Name: Fooling Some of the People All of the Time, A Long Short Story
ISBN: 9780470073940

Fooling Some of the People All of the Time, A Long Short Story

作者: David Einhorn
出版社: Wiley
出版年: 2008-5-2
页数: 380
定价: USD 29.95
装帧: Hardcover
ISBN: 9780470073940

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8.5

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内容简介 · · · · · ·

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Fooling Some of the People All of the Time is the gripping chronicle of the ongoing saga between author David Einhorn’s hedg fund, Greenlight Capital, and Allied Capital, a leader in the private finance industry. Page by page, it delves deep inside Wall Street, showing why the $6 billion hedge fund decided to short shares of Allied Capital and how Allied responded with ...

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原文摘录 · · · · · · ( 全部 )

市场保持非理性的时间可以长于你能保持偿付能力的时间。 (查看原文)

潘萄籽 2013-10-19 11:40:24

—— 引自第35页
阿兰公司是在实施欺诈，但分析师并无责任要注意到欺诈。或许他们注意到了，但认为阿兰公司因实施的严密而应得到奖赏。 (查看原文)

潘萄籽 2013-10-19 11:41:40

—— 引自第39页

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金融投资对冲基金 Einhorn finance 博弈投资与投机 business

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Fooling Some of the People All of the Time, A Long Short Story的书评 · · · · · · ( 全部 11 条 )

热门 / 最新 / 好友 /只看本版本的评论

明彻 2013-12-04 14:44:02 机械工业出版社2009版

绿光资本启示录

绿光资本成立于1996年年初，主要由大卫.艾因霍恩和他的同事创立。大卫.艾因霍恩早年在投资银行里工作了2年，随后，去了一家叫做西格尔考勒瑞的对冲基金。这家对冲基金非常关注投资标的公司向证券交易委员会提交的文件，对于他们来说，分析一家公司，有三个基本问题... (展开)

0回应

之江 2012-07-21 16:57:59 机械工业出版社2009版

不高的骗术，却长久有效

自从公司可以上市以来，公司尤其是控制者生财的方式开拓为两种：更普通公司一样买产品，服务；另外一种：就是将股市当成提款机。以前一直被人教导：外国人诚信　；　以为这是这时中国Ａ股特有的现象；实际则不不然，越来越来越多的材料说明外国公司玩这一套已经成为家常便... (展开)

0回应

漫慢MAN 2010-11-08 15:26:49 机械工业出版社2009版

你迷信华尔街吗？

如果答案是肯定的，请看看这本书。一家富可敌国的对冲基金经理，不移余力6年，仍然没能扳倒一家造假的公司。这家公司发放假贷款的低劣手法和多年以来把谎言说得比真理还响亮的做法，令人叹为观止；而众多监管部门的官僚和不作为，某种程度上远胜中国。不过，即便如此，我们的... (展开)

1回应

Robot Chicken 2012-10-29 22:59:27 机械工业出版社2009版

侦探小说

这篇书评可能有关键情节透露

可以说，这是一本不折不扣的侦探小说。作者是大名鼎鼎的绿光资本创始人David Einhorn，现代投资行业里被认为最接近沃伦巴菲特的人。我必须要说明的是他不是一本小说，但它的情节跌宕起伏让你觉得这应该是虚构的情节，你在这本书里面会看到唯利是图和颠倒黑白的媒体记者（包括我... (展开)

1 3回应

霸王硬上龙 2010-09-10 21:01:35

中文版的

http://book.douban.com/subject/3669234/ 一路骗到底最近叫板包二摸的人 (展开)

0回应

苹果里 2009-01-16 04:52:31

To be fooled all of the time. Yes, you can.

It's quite a long story for a short position, even for a long one actually. More than 6 years have passed since David Einhorn shorted Allied in 2002 where it was traded at $26. Still his call is dead right. Although the company is still in existence today ... (展开)

0回应

子曰 2009-06-15 16:08:59 机械工业出版社2009版

绩优还是绩差？

这本书其实很简单就是和联合资本斗争的书。看书时重点必须关注联合资本如何将企业的亏损隐匿的，因为这次金融危机后，中国的银行会面临巨大的坏账，银行会想方设法隐匿坏账，看了这本书后，你就会对银行股将来是绩优还是绩差有一个基本认识。我用四天时间（12个小时）在新华... (展开)

1 0回应

目送飞鸿 2017-06-20 18:59:27

做空并不容易！

这本书写的是David Einhorn做空Allied Capital的不成功经历。说不成功，是因为从2002年4月30日做空到2007年12月31日，其空头的年化回报是5.9%，落后同期中小盘股票指数2.2%，累计落后15%。当然不知道最后是什么时候平仓的，如果是08年，得益于金融危机，或许会有更好的回报。但... (展开)

0回应

Eagla-艾戈拉 2015-01-27 10:00:38 机械工业出版社2009版

前面的摘要，后面的我基本上看不懂

这篇书评可能有关键情节透露

我们制定投资计划时，采用我在西格尔考雷瑞公司学到的投资技能，也就是分析公司的经济价值和决策者与投资者之间的利益一致性。很多夹着投资者是先确定一只股票是否价格便宜，如果便宜，他们便力求确定那只股票是否便宜的理由充分。他们识别投资机会的一个典型过程是，通过计... (展开)

0回应

dhl 2014-07-24 18:24:26

做空十年 A Ten-year Feud

A Review by Squared Pages Chinese companies listed in the US may now be better prepared for short-selling reports and accusations of fraud after a spate of such “attacks”in the past five years. There is, however, still a lot to learn about the rules of t... (展开)

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读书笔记 · · · · · · (共7篇)

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最新笔记

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第243页

香葱面包 (Life is short, read more.)

The Byrne performance reminded me of something Warren Buffett once told me about the difficulty f shorting the stocks of companies run by crooks, because they'll fight dirty to save themselves. "The crook's life depends on it," Buffett said.
2014-05-08 10:38

The Byrne performance reminded me of something Warren Buffett once told me about the difficulty f shorting the stocks of companies run by crooks, because they'll fight dirty to save themselves. "The crook's life depends on it," Buffett said.
引自第243页

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回应 2014-05-08 10:38
展开收起
第64页

香葱面包 (Life is short, read more.)

It occurred to me that people who are willing to lie about small things have no problem lying about big things.
2014-04-19 10:03

It occurred to me that people who are willing to lie about small things have no problem lying about big things.

推荐

回应 2014-04-19 10:03
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第19页

Weizhi Pan™

As Joel Greenblatt pointed out in You Can Be a Stock Market Genius Even If You’re Not Too Smart: Uncover the Secret Hiding Places of Stock Market Proﬁts, holding eight stocks eliminates 81 percent of the risk in owning just one stock, and holding thirty two stocks eliminates 96 percent of the risk. Greenblatt concludes, “After purchasing six or eight stocks in different industries, the ben...
2012-01-31 11:20

As Joel Greenblatt pointed out in You Can Be a Stock Market Genius Even If You’re Not Too Smart: Uncover the Secret Hiding Places of Stock Market Proﬁts, holding eight stocks eliminates 81 percent of the risk in owning just one stock, and holding thirty two stocks eliminates 96 percent of the risk. Greenblatt concludes, “After purchasing six or eight stocks in different industries, the beneﬁt of adding even more stocks to your portfolio in an effort to decrease risk is small. ”
引自第19页

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回应 2012-01-31 11:20
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第17页

Weizhi Pan™

...we avoid “evolving hypotheses.” If our investment rationale proves false, we exit the position rather than create a new justiﬁcation to hold. We exit when our analysis is wrong or we just can ’ t stand the pain, rather than when the market simply disagrees longer than we had imagined. 简单的讲就是要正视自己的错误错不可怕可怕的是错上加错
2012-01-31 11:07

...we avoid “evolving hypotheses.” If our investment rationale proves false, we exit the position rather than create a new justiﬁcation to hold. We exit when our analysis is wrong or we just can ’ t stand the pain, rather than when the market simply disagrees longer than we had imagined.
引自第17页
简单的讲就是要正视自己的错误错不可怕可怕的是错上加错

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回应 2012-01-31 11:07

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第15页

Weizhi Pan™

It would be foolish to assume that our counterparty is uninformed or unsophisticated. In most circumstances, today’s seller has followed the situation longer and more closely than we have, has previously been a buyer, and has now changed his mind to become a seller. Even worse, the counterparty could be a company insider or an informed industry player working at a key supplier, customer or com...
2012-01-31 10:55

It would be foolish to assume that our counterparty is uninformed or unsophisticated. In most circumstances, today’s seller has followed the situation longer and more closely than we have, has previously been a buyer, and has now changed his mind to become a seller. Even worse, the counterparty could be a company insider or an informed industry player working at a key supplier, customer or competitor. Some investors believe they have an advantage trafﬁcking in stocks that have minimal Wall Street analyst coverage. We believe it doesn't matter if a stock is “underfollowed” because the person we are buying from probably has followed the stock and we need to have a better grasp on the situation than he does. Given who that may be, our burden is high.
引自第15页

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回应 2012-01-31 10:55
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第16页

Weizhi Pan™

If we are uncomfortable with the risk in a position, we simply reduce or eliminate it. By having a portfolio of worthwhile longs and worthwhile shorts, we achieve a partial market hedge without having to spend capital on negative-expected-return propositions.
2012-01-31 11:02

If we are uncomfortable with the risk in a position, we simply reduce or eliminate it. By having a portfolio of worthwhile longs and worthwhile shorts, we achieve a partial market hedge without having to spend capital on negative-expected-return propositions.
引自第16页

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回应 2012-01-31 11:02
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第17页

Weizhi Pan™

...we avoid “evolving hypotheses.” If our investment rationale proves false, we exit the position rather than create a new justiﬁcation to hold. We exit when our analysis is wrong or we just can ’ t stand the pain, rather than when the market simply disagrees longer than we had imagined. 简单的讲就是要正视自己的错误错不可怕可怕的是错上加错
2012-01-31 11:07

...we avoid “evolving hypotheses.” If our investment rationale proves false, we exit the position rather than create a new justiﬁcation to hold. We exit when our analysis is wrong or we just can ’ t stand the pain, rather than when the market simply disagrees longer than we had imagined.
引自第17页
简单的讲就是要正视自己的错误错不可怕可怕的是错上加错

推荐

回应 2012-01-31 11:07
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第19页

Weizhi Pan™

As Joel Greenblatt pointed out in You Can Be a Stock Market Genius Even If You’re Not Too Smart: Uncover the Secret Hiding Places of Stock Market Proﬁts, holding eight stocks eliminates 81 percent of the risk in owning just one stock, and holding thirty two stocks eliminates 96 percent of the risk. Greenblatt concludes, “After purchasing six or eight stocks in different industries, the ben...
2012-01-31 11:20

As Joel Greenblatt pointed out in You Can Be a Stock Market Genius Even If You’re Not Too Smart: Uncover the Secret Hiding Places of Stock Market Proﬁts, holding eight stocks eliminates 81 percent of the risk in owning just one stock, and holding thirty two stocks eliminates 96 percent of the risk. Greenblatt concludes, “After purchasing six or eight stocks in different industries, the beneﬁt of adding even more stocks to your portfolio in an effort to decrease risk is small. ”
引自第19页

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回应 2012-01-31 11:20

展开收起
第243页

香葱面包 (Life is short, read more.)

The Byrne performance reminded me of something Warren Buffett once told me about the difficulty f shorting the stocks of companies run by crooks, because they'll fight dirty to save themselves. "The crook's life depends on it," Buffett said.
2014-05-08 10:38

The Byrne performance reminded me of something Warren Buffett once told me about the difficulty f shorting the stocks of companies run by crooks, because they'll fight dirty to save themselves. "The crook's life depends on it," Buffett said.
引自第243页

推荐

回应 2014-05-08 10:38
展开收起
第64页

香葱面包 (Life is short, read more.)

It occurred to me that people who are willing to lie about small things have no problem lying about big things.
2014-04-19 10:03

It occurred to me that people who are willing to lie about small things have no problem lying about big things.

推荐

回应 2014-04-19 10:03
展开收起
第19页

Weizhi Pan™

As Joel Greenblatt pointed out in You Can Be a Stock Market Genius Even If You’re Not Too Smart: Uncover the Secret Hiding Places of Stock Market Proﬁts, holding eight stocks eliminates 81 percent of the risk in owning just one stock, and holding thirty two stocks eliminates 96 percent of the risk. Greenblatt concludes, “After purchasing six or eight stocks in different industries, the ben...
2012-01-31 11:20

As Joel Greenblatt pointed out in You Can Be a Stock Market Genius Even If You’re Not Too Smart: Uncover the Secret Hiding Places of Stock Market Proﬁts, holding eight stocks eliminates 81 percent of the risk in owning just one stock, and holding thirty two stocks eliminates 96 percent of the risk. Greenblatt concludes, “After purchasing six or eight stocks in different industries, the beneﬁt of adding even more stocks to your portfolio in an effort to decrease risk is small. ”
引自第19页

推荐

回应 2012-01-31 11:20
展开收起
第17页

Weizhi Pan™

...we avoid “evolving hypotheses.” If our investment rationale proves false, we exit the position rather than create a new justiﬁcation to hold. We exit when our analysis is wrong or we just can ’ t stand the pain, rather than when the market simply disagrees longer than we had imagined. 简单的讲就是要正视自己的错误错不可怕可怕的是错上加错
2012-01-31 11:07

...we avoid “evolving hypotheses.” If our investment rationale proves false, we exit the position rather than create a new justiﬁcation to hold. We exit when our analysis is wrong or we just can ’ t stand the pain, rather than when the market simply disagrees longer than we had imagined.
引自第17页
简单的讲就是要正视自己的错误错不可怕可怕的是错上加错

推荐

回应 2012-01-31 11:07