出版社: Oxford University Press
副标题: A Very Short Introduction
出版年: 2007112
页数: 200
定价: USD 11.95
装帧: Paperback
丛书: Very Short Introductions
ISBN: 9780199218462
内容简介 · · · · · ·
Games are everywhere: Drivers manoeuvring in heavy traffic are playing a driving game. Bargain hunters bidding on eBay are playing an auctioning game. A firm negotiating next year's wage is playing a bargaining game. The opposing candidates in an election are playing a political game. The supermarket's price for corn flakes is decided by playing an economic game. Game theory i...
Games are everywhere: Drivers manoeuvring in heavy traffic are playing a driving game. Bargain hunters bidding on eBay are playing an auctioning game. A firm negotiating next year's wage is playing a bargaining game. The opposing candidates in an election are playing a political game. The supermarket's price for corn flakes is decided by playing an economic game. Game theory is about how to play such games in a rational way. Even when the players have not thought everything out in advance, game theory often works for the same reason that mindless animals sometimes end up behaving very cleverly: evolutionary forces eliminate irrational play because it is unfit. Game theory has seen spectacular successes in evolutionary biology and economics, and is beginning to revolutionize other disciplines from psychology to political science. This Very Short Introduction introduces the fascinating world of game theory, showing how it can be understood without mathematical equations, and revealing that everything from how to play poker optimally to the sex ratio among bees can be understood by anyone willing to think seriously about the problem.
作者简介 · · · · · ·
Ken Binmore is Emeritus Professor of Economics at University College, London. He has held Chairs in Economics at LSE, the University of Michigan and UCL, and is a Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Bristol and a Fellow of the Centre for Philosophy at LSE. He began his academic career as a pure mathematician before becoming interested in game theory. Since that...
Ken Binmore is Emeritus Professor of Economics at University College, London. He has held Chairs in Economics at LSE, the University of Michigan and UCL, and is a Visiting Professor of Economics at the University of Bristol and a Fellow of the Centre for Philosophy at LSE. He began his academic career as a pure mathematician before becoming interested in game theory. Since that time, he has devoted himself to the subject, in particular designing major telecom auctions in many countries across the world. As a consequence of the L23.4 billion pounds raised by the telecom auction he organized in the UK, he was described by iNewsweek/i magazine as the "ruthless, pokerplaying economist who destroyed the telecom industry. But he nowadays devotes his time to applying game theory to the problem of the evolution of morality. The most recent of his numerous books is iPlaying for Real/i (Oxford, 2007).
http://www.amazon.com/GameTheoryShortIntroductionIntroductions/dp/0199218463/ref=pd_bbs_sr_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1204755259&sr=81
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kenneth_Binmore
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The actual probability that help is offered in equilibrium is somewhat higher, because there is some chance that you will offer to help yourself. However, the probability that any single player offers help in equilibrium has got to get smaller as the population gets larger because the probability that nobody else helps has to stay equal to 1/10. So the bigger the population, the lower the chances ...
20130326 10:57
The actual probability that help is offered in equilibrium is somewhat higher, because there is some chance that you will offer to help yourself. However, the probability that any single player offers help in equilibrium has got to get smaller as the population gets larger because the probability that nobody else helps has to stay equal to 1/10. So the bigger the population, the lower the chances that anyone will help. With only two players, each helps with probability 9/10 and the cry for help is ignored only one time in a hundred. With a million players, each helps with such a tiny probability that nobody at all answers the cry for help about one time in ten.
回应 20130326 10:57 
幼儿园园长™ (不走捷径就是捷径)
Some philosophers – notably John Rawls – insist that it is rational to be risk averse when defending whatever alternative to maximizing average utility they prefer, but such appeals miss the point that the players’ attitudes to taking risks have already been taken into account when using Von Neumann’s method to assign utilities to each outcome.20130110 21:41
Some philosophers – notably John Rawls – insist that it is rational to be risk averse when defending whatever alternative to maximizing average utility they prefer, but such appeals miss the point that the players’ attitudes to taking risks have already been taken into account when using Von Neumann’s method to assign utilities to each outcome.
回应 20130110 21:41 
幼儿园园长™ (不走捷径就是捷径)
When some people evaluate sums of money using this method, they always assign the same number of utils to each extra dollar.We call such people risk neutral. Those who assign fewer utils to each extra dollar than the one that went before are called risk averse.20130110 21:36

幼儿园园长™ (不走捷径就是捷径)
When some people evaluate sums of money using this method, they always assign the same number of utils to each extra dollar.We call such people risk neutral. Those who assign fewer utils to each extra dollar than the one that went before are called risk averse.20130110 21:36

幼儿园园长™ (不走捷径就是捷径)
Some philosophers – notably John Rawls – insist that it is rational to be risk averse when defending whatever alternative to maximizing average utility they prefer, but such appeals miss the point that the players’ attitudes to taking risks have already been taken into account when using Von Neumann’s method to assign utilities to each outcome.20130110 21:41
Some philosophers – notably John Rawls – insist that it is rational to be risk averse when defending whatever alternative to maximizing average utility they prefer, but such appeals miss the point that the players’ attitudes to taking risks have already been taken into account when using Von Neumann’s method to assign utilities to each outcome.
回应 20130110 21:41 
The actual probability that help is offered in equilibrium is somewhat higher, because there is some chance that you will offer to help yourself. However, the probability that any single player offers help in equilibrium has got to get smaller as the population gets larger because the probability that nobody else helps has to stay equal to 1/10. So the bigger the population, the lower the chances ...
20130326 10:57
The actual probability that help is offered in equilibrium is somewhat higher, because there is some chance that you will offer to help yourself. However, the probability that any single player offers help in equilibrium has got to get smaller as the population gets larger because the probability that nobody else helps has to stay equal to 1/10. So the bigger the population, the lower the chances that anyone will help. With only two players, each helps with probability 9/10 and the cry for help is ignored only one time in a hundred. With a million players, each helps with such a tiny probability that nobody at all answers the cry for help about one time in ten.
回应 20130326 10:57

The actual probability that help is offered in equilibrium is somewhat higher, because there is some chance that you will offer to help yourself. However, the probability that any single player offers help in equilibrium has got to get smaller as the population gets larger because the probability that nobody else helps has to stay equal to 1/10. So the bigger the population, the lower the chances ...
20130326 10:57
The actual probability that help is offered in equilibrium is somewhat higher, because there is some chance that you will offer to help yourself. However, the probability that any single player offers help in equilibrium has got to get smaller as the population gets larger because the probability that nobody else helps has to stay equal to 1/10. So the bigger the population, the lower the chances that anyone will help. With only two players, each helps with probability 9/10 and the cry for help is ignored only one time in a hundred. With a million players, each helps with such a tiny probability that nobody at all answers the cry for help about one time in ten.
回应 20130326 10:57 
幼儿园园长™ (不走捷径就是捷径)
Some philosophers – notably John Rawls – insist that it is rational to be risk averse when defending whatever alternative to maximizing average utility they prefer, but such appeals miss the point that the players’ attitudes to taking risks have already been taken into account when using Von Neumann’s method to assign utilities to each outcome.20130110 21:41
Some philosophers – notably John Rawls – insist that it is rational to be risk averse when defending whatever alternative to maximizing average utility they prefer, but such appeals miss the point that the players’ attitudes to taking risks have already been taken into account when using Von Neumann’s method to assign utilities to each outcome.
回应 20130110 21:41 
幼儿园园长™ (不走捷径就是捷径)
When some people evaluate sums of money using this method, they always assign the same number of utils to each extra dollar.We call such people risk neutral. Those who assign fewer utils to each extra dollar than the one that went before are called risk averse.20130110 21:36
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订阅关于Game Theory的评论:
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1 有用 Lin 20090601
Economists tend to ignore human psychology in econometrics models in the same manner that game theorists tend to assume everyone's perfectly rational in decisionmaking. Lessons from 2009: market conf... Economists tend to ignore human psychology in econometrics models in the same manner that game theorists tend to assume everyone's perfectly rational in decisionmaking. Lessons from 2009: market confidence could hardly be measured on a small time scale. (展开)
0 有用 庄常飞 20100226
还好，很多地方clarified我的misconception。但也有的地方显得过于较真和defensive（读这本书的人不会怀疑game theory的价值），或者太过晦涩，可能对beginners来说会让其敬而远之。
0 有用 笑一步是好青年 20120907
选有兴趣的部分读了。感觉，写得好乱，不系统。
0 有用 Julie 20130414
The little book touches on a comprehensive selection of topics in the field of game theory. As an introduction, it skips the math, but does a fairly good job making things interesting and describing i... The little book touches on a comprehensive selection of topics in the field of game theory. As an introduction, it skips the math, but does a fairly good job making things interesting and describing important theory results at the same time. I'd recommend it as a casual read for anyone with some experience to game theory. (展开)
0 有用 大啸 20131116
读完，只能说对核心词汇有一点儿概念吧。作者有意避免使用数学，反而有点儿让人找不到点（数学书里面用黑框框起来的结论要更醒目易读）
0 有用 丸子同学 20181126
除了第七章Auctions，其他章节写的好乱，通过作者其它作品不难看出这一章也是他的兴趣所在。
0 有用 猴哥 20170615
enjoyable. Using it to exercise my English.
0 有用 Voyager 20170511
没读完 举例不是很吸引人
0 有用 大啸 20131116
读完，只能说对核心词汇有一点儿概念吧。作者有意避免使用数学，反而有点儿让人找不到点（数学书里面用黑框框起来的结论要更醒目易读）
0 有用 Julie 20130414
The little book touches on a comprehensive selection of topics in the field of game theory. As an introduction, it skips the math, but does a fairly good job making things interesting and describing i... The little book touches on a comprehensive selection of topics in the field of game theory. As an introduction, it skips the math, but does a fairly good job making things interesting and describing important theory results at the same time. I'd recommend it as a casual read for anyone with some experience to game theory. (展开)