Name: Being Realistic about Reasons
ISBN: 9780199678488

作者: T. M. Scanlon
出版社: Oxford University Press
出版年: 2014-3-15
页数: 144
定价: USD 29.95
装帧: Hardcover
ISBN: 9780199678488

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内容简介 · · · · · ·

T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism—the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not b...

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作者简介 · · · · · ·

T. M. Scanlon received a BA from Princeton in 1962 and a PhD from Harvard in 1968, in between studying for a year at Brasenose College, Oxford. He taught at Princeton from 1966 until 1984, and at Harvard since that time. Scanlon is the author of many articles in moral and political philosophy, and of three books: What We Owe to Each Other (Harvard University Press, 1998), The D...

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目录 · · · · · ·

Introduction Reasons Fundamentalism
1
Metaphysical Objections
16
Motivation and the Appeal of Expressivism
53
· · · · · · (更多)

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: Self-Constitution

: A Short History of German Philoso...

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Being Realistic about Reasons的书评 · · · · · · ( 全部 2 条 )

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知常 2017-12-18 06:46:33

以现实的态度对待理由

本书是基于斯坎伦2009年在牛津的洛克讲座讲稿修订而成，薄薄一本，除开首尾非正文部分，只有123页，却包含了当代伦理学的大量问题。从规范性问题、动机问题、认知主义-非认知主义，到形而上学和知识论，斯坎伦可谓信手拈来。除了他一贯简洁和清晰的行文，有时读起来感觉他已步... (展开)

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游羽 2022-05-01 05:02:03 科学出版社2021版

一种弱康德式的道德建构主义

斯坎伦给出的是一种通过某种纯粹程序就能够产生出道德理由的建构主义，但要弱于康德。之所以说是弱的康德式道德建构主义，有两方面原因：首先，在康德那里，这种纯粹程序是一种概念（或意愿）的不矛盾之检验，作为其理论的一部分，罗尔斯通过原初状态的设定将其正义原则的产生... (展开)

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读书笔记 · · · · · · (共37篇)

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第53页 Lecture 3

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The second argument, which I will consider in this lecture, is that an account that interprets judgements about reasons as beliefs is unable to explain the practical significance of such judgements, in particular their connection with action.
2018-07-25 10:52:30 1人喜欢

The second argument, which I will consider in this lecture, is that an account that interprets judgements about reasons as beliefs is unable to explain the practical significance of such judgements, in particular their connection with action.

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第115页 Lecture 5

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Moral reasons, which are often cited as examples of reasons with special strength, are best understood on this multilevel, relationship model. ...... There is then the further question of what reason one has to hold these judgements and try to live by them ......
2018-08-01 19:11:32

Moral reasons, which are often cited as examples of reasons with special strength, are best understood on this multilevel, relationship model. ...... There is then the further question of what reason one has to hold these judgements and try to live by them ......

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第111页 Lecture 5

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I conclude that there is no non-normative or normative coin, in terms of which the strengths of reasons, ...... , can be expressed. ...... The strength of reason is an essentially comparative notion, understood only in relation to other particular reasons.
2018-08-01 19:02:34

I conclude that there is no non-normative or normative coin, in terms of which the strengths of reasons, ...... , can be expressed. ...... The strength of reason is an essentially comparative notion, understood only in relation to other particular reasons.

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第1页 Lecture 1

正 (豆瓣真好用)

当代metaethics 和50年代的关注点不同。 With respect to prudence and morality, the questions are why a person has reason to do what will benefit him or her in the future, and to do what morality demands.
2018-07-21 10:12:50

当代metaethics 和50年代的关注点不同。
With respect to prudence and morality, the questions are why a person has reason to do what will benefit him or her in the future, and to do what morality demands.

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第2页 Lecture 1

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Realistic Cognitivism about reasons: a view that is cognitivist in holding that claims about reasons for action can be correct or incorrect, but realistic also in recognizing that there may be limits to the range of cases in which such claims have determinate truth values.
2018-07-21 10:25:20

Realistic Cognitivism about reasons: a view that is cognitivist in holding that claims about reasons for action can be correct or incorrect, but realistic also in recognizing that there may be limits to the range of cases in which such claims have determinate truth values.

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第2页 Lecture 1

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Reasons Fundamentalism: truths about reasons are fundamental in the sense that truths about reasons are not reducible to or identifiable with non-normative truths. (******) ...... Reasons might be fundamental in the further sense of being the only fundamental elements of the normative domain, other normative notions such as good and ought being analyzable in terms of reasons.
2018-07-21 10:28:35

Reasons Fundamentalism: truths about reasons are fundamental in the sense that truths about reasons are not reducible to or identifiable with non-normative truths. (******)
...... Reasons might be fundamental in the further sense of being the only fundamental elements of the normative domain, other normative notions such as good and ought being analyzable in terms of reasons.

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第3页 Lecture 1

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All of these questions might seem to be answered by an account of reasons that bases them on desires. ...... Finally, a desire theory might claim to explain the phenomenon of supervenience (略）.
2018-07-21 11:04:56

All of these questions might seem to be answered by an account of reasons that bases them on desires.
...... Finally, a desire theory might claim to explain the phenomenon of supervenience (略）.

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第115页 Lecture 5

正 (豆瓣真好用)

Moral reasons, which are often cited as examples of reasons with special strength, are best understood on this multilevel, relationship model. ...... There is then the further question of what reason one has to hold these judgements and try to live by them ......
2018-08-01 19:11:32

Moral reasons, which are often cited as examples of reasons with special strength, are best understood on this multilevel, relationship model. ...... There is then the further question of what reason one has to hold these judgements and try to live by them ......

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回应 2018-08-01 19:11:32
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第111页 Lecture 5

正 (豆瓣真好用)

I conclude that there is no non-normative or normative coin, in terms of which the strengths of reasons, ...... , can be expressed. ...... The strength of reason is an essentially comparative notion, understood only in relation to other particular reasons.
2018-08-01 19:02:34

I conclude that there is no non-normative or normative coin, in terms of which the strengths of reasons, ...... , can be expressed. ...... The strength of reason is an essentially comparative notion, understood only in relation to other particular reasons.

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第100104页 Lecture 4

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Local Constructivism
2018-08-01 11:10:40

Local Constructivism

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第9394页 Lecture 4

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Judgment-independence; Choice-independence; Independent of what we are like.
2018-07-29 14:50:16

Judgment-independence; Choice-independence; Independent of what we are like.

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回应 2018-07-29 14:50:16