A considerable number of books and papers have analyzed normative concepts using new techniques developed by logicians; however, few have bridged the gap between the English legal culture and the Continental (i.e. European and Latin American) tradition in legal philosophy. This book addresses this issue by offering an introductory study on the many possibilities that logical an...
A considerable number of books and papers have analyzed normative concepts using new techniques developed by logicians; however, few have bridged the gap between the English legal culture and the Continental (i.e. European and Latin American) tradition in legal philosophy. This book addresses this issue by offering an introductory study on the many possibilities that logical analysis offers the study of legal systems. The volume is divided into two sections: the first covers the basic aspects of classical and deontic logic and its connections, advancing an explanation of the most important topics of the discipline by comparing different systems of deontic logic and exploring some of the most important paradoxes in its domain. The second section deals with the role of logic in the analysis of legal systems by discussing in what sense deontic logic and the logic of norm-propositions are useful tools for a proper understanding of the systematic structure of law.
作者简介
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Pablo E. Navarro, Blas Pascal University, Argentina
Pablo E. Navarro is a Professor of Philosophy of Law at the National University of the South and Blas Pascal University. He is also a researcher for the National Council for Research in Science and Technology (CONICET) in Argentina. Navarro has published several books and has written papers on legal theory and deontic logic fo...
Pablo E. Navarro, Blas Pascal University, Argentina
Pablo E. Navarro is a Professor of Philosophy of Law at the National University of the South and Blas Pascal University. He is also a researcher for the National Council for Research in Science and Technology (CONICET) in Argentina. Navarro has published several books and has written papers on legal theory and deontic logic for journals such as Law and Philosophy, Ratio Juris, Rechtstheorie, and Theoria. He was a visiting professor in many European and Latin American universities. He obtained a Guggenheim Fellowship (2001–2) and was recognized by the Konex Foundation (2006) in the discipline of legal philosophy and was awarded the Bernardo Houssay Prize (2003).
Jorge L. Rodríguez, National University of Mar del Plata, Argentina
Jorge L. Rodríguez is a Professor of Legal Theory at the National University of Mar del Plata School of Law and a visiting professor in the department of law at the University of Girona. He has published several books and articles in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Germany, Italy, Mexico, and the United Kingdom on legal theory and deontic logic. Rodríguez was awarded the Young Scholar Prize by the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (1999) and was recognized by the Konex Foundation in the discipline of the philosophy of law and legal theory (2006). He has served as a criminal judge in Mar del Plata since 2009.
目录
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Part I. Introduction to Deontic Logic:
1. The language of logic and the possibility of deontic logic
2. Paradoxes and shortcomings of deontic logic
3. Norm-propositions, conditional norms, and defeasibility
Part II. Logic and Legal Systems:
4. Legal systems and legal validity
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(更多)
Part I. Introduction to Deontic Logic:
1. The language of logic and the possibility of deontic logic
2. Paradoxes and shortcomings of deontic logic
3. Norm-propositions, conditional norms, and defeasibility
Part II. Logic and Legal Systems:
4. Legal systems and legal validity
5. Legal indeterminacy: normative gaps and conflicts of norms
6. Legal dynamics.
· · · · · · (收起)
In spite of the elegance and technical fruitfulness of possible-world semantics, it also seems to carry with it the heavy weight of strong ontological commitments: the existence of possible worlds as real as the actual world.
It seems that whoever seriously assumes the idea of possible worlds has to commit herself to the existence of a plurality of possible worlds but, on the other hand, she also has to maintain the idea that only one of those worlds is real, and the others merely possible. Nonetheless, merely possible things do not exist; therefore in contradiction to the first idea, only one possible world would exist. (查看原文)
From Quine's idea that our ontology depends on what we decide to recognize as the domain of quantification, from this point of view all possible worlds exist in the same sense in which the real world exists; only that the real world is our world. (查看原文)
Crystal clear in conceptualizing & writing; accessible summary of all aspects of deontic logic; still rigorous when needed. Inconsistency & incompleteness seem always two major concerns of a legal sys...Crystal clear in conceptualizing & writing; accessible summary of all aspects of deontic logic; still rigorous when needed. Inconsistency & incompleteness seem always two major concerns of a legal system/theory L: K213 .N38 2014(展开)
1 有用 Welfare 2016-10-06 14:52:02
Crystal clear in conceptualizing & writing; accessible summary of all aspects of deontic logic; still rigorous when needed. Inconsistency & incompleteness seem always two major concerns of a legal sys... Crystal clear in conceptualizing & writing; accessible summary of all aspects of deontic logic; still rigorous when needed. Inconsistency & incompleteness seem always two major concerns of a legal system/theory L: K213 .N38 2014 (展开)