Why do some autocratic leaders pursue aggressive or expansionist foreign policies, while others are much more cautious in their use of military force? The first book to focus systematically on the foreign policy of different types of authoritarian regimes, Dictators at War and Peace breaks new ground in our understanding of the international behavior of dictators.
Jessica L. P. Weeks explains why certain kinds of regimes are less likely to resort to war than others, why some are more likely to win the wars they start, and why some authoritarian leaders face domestic punishment for foreign policy failures whereas others can weather all but the most serious military defeat. Using novel cross-national data, Weeks looks at various nondemocratic regimes, including those of Saddam Hussein and Joseph Stalin; the Argentine junta at the time of the Falklands War, the military government in Japan before and during World War II, and the North Vietnamese communist regime. She finds that the differences in the conflict behavior of distinct kinds of autocracies are as great as those between democracies and dictatorships. Indeed, some types of autocracies are no more belligerent or reckless than democracies, casting doubt on the common view that democracies are more selective about war than autocracies.
Why do some autocratic leaders pursue aggressive or expansionist foreign policies, while others are much more cautious in their use of military force? The first book to focus systematically on the foreign policy of different types of authoritarian regimes, Dictators at War and Peace breaks new ground in our understanding of the international behavior of dictators. Jessica L. P. Weeks explains why certain kinds of regimes are less likely to resort to war than others, why some are more likely to win the wars they start, and why some authoritarian leaders face domestic punishment for foreign policy failures whereas others can weather all but the most serious military defeat. Using novel cross-national data, Weeks looks at various nondemocratic regimes, including those of Saddam Hussein and Joseph Stalin; the Argentine junta at the time of the Falklands War, the military government in Japan before and during World War II, and the North Vietnamese communist regime. She finds that the differences in the conflict behavior of distinct kinds of autocracies are as great as those between democracies and dictatorships. Indeed, some types of autocracies are no more belligerent or reckless than democracies, casting doubt on the common view that democracies are more selective about war than autocracies.
0 有用 lcy 2015-11-25 01:21:46
更年轻的一代没有几个喜欢Jessica Weeks的,但人人还不得不引她
0 有用 文泽尔 2021-05-01 09:05:54
缺乏洞见 花费大量篇幅来表述常识
0 有用 德意奥人 2022-08-25 22:20:02 北京
针对战争行为的差异化发问。基于观众的军/民属性与是否存在制度化精英制约,形成了非民主国家的四维类型学。本质是关注决策者-精英关系类型,介于中-微观层次之间,不能笼统地归为国内政治解释视角。与观众成本理论存在对话,但在理论中只纳入了精英阶层的、事后惩罚式的观众,算是一种选择性缝合。
0 有用 王亚军 2021-01-02 05:36:45
4星。细读了前三章。作者提出了一个很好的问题:以往的研究主要分析为什么民主国家比威权国家更不愿意打仗(民主和评论),但是很少有人关注和解释为什么民主国家内部在选择战争一事上有如此大的区别?作者提出了一套简单、但解释力很强的理论来回答这个问题。作者的理论和实证分析发现,一党专政的国家和民主国家在选择战争上非常相似——它们都比较谨慎地选择战争,也因为这种谨慎而更容易赢得战争(只打有把握之仗),在输掉之... 4星。细读了前三章。作者提出了一个很好的问题:以往的研究主要分析为什么民主国家比威权国家更不愿意打仗(民主和评论),但是很少有人关注和解释为什么民主国家内部在选择战争一事上有如此大的区别?作者提出了一套简单、但解释力很强的理论来回答这个问题。作者的理论和实证分析发现,一党专政的国家和民主国家在选择战争上非常相似——它们都比较谨慎地选择战争,也因为这种谨慎而更容易赢得战争(只打有把握之仗),在输掉之后也更有可能被惩罚。作者的贡献在于一个洞见:有不少数量的威权国家也有“观众成本”,因为领导人很少可以完全自由地制定政策。区别只是民主国家和威权国家的“观众”不同,但这不代表威权国家的“观众”不会让鲁莽的领导人负责。这种监督机制在一人独裁政权中则消失掉,进而这些国家更容易发动战争且输掉。 (展开)
0 有用 德意奥人 2022-08-25 22:20:02 北京
针对战争行为的差异化发问。基于观众的军/民属性与是否存在制度化精英制约,形成了非民主国家的四维类型学。本质是关注决策者-精英关系类型,介于中-微观层次之间,不能笼统地归为国内政治解释视角。与观众成本理论存在对话,但在理论中只纳入了精英阶层的、事后惩罚式的观众,算是一种选择性缝合。
0 有用 文泽尔 2021-05-01 09:05:54
缺乏洞见 花费大量篇幅来表述常识
0 有用 王亚军 2021-01-02 05:36:45
4星。细读了前三章。作者提出了一个很好的问题:以往的研究主要分析为什么民主国家比威权国家更不愿意打仗(民主和评论),但是很少有人关注和解释为什么民主国家内部在选择战争一事上有如此大的区别?作者提出了一套简单、但解释力很强的理论来回答这个问题。作者的理论和实证分析发现,一党专政的国家和民主国家在选择战争上非常相似——它们都比较谨慎地选择战争,也因为这种谨慎而更容易赢得战争(只打有把握之仗),在输掉之... 4星。细读了前三章。作者提出了一个很好的问题:以往的研究主要分析为什么民主国家比威权国家更不愿意打仗(民主和评论),但是很少有人关注和解释为什么民主国家内部在选择战争一事上有如此大的区别?作者提出了一套简单、但解释力很强的理论来回答这个问题。作者的理论和实证分析发现,一党专政的国家和民主国家在选择战争上非常相似——它们都比较谨慎地选择战争,也因为这种谨慎而更容易赢得战争(只打有把握之仗),在输掉之后也更有可能被惩罚。作者的贡献在于一个洞见:有不少数量的威权国家也有“观众成本”,因为领导人很少可以完全自由地制定政策。区别只是民主国家和威权国家的“观众”不同,但这不代表威权国家的“观众”不会让鲁莽的领导人负责。这种监督机制在一人独裁政权中则消失掉,进而这些国家更容易发动战争且输掉。 (展开)
0 有用 lcy 2015-11-25 01:21:46
更年轻的一代没有几个喜欢Jessica Weeks的,但人人还不得不引她