Inequality is widely regarded as morally objectionable: T. M. Scanlon investigates why it matters to us. Demands for greater equality can seem puzzling, because it can be unclear what reason people have for objecting to the difference between what they have and what others have, as opposed simply to wanting to be better off. This book examines six such reasons. Inequality can b...
Inequality is widely regarded as morally objectionable: T. M. Scanlon investigates why it matters to us. Demands for greater equality can seem puzzling, because it can be unclear what reason people have for objecting to the difference between what they have and what others have, as opposed simply to wanting to be better off. This book examines six such reasons. Inequality can be objectionable because it arises from a failure of some agent to give equal concern to the interests of different parties to whom it is obligated to provide some good. It can be objectionable because it involves or gives rise to objectionable inequalities in status. It can be objectionable because it gives the rich unacceptable forms of control over the lives of those who have less. It can be objectionable because it interferes with the procedural fairness of economic institutions, or because it deprives some people of substantive opportunity to take part in those institutions. Inequality can be objectionable because it interferes with the fairness of political institutions. Finally, inequality in wealth and income can be objectionable because it is unfair: the institutional mechanisms that produce it cannot be justified in the relevant way. Scanlon's aims is to provide a moral anatomy of these six reasons, and the ideas of equality that they involve. He also examines objections to the pursuit of equality on the ground that it involves objectionable interference with individual liberty, and argues that ideas of desert do not provide a basis either for justifying significant economic inequality or for objecting to it.
作者简介
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T. M. Scanlon attended Princeton University (BA in Philosophy, 1962), studied at Oxford, Brasenose College, 1962-63, and then at Harvard University (PhD in Philosophy, 1968). Scanlon taught philosophy at Princeton 1966-1984, then at Harvard from 1984 until his retirement in 2016. He was one of the founding editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs and has published mainly in moral...
T. M. Scanlon attended Princeton University (BA in Philosophy, 1962), studied at Oxford, Brasenose College, 1962-63, and then at Harvard University (PhD in Philosophy, 1968). Scanlon taught philosophy at Princeton 1966-1984, then at Harvard from 1984 until his retirement in 2016. He was one of the founding editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs and has published mainly in moral and political philosophy.
Uehiro Series in Practical Ethics(共11册)，
这套丛书还有
《Why Worry About Future Generations?》《Ethics for Enemies》《Fellow Creatures》《The Robust Demands of the Good》《Killing in War》
等
。
Because treating people fairly often means treating them differently. 就这么简单，这就是“反对不平等，以及在可能的情况下支持、减少或消除不平等的道德理由”。 读本书，您很可能会被东一榔头西一棒子地绕晕，诘屈聱牙地来回咀嚼一番后，却难以良好地消化其中文字。 如...
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1 有用 Tacitus 2018-04-28 01:32:17
本书对平等议题采取的是一种工具性的论证进路，即从剧烈不平等带来的影响及后果去论证为什么不平等应被反对。不采取‘平等的内在价值’作为论证进路可以避免‘向下看齐’的反对，但斯坎伦认为工具性的进路不一定导致优先主义，因驱使我们反对不平等后果的可以是一种从平等出发的理由，包括平等关切，身份平等，程序平等，公平机会，平等的影响政治的手段。最后讨论了自由与平等之间的表面矛盾，从实践可行性上反驳了从‘应得’出发... 本书对平等议题采取的是一种工具性的论证进路，即从剧烈不平等带来的影响及后果去论证为什么不平等应被反对。不采取‘平等的内在价值’作为论证进路可以避免‘向下看齐’的反对，但斯坎伦认为工具性的进路不一定导致优先主义，因驱使我们反对不平等后果的可以是一种从平等出发的理由，包括平等关切，身份平等，程序平等，公平机会，平等的影响政治的手段。最后讨论了自由与平等之间的表面矛盾，从实践可行性上反驳了从‘应得’出发支持不平等的理由(贡献和投入)，得出一个‘弱化’的罗尔斯式的差别原则：不平等应被反对，除非该反对将侵犯个人自由 或 该不平等对于维持惠及全体的经济制度运行乃必要。工具性论证策略在结合具体社会议题时讨论更直观，但作者对‘应得’不平等的可行性反驳略粗糙，没有在规范性层面上给出‘应得’不可取的理据 (展开)
1 有用 Buffalo’66 2022-02-15 15:17:29
有点大杂烩了，但是澄清了一些对于平等的常识性的反对。ch5最后的结论很适合为高考制度辩护;ch8对于应得的讨论很接近罗尔斯的看法:独立于特定分配制度的纯粹应得概念无法为不平等开脱。
1 有用 黄克思 2021-11-10 16:08:04
因友邻说翻译好，还说是为了保留某种论证结构才导致不符合汉语惯例，特意来读英文版，发现不必要的“动词”太多，原文也不是那么写的，也没有什么彻底保留英文结构，部分用词非常非常值得商榷。
0 有用 我们梦呓者 2023-04-16 01:18:30 北京
还没看完，但是实在想吐槽：1，没有正面回应Frankfurt的质疑。2，第二章里明显能看出来他不仅没仔细读慈继伟，还把慈继伟说的status poverty和agency poverty搞混了…
0 有用 子殷 2018-03-20 12:24:36
这本书可以视为Scanlon的契约论在平等话题上的一个应用。但仅就本书而言，并不是很满意：写作上，不分小标题，很容易让人读飘；论证上，对可能的反对主张处理力度也不够。