do countries choose to adjudicate their trade disputes in the WTO rather than settling their differences on their own? In Why Adjudicate?, Christina Davis investigates the domestic politics behind the filing of WTO complaints and reveals why formal dispute settlement creates better outcomes for governments and their citizens.

Davis demonstrates that industry lobbying, legislative demands, and international politics influence which countries and cases appear before the WTO. Democratic checks and balances bias the trade policy process toward public lawsuits and away from informal settlements. Trade officials use legal complaints to manage domestic politics and defend trade interests. WTO dispute settlement enables states and domestic groups to signal resolve more effectively, thereby enhancing the information available to policymakers and reducing the risk of a trade war. Davis establishes her argument with data on trade disputes and landmark cases, including the Boeing-Airbus controversy over aircraft subsidies, disagreement over Chinese intellectual property rights, and Japan's repeated challenges of U.S. steel industry protection. In her analysis of foreign trade barriers against U.S. exports, Davis explains why the United States gains better outcomes for cases taken to formal dispute settlement than for those negotiated. Case studies of Peru and Vietnam show that legal action can also benefit developing countries.

TABLE OF CONTENTS:
List of Figures ix
List of Tables x
Acknowledgments xi
List of Abbreviations xv
Chapter 1:.Introduction 1
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TABLE OF CONTENTS:
List of Figures ix
List of Tables x
Acknowledgments xi
List of Abbreviations xv
Chapter 1:.Introduction 1
The Enforcement of International Trade Law 6
Overview 20
Chapter 2: Domestic Constraints and Active Enforcement 26
Trade Institutions and Liberalization 29
Political Origins of Demand for Trade Enforcement 39
Hypotheses for Trade Strategies 57
Conclusion 60
Chapter 3. The Democratic Propensity for Adjudication 62
Why Are Democracies Litigious? 66
Data 72
Democratic Challengers 80
Democratic Defendants 88
Alliances and Dyadic Dispute Patterns 92
Conclusion 100
Chapter 4:The Litigious State: U.S. Trade Policy 102
U.S. Role as Enforcer of Multilateral Trade Rules 104
Legislative Constraints in U.S. Trade Policy 111
The Kodak-Fuji Film Dispute 118
Foreign Trade Barrier Dataset 123
Statistical Analysis of U.S. Forum Choice 132
Boeing-Airbus Dispute 138
The China Problem 158
Conclusion 182
Chapter 5: The Reluctant Litigant: Japanese Trade Policy 185
Defending Market Access for Japanese Exports 187
Delegation in Japanese Trade Policy 195
Statistical Analysis of Japanese Forum Choice 210
Active Adjudication Targeting U.S. Steel Protection 225
Other Solutions for China 233
Conclusion 241
Chapter 6: Conflict Management: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Adjudication 244
Solving Hard Cases 246
Analysis of Progress to Remove Barrier 248
Analysis of Trade Dispute Duration 253
Conclusion 256
Chapter 7: Level Playing Field? Adjudication by Developing Countries 258
Peru Challenges European Food Labeling 262
Vietnam and the Catfish Dispute 267
Conclusion 279
Chapter 8: Conclusion 281
The Political Role of Adjudication 281
Conflict and Cooperation 293
Toward a Broader Theory of Legalization 297
Bibliography 301
Index 319
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