By discussing what Lukács cannot mean by reifi cation, it is starting to become clearer how he does in fact intend this key concept to be understood. If reifi cation constitutes neither a mere epistemic category mistake nor a form of moral misconduct, the only remaining possibility is that it be conceived as a form of praxis that is structurally false. The detached, neutrally observing mode of behavior, which Lukács attempts to conceptualize as “reifi cation,” must form an ensemble of habits and attitudes that deviates from a more genuine or better form of human praxis. This way of formulating the issue makes it clear that this conception of reifi cation is in no way free of all normative implications. Although we are not dealing with a simple violation of moral principles, we are indeed c... (查看原文)
We can connect up with our guiding topic by pointing out that the abandonment of the originally given affi rmative stance must result in a stance in which the elements of our surroundings are experienced as mere objective entities, as objects that are presentat-hand. “Reifi cation” correspondingly signifi es a habit of thought, a habitually ossifi ed perspective, which, when taken up by the subject, leads not only to the loss of her capacity for empathetic engagement, but also to the world’s loss of its qualitatively disclosed character. (查看原文)
First, reification is a reflection of human consciousness (Lukács 1923). Entwined with the interdependent workings of capitalism and bureaucracy, reification serves as a ‘constitutive of capitalist society’ (Feenberg 2011, p. 176), so that consciousness is itself ‘reified’ and uncritically accepted as an accordant of commodity exchange (Lukács 1923, Milner 1995). Here, ‘Bureaucracy impli...
2018-08-24 13:411人喜欢
First, reification is a reflection of human consciousness (Lukács 1923). Entwined with the interdependent workings of capitalism and bureaucracy, reification serves as a ‘constitutive of capitalist society’ (Feenberg 2011, p. 176), so that consciousness is itself ‘reified’ and uncritically accepted as an accordant of commodity exchange (Lukács 1923, Milner 1995). Here, ‘Bureaucracy implies the adjustment of one’s way of life, mode of work and hence of consciousness, to the general socio-economic premises of the capitalist economy’ (Lukács, 1923; English translation: 1971, p. 98). This is echoed in Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1979 cited in Bewes 1997, p. 141) assertion that: ‘Everyone is worth what he [sic] earns and earns what he is worth. He learns what he is through the vicissitudes of his economic existence. He knows nothing else.’ 3 Elsewhere, the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947, Adorno 1955, 1978, Marcuse 1964) employed Lukács’s notion of reification in their analyses of consumerism, with culture itself becoming a commodity that is rationalised and homogenised through mass production. The Frankfurt School’s focus on the ‘totality’ of capitalism, and its ‘success’ in ensuring ‘a fully rationalized system of domination’ (Milner 1995, p. 64), underpinned their understanding of the ‘cultural industry’. As a result, reification was a class-obscuring term, with the concealment of class differences hidden behind the ‘pseudo-individuality’ of cultural goods.4 Second, reification refers to objectification. Feenberg (2011, pp. 176–177) elaborates: When most goods circulate as commodities the original relationships between producers and consumers are obscured and a new kind of society, a capitalist society, emerges. In that society all sorts of relational properties of objects and institutions are treated as things or as attributes of things. Prices determine production and move goods from place to place independent of their use value. Corporations assume a reality independent of the underlying laboring activity through which they exist, and technical control is extended throughout the society, even to the human beings who people it.
首先，具体化是人类意识的反映(Lukacs 1923)。缠绕着
资本主义和官僚主义相互依存，物化作为一种“本质”
《资本主义社会》(Feenberg 2011，第176页)，因此意识本身是“具体化”的
不加批判地接受为商品交换的协调者(Lukacs 1923，米尔纳)
1995)。在这里，官僚主义意味着生活方式和工作方式的调整
意识，也就是资本家的一般社会经济前提
经济”(卢卡奇,1923;英文译本:1971年，第98页)。这在阿多诺得到了回应
霍克海默(1979年，《比维斯1997》，第141页)断言:“每个人都是有价值的。
他挣的钱和他的价值。他通过考试了解了自己
他经济生活的变迁。他知道什么。”
在其他地方，法兰克福学派(霍克海默和阿多诺1947，阿多诺1955,1978，
(马尔库塞1964年)在他们的分析中使用了卢卡奇的物化概念
消费主义，文化本身成为一种商品，是理性的和
通过大规模生产单一化。法兰克福学派关注的是“整体”
资本主义及其在确保“完全合理化的统治体系”方面的“成功”
(米尔纳1995年，第64页)，巩固了他们对“文化产业”的理解。作为一个
结果，物化是一个阶级模糊的术语，掩盖了阶级差异
隐藏在文化商品的“伪个性”背后
二是物化。Feenberg(2011，第176-177页)阐述:
当大多数商品以商品的形式流通时，生产者和生产者之间的原始关系
消费者被模糊了，一种新的社会，资本主义社会出现了。在那
社会的各种关系属性的对象和机构被视为事物或
作为属性的东西。价格决定生产，货物从一个地方运到另一个地方
与它们的使用价值无关。公司假设一个独立于基础的现实
通过劳动活动，它们得以存在，技术控制也得以延伸
社会，甚至对人的人都是如此。
Reification, therefore, ‘objectifies’ reality, it subsumes human relations as ‘things’ (Feenberg
2011) and ‘is the process in which “thing-hood” becomes the standard of objective
reality; the “given world”’ (Bewes 2002, p. 4). This sense of ‘thingitude’ can be considered
in relation to the commercial value that is placed on a celebrity’s name and image.5 Here,
the ‘Celebrity persona has become a heritable, alienable “thing” from which the owner mayarbitrarily exclude others. In other words, it has become property’ (Armstrong 1991,
p. 444).
There are a number of criticisms that can be levelled at Lukács’s work, most notably,
the sense of idealism that pervades Lukács’s (1973) use of the term; indeed, a perspective
that commands the ‘de-ifying’ of proletarian ‘consciousness’ beyond its social context
(Adorno 1966). Equally, its application can provide a view of the public as both obedient
and passive, ignoring the potential to both resist and reinterpret cultural meanings. To
this extent, the Frankfurt School are complicit in pushing Lukács notion of reification
‘too far’ by directing attention to the alienating qualities of capitalism and culture
(Bewes 1997).
Despite these criticisms, there is the potential to view the concept of reification as a
constitutive feature of human relations. For example, whereas reification serves to highlight
a form of consciousness under which human relations are objectified, Feenberg
(2011, p. 185, emphases added) notes how Lukács’s ‘theory [on] human action in modern
societies, whether capitalist or socialist, continually constructs reified social objects
out of the underlying human relations on which it is based’. In such instances, reified
‘social objects’ provide a sense of ‘stability’ and orientation for individuals (Feenberg,
2011).
Here, one can consider celebrities as reified ‘social objects’, based upon media and
public (audience/fan) relations that work to objectify the celebrity with various cultural
meanings that are subsequently consumed (Lukács 1923, 1973, 1996, Armstrong 1991).
The reification of celebrity is not just dependent upon the celebrity’s talent, or, sometimes
lack of, but also, the ways in which both the media and public are incorporated
in this process by imbuing the celebrity with particular meaning, value and desire
(Dyer 2004, Van Krieken, 2012, Rojek 2015). This illustrates a circulatory in Lukács’s
(1923, 1996) work which details how processes of reification are maintained by cultural
contexts that interdependently ‘orientate’ both the celebrity and public (Feenberg 2011).
In order to elaborate upon this process, the following sections will examine how the
objectification of celebrity is related to authenticity and a desire for the ‘authentic celebrity’
First, reification is a reflection of human consciousness (Lukács 1923). Entwined with the interdependent workings of capitalism and bureaucracy, reification serves as a ‘constitutive of capitalist society’ (Feenberg 2011, p. 176), so that consciousness is itself ‘reified’ and uncritically accepted as an accordant of commodity exchange (Lukács 1923, Milner 1995). Here, ‘Bureaucracy impli...
2018-08-24 13:411人喜欢
First, reification is a reflection of human consciousness (Lukács 1923). Entwined with the interdependent workings of capitalism and bureaucracy, reification serves as a ‘constitutive of capitalist society’ (Feenberg 2011, p. 176), so that consciousness is itself ‘reified’ and uncritically accepted as an accordant of commodity exchange (Lukács 1923, Milner 1995). Here, ‘Bureaucracy implies the adjustment of one’s way of life, mode of work and hence of consciousness, to the general socio-economic premises of the capitalist economy’ (Lukács, 1923; English translation: 1971, p. 98). This is echoed in Adorno and Horkheimer’s (1979 cited in Bewes 1997, p. 141) assertion that: ‘Everyone is worth what he [sic] earns and earns what he is worth. He learns what he is through the vicissitudes of his economic existence. He knows nothing else.’ 3 Elsewhere, the Frankfurt School (Horkheimer and Adorno 1947, Adorno 1955, 1978, Marcuse 1964) employed Lukács’s notion of reification in their analyses of consumerism, with culture itself becoming a commodity that is rationalised and homogenised through mass production. The Frankfurt School’s focus on the ‘totality’ of capitalism, and its ‘success’ in ensuring ‘a fully rationalized system of domination’ (Milner 1995, p. 64), underpinned their understanding of the ‘cultural industry’. As a result, reification was a class-obscuring term, with the concealment of class differences hidden behind the ‘pseudo-individuality’ of cultural goods.4 Second, reification refers to objectification. Feenberg (2011, pp. 176–177) elaborates: When most goods circulate as commodities the original relationships between producers and consumers are obscured and a new kind of society, a capitalist society, emerges. In that society all sorts of relational properties of objects and institutions are treated as things or as attributes of things. Prices determine production and move goods from place to place independent of their use value. Corporations assume a reality independent of the underlying laboring activity through which they exist, and technical control is extended throughout the society, even to the human beings who people it.
首先，具体化是人类意识的反映(Lukacs 1923)。缠绕着
资本主义和官僚主义相互依存，物化作为一种“本质”
《资本主义社会》(Feenberg 2011，第176页)，因此意识本身是“具体化”的
不加批判地接受为商品交换的协调者(Lukacs 1923，米尔纳)
1995)。在这里，官僚主义意味着生活方式和工作方式的调整
意识，也就是资本家的一般社会经济前提
经济”(卢卡奇,1923;英文译本:1971年，第98页)。这在阿多诺得到了回应
霍克海默(1979年，《比维斯1997》，第141页)断言:“每个人都是有价值的。
他挣的钱和他的价值。他通过考试了解了自己
他经济生活的变迁。他知道什么。”
在其他地方，法兰克福学派(霍克海默和阿多诺1947，阿多诺1955,1978，
(马尔库塞1964年)在他们的分析中使用了卢卡奇的物化概念
消费主义，文化本身成为一种商品，是理性的和
通过大规模生产单一化。法兰克福学派关注的是“整体”
资本主义及其在确保“完全合理化的统治体系”方面的“成功”
(米尔纳1995年，第64页)，巩固了他们对“文化产业”的理解。作为一个
结果，物化是一个阶级模糊的术语，掩盖了阶级差异
隐藏在文化商品的“伪个性”背后
二是物化。Feenberg(2011，第176-177页)阐述:
当大多数商品以商品的形式流通时，生产者和生产者之间的原始关系
消费者被模糊了，一种新的社会，资本主义社会出现了。在那
社会的各种关系属性的对象和机构被视为事物或
作为属性的东西。价格决定生产，货物从一个地方运到另一个地方
与它们的使用价值无关。公司假设一个独立于基础的现实
通过劳动活动，它们得以存在，技术控制也得以延伸
社会，甚至对人的人都是如此。
Reification, therefore, ‘objectifies’ reality, it subsumes human relations as ‘things’ (Feenberg
2011) and ‘is the process in which “thing-hood” becomes the standard of objective
reality; the “given world”’ (Bewes 2002, p. 4). This sense of ‘thingitude’ can be considered
in relation to the commercial value that is placed on a celebrity’s name and image.5 Here,
the ‘Celebrity persona has become a heritable, alienable “thing” from which the owner mayarbitrarily exclude others. In other words, it has become property’ (Armstrong 1991,
p. 444).
There are a number of criticisms that can be levelled at Lukács’s work, most notably,
the sense of idealism that pervades Lukács’s (1973) use of the term; indeed, a perspective
that commands the ‘de-ifying’ of proletarian ‘consciousness’ beyond its social context
(Adorno 1966). Equally, its application can provide a view of the public as both obedient
and passive, ignoring the potential to both resist and reinterpret cultural meanings. To
this extent, the Frankfurt School are complicit in pushing Lukács notion of reification
‘too far’ by directing attention to the alienating qualities of capitalism and culture
(Bewes 1997).
Despite these criticisms, there is the potential to view the concept of reification as a
constitutive feature of human relations. For example, whereas reification serves to highlight
a form of consciousness under which human relations are objectified, Feenberg
(2011, p. 185, emphases added) notes how Lukács’s ‘theory [on] human action in modern
societies, whether capitalist or socialist, continually constructs reified social objects
out of the underlying human relations on which it is based’. In such instances, reified
‘social objects’ provide a sense of ‘stability’ and orientation for individuals (Feenberg,
2011).
Here, one can consider celebrities as reified ‘social objects’, based upon media and
public (audience/fan) relations that work to objectify the celebrity with various cultural
meanings that are subsequently consumed (Lukács 1923, 1973, 1996, Armstrong 1991).
The reification of celebrity is not just dependent upon the celebrity’s talent, or, sometimes
lack of, but also, the ways in which both the media and public are incorporated
in this process by imbuing the celebrity with particular meaning, value and desire
(Dyer 2004, Van Krieken, 2012, Rojek 2015). This illustrates a circulatory in Lukács’s
(1923, 1996) work which details how processes of reification are maintained by cultural
contexts that interdependently ‘orientate’ both the celebrity and public (Feenberg 2011).
In order to elaborate upon this process, the following sections will examine how the
objectification of celebrity is related to authenticity and a desire for the ‘authentic celebrity’
……然而，即便是在这些情况中，我们还是能怀着某种态度，从已经熟悉的情感视域出发，对照比较这些陌生的感受，藉此理解它们并将之表达出来。若依照此种模式来设想自我关系，就出现介于侦探主义与建构主义中间的另一可能模式，其可称之为“表达主义”（ Expressionismus）。在此，我们既不是像单纯觉察一个客体物那样觉察到自身的心灵状态，也不是借着语言陈述来建构此状态，而是根据内心已经熟知者来表达之。而当主体以此种独特的方式与自身建立关系时，他必然认为自身感受愿望有被表达的价值，所以，我们在此脉络下谈承认先在之必然性，应也是合适的。
此种形式的承认，并不是以互动者为对象。面对互动者时互动者必然因其人格性（ Personseir）先被我们所承认，我们才有可能与他或她进行任何沟通。而此处的承认指的是，主体必须先已承认了自己，才有可能以表达的方式接触到自身的内在状态。若是自身的愿望或感受自始就被视为毫无表达价值，那么主体将无法寻得通往自身内心的途径，而后者应存于自我关系中。近来，这种对自我的承认常被类比于海德格尔的“自我挂念”（ Selbst sorge），即，主体在面对自我时，首先也带着一种挂念且投入的态度，而海徳格尔认为，人同样是以此种态度对待其他的人与物事。若我们将此种“自我挂念”的相处方式理解为先前所说的：将自身愿望与感受“视为有价值的”，且不投射任何额外的伦理学之企图于其上，那么它和我想以“自我承认”指称的态度乃是相同的——任何一个主体若要能与自身处于一种表达的关系，她或他必须先能肯认自我，肯认自己的心理经历值得被主动认识及表达。此种对自我承认的定义和哈利·法兰克福（ Harry Frank furt）在近作中提出的“对己之爱（ Selbstliebe）①十分相符。我与法兰克福皆预设，人会以某种方式认同或肯认自身愿望与意图，而这会近乎强制地使我们想要发现自己根本的、真正的或说“第二序”的愿望。人在这种自我探素的过程中所持的态度，就是我称为“表达的”态度。或许与法兰克福不同的是，我相信这种对自我的承认，也就是弗洛伊德在其精神分析学说中预设的一种完全自然而然的、无可继续追问的面对自我的态度。
要从上述这个结论导回我们真正的主题，即卢卡奇对于可能的自我物化之想法，我们只需要稍微调整对前述两种自我关系模式的诠释。我在至今的论述中皆预设侦探主义和建构主义乃是两种错误的界定自我关系的方式——不论是以为心灵感受只是某种认识对象，或以为我们可以借着自我谓述建构在感受，这两种模式都无法贴切地描绘人的自我关系。但我们何不把这两种模式
当作两种可设想的错误的自我关系？倘若我们将侦探主义以及建构主义转而诠释为一种“意识形态批判”，那么它们就不是在描述那真正原初的、而是在描述两种缺误的自我关系模式。
引自 五 自我物化之概貌
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First, reification is a reflection of human consciousness (Lukács 1923). Entwined with the interdependent workings of capitalism and bureaucracy, reification serves as a ‘constitutive of capitalist society’ (Feenberg 2011, p. 176), so that consciousness is itself ‘reified’ and uncritically accepted as an accordant of commodity exchange (Lukács 1923, Milner 1995). Here, ‘Bureaucracy impli...
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本書對社会文化批判里“物化”概念以卢卡奇对魏玛德国重物质工具利用占据主体经验的时代诊断为例，即生活实践中依存有利可图的资源增值关系，马克思称为“商品拜物教”现象，在资本主义制度下，物化已成为人类的“第二自然”。 潛在地强迫主体假装表现出某些特定感受，促使主体发展自我物化，延伸至“默想”与“疏离”这两种被动而消极的中立旁观态度：只注意可被估量的实用质性，工具式的对待他者。高度分化的社会也出于对效率... 本書對社会文化批判里“物化”概念以卢卡奇对魏玛德国重物质工具利用占据主体经验的时代诊断为例，即生活实践中依存有利可图的资源增值关系，马克思称为“商品拜物教”现象，在资本主义制度下，物化已成为人类的“第二自然”。 潛在地强迫主体假装表现出某些特定感受，促使主体发展自我物化，延伸至“默想”与“疏离”这两种被动而消极的中立旁观态度：只注意可被估量的实用质性，工具式的对待他者。高度分化的社会也出于对效率之需求，让共感且参与的人际关系偏失异化。 哈贝马斯《沟通行动理论》将物化理解为策略性的旁观侵入特定社会领域，致其各种沟通条件受损。即遗忘对他者的“承认”，或海德格尔的“挂念”，仅仅视之为无感受的客体，其涉及社会互动采取的高效认知模式，是没有情感参与及先行认同的，後果则是忽视他者共有的多元存在意义。 (展开)
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霍耐特关于物化的论述是全面且深入的，以围绕卢卡奇的物化理论展开进行的批判式、非补充式论述。他这一展开确让我对于物化这一概念有了横向且纵深的认识，自此不会片面的去使用物化这一词汇去指认某一种现象.....但就这一现象的指认，我倒认为就如霍耐特在结尾句也承认的那样，我们的社会有可能朝一个方向发展，一个卢卡奇在八十年前以过少理论工具、过于概括之论述曾预见的方向那样。我更多认为卢卡奇的物化理论是对于这一未... 霍耐特关于物化的论述是全面且深入的，以围绕卢卡奇的物化理论展开进行的批判式、非补充式论述。他这一展开确让我对于物化这一概念有了横向且纵深的认识，自此不会片面的去使用物化这一词汇去指认某一种现象.....但就这一现象的指认，我倒认为就如霍耐特在结尾句也承认的那样，我们的社会有可能朝一个方向发展，一个卢卡奇在八十年前以过少理论工具、过于概括之论述曾预见的方向那样。我更多认为卢卡奇的物化理论是对于这一未来现象的警言式预判，它仅仅是《历史与阶级意识》一书里非主要论述主题而篇幅不可能多的一个章节，无法像霍耐特那样全面深入就这一个“物化”主题展开论述，阿伦特在《人的境况》里的物化章节，也是一种就社会发展及人的境况那般的预见论述，一种对于人的生产力必然，以及资本主义发展之必然的预见。 (展开)
0 有用 Daytun 2021-01-20
衔接物化逻辑的清晰之作。在各类理论工具烛照之中，霍耐特推翻和填平了一些卢卡奇时代留下的裂隙。但越是这种清晰的逻辑，越驱使着我们继续去怀疑其建基在发展心理学上的前提以及折衷的路径。但肯定瑕不掩瑜，若要物化理论在新的时代继续有解释力，霍耐特的扬弃是十分必要的。
0 有用 Saga 2021-01-14
要写一个总结。
0 有用 绵宁 2020-12-30
很好