You mentioned as a problem with credit creation/policy application that
"Japanese problem. In this case, the government failed to effectively implement the policy of window guidance in the past several years "
The Bank of Japan has not applied window guidance since 1991. Thus the post-1991 period cannot be used to judge the efficacy of window guidance/credit allocation policies.
On England: BoE introduced what they call QE one year ago. So there is a one-year track record in the UK.
Please note that what they call QE is not what I termed QE when I invented the expression in 1994/1995 (namely expand credit creation for productive use). Thus BoE have not implemented a proper QE policy and hence it is not likely to be very successful, as I said before they implemented it.
The Chinese example is a good case in point showing that window guidance is highly effective: the government ordered banks to increase credit creation. This had a visible stimulatory effect on the economy. Again, it did not do what I recommend, namley order the increase only of productive credit creation, so much money seems to have been directed into asset markets. This is not a good policy as it is unsustainable. But it does show that the credit creation framework as described by me works very well.
I do describe how to manage the credit allocation policy well, namely in the way it was organised in Japan from 1942 until 1991. This worked exceedingly well (including when the Bank of Japan wanted to create a property bubble in the 1980s, which was the objective of its policy at the time). This is described in one chapter in my 2005 book New Paradigm, but in greater detail in my 2003 book Princes of the Yen.
his explanation to my puzzles
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