《アメリカ外交50年》的原文摘录

  • Thus it was essential to us, as it was to Britain, that no single Continental land power should come to dominate the entire Eurasian land mass. Our interest has lain rather in the maintenance of some sort of stable balance among the powers of the interior, in order that none of them should effect the subjugation of the others, conquer the seafaring fringes of the land mass, become a great sea power as well as land power, shatter the position of England, and enter—as in these circumstances it certainly would—on an overseas expansion hostile to ourselves and supported by the immense resources of the interior of Europe and Asia. Seeing these things, we can understand that we have had a stake in the prosperity and independence of the peripheral powers of Europe and Asia: those countries whose ... (查看原文)
    目送飞鸿 1赞 2020-07-19 23:29:46
  • 如果不能说,西方民主国家从与俄国的这些会谈中获得很多好处,那么说它们放弃了很多也是不对的。苏联在东欧建立的军事力量以及苏联军队入侵满洲并不是这些会谈的结果,它们是战争结束阶段军事行动的结果。除了率先到达那里之外(在当时它们不可能这么做),西方民主国家不能做什么来阻止俄国人进入这些地区。如果罗斯福没有出席雅尔塔会议,没有与斯大林达成共识,那么苏联军队就不会进入满洲,这种暗示无疑是没有意义的。为了在战争结束的时候登场,为了从达到目的(这个目的它们追寻了近半个世纪)的机会中获利,没有什么能阻止俄国人参与到最后阶段的太平洋战争中去。 (查看原文)
    Amasia 2013-11-19 14:27:07
    —— 引自第121页
  • 将雅尔塔协定描述为对民族主义中国的可怕的背板,这同样也是错误的。这个协定是我们应当将其中某些东西推荐给中国政府的一个协定。当时,中国政府并不反对这些事情。早在雅尔塔会议之前,他们就要求我们帮助他们安排与苏联政府的事务。后来,他们表示对我们所做的非常满意。在他们独立与俄国人进行的随后谈判中(这些谈判实际上构成了对满洲未来的控制布局),在一些方面,他们在对苏联的让部方面走得比雅尔塔会议上达成的协议以及我们推荐的还要远。我们特别警告中国:这样做他们就是在按照他们自己的责任行事,而不是按照我们的建议行事。尽管存在这一事实,他们仍然这样做了 (查看原文)
    Amasia 2回复 2013-11-19 14:31:57
    —— 引自第122页
  • 转向政治层面,我们也不能期待看到一个根据美国模式出现的自由民主的俄国。这一点不应被强调过甚:这并不意味着今后的俄国政权必然是非民主的。没什么比俄国本来就有的自由主义传统能更好的发挥影响,很多俄国人和团体已深深地受到这个传统的影响,也会尽其所能使其成为俄国未来的主导因素。对这种努力,我们毫无保留地希望他们能做的很好。但如果我们急于求成,或者指望他们能创造出什么同我们相似的制度,那我们就不是在对他们施以援手。这些俄国自由主义者的路不好走。他们将会发现,他们国家的年轻一代除了知道苏联政权之外,其它一无所知。即使他们已经开始反感和憎恶这个政权,但他们已经被训练成下意识地以该政权灌输的思维方式考虑问题。只要可能成为苏联制度替代物的所有事物被摧毁,苏联制度的很多特性将会长期留存下去。有些特性值得保留,因为没有一种制度存在几十年而完全没有价值。因为已经存在苏联这段插曲,而且它留下了积极的印记,也留下了消极的痕迹,未来俄国政府的任何纲领将不得不根据现实调整自己。 (查看原文)
    Amasia 2013-11-20 14:03:05
    —— 引自第184页
  • Turning to the political side, we could not expect to see the emergence of a liberal-democratic Russia along American patterns. This cannot be too strongly emphasized. It does not mean that future Russian regimes will necessarily be unliberal. There is no liberal tradition finer than the strain which existed in the Russia of the past. Many Russian individuals and groups of this day are deeply imbued with that tradition, and will do all in their power to make it the dominant element in the Russian future. In that effort, we may wish them well without reservation. But we will be doing them no favor if we permit ourselves to expect too much to happen too fast, or look to them to produce anything resembling our own institutions. These Russian liberals will have no easy road to walk. They will ... (查看原文)
    Amasia 2013-11-20 14:03:05
    —— 引自第184页
  • In these circumstances it is clear that the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but Firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies. (查看原文)
    目送飞鸿 2020-07-20 18:27:12
  • The present generation of Russians have never known spontaneity of collective action. If, consequently, anything were ever to occur to disrupt the unity and efficacy of the Party as a political instrument, Soviet Russia might be changed overnight from one of the strongest to one of the weakest and most pitiable of national societies. (查看原文)
    目送飞鸿 2020-07-20 18:27:12
  • Balanced against this are the facts that Russia, as opposed to the Western world in general, is still by far the weaker party, that Soviet policy is highly flexible, and that Soviet society may well contain deficiencies which will eventually weaken its own total potential. This would of itself warrant the United States entering with reasonable confidence upon a policy of Firm containment, designed to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world. (查看原文)
    目送飞鸿 2020-07-20 18:27:12